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Abstract 
            
	
This thesis contrasts the construction of medical knowledge that surgeons must 
acquire to practice with the kind of knowing that arises unpredictably, through actual 
events of surgical practice.  Such knowing is demonstrated through the research 
process in which surgeons discuss events of practice and their strategies for coping.  
As such, the thesis argues that this kind of knowing is central to the onto-
epistemological task of becoming a surgeon and is therefore, a crucial pedagogic 
dimension of such becoming.  
In actual situations of practice, surgeons may be forced to respond, act and think in 
ways that exceed the approved teachings of surgical knowledge and technical skills.  
This is not to diminish or disregard the structured programmes of education and 
training.  Instead, I advocate reconfiguring the dominant models of surgical teaching 
and learning to include pedagogies that are sensitive to the immanent nature of 
clinical relations and practice. Whilst established clinical knowledge may be said to be 
abstracted from actual occasions of practice, knowing that emerges through the 
contingencies of such occasions is grounded in the ‘thisness’ of practice.  In this 
practical immediacy, affective experiencing is a critical precursor to clinical strategies.   
The thesis draws upon theories of affect and becoming from Alfred North Whitehead, 
Gilles Deleuze, Brian Massumi and Gilbert Simondon.  In analysing the policy 
documentation and training materials, the thesis draws from the theories of Michel 
Foucault, Judith Butler and Pierre Bourdieu.  This investigation identified affective 
relations that form and develop within the local flows of experiencing of an event of 
practice.  These forms of ‘thinking-feeling’ contribute to the entangled subjectivities 
and heterogenous obligations that can expand surgeons’ capacities of becoming.  A 
pedagogy of the surgical event attempts to engage with a learner’s ideas and 
intensities of experience, triggered by the affective connections that arise when coping 
with the thisness of contingent events of practice.  These immanent relations express 
how an event of practice comes to matter to a surgeon, how it attains significance. 
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Chapter 1  
 
Introduction:  Autobiography and Background  
to the Research Question 
               
 
1.1  A Stolen Harvest 
We change into the scrub suits, I glance at the white, hospital clock, 10.52pm.  The 
night has yet to begin.  The operating theatre is large, cold with a faint whiff of 
detergent.  Vinny, the senior surgeon, vigorously scrubs his hands creating an 
impressive pink froth.  Masked, gloved and gowned in sky blue robes, we perch on 
stools against the theatre door.  I ask Vinny, how many retrievals have you done?  His 
eyes betray the years of sleepless nights spent harvesting.  An organ procurement or 
retrieval surgery is an operation in which a person who is dying gives prior consent to 
have their organs removed on death.  The organs are then implanted in patients on 
waiting lists with liver, kidney or heart failure.  It gives these human lives a second 
chance.  Retrieval teams can travel far and wide to harvest organs.  However, the 
destination always remains the same, a place between the portals of life and death.   
I request that as both kidneys are to be retrieved, could I watch him remove the right 
kidney and then he supervise me with taking out the left?  I reassert that he must let 
me do the procedure by myself, how else am I to learn?  The transplant coordinator 
darts her head through the theatre door and sharply orders us, “the donor is here, 
everyone be quiet!”  (the donor is the patient who has been diagnosed with brain 
death, kept alive by a heart and lung machine.)  The whir of the patient trolley wheels 
can be heard in the distance, growing nearer with each microsecond.  I can also hear 
a shuffle of feet - the donor is being brought to the theatre doors accompanied by a 
few members of the family and the nursing staff.  Outside the theatre door lie the 
remaining vestiges of a human life in all its fading colours.  Inside the theatre room 
lies the ultimate destiny of this human life - an offering of their tissues and organs.   
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Death cannot be coerced or hurried into a time of our choosing.  Neither will it politely 
oblige or fall in line with our convenience.  The living, however, are required to be 
punctual.  A retrieval team must be ready to swing into action as soon as death has 
been pronounced.  Our philosophy is, ‘always early, but never late’.  
The breathing apparatus is stopped. The sound of the donor’s family softly weeping 
and their heart wrenching sobs waft through what is supposed to be an impenetrable 
theatre door - a fierce barrier against the spread of infection and disease, but not, it 
seems, an impervious screen against the human condition.  I feel anxious and 
uneasy, agitating in my gown.  I was not prepared for this?!  All that had been 
discussed was the placement of the incision, “from suprasternal notch to pubis”, and “
clamp the aorta, move with speed, quickly dissect those tissues, there’s not much 
time to get those organs out. . .”  Instead, here I am occupying a limbo land - a place 
where life has been extinguished but death has not quite taken hold, just yet.   
The Hindus believe that after the moment of death has passed, the soul of the 
deceased floats in the atmosphere, waiting for passage into the afterlife.  It’s a bit like 
occupying a seat in a waiting room, biding one’s time.  I’ve often wondered what the 
lingering spirit of a donor patient would make of my surgical handiwork.  Would they 
peer over my shoulder and remark that my hands could be steadier, my dissection 
more precise and surely I could work with more speed?  Would they ‘tut-tut’ resignedly 
or ‘hmmmm’ in approval?  Would the surgery school report read, ‘has real potential 
but must try harder!’  
The doors swing open abruptly and the trolley is whisked in.  The team turn their faces 
away.  Too late.  I see her face.  Pale, puffy, swollen skin turgid from the weeks of 
medications and futile life-saving treatments.  Brown, disheveled hair, grey-blue eyes, 
dilated, staring into the blank air.  I am rooted to the ground, stunned.  Vinny seeing 
my distress, barks, “cover her face. . . Arundi, come over here and don’t look. . .”  He 
knows it is too late to warn me.  She will now live in a piece of my brain that frequently 
wakes me up at night with thoughts and images of things I have seen and done.  
 13 
Another person to haunt my being.  Her body is transferred and quickly prepared for 
surgery.     
There is no time to dwell on those eyes.  Brush it away.  Bury it.  But, it remains, 
simmering beneath a veneer.  Get on with the job.  You have the living to contemplate 
now.  Vinny grabs the knife from me.  I have failed at my first organ procurement.  The 
stealth with which he cuts and dissects the tissues is remarkable.  He enters the 
abdominal cavity where the stash we have come for is being held.  I watch, numb and 
paralysed.  I had wanted to do this operation so much, but right now I have neither 
thoughts nor words that can articulate just how I feel at this moment.  Later when 
we’re finished, Vinny pats me on the back saying stiffly and somewhat awkwardly, 
“uhh. . . don’t worry. . . there’ll be a next time. . .  you just need to do more, that’s all. .” 
How do I make sense of this strange harvest?  We are errant farmers, appearing in 
the night to steal and abscond with a harvest that we have neither sown nor cultivated 
to maturity.  We were not present at the time of birth to thrill at the beautifully formed 
fingers and toes, to take pride when the first few words were uttered, to nurse knees 
grazed on the school playground or to pack a car full of things to be debunked at a 
university dorm.  Instead, we are robber farmers from a limbo land.  Reaping a 
harvest which is carefully and dutifully implanted in the battered landscape of another 
human being.  This harvest, stolen in the night, can nourish a diseased body and 
provide hope where there was little to begin with.  This is the lived reality of our task.  
But today, I’m not sure that I have what it takes to be a robber farmer.  And, I’m not 
sure that I want to be a robber farmer, anymore.   
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1.2  What Is This Thesis About? 
a)  The context of the research: the ‘speechlessness of practice’ 
The above excerpt is taken from my surgical journal, one of many stories I have 
collected over a decade spent training to be a surgeon.  The narrative illustrates how I 
was deeply affected by my first organ retrieval surgery.  Prior to the clinical encounter, 
I had prepared for the experience by reading up on the operative technique, 
visualising how I would undertake the procedure and discussing the surgery with my 
mentors.  However, when confronted by the reality of the task, operating on a still 
warm corpse, knowing that the family were grieving outside, I was speechless and 
paralyzed.  The operation I was expected to do, would confer no benefit to the 
deceased donor—an operation that no-one does, normally.  All the preparation I had 
done and the prior operative experience I had acquired, appeared irrelevant, because 
when the moment came to act, I could not.   
I have described this experience as the speechlessness of practice.  It is a form of 
non-cognitive thinking and non-rational behaviour, that has often characterized my 
initial experience of clinical practice.  This has included how I have responded in other 
situations such as, performing an operation in which there has been an unanticipated 
finding or outcome, being confronted by a patient who reacts in a manner that I had 
not expected or faced with a surgical trainee who interprets my instruction or teaching 
content in alternative ways to how I had intended.  My immediate response in the 
above narrative, characterized by a muteness and physical inaction, could be 
interpreted as shock, caused by inexperience.  The reaction could also be interpreted 
as a simple failure to perform when necessary.   
But, since the organ procurement event, I have frequently reflected on it and come to 
the following conclusion.  The way I immediately responded to the acuteness of the 
experience, reflected the affective nature of the encounter for me.  That is, in the 
‘thisness'’ or the here-and-now of experience, the initial impact of a clinical encounter 
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procof practice is affective.   
b)  Affective experiencing: alternative theories of surgical learning 
The notion of affect is a delineation of the feelings and emotions, that arise out of the 
encounters and events that we experience.  These affectations, push and pull us in 
various directions, which have an impact upon our thoughts, actions and decision 
making processes.  Our affective states are involved in controlling and modulating 
how we perceive and respond to events as they unfold.   
Theories of affect are increasingly being applied to aspects of society, culture, art and 
life in general (Clough and Halley, 2007; Ahmed, 2010; Gregg and Seigworth, 2010; 
Berberich, 2015; Angerer et al, 2014).  I have adopted the notions of affect espoused 
by Alfred North Whitehead, Gilles Deleuze, Gilbert Simondon and Brian Massumi.  
These theorists have developed a variety of similar concepts that are premised on the 
notion that the initial impact of an encounter is affective prior to cognitive processes 
becoming involved.  Put another way, actions and behaviours are first informed by 
affective dispositions that are initially independent of consciousness or rational 
thought.    
c)  Research hypothesis 
Based on my earlier observations and thoughts about the affective nature of clinical 
encounters, I have formulated the following hypothesis, which I present in three parts:  
In the acuity or thisness of surgical practice, the initial impact of the clinical 
encounter is experienced as an ‘affective learning’, prior to the development of 
cognitive and rational processes.  This is how the surgeon first comes to know 
the event. 
The affective dimension of learning may emerge as ‘learner behaviours’ that are 
not always visible or tangible.  The ‘speechlessness of practice’ may constitute 
such a non-visible yet powerful affective component.   
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The affective nature of an event of surgical practice may be involved in 
mediating how this encounter comes to matter or attains significance for the 
learner. 
I will now clarify these ideas by explaining what concepts I am communicating through 
the terms, ‘knowing’ and ‘mattering’.   
d)  Ways of learning: ‘knowing’ and ‘mattering’ 
In the above surgical narrative, how I experienced the learning encounter was how I 
came to know the event.  The literature on ‘knowing’ and how one ‘comes to know’ 
something is a substantial body of work, incorporating amongst others, tacit 
knowledge (Polanyi, 1958, 2009), situated knowing (Lave and Wenger, 1991) and the 
knowing that arises through observation and experimentation.   
But, in the context of this research study, I use the terms ‘know’ and ‘knowing’ to refer 
to Alfred North Whitehead’s (1929) writings on Prehension.  Whitehead describes 
prehension as the way in which a subject accounts for something else: how a subject 
(human/nonhuman) encounters something that makes a difference for her.  The 
difference may arise through language, smell or touch.  An example is how I 
prehended the encounter of the organ procurement, through the sound of the family 
weeping, the sight of a pair of dilated blue eyes, the warmth radiating from a newly 
deceased corpse.  These elements of the clinical encounter trigger affective relations 
that form and develop in the local flows of experiencing.  Processes of affective 
experiencing become significant through the ways in which they contribute to create 
the realities of the event for me.  This is how I come to know the organ procurement 
as an encounter of practice.   
Thus, in creating the realities of the encounter, the affective nature of experiencing 
also mediates how the encounter attains significance for the subject.  In other words, 
how something comes to matter to a surgeon, emerges through the temporal realities 
of an encounter.   
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e)  Hylomorphic principles of learning and practice  
The initial construction of meaning and purpose through affective engagement is, I 
suggest, an alternative and complementary approach to the established thinking on 
the matter.  In the latter, prior categories of approved medical knowledge and formal 
clinical skills are applied to learning encounters of surgical practice.  This method of 
clinical learning is driven by hylomorphic principles; whereby established form is 
imposed on matter.  In other words, individual experiences of clinical learning, which 
can differ from encounter to encounter or from trainee to trainee, are homogenised by 
the application of common principles embedded within existing knowledge and 
practices.  This organizational approach to the chaos of experience is unavoidable.  
Namely because the structuring of experience in this way is to ensure that medical 
practitioners acquire the necessary knowledge and skills to practice effectively.  
However, it becomes problematical if it begins to totalize medical practice.  This is 
best illustrated through the organ procurement example.   
An observation of my visible actions using one of the many assessment formats may 
conclude the following.  My performance at a training opportunity was inadequate.  I 
had not displayed the relevant skills, neither had I acquired any new practical skills.  
Through this lack of performance, I had demonstrated a poor understanding of organ 
procurement surgery (even though I was fully versed on the technique).  This 
summary of my learning experience, derived from established methods of assessment 
based on curricular and learning objectives in surgery, raises a few points.   
f)  Challenges to the hylomorphic model of learning and assessment 
The trainee 
A narrow emphasis on acquisition of technical skills and clinical expertise at the 
expense of other skills, risks obscuring the wider pedagogic implications of learning ‘in 
the field’.  Clinical encounters have the potential to generate alternative forms of 
knowing, beyond the knowledge created by privileging technical experience.  These 
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other forms of knowing may express how the clinical experience really matters to the 
surgeon.  However, they become invisible in a system that focuses on technical 
schemas.  
This is not to diminish or minimize the critical importance of learning practical skills in 
a craft specialty.  Instead, I argue for an approach that acknowledges the supportive 
value of affective learning while recognizing its potential to extend existing pedagogic 
strategies.  How would affective learning achieve this?  First, by enhancing 
assimilation of established skills and knowledge.  Second, by triggering novel ways of 
thinking, doing and being which can be complementary and additive to standard 
clinical practice.   
A personal example of the contribution of affective learning is how I developed my 
future role as a surgical trainer.  I had good insights into the educational difficulties 
facing trainees: predominantly, attempting to learn in contingent clinical environments.  
I designed inductions and simple simulations to progressively immerse trainees in 
surgical practice.  I initiated new surgical trainees to operative culture by taking them 
to empty operating theatres, after hours when there were no other staff present.  This 
way they could familiarize themselves with the environment, equipment, orient 
themselves with scrubbing technique, practice transferring on and off operating tables 
and so on.   
The absence of other staff encouraged the trainees to explore and ask questions 
without feeling foolish or judged. These initial forays into surgical culture proved 
successful in building confidence.  It also diminished the anxiety that can debilitate or 
interrupt the learning of important foundation skills such as tissue handling or suturing 
technique.        
The patient 
It is also important to build an awareness of how the patient experience of clinical 
practice can be impacted by hylomorphic structures.  The latter may obscure factors 
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that emerge from the patient-surgeon relations and which really matter to the patient.  
An example is how a physician may organize a particular test for a patient, in 
accordance with the principles of good medical practice.  But he may still miss 
recognising the patient’s beliefs and anxieties which cause the patient to refuse the 
test (see Chapter 5).  However, the patient’s refusal may be attributed to poor 
communication or a lack of empathy on the part of the doctor.  Good Medical Practice 
(2013) which advises doctors on all aspects of their professional duties, presents a 
didactic format for how communications should be conducted.  But, to focus solely on 
the communication skills of a doctor is to neglect to understand the wider complexities 
involved in everyday examples of routine care, of which the doctor-patient relation is 
one, (see Chapter 5).   
These are some of the key challenges associated with applying formal knowledge and 
practices (hylomorphic frameworks) to experiences of clinical practice and learning.   
g)  The immanence of form 
In the above, I discussed the dominant way of viewing clinical learning and practice 
namely through hylomorphic principles.  However, as already mentioned, learning 
encounters are fluid and dynamic, by virtue of the fact that it is impossible to fully 
anticipate how a clinical encounter will unravel, and how a learner may respond to its 
unpredictable nature.    
In situations similar to the procurement of organs, it is not uncommon to dwell on 
moments of uncertainty, which relate to the intensities of affect: ‘what do I do here? 
how must I think/act? how do I carry on?’  On occasion, as in the retrieval narrative, 
the states of affect can overwhelm us.  However, performance in contingent 
environments, where events cannot always be adequately prepared for, is a key 
feature of a surgeon’s practice.  Focusing on the practical aspects of a task, such as 
performing a clinical procedure, can provide a way to navigate the turbulence of the 
unanticipated affective state, and for the physician avoid being incapacitated.  This 
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approach may work because it functions to bring structure or form, to the chaos of 
unanticipated practice and its associated affective components.   
But, these established categories of knowledge and skill tend to exist in idealized 
forms.  As such, they are removed from actual practices of surgery.  They are 
designed to be relevant and applicable to actual encounters of practice.  But their 
ability to anticipate the affective nature of contingent surgical practice is limited.  This 
is because it is impossible to know in advance how exactly a clinical encounter may 
unravel. In addition, real encounters of surgery tend to exceed what is contained in 
official practices of knowledge.    
 Gilbert Simondon’s (1964, 1989, 1992, 2005a, 2005b) writings on individuation 
(processes of becoming) and form bring to light the notion that form and matter cannot 
be separated.  They are indissoluble from each other.  Instead, form emerges through 
individuation.  He gives the example of clay used to make a brick.  A brick may be 
considered a ‘proper’ structure unlike the amorphous clay which requires a mould and 
a brick oven to convert it into a perceptible form.  However, such an approach, 
neglects to recognise the form that is inherent to the substance of clay.  Clay is 
created from marshy soil that is dried, ground and kneaded (Chabot, 2003: 76).  
Therefore, form is already intrinsic to these processes of individuation, prior to the clay 
being moulded into the conventional form of a brick.  So, one can suggest, that in the 
moulding of the brick, the relations composing the clay and the relations between 
mould and clay, are constantly individuating.  There is no priority of the mould over the 
clay. 
Thus, the immanence of form is a notion that can be used to conceive how trainees 
cope and make meaning out of the ‘matter’ that constitutes unpredictable clinical 
encounters.  At present, established practices are applied to learning encounters.  
This rightly helps to ensure that trainees are equipped with the necessary skills and 
knowledge to practice.  However, if we accept that encounters of clinical practice have 
an inherent form embedded in the substance and relations of the encounter, then 
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learning is reconfigured as an attempt to grasp the forms that are immanent to an 
event of practice.  Through this ‘grasping’ of the event, a learner may begin to 
construct meaning and understanding out of the chaos of contingent clinical practice.  
This form of learning, exceeds prior categories of assimilation and understanding.  It 
may contribute to the existing bodies of medical knowledge by deepening the 
understanding of practice as it becomes more relevant to the individual.       
1.3  The Contingency Of Practice 
How do surgeons come to terms with the affective realm of practice?  And why is it 
important in clinical practice?  One could argue that my narrative above, is an 
example of an extraordinary clinical circumstance and therefore, an exceptional 
learning encounter.  As a result, it is not unreasonable to expect that a novice surgeon 
would be so profoundly affected by a powerful clinical experience.   
However, while the organ procurement is a special learning event, I would contend 
that all encounters of clinical practice have the potential to surprise, shock and 
transform physicians as both practitioners and human beings.  Even engaging in 
clinical tasks that are routine or repetitive such as changing a dressing on a wound, 
performing a common hernia operation, or discussing therapeutic options with a 
patient have the potential to disclose new ways of thinking and doing which can 
transform practice.   
a)  What is already known? 
Workplace based learning theories 
These notions of learning and teaching have already been researched and 
investigated from different perspectives.  First, there is a category of workplace-based 
learning theories. Prominent among these are theories of situated learning and of 
communities of practice (Vygotsky, 1978; Lave and Wenger, 1991).  These assert that 
learning is intimately connected to its context and the social relations and practices 
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that form.  Learners are active participants, learning from and with the members of the 
working community (Billett, 2001, 2004).  These activities transform the identity of the 
learner.   
Michael Eraut (2000, 2007), described the informal learning that occurs through 
experience and interaction with colleagues at work.  He identified the tacit learning, 
which develops as a function of processes of socialisation, observation and 
participation, and knowledge that develops in the absence of explicit teaching.  These 
theories conceive knowledge as contextually situated.  Knowledge arises through the 
activities and social processes embedded in the workplace.  But, these theories stop 
short of critically examining the nature of the experiencing itself in clinical environs.  
They do not comment on the processes that constitute how something is experienced 
by a learner.  In other words, the workplace learning theories do not adequately 
resolve how an encounter attains significance for the learner through the actual 
experiencing of it.  
Experiential and reflective learning 
A second category of theories focuses on experiential learning (Kolb, 1984; Boud and 
Walker, 1998) and reflective practice (Schon, 1983; Moon, 1999).  These applications 
of learning have been strongly embraced by medical education (Mann et al, 2009; 
Wald et al, 2009; Wear et al, 2012; Ng et al, 2015), forming the foundations of the 
surgical curriculum (ISC, 2016), systems of assessment (ISC, 2016), as well as 
processes of professional licensing and regulation (appraisal and revalidation) (GMC, 
2013).   
The objective of reflective learning is to critically examine experience in an effort to 
understand why certain forms of thought and behaviour occur.  How can this 
knowledge then be used to create improved practice through enhanced self-
awareness and self-monitoring?  Trainees and surgeons are required to record on 
online portfolios their thoughts and views on events in practice.  This is a challenging 
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activity to accomplish, given the other competing interests on a physician’s time 
(Grant et al, 2006; Mann et al, 2009).  In addition, enforcing the exercise can lead to a 
superficial engagement with the activity to meet the requirements of professional 
regulation (Murdoch-Eaton and Sandars, 2014).   
More recently, reflective exercises mandated by medical curriculae have become 
controversial.  This follows a case, in which a trainee’s written reflections on their 
training development were used in legal proceedings against the doctor (Matthews-
King, 2016).  I mention this incident to illustrate the wider complexities surrounding the 
activity of reflective practice in our present litigious medical climate.  However, while 
there are a number of concerns regarding how reflective practice is applied and 
assimilated in learning environments (see chapter 6 for a detailed discussion), I am 
concerned with its limitations to capture the affective dimension of experiencing.   
Reflective practice, as applied in postgraduate medical education, requires surgeons 
to engage in rational processes of critical analysis.  Learners are ‘forced’ to 
interrogate examples of their daily practice from a perspective of reasoning and logic.  
‘Why did I act this way?  What can I learn from my actions?  How can I improve my 
awareness and practice for the future?’  However, this approach risks totalising 
clinical experience as a function of cognitive processes.  It may also redefine the 
purpose of reflection as an exercise to identify rationale for thinking and doing in 
practice.   
b)  Summary 
Both these categories of learning theory are useful in organising the chaos of 
experience into meaningful structures that can be reviewed and critiqued.  But, they 
risk suppressing affective elements of the experience.  This I suggest, constitutes how 
the learner comes to know the event, how they ‘prehend’ (Whitehead, 1929) the 
learning encounter, and how the learning event comes to matter to the learner 
(Atkinson, 2016).   
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These assertions have led me to think critically about how surgeon education 
considers and attends to the importance of affect within daily encounters of clinical 
practice.     
1.4  What Is Missing From The Research Literature?  
At present, research paradigms in postgraduate surgical training, examine learning 
experiences from a variety of perspectives.  These include:   
• curriculum design 
• assessment strategies to evaluate assimilation of knowledge and 
development of skill 
• how to improve or advance skills acquisition (operative/clinical/behavioural)  
• development of professional attitudes and behaviours 
• improving selection into surgery or higher surgical specialties  
• simulation training to advance the above skills 
• the impact of national policies (e.g. European Working Time Directive) and 
educational reform (e.g. competency based medical education).  
These approaches are concerned with the technical and mechanistic aspects of 
learning experiences.  They are premised on the assumption that there are fixed 
forms of knowing and knowledge to be acquired.   
a)  Research into skills acquisition 
An example is the research that investigates how novice surgeons develop 
laparoscopic surgery skills (Hance et al, 2005; Larsen et al, 2009; Mansour, 2012).  
These studies identify the necessary skills: spatial awareness, ergonomic instrument 
handling, ability to perform sharp and blunt dissection, port site closure.  The research 
analyses how novice surgeons acquire these pre-defined and established techniques 
in learning encounters.  It constructs a methodology that identifies observable 
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behaviours associated with the acquisition of a skill.  The study design then 
incorporates ways of measuring and quantifying the attainment of that particular skill.   
b)  Dominant methodologies of research studies 
The principles that inform this research method into learning experiences are based 
on two ideologies.  The first is the scientific method and quantitative analysis of data, 
the standard practice in science and medical research, in general.  The second is 
competency based medical education which requires demonstrating the attainment of 
learning outcomes.  The latter identifies specific competencies that must be obtained 
in accordance with good medical practice, such as ‘communication skills’ or ‘technical 
proficiency’.  Successful acquisition of competencies is checked via a system of 
routine assessments, which measure and quantify performance against pre-defined 
norms.   
These systems are in part a response of the ‘post-Francis’ age_ (see Chapter 2), 
which demands accountability of physicians, personnel and organizations employed in 
the daily work of providing healthcare.   
The objective of the scientific method and competency based approach to examining 
learning experiences, is to assess how well the intended content of a learning 
exercise has been assimilated and understood.  It provides a means of evaluating 
whether surgeons in training are developing into skilled and safe practitioners.  This is 
a necessary and critical aspect of professional medical training.   
But, the difficulty arises when research studies into postgraduate training are 
compelled by an emphasis on outcomes.  This channels research studies into aspects 
of surgical practice that are visible and therefore measurable and quantifiable.  The 
consequences are twofold.  First, it favours research that can firmly establish concrete 
links between observable learning outcomes and evidence of good practice.  Second, 
the narrowing of the research approach, limits the areas of surgical practice 
scrutinised through a critical lens.  I would argue that within research into 
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postgraduate surgical training, the affective dimension of practice, is a neglected field 
of inquiry.   
I hypothesise that in the haecceties of practice, a clinical encounter comes to matter 
to a learner through the affective relationalities that form and develop within the local 
flows of experiencing.  These ideas are not developed to oppose or reduce the 
importance of formal bodies of surgical knowledge and practice—biomedical models 
of knowledge remain a very important part of the training.  However, I am suggesting 
that to enhance the uptake and assimilation of foundational knowledges and 
practices, it may be necessary to acknowledge and understand the role of the 
affective dimension in learning.   
1.5  The Theoretical Struggle Of This Research Study 
How can the affective nature of clinical practice be investigated?  How can its 
implications for learning and teaching be understood?  I propose that it is mainly 
through exploring the dynamic and complex nature of experiencing.  As mentioned 
earlier, present approaches to learning and practice in Medicine tend towards 
hylomorphic principles.  The reasons for this have already been discussed.  
Therefore, what I attempted to identify, was a methodological approach that would 
accommodate the richness of the available information contained in narrative 
accounts of experiencing.   Such an approach would recognise the multiple realities 
embedded in encounters of clinical practice.  This in turn would foster a range of 
interpretations to emerge from the data analysis, which may better elucidate the 
complexities of thinking and doing in contingent clinical practice.  This contrasts with 
the prevailing hylomorphic framework in which the data on experiencing is forced into 
set categories, a procrustean approach.   
a)  Developing a conceptual framework for data analysis 
I developed a theoretical framework by drawing on the writings of a number of 
philosophers, including, Alain Badiou, Alfred North Whitehead, Gilles Deleuze, Gilbert 
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Simondon, Brian Massumi, Michel Foucault, Judith Butler and Pierre Bourdieu.   
Deleuze proposes that at a given moment in time, what an individual decides to do or 
how she decides to act in the thisness of an encounter, is a consequence of 
actualizing the virtual potential.  This is the notion that the intensities of affect 
produced within the experiencing, spark a virtual dimension of ways of thinking, acting 
and being.  It is virtual because in actualizing a potential, an individual’s mode of 
being is brought into existence, though previously it had neither existed nor been 
conceived of.  It is possible that at the organ procurement, the way I initially 
responded, was an actualization of the virtual dimension.  It represented a mode of 
being and a mode of thinking, that I had previously not envisaged.  This was probably 
because I attended the organ procurement with a definite plan of action, and had not 
anticipated how I would actually react.    
Massumi builds on the notions of virtualities.  He states that while affects can be 
perceptible (feeling a ‘rush’ of anger or excitement) they can also be imperceptible.  In 
the latter, the affect is ‘felt’ through the ways in which our bodies are capacitated or 
diminished in their abilities to respond to an encounter (Massumi, 2002).  In other 
words, our responses are determined by the affective state we inhabit, allowing us to 
react in ways that expand or reduce our capabilities.  He describes this quality as a ‘
thinking-feeling’ that emerges within experiencing an encounter.  My inaction and 
paralysis at the organ procurement may represent a diminishing of my ability to act, 
operate and participate in the surgery.  However, in the days and weeks that followed, 
my abilities to think upon the event and reflect on how I would act in the future, 
constituted a capacitation of my being.   
b)  How my practice transformed 
In Deleuzian terms, the virtual potentialities were actualized at a later date.  The 
affective relations that formed and developed in the encounter contributed to and 
transformed my practice as a transplant surgeon as well as my conduct as a human 
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being.  It precipitated a line of questioning which might otherwise have not been 
fostered by the more established and formal bodies of surgical knowledge.  I started 
to think about the environment in which I developed my operative skills, how I 
negotiated emotions in practice that had the potential to engulf or distract me from 
important clinical tasks, how I approached and discussed organ donation with the 
families of brain dead patients.  Today, as a surgeon educator, I am more sensitive to 
the trainee perspective when contemplating how best to teach organ procurement 
surgery.  
Ten years on from the initial organ procurement experience, I am still actualizing the 
virtual potentialities of that specific surgical event, still attempting to augment my 
capacities as a surgeon, not always successfully, but at least with an improved 
awareness of my individual thoughts and actions. 
c)  The challenges of a singular cognitive approach to ‘thinking’ 
This approach does not reduce or obviate the fundamental role of established surgical 
knowledge or critical practical skills.  These aspects of surgical education are the 
bedrock of professional training, ensuring the production of practitioners who are 
skilled, proficient and safe.  However, the dominant ideology in medical education is 
the premise that clinical teaching and learning is firmly grounded in notions of 
reasoning and rationality.  This is the unquestioned assumption that, ‘thinking’ is 
predominantly a cognitive activity.  As I have demonstrated in the above narrative, 
logic and reasoning as functions of cognition, are often not the first faculties to be 
stimulated, in actual experiences of clinical practice.  Therefore, I argue that it is 
crucial to acknowledge and recognise that the affective intensities of clinical 
experience can be implicated in how we choose to think and act.   
d)  Coping with uncertainty in clinical practice 
This has two major applications for surgical education. First, the contingency of 
clinical practice requires surgeons to make decisions in unfamiliar situations, trying to 
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find a way forward to meet the needs of the patient.  An awareness of the affective 
dimension is particularly important when addressing the uncertainty of clinical 
situations.  It engenders an improved self-awareness in practice, as the learner 
recognizes how thoughts and actions are precipitated or influenced.  This also has 
important implications for how policy is constructed in healthcare, bringing to attention 
the ways in which the affective nature of behaviour can impact policy enactment.    
e)  Recognising the non-visible and immanent forms of learning  
Second, affective modes of experiencing may contribute to the emergence of qualities 
in surgical trainees which are neither visible nor tangible through the conventional 
training assessment.  An example is how clinical decision making is assessed through 
a learner’s ability to ‘talk through’ the steps of their process.  This relies on a linguistic 
grammar to demonstrate assimilation of knowledge and an ability to rationalize.  The 
difficulty arises when this assessment format is developed around a learner’s 
language ability.  This may mean that what is examined is not the skill of decision 
making but rather the ability to communicate one’s thoughts.  As a consequence, the 
affective aspects of decision making become invisible and are not considered as 
relevant or valuable by existing pedagogic discourses. 
f)  Badiou’s notion of ‘event’ 
The intensities I experienced in the opening narrative, can also be interpreted through 
Alain Badiou’s notion of the ‘event’.  Badiou emphasized an ‘event’ as an eruption in 
a situation, which could otherwise have not been predicted to happen (Badiou, 
2005a).  The clinical encounter caused a disturbance between what I had been taught 
about an organ procurement and the lived reality of the surgical experience.  By 
choosing to persevere with the uncomfortable reality of the event (Badiou’s notion of 
‘truth’), I attained a new ontological and epistemological state.  I came to understand 
that I was to operate on a dead person, something I had never done before, which 
triggered an emotional wakening that exceeded the practical nature of the task.   
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g)  Reconciling emotion with notions of effective practice 
However, my colleagues at the organ procurement may have been aware of how the 
experience would affect me thereafter.  But they chose to say nothing to warn or 
prepare me for the affective reality of the retrieval, that I would subsequently 
experience.  I have asked myself why this might be.  One reason in particular has 
resonated with me.  Vinny, my mentor at the organ procurement, may have believed 
that experiencing such shocks in practice was ‘part and parcel’ of the learning 
process.  It is a way of ensuring that trainees are resilient and hardened to deal with 
the spectrum of emotions that are precipitated in practice.  There is a belief in surgical 
practice, that emotions need to be banished because they cloud objective thinking 
and hamper decisive actions.  There is a long tradition of this approach in Medicine.   
However, modern day principles of good medical practice (GMC, 2013; RCS, 2014b) 
emphasize the fundamental qualities of empathy and compassion in a physician.  
These characteristics require a doctor to be strongly engaged with the emotive 
aspects of her practice at all times.  Otherwise, it is difficult to connect with patients on 
an ‘as needed’ basis in isolated instances.  I would conclude therefore that to 
establish enduring and caring therapeutic relationships, doctors must try to reconnect 
with how something matters to them in practice.  They must also recognize how 
factors in the patient-surgeon relation matter to the patient.        
1.6  Research Aims And Structure  
The overarching goal of my research thesis is to explore the ways in which the 
affective dimension of practice is involved in how learners experience events of 
clinical practice.  A second objective, is to demonstrate how a theoretical framework 
constructed from philosophical theory, can be used to develop complementary 
pedagogic strategies to assist learning that arises from the thisness of clinical 
practice.  This is a novel research venture in the realm of postgraduate surgical 
education and training.    
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a)  The research questions 
To conduct this investigation, I have posed the following research questions to direct 
the study and structure the findings: 
• How do surgeons make sense of their day to day experiences, in and of 
practice, as they happen in actual time? 
• What are the educational opportunities embedded in the day to day 
phenomenology of practice? 
• What are the ways in which a trainee constructs meaning in and of routine 
surgical practice?   
b)  The research methodology  
To answer these questions, I explored data from three sources; ethnographic data 
from my own training journals in general surgery and transplantation over a 5 year 
period based on experiences in the UK and USA, data collected from semi-structured 
interviews with senior and junior surgeons and finally a detailed analysis of the official 
curriculum and documentation pertaining to surgical training in the UK as published by 
the General Medical Council and Royal College of Surgeons of England.   
I contrasted the established knowledge of clinical procedures with the knowing that 
arises from the actualities of practice.  I did this by first analysing policy 
documentation and training materials (curriculum, assessments) pertaining to medical 
and surgical education.  The analytical framework I devised for the critique of 
documentation was derived from the writings on discourse and power-knowledge by 
Foucault and Butler.  In addition, I used Bourdieu’s theories on social reproduction.  
The second phase of the study involved conducting 8 semi-structured interviews with 
senior trainees and consultants in a variety of surgical disciplines that ranged from 
general surgery to neurosurgery.  The interviews were analysed using the theoretical 
framework I discussed earlier which was based on notions of event, virtualities, affect, 
experience, individuation and ethics. 
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c)  The structure of the thesis 
As mentioned above, the focus of this thesis is in contrasting and comparing the 
established knowledge of clinical procedures and practices with the knowing that 
arises from being immersed in actual events of surgical practice.  The next chapter 
provides a brief history of surgical education in the UK, the organization of medical 
training in this country and a summary of the modern-day challenges and issues 
confronting the profession and its training practices.  Chapter 3 describes my 
methodology including the problems I encountered and how I responded.  Chapter 4 
presents the theoretical framework that I have drawn on to structure the research 
question as well as formulate how I intend to analyse the data.  Chapters 5 and 6 
contain my data analysis of policy documents, training materials and interviews as 
informed by the analytic method based on philosophical theory.  Chapter 7, is the 
conclusion to this thesis with a presentation of the main findings of the research and 
the recommendations for surgical training and education.   
1.7  Concluding Remarks 
The lived reality of affective experiences in clinical practice and the challenges that 
trainees face in attempting to make sense of these, is an area that I believe at present 
lacks an adequate and effective educational strategy.  One of the important aspects of 
medical training is to provide a space in which learners and teachers can unpack their 
experiences with colleagues. This was, I think, the initial motivation for reflective 
practice which has subsequently been overwhelmed by a rhetoric of standards and 
accountability.   
In this thesis, I attempt to emphasize, alternative yet complementary research 
approaches which may enhance current pedagogic strategies. I argue that, it is in 
preparing to manage the everyday transience of surgical practice that surgeons may 
better confront the uncertainty of clinical medicine and develop an ethics of practice 
that is relevant to their individual practice and enduring.    
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Chapter 2 
 
What’s The Matter With Surgical Training?   
A Discussion Of Traditions, Recent Trends And Controversies In 
Surgical Education 
               
 
2.1  Introduction 
The objective of my thesis is an exploration of the phenomenology of training, in an 
attempt to elucidate how surgeons make sense of their experiences in acute clinical 
practice.  To understand the context of this study I begin with an account of the 
surgical training system in the UK.  I describe the evolution of surgical training from 
the early apprenticeship system to its current incarnation as a well-defined 
programme of study with regular assessments.  This chapter is mainly devoted to an 
investigation of how socio-cultural events and priorities in government policy have 
shaped models of surgical education.  This provides a background and context to the 
themes in education that are explored and critiqued in Chapter 4.  In the latter, policy 
documents are critically analysed with two aims.  First, to examine how surgical 
practice is conceptualized.  Second, to compare and contrast these conceptions of 
practice with narrative examples of actual clinical practice.   
I would advise the reader to familiarize themselves with this chapter once again prior 
to engaging with the content of Chapter 4.  I hope that when read concurrently, the 
reader may develop a deeper understanding of how issues arising in healthcare are 
implicated in the ideologies of surgical practice and training.   
In recent decades, there has been a paradigm shift in surgical education and training.  
A discipline that was firmly entrenched in the values of surgical culture, has been 
transformed (along with the rest of medical education) to a competency-based model 
of training and practice.  This has in part been to ensure that incompetent doctors and 
poor practice are not allowed to flourish within the healthcare system.  Surgical 
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training refers to a period of ‘study’ concerned with both the academic and technical 
components responsible for converting novices into technically competent and 
professional surgeons (Zwierstra, 1994; Nyhus et al, 2000; Peracchia, 2001). 
Surgical culture 
For several centuries, surgical training and education, the ways in which would-be 
surgeons were taught and schooled, was defined and shaped by the dominant 
surgical culture of the time.  Surgical culture was synonymous with surgical training.  
There is a considerable body of literature exploring the traditions and practices of 
surgical culture through ethnographic studies, experiences of training and clinical 
practice as well as biographies used to illustrate the challenges and complexities of 
life as a surgeon (Katz, 1998; Gawande, 2002; Bosk, 2003; Weston, 2009; Marsh, 
2010; Kalanithi, 2016).  
Pearl Katz (1998) in The Scalpel’s Edge: the culture of surgeons, defines surgical 
culture as, “a professional ‘subculture’”, with its own social organisation, values, 
theories of disease causation, and treatment, and rules of behaviour.”  She, and other 
medical sociologists have documented that the profession perpetuates its values and 
practices by recruiting candidates to the programme who appear to closely resemble 
the thinking and behaviour emblematic of the discipline (Mishler, 1981: 205; Helman, 
1994; Stein,1990).  ‘Grit’, ‘resilience’, ‘endurance’, ‘stubborness’, ‘arrogance’, ‘the last 
man standing’, are all terms found in the aforementioned texts to describe the 
qualities of a surgeon.  Unsurprisingly, the practices that evolve in training, have in the 
past centred around ways of promoting and cultivating these skills (Weston, 2009).        
2.2  The History Of Surgical Training 
a)  Medieval surgeons 
700 years ago English surgeons were common barbers (Pelling, 1981, 1998).  They 
would carry out a number of procedures; teeth extraction, blood-letting, setting broken 
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bones, excision of skin tumours and amputation of limbs on the war wounded. Initially, 
priests were called upon to perform blood-letting.  However, the church discouraged 
this practice by insisting that handling blood, contaminated the priesthood and thus 
prevented them from giving the Eucharist.  Barbers were hired to perform these “dirty” 
tasks for a small fee.  The red and white striped pole, which is still found today outside 
barbershops, signified the blood soiled white bandages that were applied after blood-
letting (Pelling, 1981).   
Surgery, at this time was not considered an elite or academic practice associated with 
a formal period of university study.  Surgical practice was separate to the study and 
practice of Medicine by medical physicians.  Barber-surgeons were often illiterate with 
no formal learning and would learn their trade as an apprentice to an experienced 
master.  The tradition of apprenticeship has pervaded surgical education for centuries 
and only been challenged as recently as the last two decades.  In the 18th century, 
George II separated barbers from surgeons by establishing the London College of 
Surgeons, which then became the Royal College of Surgeons in London following 
decree by royal charter.  Some vestiges of the barber origins are seen in the British 
practice of addressing surgeons by the title of “Mr” or “Miss”.  This address reflects the 
medieval era when surgeons were not considered physicians, had no university 
education and were therefore not permitted to call themselves “Doctor”.  Today, all 
would-be surgeons are trained physicians who subsequently enter a surgical training 
programme in which they acquire the knowledge and skills to practice as Surgeons.   
b)  The 19th century surgeon 
In the 19th century, there was no compulsory curriculum and surgeons undertook a 7-
year apprenticeship.  An oral examination in anatomy and surgery was compulsory for 
Navy and Army surgeons.  However, following the Apothecaries’ Act in 1819, the 
College printed its first curriculum and by 1837 a written examination was established 
for those candidates who had not performed adequately in the oral assessment 
(Blandy and Lumley, 2000: chapter 3).  Over the ensuing years, the curriculum 
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expanded and George IV (1822) approved a 6-year apprenticeship and a mandatory 
period of ‘walking the hospitals’ (Galasko, 2005).   
By the end of the century, there was consensus about a curriculum and examination 
system that would test a candidate’s knowledge of anatomy, physiology, surgery and 
pathology.  In addition, it was decided that examination of real life patients should be 
incorporated into the assessment format.  The College started to emerge primarily as 
an examining body.  By the inception of the NHS in 1948, the FRCS qualification or 
Fellowship of the Royal College of Surgeons examination became a mandatory 
requirement prior to entering a senior surgical trainee position.    
c)  The apprenticeship system: the ‘waiting room’ 
As mentioned earlier, surgeons were typically trained through an apprenticeship 
system.  It was not unusual for senior consultant surgeons in the UK, qualifying from 
medical school in the early 1970s to have spent on average, fifteen years being 
apprenticed to various surgeons (Ribeiro, 2006).  During this period of apprenticeship, 
a surgical trainee was expected to learn by observation, assistance and eventually 
permitted to carry out procedures independently.  The latter would often occur with no 
oversight or supervision, and it was not uncommon for the consultant trainer to not be 
physically present in the hospital while the trainee operated.   
This was a common experience in the apprenticeship system of surgical training, and 
was considered necessary.  The belief underlying this interpretation of ‘independent 
practice’ was that a trainee left to manage an operative situation would develop 
important skills and personal knowledge.  This included coping mechanisms in 
stressful environments, growing in confidence and learning important technical skills 
and operative judgement when confronted by difficulties or complications that had to 
be navigated in the absence of a mentor.   
Appointment to a consultant surgeon post, was infrequent because new positions 
were rarely created.  If an established consultant surgeon resigned his position or died 
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while still practicing, a position would become vacant and a younger surgeon could be 
appointed (Ribeiro, 2006).  To be acknowledged as an able and experienced 
practitioner, ready to assume a consultant position, a surgical trainee was expected to 
be fluent in a number of procedures (no formal assessment of proficiency) and to 
have passed the qualifying exams (Fellowship of the Royal College of Surgeons or 
FRCS).   
However, even the attainment of these qualifications was not a guarantee of a job as 
consultant surgeon.  Skilled and knowledgeable surgeons had to bide their time in 
what I call the “waiting room” - an indefinite period spent as a very senior trainee, 
waiting for a consultant position to become vacant.  As a teenager, I witnessed many 
surgeons go through this process, including my father and his colleagues.  
 Eventually, the financial pressures of a young family and mounting expenses plus 
sheer frustration with a poorly designed professional structure would push these 
committed and experienced surgeons out of surgical practice and into another career, 
such as General Practice (Hunter and McLaren, 1993).  The apprenticeship system 
was notorious for the indeterminate time spent in training.  There was no assessment 
structure and an absence of quality assurance mechanisms, to ensure that surgeons 
emerging from training were diligent, able, caring and professional (Department of 
Health, 1993).  
d)  The Calman era in medical training 
The 1990s heralded the beginning of the period of transition in medical (surgical) 
education.  The previously unquestioned structure of training (the apprenticeship 
system) and the indefinite training period were challenged.  In 1992, Kenneth Calman, 
the then Chief Medical Officer, set up a working group.  The aim was to bring 
postgraduate training in line with the requirements of the European medical directives 
(Department of Health, 1993).  The report proposed a streamlined specialist training 
programme with a defined curriculum and minimum training period.  Successful 
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completion of the postgraduate programme would result in formal qualification as a 
specialist in that particular field.   
The new training system was to be defined by clear educational objectives, training 
agreements, and a move towards ensuring that trainees were competent, irrespective 
of how long they had spent in training (Department of Health, 1995).  Crucially, the 
new proposed system did not address what I believe to be two of the most important 
failings of training to date.  First, trainees who had completed basic training in surgery 
had to reapply for a very small number of higher specialist training positions.  This 
meant that to continue training as a surgeon and enter specialty training (such as 
vascular surgery or urology), candidates had to reapply for a limited number of 
training posts.  The additional selection system, made entry into higher specialist 
training very competitive, and unnecessarily so, in my opinion.  The result was similar 
to the ‘waiting room’ of the apprenticeship system, it created a lost tribe of aspiring 
surgeons who would move from job to job, till they were successful in their application 
for higher surgical training (Department of Health, 2002).   
Second, having completed specialist training, trainees were now confronted by a lack 
of available consultant jobs.  While the structure of training had been drastically 
altered, the challenges facing the profession in terms of inadequate workforce 
planning and funding for consultant posts, had not been tackled by the reforms.  It is 
an exasperating position to be in when, having completed a ten-year training 
programme and having acquired all the necessary examinations and assessments, a 
surgeon is then confronted by the fact that there are no vacant positions to be filled.   
e)  Modernising Medical Careers (MMC):  
competency-based training 
In 2005, a new postgraduate training programme was instituted for all disciplines of 
Medicine called Modernising Medical Careers (MMC) (Department of Health, 2003).  
The system introduced new ways of training and assessing trainees in all disciplines 
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of medicine.  The house officer grade of doctor (first year post-qualification from 
medical school) was replaced with the Foundation year trainee.  The latter doctor, 
having graduated from Medical School, was now required to demonstrate safe 
practice over two years, prior to being fully licensed as a practicing physician.   
Specialist training was highly structured and defined with objectives and outcomes 
forming the introduction of a competency-based model of medical education.  
Competence-based training (CBT) refers to outcomes-based education and 
assessment, whereby a trainee is expected to demonstrate what they have learned: 
. . not only must doctors have the technical competence to treat a patient but 
they must also understand why they are doing it; they should adopt 
appropriate critical thinking to what they are doing; use appropriate decision-
making strategies; and adopt appropriate attitudes to their patients.  (Davis et 
al, 2007: 342)   
Whilst, competency-based training (CBT) now defines modern medical training, 
controversy continues as to its appropriateness as a model for medical education and 
its effectiveness in ensuring the aptitude and safety of trainees (Lurie, 2007; Albanese 
et al, 2008; Touchie and Ten Cate, 2016).  The issues surrounding CBT are 
discussed further in the ensuing pages of this chapter as well as in Chapter 5.    
In addition, to a further restructuring of training grades, MMC established a certificate 
of completion of training (CCT) awarded on successful completion of specialist 
surgical training. CCT is a mandatory requirement for any trainee expecting to 
assume consultant duties.  I know a number of colleagues who have passed 
postgraduate exams and attained CCT but have yet to find a vacant consultant post.  
MMC was reviewed in an independent inquiry led by Professor Sir John Tooke in 
2008, after the failings and scandals surrounding specialty training recruitment 
through its online application process, MTAS (Medical Training Application Service).  
Prior to MMC, entry into specialist surgical training was through a selection system 
organised by the medical deaneries.  For example, entry into general surgical 
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specialist training required meeting set criteria specified by the deanery such as, 
completion of the MRCS (membership of the royal college of surgeons) surgical 
exam, evidence of first author publications, demonstrating research skills (being in 
possession of a Masters degree or a PhD).   
Importantly, surgical mentors had the ability to support their candidates directly, by 
writing glowing references or using their personal contacts with the selection team.  
However, under MTAS, all specialist training posts would be advertised under a 
centralised scheme which did not permit the ‘biased’ interventions of surgical mentors.  
Instead points were allocated to each trainee depending on how well they met the 
selection criteria, leading to shortlisted candidates competing against each other in an 
OSCE1.   
However, only 18,500 training posts were available for 32,000 applicants, which 
meant that over 14,000 junior doctors were left without training jobs (Tooke, 2008).  
Concerns were expressed that without the prospect of training positions, medical 
trainees would either seek employment abroad or leave medicine altogether 
(Shannon, 2007; Gordon, 2007).  Large protests and rallies were held across the 
country with doctors striking and marching against MMC and MTAS (Delamothe, 
2007; BBC, 2007; Boseley, 2007; Eaton, 2007).   
The introduction of the 48-hour work week (the European Working Time Directive or 
EWTD), was rolled out to hospitals across the UK at the same time.  It was voiced by 
Doctors’ Unions and the British Medical Association, that to be compliant with the 
reduced work hours, hospitals would have to recruit extra doctors into service jobs 
which carried no training prospects or career progression.  Thus, creating, "a 
permanent subclass of cheap, undertrained sub-specialists”, (Brown et al, 2007).   
																																																						
1 OSCE or objective structured clinical examination is a performance based test of candidates 
through a series of stations which allows evaluation of clinical skills, decision making and judgement 
skills, practical skills and knowledge.  Candidates are set specific tasks at each station and 
assessed through direct observation of behaviour.   
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The Tooke inquiry was highly critical of MMC, stating that it had been an 
“overambitious” strategy which had not engaged with the medical profession 
regarding how the recruitment process should be instituted or structured (Tooke, 
2008).  These findings were supported by the review organised by the House of 
Commons Health Committee (2008).  Following a judicial review of MTAS brought 
about by pressure from Remedy UK, a junior doctors union, the application system 
was turned over from the Department of Health to the Royal Colleges and the national 
deaneries who had, up until then, been responsible for the recruitment and training of 
all trainees.  However, the concepts introduced by MMC were here to stay and 
continued to cause stress and anxiety for medical trainees in the UK.  The impact of 
MMC on surgical training is a critical issue in this thesis.  In Chapter 5, I examine the 
experiences of Lydia, a surgical trainee as she describes the difficulties and 
challenges she faced in the post MMC era.  To facilitate the reader’s understanding of 
this issue, I have included a summary report from Sir John Tooke’s final inquiry into 
MTAS and MMC in Appendix A.     
2.3  Present Day Surgical Training  
a)  Intercollegiate surgical curriculum project (ISCP) 
In 2003, the Intercollegiate Surgical Curriculum Project (ISCP, https://www.iscp.ac.uk) 
was introduced as an online resource and educational tool with a clearly defined 
syllabus for all the surgical disciplines.  The resource was developed along 
educational theories and CanMEDS guidelines (Frank, 2004).  The CanMEDS project 
was commissioned by the Canadian government in the 1990s to assess the 
implications for postgraduate specialty programmes (see Figure 1 below).  
It identified seven key roles of the surgeon; a professional (in terms of humane and 
ethical practice), a communicator, a scholar (in terms of teaching and research), a 
collaborator/team worker, a health advocate in wider society, and a manager of 
resources (people, expertise, time and money).   
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The ISCP adapted the CanMEDS criteria.  A number of stakeholders were involved in 
its construction; surgeons, the public, government organisations, and medical 
educationalists.  The purpose of the curriculum project was to integrate  
Figure 1:  CanMEDS illustration of the surgical expert (taken from: Frank, 2004) 
 
 
four pre-defined domains of surgical practice: clinical judgement, technical and 
operative skills, specialty-based knowledge, and generic professional skills.  The 
proposed curriculum, which was called the ISC (Intercollegiate Surgical Curriculum) 
specified the stages of training and the training pathway including the expected 
standards of practice in each domain.   
However, while ISCP formed the staple of surgical training and assessment, it still 
remains an educational phenomenon that greatly divides the surgical community, 
even today.  The main criticisms identified by Michael Eraut’s inquiry into the 
curriculum project (2009) are that though it claims to be trainee-led, trainer 
engagement with the curriculum is variable and often poor, making it a stressful and 
difficult exercise for most trainees.  Eraut (2009) was commissioned by the ISCP to 
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investigate how the curriculum project was being assimilated.  I have included a 
summary report of his findings in Appendix A, to assist the reader in understanding 
the challenges that trainers and trainees faced with its imposition.   
Eraut found that trainees reported difficulty in achieving the targets set by ISCP due to 
variability in the hours spent working with trainers, the loss of operative training lists in 
order to meet urgent hospital targets2, clinics no longer allow time for trainers and 
trainees to see patients together3, trainees spending most of their time performing 
ward work with little educational value and diminished time in theatre (ASIT, 2009).  
b)  Training structure 
The standards for postgraduate surgical training, assessment and examination are set 
by the Royal College of Surgeons which function through the Joint Committee on 
Surgical Training (JCST) and its ten Specialty Advisory Committees (SACs) and the 
Core Surgical Training Committee (CSTC).  It is the task of the SACs to develop the 
person specifications for selection into training.  Whilst the responsibility for running 
training programmes rests with the postgraduate medical deaneries and/or Local 
Education and Training Boards (LETBs) and their Schools of Surgery.  The General 
Medical Council (GMC) is responsible for approving the programmes and setting the 
standards of training that have to be met by all postgraduate training programmes.   
(The ISC is further analysed in Chapter 6). 
Postgraduate training in surgery begins with a two-year core surgical training 
programme (CT1 and CT2) followed by entry into a surgical speciality (ST3) through a 
highly competitive application process (ISCP, 2016).  The purpose of core surgical 
																																																						
2 A training list is an operating list with fewer cases scheduled so that the trainer has the opportunity 
and time to teach a trainee.  Hospitals struggling to meet government set targets will sacrifice 
training lists in an attempt to ensure more operations are performed per list.  An efficiency saving 
manoeuvre.   
3 FRCS examiners have reported that candidates are becoming increasingly weak as diagnosticians 
(Eraut, 2009). 
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training (CST) is to acquire a strong foundation in the basic principles of surgery which 
are common to all surgical specialties.   
Entry into one of the seven surgical specialities begins at the level of ST3 and 
continues for five years (ST3 to ST8) and represents the advanced training prior to 
certification and inclusion onto the GMC’s specialty register.  Progression through 
each year of training (ST3 to ST4, to ST5 etc.) is dependent on trainees 
demonstrating that they have met the required standards or ‘competences’ in practice 
expected of a candidate at that particular stage of training.  The average medical 
school graduate may undertake a ten-year period in surgical training before emerging 
as a specialist.  Post specialist training and on gaining CCT, there is now the option to 
do what is described as a ‘post CCT fellowships’.  However, there is growing concern 
that these fellowship are actually a form of ‘waiting room’ whereby trainees having 
completed training are coerced into these roles because of a lack of recognised 
consultant posts. In effect they are doing the job of consultants without recognition of 
this fact or appropriate compensation.     
The curriculum identifies ten surgical specialities; cardiothoracic surgery, ENT surgery 
(otolaryngology), general surgery, paediatric surgery, plastic surgery, vascular 
surgery, trauma and orthopaedic surgery, neurosurgery, oral and maxillofacial surgery 
and urology.  Table 1 below, illustrates data taken from the application process into a 
surgical specialty in August 2010.  The yellow highlighted box draws attention to the 
general surgery candidates, which is the focus of this research.   
Of the 2,178 applicants, 16.2% of candidates were female, 83.3% male.  Of the 341 
successful candidates, 19.2% were female.  This ‘pyramidal’ system of training, 
whereby not all trainees who begin on a surgical pathway (CT1 and CT2 signify the 
entry into surgical training) are accepted onto a completion programme of training still 
persists in today’s postgraduate education structure.   
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Table 1:  Competition ratios for ST3 entry into surgical speciality training (Carr et 
al, 2011) 
Specialty No. of 
Applicants 
No. of ST3 
posts 
Ratio 
Plastic surgery 148 10 15 : 1 
General surgery 735 105  7 : 1 
Trauma & Orthopaedics 739 110  7 : 1 
Paediatric surgery 60 9  7 : 1 
Cardiothoracic surgery 134 22  6 : 1 
Ear, nose & throat surgery 173 42  4 : 1 
Urology 189 43  4 : 1 
Totals: 2,178 341  6 : 1 
 
The US graduate surgical residency programme abandoned the pyramidal system for 
a ‘rectangular system’ in which all candidates accepted onto a training programme 
were able to complete their training, providing their annual performance was deemed 
satisfactory (Kaiser and Mallen, 2004; Nauta, 2012).  Most surgical residents spend 
five years in surgical training with an additional 2 years in research.  On graduating as 
a qualified surgeon, candidates may decide to pursue a fellowship in a specialist field, 
such as; colorectal surgery, laparoscopic surgery, vascular surgery or transplant 
surgery.  The fellowship can last between 1 to 3 years.  
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c)  Systems of assessment 
The tools of the curriculum are a plethora of workplace based assessments (WBAs), 
formal examinations (MRCS, FRCS), trainer-trainee learning agreements and the 
ARCP (annual review of competence progression).   The latter is a panel interview to 
assess a trainee’s progress, which includes a discussion of the operations recorded in 
their logbook and the results of the WBAs.  WBAs were designed to provide feedback 
to aid learning (formative assessments), however, in practice, they have become a 
form of examination (summative assessment): 
I think all WBAs are like driving lessons.  You don’t need to know the result of 
the driving lesson.  It’s probably a good idea to know that you’ve had some 
driving lessons because it shows engagement with the task of learning to 
drive.  I don’t think you need to say how many driving lessons you’ve had, 
because some people learn quicker than others.  We don’t insist that you take 
20 driving lessons before you take your test do you?  If you’re ready you’re 
ready, if you’re not, then you’re not.  So I think . . . deaneries who have 
introduced artificial numbers for procedures for trainees to achieve . . .  is a 
bad idea.  Again they haven’t really understood the purpose.  The whole ethos 
around WBAs was to improve training, give feedback.  
(Professor Jonathan Beard, Royal College of Surgeons)  
WBAs were initially introduced to provide trainees with information about how they 
performed a certain procedure or feedback on their clinical skills and judgement in a 
situation.  However, WBAs are increasingly used to formally evaluate a trainee’s 
abilities.  Professor Eraut (2008), states that in the culture of high competition that is 
surgical practice, it is unlikely that trainee’s will grasp that WBAs are not about 
examining performance but more about helping improve performance.  As a 
consequence, this assessment format will be another ‘test’ that trainees feel they will 
have to surpass.   
WBAs include; case based discussion (CBD), clinical evaluation exercise (CEX), 
multi-source feedback (MSF), direct observation of procedural skills in surgery 
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(DOPS) and procedure based assessment (PBA).  In Chapter 5 I analyse PBAs as 
part of a critique on assessment formats.  Figure 2 is a sample of a CBD I was 
involved in as a trainer.  I have changed the patient’s clinical data and the trainee’s 
name to maintain anonymity and confidentiality.  The example is a case of a frail 
elderly patient with poor blood supply to her legs resulting in a persistent ulcer that 
threatens the survival of her limb.   
Andrew, the trainee, was responsible for managing this lady’s day to day clinical care 
as well as coping with the complications of her condition and age, primarily a descent 
into dementia.  The aim of the CBD is to encourage the trainee to reflect on their 
thoughts and actions in practice, with the specific aims of assessing their knowledge 
base (what are the causes of poor blood supply? what types of lower limb ulcers do 
you know?), identifying their understanding of treatment options, and asking them to 
reflect on what elements helped or hindered patient care (what did you do well? what 
could you improve on for future?).  The format assumes a conversation between 
trainer and trainee after patient care has been completed.  The outcome is an agreed 
action plan for how the trainee can develop the lessons learned from the particular 
clinical encounter to improve their future practice.   
The CBD provides a useful framework in which to structure a learning encounter.  My 
concern with the didactic and prescriptive nature of the assessment is twofold.  First, it 
strongly embraces an outcomes focused approach to learning.  A trainee must  
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Figure 2: An example of a case based discussion (CBD) (ISCP, 2016). 
 
 
 49 
demonstrate what they have learned through reflective conversation.  This 
expectation is underlined by a belief that there are rational explanations for the 
thoughts and actions that develop within an encounter of practice.  But, what about 
those aspects of performance that are non-visible and intangible?  Can these 
components of experiencing be explained through a cognitive, reasoned approach?  
These are themes that lie at the heart of this thesis and which are explored further in 
the remaining chapters. 
Finally, the FRCS is now a formal professional examination with clearly defined 
standards that relate back to the online curriculum.  In addition, the ‘new’ FRCS as 
opposed to the FRCS of the apprenticeship system, examines professional education 
that had previously not been recognised (ISCP, 2013); ethics, professionalism and 
legally compliant practices.  Self-directed learning, reflective practice and peer 
education have permeated surgical culture and been formalised in the curriculum.  
There is much interest and financial support for research into surgical education that 
is focused on objective quality measurement and performance benchmarks of surgical 
skills training (Beard, 2008; Bell, 2011a; 2011b; Arora et al, 2009).  The motivation 
behind these research studies is in part due to pressure to ensure that systems of 
assessment are appropriate and fit for purpose.  It is also part of a movement in 
medical education that believes all aspects of physician performance must be 
amenable to measurement and quantification as part of processes of quality 
assurance (Brooks, 2009; Brice and O’Corrigan, 2010; Brightwell and Grant, 2013).  
These themes are explored further in Chapters 5 and 6. 
d) Reviews of Medical Education and Training 
In the last decade, there have been six major inquiries into various aspects of surgical 
training and education (Tooke, 2008; Collins, 2010; Cook, 2010; GMC 2010a; Temple, 
2010; Greenaway, 2013, 2015).  The structure and function of surgical training and 
education, which has enjoyed relative stability for several centuries, has previously not 
been subjected to relentless change and constant scrutiny.   
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The most recent investigation of training, ‘the shape of training review’ (Greenaway, 
2013, 2015), was launched by the GMC to ‘ensure that UK medical education and 
training is structured in a way that ensures it meets the needs of service and the 
patient population’, (GMC, 2015: 3).  The inquiry gathered data through consultations 
with patients, the general public, doctors in training, trainers and the organisations 
responsible for delivering education and training (ibid., 19).  The review made 19 
recommendations.  The following findings were of particular interest to how curriculum 
and assessment are realised in actual practice (GMC, 2015):  
We also heard that assessment and evaluation throughout postgraduate 
training is becoming increasingly bureaucratic – ticking boxes – and is not 
necessarily demonstrating capabilities or showing that a doctor is consistently 
working safely. Trainers told us their relationships with doctors in training have 
been eroded over the past decade. (p. 34) 
A more apprenticeship-based approach to training . . . Doctors would train and 
work alongside a small number of trainers and within specific teams.  But 
doctors must have more personal supervision, by a named supervisor for at 
least a year, to get the best training opportunities and build up confidence in 
trainers about the competence of their doctors in training. (p. 36) 
Assessments had become an exercise of necessity, in order to comply with training 
documentation (‘tick box’) rather than achieving what they were originally designed to 
do, facilitate reflective practice, thereby improving performance (see Chapter 6 for 
further analysis and discussion).  Importantly, having removed the original 
apprenticeship system from training, the review (Greenaway, 2013, 2015) advocated 
a return to the apprentice-master relationship of training with the caveat that a trainee 
was constantly supervised in practice.   
The review also concluded, along with other international studies that medical 
education, should be shaped by the health needs of its respective population rather 
than being defined by an academic focus on scientific principles and clinical skills 
(Nauta, 2012; Dumon et al, 2012).  A training programme should rightly be fit for 
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purpose.  However, striking a balance between a pragmatic form of training and an 
acknowledgement that medical professionals need to be more than a body of 
technicians and diagnosticians is challenging (Fitzgerald, et al 2012).   
e)  The general surgeon 
There are many disciplines of surgery; general and emergency surgery, vascular, 
orthopaedics, transplantation, colorectal, breast, endocrine, ear nose and throat 
(ENT), neurosurgery, plastic surgery etc.  I have used the general surgeon to illustrate 
the training practices and clinical duties.      
A general surgeon is a physician who operates predominantly on the abdominal area 
and manages emergency procedures as well as non-urgent surgeries of this 
anatomical region.  A general surgeon may operate on the stomach, large and small 
bowel, pancreas, oesophagus, spleen, liver and gall bladder.  An emergency 
procedure may involve a patient with acute appendicitis which necessitates immediate 
treatment and surgery.  A non-urgent surgery, also known as an elective surgery, 
involves conditions which are not life threatening but are sufficiently serious to cause 
difficult symptoms to the patient and which have the potential of worsening and 
causing complications.  A common example would be removal of the gallbladder 
because of painful symptoms experienced due to gallstones and the potential for 
acute pancreatitis (inflammation of the pancreas gland). 
On completion of a surgical training programme, a general surgeon may then sub-
specialise, and thereby offer an additional area of expertise in her practice, for 
example; vascular surgery, endocrine surgery, colorectal surgery or transplant surgery 
(ISCP, 2016).  Surgeries can be performed ‘open, ‘laparoscopic’ or ‘robotically-
assisted’.  Open surgery refers to the traditional skin incision and gross dissection of 
tissue planes with a scalpel or cautery.  Laparoscopic procedures, known popularly as 
‘keyhole surgeries’, are performed through miniature incisions, whereby long 
instruments are passed into the body cavity and manipulated by watching a projected 
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camera view that displays the operative movements on a screen.  Technical surgical 
training involves learning the techniques of all three modes of operations.    
2.4  Women Surgeons 
A brief walk along the corridors of the Royal College of Surgeons will inform one a 
great deal about the dominant traits of the surgical professional.  The walls are 
adorned with the portraits of famous or distinguished surgeons, “all, white, male and 
middle class . . .” was the riposte of one of the educators I interviewed at the Royal 
College of Surgeons.  In 2014, 29.5% of surgical trainees were women (compared 
with 24% in 2010) (Royal College of Surgeons of England (RCS), 2011).   
However, women are still vastly under-represented in the higher echelons of surgery.  
The RCS’ 2011 surgical workforce census, reported that only 10.5% of consultant 
surgeons were female with paediatric surgery acquiring the highest percentage of 
female surgeons, 21.5%, whereas, in general surgery 11.1% of consultants were 
female.   This compared to the fact that in 2014, 55% of medical students were female 
(RCS, 2014a).  The RCS commissioned research at Exeter University which 
suggested that the low numbers of women in surgery was not due to a lack of 
ambition or reluctance at the long work hours but rather a perception held by women 
that they were unlikely to succeed compared to their male counterparts.   
In the USA, 1050 new general surgeons graduate each year from surgical training 
programmes, with more than a third going onto pursue subspecialty training in the 
form of a one to three-year fellowship (Stabile, 2008).  Thus, 600 newly qualified 
general surgeons enter the workforce annually, with more than a 100 surgeons 
retiring or dying each year.  Here too, only 7% of associate professors (equivalent of 
consultant surgeon) are women.  However, Recent analysis from the USA shows that 
the proportion of women entering surgical training programmes has increased from 
32% in 2000 to 40% in 2005 (Davis et al, 2007).  In July 2014, The Royal College of 
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Surgeons of England for the first time appointed a female orthopaedic surgeon, Clare 
Marx, as the president of the college.   
2.5  The General Medical Council (GMC) 
The GMC is the regulatory authority responsible for licensing doctors to practice in the 
UK.  However, in the last two decades, its remit has widened.  It is now the principal 
organisation with responsibility for setting the standards for professional practice 
(GMC, 2013), managing a doctor’s fitness to practice, and setting the standards that 
all organisations and individuals involved in undergraduate and postgraduate medical 
education must meet (GMC, 1993, 2016).   
In the mid 1800s, Britain was overflowing with a variety of ‘healers’: men and women 
who provided an assortment of services for all that ‘ails one’.  There was staunch 
competition in the medical marketplace and allopathic practitioners (the predecessors 
of modern day physicians) who had undergone an expensive period of training and 
possessed qualifications of their knowledge and skill were resentful of their less 
qualified competitors (Stacey, 1992; Irvine, 2006).   
The Medical Act of 1858 was motivated by discontented allopaths and it established 
the GMC (known then as the General Council of Medical Education and Registration) 
as an organisation that would implement order by distinguishing the ‘qualified’ from 
the unqualified practitioners.  From this point onwards, the scene was set for the 
emerging medical profession in later years to be in sole charge of the licensing and 
regulation of practicing doctors.  A consequence of this arrangement was that what 
constituted professional medical practice would be determined by the values and 
beliefs of doctors themselves (Irvine, 2003).  The power in the doctor-patient 
relationship firmly lay with the physician and this is exemplified in the paternalistic 
model of healthcare that prevailed following the inception of the NHS in 1948 (Irvine, 
2006).  Doctors were increasingly powerful, unquestioned and free from the scrutiny 
of politicians and NHS management.   
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At this time, the GMC was one of a number of medical corporations involved in the 
governance and regulation of practitioners.  The other institutions were; the Royal 
Colleges, university medical schools and the British Medical Association (BMA), all of 
which were older, more established and powerful organisations.  The GMC however 
was the more passive member and functioned as instructed by the other medical 
corporations (Richardson, 1983).  This pattern of behaviour continued till 1998 when 
the first of a series of scandals, the Bristol Heart inquiry, rocked the profession and set 
the GMC on a path that led to its current transformation as a powerful regulator of 
practice and education.  Prior to this time, the protection of the public was not the 
primary concern of the GMC.  For example, disciplinary charges in the 19th century 
comprised adultery, criminal behaviour or anything that contravened professional 
etiquette (advertising one’s medical services was frowned upon).   
In the 1970s, due to a combination of events, the GMC lost control as doctors revolted 
and refused to pay an annual fee.  The government became involved in the dispute 
and the matter of professional self-regulation now rose to the fore.  The vast majority 
of doctors provided competent and compassionate care, however the GMC was 
woefully inept in dealing with physicians who were clearly underperforming and even 
dangerous.  In 1998, an inquiry into 29 deaths of babies at the Bristol Royal Infirmary 
paediatric heart surgery unit found a culture of incompetence and neglect amongst 
doctors and nurses, with poor measures to ensure clinical accountability or patient 
safety (Bristol Royal Infirmary, 2001).  There were further inquiries over the years--
Ledward, Shipman, Neale, Alderney—which supported a widely held view that the 
GMC was failing as a regulator of physicians by being tolerant of poor performance 
(Irvine, 2006; Delamothe, 2007).  
The perception of a culture of ‘cover up’ in the profession when errors are made and 
adverse events result, has been a powerful influence in the way medical registration 
and fitness to practice are structured (Irvine, 2006).  The 1990s saw the initial move 
towards a standards-based model of medical licensure.  Good Medical Practice 
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(2013) became the profession’s bible, clearly defining and stating non-negotiable 
standards of professional practice.   Annual appraisal and five yearly revalidation 
processes are routine for all doctors in the UK, who wish to retain their medical 
license and continue to practice.  In essence, appraisal is a documentation process to 
monitor and ensure that a doctor has met the minimum standard of practice by 
engaging in the required activities and meeting the basic criteria.  There are four 
areas of practice which a doctor must demonstrate activity in: 
• domain 1: knowledge, skills and performance 
• domain 2: safety and quality 
• domain 3: communication, partnership and teamwork 
• domain 4: maintaining trust 
For example, when I completed my appraisal this year, I provided the following 
evidence of my compliance with domain 4 — 18 patient feedback surveys, 12 
colleague feedback surveys, letters and cards from patients I had treated, written 
reflections of complex clinical events that I had engaged in and which tested my 
coping mechanisms and knowledge.  Revalidation is a cyclical process which reviews 
appraisal data and affirms that a physician should be permitted to continue practicing 
within the NHS.   
2.6  Challenges to Surgical Education 
Professional accountability, reduced work hours, patient safety and satisfaction, cost 
containment, the economic drives to reduction in hospital beds, plus the public 
expectations for same day procedures have all borne various forces and impacts on 
the ways in which surgeons are trained and nurtured.  This thesis explores how some 
of these factors impact upon the actualisations of clinical practice.   
There is an emphasis on the curriculum being outcomes based.  Therefore, what is 
measured is the competence of a trainee in a number of skills rather than the actual 
time the trainee spends in training, which was previously thought to equate to 
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proficiency (Frank, 2004; Dumon et al, 2004).  The curriculum is designed to ensure 
that these competencies are met at each stage to permit progression to the next stage 
of training.  It ensures a form of quality control by providing a number of ways in which 
proficiency can be measured; online assessments, simulated procedures, logbooks, 
feedback forms and a surgeon portfolio.   
a) Tensions between policy and practice 
Healthcare in the United Kingdom has in recent decades become a highly emotive 
and politicised area.  Since its inception in 1948, the NHS is portrayed as a bastion of 
Britishness, a shining beacon of all that is good and noble, the best of British values.  
A brief examination of Department of Health (DoH) policy text illustrates this pervasive 
discourse of sentimental rhetoric and nostalgia and nationalism: 
[…] a service founded in adversity, from which were established enduring 
principles […] it has been a vital friend to millions of people, sharing their joy 
and comforting their sorrow. (DoH, 2008: 7-9). 
 […] the NHS has come to embody values of fairness, compassion and 
equality. (NHS England, 2013: 3). 
[…] it is an expression of British values of fairness, solidarity and compassion.  
(NHS England, 2013: 5).  
Successive governments have, in my opinion, ‘fiddled and meddled’ with the 
mechanisms by which services are funded, organised and structured.  The reasons 
cited for this include; an expanding elderly population, a changing demographic, 
increasing numbers of people living with chronic medical conditions, the growing 
expectations of the public in terms of the quality and convenience of care, the rising 
costs of medications and therapies technologies (DoH, 2000, 2008; 2013).  What a 
patient may undergo in terms of diagnosis and treatment has radically altered in the 
last twenty years.  Lord Darzi commented in 2008: 
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Ten years ago, my patients would sometimes wait over a year for treatment, 
and now they wait just a few weeks – and even less if cancer is suspected. My 
patients are treated using keyhole surgery enabling them to leave hospital in 
days rather than weeks. My team’s conversations about quality take place in 
weekly multidisciplinary meetings rather than in corridors. Together, these 
changes have meant real improvements for patients. (DoH, 2008: 13). 
Advances in science and technology, improved team working and an agenda that 
prioritises patient need has transformed the patient experience for better.  The way in 
which healthcare is conceived, organised and delivered has a direct impact on the 
content and structures of medical training and education.   
It is therefore unsurprising to find that the aims and priorities of the NHS are 
increasingly shaping the goals and aspirations of medical (surgeon) education.  On 
initial inspection, this may seem ideal: a close relationship between the prerogatives 
of health care and the objectives of the medical training programme.  Such 
collaboration should develop education programs that are current and fit for purpose, 
training doctors to provide appropriate medical care for patients.  
However, the difficulty arises when the purpose of medical education is obscured by 
the policies and practices associated with the business of delivering health care (NHS 
policy).  The main objective of medical education is to cultivate professionals imbued 
with the knowledge and skills needed to provide compassionate and appropriate care.  
NHS policy is concerned with the delivery of care, how the systems and services are 
best organised and managed to ensure patients receive the necessary care in safe 
and caring environments.  Certainly, it is critical that doctors in training are grounded 
in the practicalities of providing health care, as this is the reality of clinical practice in 
the NHS.  There is also good evidence to demonstrate that professional development 
situated in a clinical context is necessary for meaningful learning (Lave and Wenger, 
1991). 
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To provide an example of the above I recount the ward rounds I would undertake as a 
surgical trainee.  These were usually conducted at 8 am and included making 
decisions on which patients were fit for discharge from hospital that day.  It was not 
unusual to be called mid-morning by the Bed Manager and asked if I would discharge 
more patients.  The hospital was low on unoccupied beds and this would affect the 
admission of patients through the emergency department (without sufficient beds 
available patients would be kept waiting on trolleys or referred to another hospital 
providing their condition was not urgent).   
As a junior doctor, I would feel pressure to ‘create’ more unoccupied beds in the 
department.  I was aware that prolonging a patient’s hospital stay either by not 
expediting their treatment or by maintaining them on a ward when medical care was 
no longer required, was both inconvenient to the patient and placed an unnecessary 
financial burden on the hospital.  However, a doctor’s prerogative is to her patients 
and their clinical care: I could not discharge patients earlier than their clinical needs 
would permit.  Undergraduate studies in pathophysiology had equipped me with an 
understanding of the natural history of diseases.  Therefore, I could not send home a 
patient whose illness I had learned would require a longer period of inpatient care. 
Second, a commitment to ethical practice would prevent me from prematurely 
discharging a patient in good conscience.   
The reality of a doctor’s routine practice and the care involved in a patient’s hospital 
stay are constituted by these multiple issues, often conflicting.  They are not explicitly 
taught either on undergraduate or postgraduate training programs.  However, they 
remain important tensions in practice that a newly qualified doctor must learn to 
negotiate.  For this reason, (one of many) I would strongly agree that curriculae must 
reflect the actualities of clinical practice in the NHS.  But, these are not grounds for 
focusing medical education on the business of delivering health care.   
Doctors primarily provide specialist medical (surgical) care for patients and as such 
education programmes should be oriented around questions of how to cultivate the 
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knowledge and skills to achieve this.  In particular, to foster professionals who are 
compassionate in their care and thorough in their investigative processes, one may 
need to inquire as to what kind of doctor we hope to meet in health care?  This would 
pose similar questions as to the character of training; what is a surgical (medical) 
education for?  What is its purpose?   
At present, it is a challenge to answer these questions because the goal of healthcare 
we are told is the ‘pursuit of excellence’.  Therefore, one can assume that the purpose 
of medical education must be to create ‘purveyors of excellence’.  My personal belief 
is that such a paradigm confuses the role of clinicians from autonomous, ethical 
professionals to workmen labouring under the promise of excellence.   
b) The Francis Inquiry: patient safety 
The Mid Staffordshire inquiry, led by Sir Francis (2013), identified serious failings in 
health and social care at the NHS trust which led to unacceptable patient harm 
resulting in ‘appalling suffering’ as well as patient deaths.  This inquiry in addition to 
many other incidents over a decade (Bristol heart inquiry, Shipman, Winterbourne 
etc.) placed an intense scrutiny on harmful practices in healthcare.  The Francis report 
(2013) attributed the failures partly to a working culture that lacked openness, 
transparency and honesty in practice.  It created a decaying environment that was 
fertile for wilful neglect, poor practice, mistakes and errors.   
Recommendations were made that would increase the surveillance and checks on 
hospital systems and regulatory authorities (see Prof. Francis’ letter in Appendix A).  
Government policy and further inquiries explored measures to combat dangerous 
attitudes and practices in healthcare, (DoH 2014a, 2014b).  An example of the 
proposal included the overall objective to create ‘a culture of candour’ in clinical 
environments (DoH, 2014 a, 2014b, 2014c; RCS, 2015), that would make unsafe and 
potentially harmful situations unacceptable.  The overall outcome was the widespread 
initiative to place ‘patient safety’ at the centre of all systems, practices and training.   
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Patient safety has become a blanket term in modern medicine.  In my own surgical 
practice, I understand measures to ensure patient safety as: checking the correct site 
has been marked for surgery (for example; the left groin for a left hernia repair), that 
the equipment is working correctly, the patient is appropriately positioned on the 
operating table with the electrode pad correctly applied and adequate padding of their 
limbs to prevent injury, checking medication doses prior to administration, watchful 
care of the elderly to prevent falls from hospital beds.  These are a sample of the 
everyday tasks associated with making sure a patient comes to no harm whilst in 
hospital or undergoing medical treatment.  However, ‘the ethos of the safety culture’, 
has come to encompass all aspects of patient care.  This theme is examined closely 
in Chapter 5.    
Surgery, unlike other disciplines within Medicine, is defined by the risks that are 
quoted and in turn taken by the surgeon.  The modern awareness of adverse events 
and the procedural inquiries that follow have required that surgeons be fully 
accountable for all their actions.  Analysis of international data and literature has 
indicated that as much as 10% to 15% of patients admitted to hospital experience an 
adverse event not directly related to their underlying condition, around 50% of which 
has been classified as avoidable.  The majority of these patients have been identified 
as surgical, with half of all adverse events occurring in operating room (Vincent et al, 
2001; Flin and Mitchell, 2009).   
International adoption of checklists has gone some way toward diminishing the 
incidence of adverse events (Vincent et al, 2001). However, it is not an answer in 
itself, and it has refocused attention on the value of improving non-technical skills to 
ensure optimum outcomes for patients.  Non-technical skills are defined as those 
skills relating to attitude and behaviour, for example, team building, leadership, conflict 
resolution, listening ability.   One North American study demonstrated that poor 
communication was a causal factor in 43% of errors made in surgery (Gawande et al, 
2003).  Teamwork and decision making have also been shown to be causal in these 
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adverse events (Flin et al, 2007a, 2007b; .  This has led to the curriculum embracing 
the formal teaching and assessment of skills that previously had either been assumed 
inherent in a trainee or forgotten altogether.   
2.7  Challenges to Surgeon Education 
If surgical education is the enculturation of a surgical trainee into a prior defined, age 
old practice, then I propose that, “surgeon education” refers to an individual’s unique 
development and experiences through training.  But crucially, it is an account that 
derives from their personal perceptions and thoughts.  In a surgeon education, the 
focus of the educational theory shifts away from perpetuating a culture of surgery to 
exploring concepts that may unpack or expand an individual’s notion of professional 
practice.   
A surgeon-in-training will also study and experience knowledge and content not 
explicitly specified or even considered by the conventional curriculum.  As such, I am 
proposing that surgeon education goes beyond surgical education.  The lived reality of 
becoming a surgeon provides powerful educational opportunities which have been 
neglected and overlooked by conventional surgical education research.  How a 
surgeon in training understands and embodies the study and practice of the discipline, 
I propose, goes beyond an assimilation of the technical knowledge and theory.   
I argue the concept of a surgeon in training developing along trajectories that may not 
be understood or acknowledged by the present curriculum, must be strongly 
considered and embraced.  This development may occur independently of time, so 
that certain understandings of practice may be acquired prior to the expected stage as 
defined by the formal curriculum.  However, it can also be dependent on time, since it 
is through the passage of time that meaning may be constructed around some 
experiences.   
These different factors experienced in the lived reality of becoming a surgeon, create 
a co-existing and parallel affective training manual that has yet to be explored in the 
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research on postgraduate surgical education.  How this affective training manual 
shapes a surgeon’s sense of who they are becoming and how they choose to practice 
surgery both as a trainee and as a consultant surgeon is the key area of enquiry in 
this thesis.   
2.8  Summary 
The objective of this chapter is to locate the enquiry of this thesis within the broader 
context of surgical training and education.  I have presented a historical account 
detailing the evolution of Surgery as a medical discipline.  In addition, I have identified 
issues that impact on training.  
The poor regulation of the profession combined with investigations identifying 
unacceptable practices in healthcare created an urgent need to radically alter 
professional regulation as well as medical training schemes.  The aim of these 
measures was to make the profession more accountable to the human lives under 
their care.   
The difficulty arises in how the various forms of regulation have manifested in training 
and assessment programmes.  There is a rigorous system of assessment which has 
created tensions between how doctors are expected to perform and the reality of their 
everyday clinical interactions.   
I have concluded by identifying the surgeon-in-training as opposed to the surgical-
trainee.  This distinction exceeds pure semantics to argue for a recognition of the 
actual experiences of clinical practice that an individual surgeon-in-training undergoes 
routinely.  This ‘lived’ understanding of encounters of practice may reside in tension 
with the demands made by the more prescriptive, mandated aspects of clinical 
practice.  The latter is ‘forced’ to reflect the concerns of government policy as well as 
new developments in educational practice.  This may be necessary to ensure 
transparency and effectiveness of training schemes.  However, how it influences and 
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potentially changes learning encounters must be considered and reviewed critically, in 
order that trainees feel supported in their everyday practice.   
2.9  Statements Towards A Literature Review 
The next chapter examines how to explore these issues and the potential challenges 
posed by an unconventional methodological approach to investigating experiences of 
surgical practice.  The paucity of research literature in postgraduate medical 
education, which examines issues of experiencing from a philosophy derived 
theoretical base, has led to my decision to provide an alternative to the traditional 
literature review.  In Chapters 3 (methodology) and 4 (theoretical framework for 
analysis), I combine a limited review of surgical education literature (which is 
predominantly concerned with skills acquisition) with a more in depth analysis of 
philosophical discourse, to develop arguments that support my study rationale and 
research strategy.        
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Chapter 3 
Statements Towards a Methodology 
               
3.1  Introduction: My Methodological Position 
Physicians engaged in clinical medicine, whatever their specialty may be, are 
confronted by the same dilemma everyday: how to negotiate the contingency of actual 
events of clinical practice.  Put another way, clinicians are engaged in a daily struggle, 
to accurately predict, anticipate and control how a clinical event unfolds and manage 
its consequences.  This daily challenge is the incontrovertible reality of clinical 
practice, despite the best laid intentions and motivations (the meticulous efforts of the 
doctor and the desires of the patient to find answers and ‘get better’) and the most up 
to date scientific evidence and technical wizardry.   
However, the uncertainty of practice is dealt with in specific ways both by the official 
clinical guidelines and manuals as well as the medical training practices.  An example 
is the development of protocols, ‘clinical pathways’ and algorithms, which collectively 
constitute formal epistemologies to combat the uncertainty of medical practice.  These 
elements represent an application of rigour to structure and order the unexpected and 
unanticipated aspects of practice.  After all, doctors must be able to act decisively and 
effectively when caring for sick patients in risky and unpredictable situations.   
But, as I hypothesized in chapter 1, it is in these moments of uncertainty that clinicians 
first come to know the event of practice, through the affective force of the clinical 
encounter.  Through an engagement with the affective dimension, the form of the 
clinical encounter begins to emerge.  The surgeon can now grasp the experience, so 
that the event of practice begins to attain significance for the clinician, the encounter 
starts to matter to the doctor in ways that cannot be predicted or adequately 
anticipated.  These affective aspects of actual practice arise from the immanence of 
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clinical encounters, and lie in tension with the established protocols of transcendent 
medical practice.    
Therefore, at the heart of this thesis is an exploration of actual events of practice—the 
paradoxical relationship between the transcendent elements of practice and the 
immanence of actual clinical encounters.  To investigate how events of clinical 
practice affect surgeons, I propose a research strategy that unpacks clinician 
accounts of actual contingent practice, whilst, comparing and contrasting it with what 
is set out in the official guidelines and ethical codes of clinical practice. 
Given the above statements on my proposed research project, it is my contention that 
the traditional approach to writing a methodology chapter is not appropriate here.  
That is, a formal critique of the literature on established research methods and 
practices, with reference to my research strategy.  In addition, as I have stated in 
Chapter 1, medical education research has not explored events of practice from the 
perspective of the affective dimension.  For these reasons, I advocate an investigative 
method that is open and unconstrained by the hylomorphic frameworks of established 
research methodologies.   
My assertion is not to diminish prior research investigations, nor suggest that current 
methodologies are ineffective as a whole.  Rather, what I am proposing is a research 
strategy that recognises existing categories of medical education research (MER) and 
known or established analytic methods, but attempts to move beyond the limits of 
hylomorphic schemes.  Instead, I put forward narrative statements in this chapter that 
explain and discuss my research methodology.  It is a descriptive account of my PhD 
journey, which includes how I came to develop and organize my research question 
and strategy.   
I begin with a summary of my research strategy, followed by a review of the problems 
that need to be considered when developing this type of research enquiry.  I conclude 
with a reflexive account of the methodological approach I have developed to. 
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3.2  Summary of My Research Strategy 
To explore the research question, I collected specific accounts of clinical experience 
gathered from individual surgeons as well as my own clinical practice.  I employed a 
mixed methodology which comprised a philosophical discourse analysis of; policy 
documentation, training materials, semi-structured interviews with surgeons and 
educators and finally ethnographic field notes from my own experiences of clinical 
practice.  
I decided on a mixed research methodology, as I thought that this would foster the 
richness of detailed analysis as well as an approach that would consider the data from 
different perspectives.  Schifferdecker and Reed (2009) have supported this approach 
and concluded that it strengthens the conclusions reached by the project. Interviews 
were transcribed from audio recordings prior to an analysis using the theoretical 
framework.   
3.3  The Challenges To Developing A Research Strategy   
The pedagogical concerns of this thesis, as demonstrated in the organ procurement 
narrative (see Chapter 1), are concerned with expanding what is known and 
understood about how surgeons cope and learn in the thisness of unexpected clinical 
encounters.  This amounts to an exploration of the affective force of actual clinical 
encounters.  
I believe that such an undertaking is a complex endeavour because it delves into the 
messiness of lived experiences of practice.  For this reason, my research study does 
not concern itself with establishing the ‘truth’ of surgical training and practice.  
Although, I am interested in actual encounters of clinical practice, as expressed 
through the lived experiences of surgeons, my intention is not to explore notions of 
reality.  What I am concerned with is how ‘knowing’ and ‘mattering’ emerge from 
encounters with unexpected clinical practice.   
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a)  Examining aspects of experience that are obscured 
As discussed in Chapter 1, forms of knowing and mattering that arise from the 
uncertainty of clinical experience, can be expressed through thoughts and actions that 
are non-visible or intangible within the parameters of standard pedagogic practice.  
Therefore, established practices of teaching and learning may not consider these 
aspects of learning encounters or even disregard their pedagogic significance to the 
learner.  An example of this, is the ‘speechlessness of practice’ I exhibit at the organ 
procurement.  To the casual observer or indeed surgical trainer, my state of physical 
paralysis would not alert him to the intrinsic affective processes that had been 
triggered by the event of practice.  The affective force of the organ procurement 
encounter had a powerful impact on me, which is ongoing to this day.  Therefore, the 
question arises as to how the affective nature of clinical experiences can be identified 
and explored.   
In the realm of medical education research, an affective project that explores 
experiencing within events of practice has yet to be conceived.  ‘Experiencing’ tends 
to be examined from a dual perspective.  First, skills acquisition, measured through 
quantitative means (Arora et al, 2009; Beard, 2008; Bell et al, 2011a, 2011b).  This 
approach views experiencing as an uptake of discrete skills such as technical 
proficiency or clinical judgment.   
Second, through reflective exercises that require verbal explication or written 
documentation (Sumsion and Richardson, 2000; Boud and Walker, 1998; Mann et al, 
2009).  However, the difficulty arises in how reflection and reflective practice have 
been applied to the curriculum—influenced by the wider discourses of assessment 
and evidence.  Paradoxically, clinicians must prove their reflective dispositions.  The 
nature of reflection is as an open, considered and thoughtful activity.  It cannot be 
confined by time constraints or defined by the demands to prove evidence that one 
has engaged in ‘rational’ reflection.  In addition to the below section, these themes are 
discussed further in Chapter 6.       
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b)  The limits of reflection 
Schon (1983) coined the term ‘reflective practice’, drawing on Dewey’s notions of 
reflection (1910).  John Dewey defined reflection as: ‘Active, persistent and careful 
consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in light of the grounds that 
support it and the further conclusion to which it tends, constitutes reflective thought’ 
(ibid., 9).  These ideas have been used within professional practice, to develop a 
practice-based knowledge that derives from carefully considering how one thinks and 
does within specific situations (Moon, 1999; Redmond, 2004).  The outcome is 
reflection as a process of knowledge creation which is then checked (to ensure that 
learning has occurred) through an array of assessments (Hall et al, 2012; Ng, 2012).   
However, these notions of reflection conceive thinking as a rational activity and 
behaviours and conducts in practice as premised on prior cognitive processes.  But, 
what about the ‘speechlessness of practice’, the ‘physical inaction of practice’ or other 
responses visceral or otherwise to the thisness of clinical practice?  How do these 
initial reactions, which may lack a cognitive foundation, be interpreted through the 
current framework of reflection in practice?  As I discuss in Chapter 4, 5 and 6, these 
responses to the immediacy of practice tend to be categorized as anomalies or as 
associated with inexperience in clinical practice.   
Ng et al (2015) argue for a reorientation of reflective practice as more than a 
pedagogic tool or technique to acquire knowledge: 
‘Reflective practice as a way of being transcends traditional assessment; it is 
an orientation through which one practices, continually challenges one’s own 
assumptions, and builds new knowledge. . . reflective practice demands a 
space to broaden understandings of reflection at an epistemological and 
theoretical level. . . understanding inquiry and experimentation within practice 
as opportunities for the generation of knowledge, and as avenues for 
navigating uncertainty and complexity.’ (p. 464, original emphasis). 
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The authors emphasise reflection as a theoretical framework in itself with which to 
analyse the complexity of practice, and develop ways of practicing that can be 
personally transformative and clinically effective.    
However, while these efforts to re-engage with reflection as a theoretical orientation 
and an epistemology of practice (rather than submitting to the reductionism of the 
assessment agenda) are welcome, they stop short of providing answers to my 
questions regarding the affective force of events of practice.  Therefore, I looked 
beyond traditional and well established methods of analysing data gleaned from 
surgical experiences. 
c) The search for an appropriate research methodology: my PhD 
journey 
I consider how I developed this research study, over a period of 6 years, as a 
culmination of personal struggles with institutions, supervisors, negotiating conflicting 
tensions between the paradigms of medical science and social science, relearning 
critical analysis through the lens of sociological and philosophical discourse.  In the 
first year of my PhD I moved from the original institution in which my research degree 
was based, Imperial College London (ICL), an institution that specializes in technology 
and science, to the other end of the educational spectrum, Goldsmith’s College, a 
smaller liberal arts school.   
Capturing the multiple realities 
My shift in institutions was partly motivated by a dissatisfaction with the research 
approach advocated by Imperial College academic staff.  I embraced the scientific 
mode of enquiry, a demand for rigour in all research processes and an ability to 
rationalize and justify all decisions pertaining to methodology and analysis.  But, 
paradoxically I found the scientific approach limited and ineffective when exploring the 
messiness of actual experiences of practice.  The scientific method forced an artificial 
and hylomorphic order onto the chaos of human experience through an application of 
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numerical scales and calculations.  I concluded that an investigation of the 
experiencing that occurred within events of practice required a broader approach.  
One that could accommodate the multiple realities embedded within an encounter of 
practice.    
One of my supervisors at the time, accepted a new position at Goldsmith’s college, 
and I decided to follow him to this institution.  Once a student at Goldsmith’s college, I 
was exposed to the various research philosophies and methodologies that constitute 
the social sciences.  In addition, I started to explore the spectrum of qualitative tools 
that were available to examine experience; autobiography, ethnography, surveys and 
interviews.  Over the course of the next year, another four supervisors came and 
went!  Some left because of new job opportunities or a change in personal 
circumstances.  Others, because our respective visions of how the research should be 
developed and conducted were too different to be reconciled.   
An example of this was one supervisor’s resolute belief and inclination towards 
developing my study along feminist epistemologies, as a piece of feminist writing.  
Although I am a female surgeon, with an educational and practical experience of 
surgical training that was often influenced by my status as a woman, I was very clear 
that my research questions pertained to all surgical trainees regardless of gender.  In 
the course of conducting this research investigation, I have read many feminist writers 
and theorists, Judith Butler, in particular informs my approach to discourse analysis.  
However, my exploration of surgical training and practice transcends possible gender 
divides and issues that may specifically confront female trainees, such as the 
machoism evident in some practices.   
When I finally settled on my present supervisor, Dennis Atkinson, we shared a 
common vision of how philosophical theory and discourse could help me unpack the 
intricacies and complexities of experiencing within clinical environments.  A theoretical 
framework constructed on the writings of Alain Badiou, Michel Foucault, Alfred North 
Whitehead, Gilbert Simondon and Brian Massumi, to name a few, promised the 
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necessary analytic rigour to address the affective force of clinical encounters of 
practice.       
Personal documentation of practice 
I had kept field notes throughout my surgical training and consultant practice, to 
describe events of practice and my associated thoughts and actions.  I returned to 
these ethnographic accounts of surgical practice and explored themes such as, 
providing care in complex environments, negotiating uncertainty in practice, emotions 
in practice (feelings of humiliation, surprise, anger and grief), learning in difficult 
situations.  I used these themes to guide my reading of the above philosophers.  For 
example, Alain Badiou’s (1992) notion of truth and event when struggling to 
understand and conceptualise ideas regarding conduct in contingent environments.       
The reading of theoretical philosophy texts informed my analysis of training materials 
and policy documents.  In addition, the philosophical discourses also helped to 
construct my research questions, as well as the later interview questions.  In the 
below sections, I elaborate further on these elements of my research strategy.   
d) Using interviews to examine ‘experiencing’ and ‘events of 
practice’ 
I decided to collect data on events of practice through a series of interviews with 
surgeons.  I felt this approach would allow me to look at how clinical practice is 
experienced as reported by the individual surgeon’s encounter with it.  I decided on an 
interview as opposed to a survey because my aim was to attempt to capture the 
breadth and range of thoughts, emotions, affectations4 and actions experienced in 
practice.  I reasoned that an interview approach would provide me with narrative 
accounts that were rich in data and amenable to a closer scrutiny.   
																																																						
4 Derived from Spinoza to capture how a being affects and is in turn affected by the encounter.   
 72 
Although, I had decided that interviews would be the best method for the collection of 
data around experiencing, I was also aware that interviews in and of themselves 
never actually capture living experiences (Kvale, 1996. Hammersley 1989; Silverman 
2006).  However, the focus of my research is precisely on the thisness of experience.  
How then would I reconcile these two facts?  I discovered in the pilot interviews, that 
the narrative accounts hint at the affective nature of experiencing.  Therefore, I 
developed an interview technique around eliciting further these affective nuances.  In 
addition, the theoretical analysis is also oriented on illuminating notions of affective 
thinking.  These challenges demonstrate the difficulties of researching lived realities 
(Van Manen, 1990). 
Interviews: capturing lived experiences 
A lived experience does not confront me as something perceived or 
represented; it is not given to me, but the reality of lived experience is there-
for-me because I have a reflexive awareness of it, because I possess it 
immediately as belonging to me in some sense.  Only in thought does it 
become objective.  (Dilthey, 1985: 223).    
The above statement refers to the here and now of experience, to be aware of an 
event as one is going through it.  This is best illustrated by the interview process.  In 
posing questions to the surgeon, I am ‘putting him on the spot’.  He becomes aware of 
his experience of being interviewed while he is still experiencing it.  Therefore, lived 
experience has a temporal structure: ‘it can never be grasped in its immediate 
manifestation but only reflectively as past presence, (Van Mannen, 1990: 36).  Thus, 
interviews can attempt to appropriate the meaning of lived experience, but it can 
never fully capture the richness or depth of the experience. 
Pilot interviews 
I conducted pilot interviews, for the purpose of investigating the scope of data 
available to this study and to inform the question design.  Three pilot interviews were 
conducted with very senior surgeons (more than 15 years of consultant practice).  
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These early test interviews helped me to finalise the duration of each interview (1 
hour), the structure of the questions, to identify potential difficulties with acquiring 
responses and to be cognisant of the practical challenges of the interview process. 
Interview questions  
I divided the interview into two halves.  In the first fifteen minutes, I pursued a light 
form of questioning which allowed the interviewee to ‘settle’ into the process by 
responding to questions about their biography: when they decided to pursue 
Medicine, where they trained, what aspects of surgical practice they enjoyed/disliked 
and so on.  Appendix B contains a list of the questions, surgeon profile document, 
interview letters and consent form.  
Once a rapport was established and the interviewees felt comfortable and relaxed, I 
moved on to questions that concerned areas of training that interested me.  This 
primarily comprised how the surgeon gathered or developed her knowledge for daily 
practice.  In answering these questions, I probed subjects about whether they relied 
on textbooks, research papers, peer discussions and support or independent 
experience of practice to inform and develop their knowledge of practice.  I asked the 
surgeon to give examples of events of practice, if they could remember any, which 
had led to some new learning or understanding of surgical practice.  In effect, I was 
inquiring about transformative events of practice which had influenced or shaped 
thoughts, actions and future conduct.  I used my first experience at the organ 
procurement as an example to communicate what I meant by my question.   
Interview analysis 
Common approaches to interview analysis (Kvale, 1996), include an application of 
grounded theory to draw out shared themes, such as; ‘honesty’, ‘depression’, 
‘grittiness’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Charmaz, 2007; Bryant and Charmaz, 2007).  
However, it is not my intention to quantify certain behaviours or ways of thinking, in an 
attempt to draw conclusions about what it means to be a practitioner (Schon, 1983; 
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Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983; Elliot, 2005).  This refers to my earlier comments on 
establishing the ‘truth’ of surgical training and practices.   
Instead, by eliciting narrative examples of clinical experience, I am not concerned with 
establishing these accounts as representative or typical of clinical practice and as 
such containing objective truths.  Instead, my purpose is to explore the accounts of 
clinical events from the perspective of how they are recounted.  That is, to examine 
the ‘telling’, ‘structuring’ and ‘reasoning’ of the stories, which may illuminate how the 
clinical experience matters to an individual.  My main preoccupation in this research, 
is how the content of the story indicates what matters to a trainee in that moment and 
in the time that has passed.   
Therefore, my analysis of the interviews begins from the premise that clinical practice 
is uncertain and requires responding in the moment as the event of practice unfolds.  I 
then look to see how my theoretical framework can be employed to unravel and 
unpack events of practice, to understand better what is implicated in the described 
thoughts and actions.  The objective is to gain a deeper understanding of what factors 
are involved in how a doctor affectively experiences an event and therefore makes 
sense of it and learns from it. 
e)  Selecting participants and organising interviews 
Practical difficulties in organizing interviews 
The early pilot interviews demonstrated the main difficulty I would face when selecting 
participants for the study: finding surgeons who could spare the time from the 
demands of busy and unpredictable NHS practice.  Frequently, interviews were 
cancelled at the last minute due to surgical operations that had required more time 
than had been initially expected or supporting a colleague (senior and junior) with the 
care of a patient or surgeons finding themselves oncall suddenly and so on.   
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In total, I contacted 15 surgeons, 8 were consultants and 7 were trainees.  While all 
showed appropriate interest and a genuine desire to help me with my enquiries, the 
reality was that I was only able to successfully complete 8 interviews.  This was 
mainly due to the difficulty of negotiating complex work schedules and oncall 
commitments.   
Two of the interviews were conducted ‘face to face’, while the remaining five were 
conducted via Skype or Facetime.  This again was due to difficulties experienced in 
finding appropriate times to speak about complex topics which would require both 
time and a lack of interruption.  In the end, I collected interviews from 4 consultant 
surgeons and 3 surgical trainees.   
Who were the participants?  Why were they chosen? 
The four consultants I interviewed had been appointed between 2011 and 2015, whilst 
the trainees were in the final years of surgical training.  I decided to use interview 
subjects who were in the latter stages of training or had become consultants recently 
for the following reasons.   
First, both senior trainees and junior consultants were the group most likely to have 
the time and inclination to speak about training experiences.  I believe this was 
because these surgeons had either finished, or were finishing training and therefore, 
had a tendency to reflect on their training experiences with eloquent and thoughtful 
descriptions.   
Second, they were also the group of surgeons who had the least busy schedules.  
Although, I would emphasise that the standard of ‘busy-ness’ was already very high 
across the profession.  But, this cohort of subjects was marginally less busy than their 
counterparts.  
Third, I felt that junior trainees might struggle to describe events of practice that were 
memorable, given the shorter number of years they had spent in training, 
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comparatively.  Senior trainees were more likely to have varied experiences that they 
could draw on to illustrate their thoughts and opinions.  This assumption was based 
on my own practice as a surgical trainee and trainer, observing the levels of 
experience that were demonstrated by trainees at all stages of training. 
Fourth, senior trainees and junior consultants tend to engage in training other doctors 
more readily.  This is for different reasons which I base on my own experience and 
observations as there is a paucity of research to support these ideas.  Senior trainees 
are often charged with observing or assisting other junior colleagues through 
procedures, as they are expected to act in a more senior capacity.  Junior consultants 
tend to be enthused about training, having recently completed their own training 
years.   
Finally, I was aware that my own position as a surgeon could influence the course of 
the interview or the answers provided because of the relations of power.  As a junior 
consultant, I was unlikely to pose a ‘threat’ or cause discomfort amongst the senior 
trainees, who as it happened, considered me a peer in the interview process.  A more 
junior trainee might feel intimidated or paradoxically demonstrate a need to show how 
robust or capable they were when managing the complexities of clinical care.  I noted 
in the pilot interviews that the senior consultants tended to treat me as an ingénue, a 
junior colleague who would benefit clinically from stories of their experiences, rather 
than viewing me as a researcher engaged in a study.   
I attempted to balance the gender and ethnicity amongst my interviewees, 3 are male 
surgeons and 5 are female.  Five participants are classed as white British and three 
as Asian.  In addition to the surgeon interviews I also conducted a further two 
interviews with educators at the Royal College of Surgeons, involved in the delivery of 
training programmes and development of educational policy.  Both educators are 
white British, one female, the other male.   
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The pilot interviews demonstrated the importance of establishing a good rapport with 
the subject to assure confidence and confidentiality in the reporting.  Often sensitive 
issues were discussed.  I found that my opportunity to probe and question the 
answers was improved by the existence of some prior familiarity between myself and 
the surgeon.  This was particularly important when encouraging honest accounts of 
practice which risked admissions of errors or other oversights (see below for further 
development of this point).  I therefore developed a network of potential surgeon 
interviewees.  Every interview subject was either known to me directly through a prior 
working relationship or was referred to me by a colleague I was familiar with.  This 
helped to create a confidential environment that encouraged the interviewee to speak 
openly and honestly about their experiences of clinical practice.   
All interviewees were contacted by telephone initially to establish availability and 
interest.  I then sent emails with details regarding the format of the interview, 
examples of the types of questions being asked as well as a consent form to 
participate in the research study.  The interviews were on average 75 minutes long 
and recorded on audio files, which I later transcribed.  Interviewees were offered the 
option of access to transcripts of the interviews if they so desired.  None requested a 
transcript (see appendix B for consent forms and letters of introduction).   
f)  Ethics and honesty 
Central to the investigation was the attempt to uncover honest accounts of practices 
(as opposed to truthful accounts).  These stories might include admissions of 
perceived ‘negative behaviours’, such as; clinician failure or error, poor judgement, 
shock, sadness, inexperience, incompetence, disillusionment, disappointment and 
guilt.  These ‘felt qualities’ can have unfavourable associations with practice, though I 
hypothesise that they are implicated in how an individual experiences an encounter of 
practice and makes sense of it.   
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I described the aforementioned thoughts, emotions and feelings, which may or may 
not be grounded in cognition as ‘felt qualities’ - ‘felt’5 because they are perceived by 
the individual but not always in ways that are conscious or captured by language.  The 
objective of my research was not to judge or cast aspersions on an individual’s 
conduct, I was interested in what had motivated the felt qualities and how practice 
was shaped and influenced by these, if at all.   
To gather such sensitive data, trust was critical in establishing a rapport that led to 
surgeons speaking frankly about their experiences and relating honest insights.  For 
this reason, I requested interviews from surgeons I had either worked under as a 
trainee in the past (3 of the 8 interviewees) or knew through my training days though 
we each belonged to different specialties.  For example, I trained in transplantation 
but the interview subject may have trained in orthopaedics or ENT and therefore our 
paths may have crossed when we referred patients to each other in the hospital.   
Stephen Ball describes how when addressing the ‘organisational underworld’ (Hoyle, 
1982; 87) it was those interviewees whom he knew who trusted him: ‘not surprisingly 
the better I knew my interviewee the more candid the disclosures tended to be’ (Ball, 
1991; 178-179).  As each of the surgeons knew me in some capacity there was a 
sense that I had shared similar experiences of practice and would understand their 
thoughts and feelings.  I discovered that my position as a ‘familiar face’ and ‘insider’ 
was instrumental in gaining the trust of a respective interviewee and facilitated a form 
of questioning that could be probing even if it elicited feelings of discomfort in the 
interviewee.  From a practical stance, ethics approval was acquired for this study, 
given the confidential nature of the responses. 
																																																						
5 In developing this term, I take inspiration from Whitehead and Massumi’s writings on ‘feelings’ and 
‘affect’.   
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3.4 A Reflexive Stance: My Thoughts On The Research 
Methodology 
a)  The interview process 
I was pleasantly surprised by how willing surgeons were, in general, to assist me with 
my research efforts.  Most were intrigued by the opportunity to speak freely and 
confidentially about how they conceived their practice.  My initial difficulty once 
engaged in the actual process of interviewing was getting interviewees to realise that 
the interview was not about their awareness of official protocols and hospital policy or 
an assessment of their surgical knowledge!   
For example, one interviewee proceeded to speak in great length about the hospital 
protocols for monitoring and reporting adverse events.  However, the question I had 
actually posed was what was his personal experience of adversity in practice and how 
did he cope with it.  This did make me realise how as medical practitioners we 
become ‘institutionalised’ in our thinking and acting, in assiduous ways that are not 
apparent to us at first.  This echoes Foucault’s (2002) writing on power in which he 
states that we come to desire the power relations which entangle and subjugate us.  
In the case of this interviewee, the hospital protocol on adverse events had been 
adopted by him to explain and cope with the consequences of medical error.   
I found that giving my own example of the organ procurement story a helpful tool in 
orienting the surgeon about what exactly I was keen to know about their practice.  
This seemed to clarify the questions and it produced accounts of experiences that I 
was hoping to uncover.   
All the surgeons spoke with an impressive level of honesty and thoughtfulness.  They 
were keen to remain anonymous and I assured them that I would mask all identifiers 
in their stories.  This included their names, where they worked, their ethnicities as well 
as the specific details of the clinical stories.  The surgeon narratives I subsequently 
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chose to use, contain patient details that have been altered, so that there is no 
recognizable link to the actual patient.   
b)  Active interviewing 
Holstein and Gubrium (1995) introduce an approach to the process of interviewing 
which ‘activates narrative production’ (p. 39).  This is the theory that interviews are a 
‘meaning-making practice’ (ibid., 4) between researcher and interview participant: a 
co-constructive exploration of meaning.  I undertook this research project from the 
perspective of understanding experience as initially constituted by affective forces.  I 
have identified themes and ideas in the interviews from this research position.  This 
has allowed me to theorise how surgeons experience events of practice.  In a similar 
way, my research subjects participated in the interviews to express their thoughts and 
opinions on how they learn and grow in practice.  The cooperative nature of the 
interview has provided a discursive space in which to extend and hypothesise aspects 
of clinical practice which hitherto have not been examined or theorised.      
c)  Philosophical discourse to construct a theoretical framework 
Surgical education research has yet to embrace philosophical concepts as a way of 
exploring and analysing events of practice and the notion of experiencing in clinical 
environments.  The complex nature of providing surgical care in unexpected and 
unpredictable situations of clinical practice cannot be overcome or managed by a 
singular approach that emphasizes the protocols and guidelines extolled by official 
manuals of surgical practice or clinical policy.  The interviews demonstrated this fact 
to me very clearly.  I believe that philosophical theories may help to enhance how the 
medical profession can engage more affectively and effectively with the contingency 
of clinical encounters.   
Pickering’s (1993) notion of ‘the dance of agency’ in which he examines the real-time 
understanding of practice as an interplay between human forms of agency (patient, 
doctor) and non-human forms of agency (medical technology, procedural equipment, 
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hospital policies, waiting times and so on) is particularly relevant to an analysis of 
events of practice.  It expresses clearly the complex nature of the reciprocity between 
the thoughts and actions of the doctor and the patient.  The clinical practice that 
constitutes this encounter is the milieu of the dance—the diagnosis given by the 
doctor, the treatment plan organized, the patient’s questions and understanding of 
what is occurring and yet to happen.  Attempting to understand the layers of this 
‘dance’ is the struggle of my research methodology.  I believe that philosophical 
discourse may help provide an alternative method of examining how surgeons think, 
do and act in the acuity of events of practice.   
In the next chapter, I present a theoretical framework based on philosophical 
discourse to unpack the objects of my research (interviews, policy documents and 
auto-ethnography).  Chapter 4 is an extension of the themes outlined in this 
discussion on methodology.  It examines how best to achieve the aims that have been 
set out in the research strategy.   
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Preface to Chapter 4 
               
Chapter two provided an account of the factors involved in how medical pedagogies in 
practice are conditioned and structured.  This included, transcendent frameworks, 
historical events, as well as political and social issues.  Medical education research 
(MER) has explored the impact of these factors through specific methodologies.    
Evidence based medicine (EBM) 
An example is the growing tendency in MER to use research methods that reflect the 
principles of evidence-based medicine (EBM).  What is EBM?  In brief, EBM is an 
approach to clinical problem solving that involves searching for evidence from 
randomised controlled trials, systematic reviews, and meta-analyses.   
This thesis is not a critique of EBM.  However, the difficulty in MER is that the EBM 
approach has pre-determined what is and what is not deemed to be relevant in 
educational experiences, as well as, what activities constitute ‘evidence’ of learning 
and assimilation.  But, I want to emphasise that certain practices, ways of thinking, 
doing and being are obscured or considered irrelevant by an approach that views the 
diverse activities in education through a singular lens.  
An example of this is how quantitative approaches have been adopted to analyse 
behavioural components that underline skills acquisition, abilities to communicate and 
work in teams or clinical decision-making (Reznick et al, 1997; Rosser et al, 1997; 
Rosen et al, 2002; Schwind et al, 2004; Leblanc et al, 2009; Richstone et al, 2010).  
There is also an expanding body of research which investigates the role of simulation 
to recreate the reality of clinical experiencing (Buck, 1991; Kneebone, 2010; 
Kneebone et al, 2001, 2004; Beyea, 2004; Kassab et al, 2011).   
The shortcomings of traditional pedagogies 
As mentioned in chapter 1, the difficulty with these investigative approaches is that 
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they apply hylomorphic principles to studying experiences of learning and practice.  
This method of analysis can be problematical, if it functions in ways that recognise 
and legitimize only those aspects of performance that are already known, or defined 
by prior approved categories of learning and practice.       
I therefore suggest, that traditional pedagogical methods, with their transcendent 
forms of knowledge and practice, are inadequate to disclose the subtle and intangible 
elements of practical clinical experience (Frank, 2013; Whitehead, 2013; 
Martimianakis and Albert, 2013).  Why might this be?  Established teaching and 
learning models tend to focus on what is visible and demonstrable in a clinical setting.  
This includes, a trainee’s expressed communication and observable behaviour.  Such 
a conception of clinical education and training may neglect the unseen and unspoken 
aspects of an actual clinical event of practice: the affective forces that arise and are 
difficult to predict. 
‘Knowing’ that is immanent to clinical events 
Thus, I am not proposing a body of established external or transcendent knowledge, 
as generated by the above research regimes, to judge learning and practice.  Instead, 
I attempt to work with the notion of a kind of knowing on the inside, as it emerges in 
events of practice.  But, externally applied knowledge, although useful, tends to 
presuppose a particular subject of knowledge.  One that is grounded in an 
epistemology created from past experiences.  Whereas, in the process of knowing on 
the inside, or knowing which is immanent to events, knowing and the subject are not 
prior established entities.  Rather, they emerge through the flux of experiencing that 
constitutes the event.   
Applications of social theory in medical education research 
What I emphasize in this approach, is the knowing that emerges through the 
intensities of affect, which form and develop in an encounter of practice.  As 
mentioned, this is not how clinical knowing or learning has traditionally been examined 
 84 
or understood (i.e. through a framework of EBM).  Nevertheless, in recent years, 
aspects of social theory are increasingly being used to research medical education.  
What are the ways in which this approach is used in MER?   
First, an exploration of the MER literature, identified the widespread use of specific 
methodologies associated with social theory.  This included semi structured 
interviews, case studies and surveys (Bourhis et al, 1989; Keddy et al, 1986, Weller et 
al, 2008; Arora et al, 2009; Singh et al, 2013; Bhatti et al, 2015; Cope et al, 2015, 
2016).  Second, some studies used well established qualitative techniques such as 
grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin, 1990) or thematic 
analysis (initially introduced in psychology) (Braun and Clarke, 2006).  However, aside 
from established methodologies, how are the actual philosophies that underpin social 
theory, being used to critically examine issues in medical education and training?   
An investigation of the research literature into undergraduate medical education 
demonstrated a fledgling appeal and movement to use social theory as a conceptual 
framework for critical analysis (Frank, 2013).  This has included an application of the 
writings of Bourdieu and Foucault to critique undergraduate programs in medicine 
(Brosnan, 2009; 2010, Frank, 2013; McNaughton, 2013).   
By contrast, there appears to be no such approach to research in postgraduate 
surgical education.  I was not able to uncover any research studies or editorials in the 
surgical education literature, that use philosophical concepts and theory to critically 
examine issues in training.  As a consequence, I have included a limited literature 
review of specific research focused on the education of surgeons.  
An alternative research approach in postgraduate surgical education 
In this research study, I intend to draw upon selected philosophical literature in order 
to explore how learning emerges through actual events of practice.  In addition, I 
investigate how such learning may effect changes in surgical practice, in contrast to 
the learning that emerges through the acquisition of established clinical knowledge 
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and procedures in surgery. 
Throughout this chapter, I introduce a philosophical framework to explore the notion of 
‘experiencing’ in contingent surgical practice which I described earlier as a 
‘speechlessness of practice’ (see Chapter 1).   
I have hypothesized that this eventful learning has important implications for how 
surgeons in training construct meaning within actual encounters of practice.  It entails 
a response to a clinical encounter that accommodates how the event presents itself 
and how it is sensed and interpreted.   
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Chapter 4 
A Theoretical Framework:  Part One 
               
4.1  Entangled Subjectivities 
AOM: I’m interested in your encounters of daily practice and how you are able to cope 
in the immediacy of a clinical event, the moments in which it unfurls and the minutes 
or hours that are consumed by this particular event.  How does your clinical training 
prepare you for such situations?  How do you make sense of it?  
R: I think you’re referring to what I call ‘emotional moments’.  To think that we are 
non-emotional creatures is not true.  Our emotion and mental being affects our 
operating.  From the simplest thing of when I go into an operating list, I don’t fight with 
the children that morning!  No arguments.  Just a chilled breakfast.  I get into my Zen 
because that WHO_ checklist which states in the last question, “is everyone well in the 
team?  Or is there anything bothering the team that’s going to affect the list?”  That’s 
an important one.  And I would declare that I have been up last night on call, or I want 
to go for my-whatever-children’s thing in the evening.  I think that emotional state is 
important, you know.  I guess there are times when you’re operating as a consultant 
and its basically emergency surgery, because elective surgery is very much follow 
these ten steps, systematic.  But when you go into an emergency, that is when all the 
uncertainty arises and sometimes you get called into someone else’s operating 
theatre because they’ve damaged something and they need your help to fix it or sort it 
out. . .  
I remember going to see a female patient in ITU.  She had had a horrendous, horrible, 
horrible experience and ended up losing parts of her body and had bled so much.  I 
wasn’t present at her original surgery but even just hearing about it was itself so 
traumatic.   I got told about this woman at 7.45 in the morning to say she was being 
taken to theatre at any moment.  But that morning was my daughter’s school 
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assembly, and I was all set to go for that for ten minutes.  I called back home and my 
daughter was in tears when I told her that I was not going to make it.  Then I had to 
speak to my husband to tell him, please video it or whatever.  But it was bothering me 
that I wasn’t going to be there.  And then I got told off by the medical director because 
I had rushed into the hospital, holding my bag and I wasn’t appropriately ‘bare below 
the elbows’!_  So when I started that operation I wanted all of that out of my head . . . 
so I basically told the team of doctors who were with me, and for me just telling them 
this, was enough to get it out of my head.  I can’t be there, I just can’t.  I’m oncall and 
this is my duty, I have to be here for the patient.  For me, telling someone else was 
enough to transfer the guilt if you like and get on with the task at hand.  I needed to 
focus because this patient had suffered a terrible injury, a significant one.  Operating 
that day, the surgery was very difficult, there were two other surgeons in the room . . .  
and you realise that you’ve tried all the manoeuvres that you know about, but 
NOTHING has worked!  Then what do you do?  You call for help. . . You realise at 
that point that you have to stop.  You have to close up, it might be absolutely fine and 
if you need to go back in, then you need to go back in.  If you need to do more 
investigations, then you need to do more investigations.  But that thing of learning to 
stop, which you do learn in very small ways . . . It’s then having to sit it out for the next 
three days and watch her, all the parameters (urine output, haemoglobin, creatinine). . 
. Do I think about what she’s going through?  Of course . . . On the drive into work that 
day and the drive home and days after that, when I see her later in clinic, I can’t help 
but think that she has been through a lot and how can anyone understand what she 
has been through?!  I don’t think about it too much in a way, especially when you’re 
dealing with the surgical problem.  You have to dissociate it, that emotional bit of it.  
And dealing with the emotions is the really important bit, because otherwise I think it 
would overwhelm me.  Just hearing about the story starts to make you upset . . . you 
know . . . as a fellow human being.  
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4.2  Introduction 
How surgeons sense or cope with the immediacy of practice, the ways in which 
unanticipated encounters of clinical practice inform the knowledge or knowing that 
arises from the event is the central preoccupation of this thesis.  I use ‘sense’ to mean 
two things: an interpretation of clinical practice and the sensations experienced within 
a clinical encounter.  In pedagogical terms, this question has implications for a 
learner’s mode of learning as well as how an educator orients and conceives teaching 
practices.  As explained in the preface to this chapter, ‘making sense’ of daily clinical 
experience is an area that has been developed in specific ways within medical 
education.  Two specific points stand out.   
a)  Thinking and doing as cognitive processes 
First, pedagogic attempts to reform and better comprehend medical education start 
from a premise that clinical learning and understanding are primarily rational 
processes.  That is, how trainees experience clinical practice is principally through 
cognitive processes of reasoning and logic which can be fragmented into discrete 
component parts.  For example, the work on ‘uncertainty’ in medical practice is widely 
conceived through a biomedical discourse of clinical reasoning (Mattingly, 1988; Little, 
1995; Logan and Scott, 1995; Wilson, 2000; West and West, 2002; Yuill et al, 2010; 
Guenter et al, 2011) (see also chapter 4).  It states that uncertainty can be reduced or 
eliminated by an application of evidence-based medicine (EBM) and standardisation 
of health care processes to create predictability and objective knowledge (Sacket et 
al, 1996; Timmermans and Berg, 2003).   
As illustrated in the above as well as other narratives in this thesis, the uncertainty 
that arises in clinical practice, is the eternal condition of all medical practice.  It is 
impossible to adequately control and fully anticipate how any clinical interaction in the 
realm of doctor-patient relations may unfold (Greenhalgh, 2013, 2014).  As such, it is 
also difficult to predict how the event may proceed to transform the clinician by 
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triggering new worlds of interpretation, understanding, and knowing.   
b)  Clinical learning occurs in contingent environments 
Second, what a learner needs to know (derived from the educational, historical and 
social priorities of society at this time) such as, demonstrable proficiency, anatomical 
theory, physiological principals, clear and concise communication, are crucial to 
developing competent and safe medical practice.  A comprehensive and replicable 
approach which can be used with ease in situations of uncertainty, utilising 
appropriate skills, is a necessity.  This is not refuted. 
c)  An expanded approach to learning in contingent environments 
But, to extend the understanding of what patient care and surgical training can 
become, requires going beyond established ways of thinking and doing, to break open 
the pedagogic confines of what is known and accepted.  Such a pedagogic ‘explosion’ 
may permit new knowledges, practices and ways of being to emerge from local events 
of learning (Atkinson, 2011, 2016).  A pedagogy of the surgical event, as proposed 
here, is grounded in the contingency of surgical practice, acknowledging the 
immanent nature of clinical relations and practice.  Such a pedagogy, has the 
potential to ‘rupture’ what is already known and assimilated by recognising that actual 
events of practice are unplanned and unpredictable.  
d)  ‘Mattering’ in encounters of clinical practice 
The key objective of this chapter, is to provide the theoretical foundations for a 
pedagogy, that prioritises, how something matters to a surgeon within a learning 
encounter.  Put another way, the aim is to emphasise how an event of practice is 
affectively experienced by the surgeon and how it attains significance for the 
practitioner.  As opposed to what is prescribed and valued within official training 
materials of surgery.   
In the above narrative, Radha, a consultant surgeon who works in a teaching hospital 
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outside of London, describes how she responded in an acute event of surgical 
practice, when she was the oncall surgeon.  Her narrative raises three points in 
particular, that I wish to examine, through a number of philosophical writings that I 
have selected.   
e)  Entangled relations in actual events of clinical practice 
First, Radha asserts the importance of ‘keeping in check’ her emotional state.  She 
identifies the need to control her emotions, which range from “guilt” and anxiety about 
her daughter, to feeling “upset” about the fate of the female patient.  Her rationale is 
that these emotions will overwhelm her, and negatively impact on her need to focus 
on the patient.   
Her description clearly illustrates the entangled relations intimated in how a doctor 
thinks and acts in clinical practice.  These involve personal concerns and 
commitments, professional duties as well as the relationships formed in the working 
environment with organic (patients, colleagues) and non-organic (operating theatre, 
wards, medical equipment) entities.  These intra-actions between the complex layers 
of practice, are identified by Karen Barad (2007), as a metaphysics of relationality.  
These connectivities deepen the existing contingency of clinical encounters, by adding 
a further dimension of complexity to events of practice.   
f)  The impact of uncertainty in clinical practice 
Second, Radha refers to the notion of “uncertainty” in clinical practice, particularly in 
the context of emergency surgery.  As discussed earlier, it is impossible to fully 
anticipate how uncertainty may manifest and Radha’s narrative exemplifies this.  How 
a surgical oncall may unravel is unknown, with implications for both her personal 
commitments (attending her daughter’s assembly) as well as her professional duties 
as a surgeon (abandoning the exploratory surgery for a watchful waiting approach).  
This condition of contingency in clinical practice, has a powerful impact on the thinking 
and ‘doing’ that emerge within events of actual practice.  It is critical that the 
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development of pedagogical strategies recognise and accommodate the ways in 
which uncertainty shapes and influences teaching and learning, even though, 
paradoxically we cannot predict when uncertainty will arise!   
g)  ‘To affect and in turn be affected’ 
Finally, Radha’s story is an account of the state of affectations at a given moment.  
This relates directly to my initial claims regarding the effects of the affective realm of 
practice, in clinical encounters.  As illustrated in the above narrative, Radha is affected 
by the encounter with the female patient and in turn, she affects the clinical event 
through her position as the on-call surgeon charged with caring for the patient and as 
a “fellow human being” trying to contemplate the traumas that the woman has 
suffered.  How these affectations are implicated in the beliefs and behaviours 
manifested in clinical practice is at the heart of this research study.       
 h)  Aims of the theoretical framework 
To explore these areas, I present in the following pages a theoretical framework that 
functions to loosen the ideological framings that currently structure medical education.  
Put another way, my objective is to explore what unravels in actual clinical encounters 
through notions of prehension, affect, individuation, virtual potential, ethics, 
transcendence and immanence.   
Through this conceptual framework, I attempt to illuminate the multiple realities 
embedded in experiences of clinical practice to create new ways of contemplating 
surgical practice and to develop novel approaches to learning and practicing. The 
overall aim is to discover what can be inferred about the nature of pedagogic relations 
and opportunities embedded in real experiences of surgical training: a pedagogy of 
the surgical event (PSE).     
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4.3  Pedagogy Of The Surgical Event (PSE) 
a)  What is missing in the research literature examining    
  postgraduate surgical training (PGST)? 
Criticisms of social theory 
There have been increasing attempts to adapt social theory as well as educational 
theory to aspects of medical education as well as medical education research (MER).  
The field of social theory is interdisciplinary, drawing on disciplines that include 
philosophy and sociology.  However, the applications of social theory tend to be 
limited to particular sociological methodologies.  An example in medical education is 
the widespread use of reflective practice to structure and organise the curriculum at 
both the undergraduate and postgraduate levels (GMC, 2016; RCS, 2014b).  
Reflective practice is also a core component of the system of appraisal and 
revalidation that underlines the licensing of doctors in the UK.   
However, the difficulty arises, when reflective practice or other sociological methods 
are applied as forms of external knowledge, that are used to categorise ways of acting 
and thinking that arise immanently from the clinical encounter.  What I emphasize is 
the limitation of using a static format to capture the immanence of clinical learning, 
which by nature is dynamic and fluid.   
An example of this is taken from the case based discussion (CBD), a staple amongst 
the growing spectrum of assessment exercises.  The CBD is used to assess clinical 
judgement, decision making, and the application of medical knowledge in an 
encounter of practice (ISC, 2016, Mehta et al, 2013, Phillips and Jones, 2015; Phillips 
et al, 2016).  The assessment poses three questions to make the trainee reflect on the 
clinical encounter: ‘what did I learn from this experience?  what did I do well?  what do 
I need to improve or change and how will I achieve it?’  All these questions serve to 
force the learner into structuring their experience through rational categories of 
conscious thought.  This is a necessary process to ensure that the learner is acquiring 
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the required skills for professional practice.  However, what is not known is how well 
the assessment form captures those aspects of the clinical experience which are not 
easily accessed or verbalized: the affective response that arises from the immanence 
of practice.  (Reflective Practice is further examined in Chapter 6). 
Criticisms of educational theory 
The same criticism can be levelled at how educational theory is applied in PGST.  In 
recent decades, the teaching and learning of surgical skills and knowledge has been 
formalized and strengthened, through an application of educational theory (Lave and 
Wenger, 1991; Reznick and MacRae, 2005; Moulton et al, 2006; Arora et al, 2009; 
Mitchell and Arora, 2012).  This has included the work of Piaget (1971), Vygotsky 
(1978), Kolb (1975, 1984) and Ericsson (2004, 2006) to name a few.  But, I would 
argue, that these theories have primarily been used to structure or extend existing 
educational practices, rather than creating the conditions for novel ways to 
contemplate the thinking, doing and being that emerges when engaged in actual 
encounters of practice.   
Examples include, the notion of ‘deliberate practice’ or the ‘zone of proximal 
development’.  In the former, repetitive practice of specific components of 
performance are associated with the acquisition of technical expertise (Ericsson et al, 
1993).  The concept of the ‘zone of proximal development’, refers to the potential for 
development that arises when a learner is provided with a teacher’s guidance.  An 
individual’s independent ability to problem solve is furthered by such an intervention.   
In Chapter 6, I explore how Kolb’s theory of experiential learning (1975) has been 
treated in the widespread practice of reflection, a core pillar in medical education and 
practice.    
‘Affective learning’ 
For the reasons stated above, I assert that the notion of ‘affective learning’ is a 
pedagogical domain, that has been neglected by research studies into PGST.  In 
 94 
addition to being poorly investigated, this aspect of learning and practice lacks a 
strong foundation in educational theory and strategy.  Therefore, what I propose is a 
research methodology that is informed by a range of philosophical concepts and 
discourses that can accommodate how an encounter presents itself, and how it is 
sensed and interpreted.   Such an undertaking is a unique and novel approach to 
examining the entangled relations that form and develop in the contingency of surgical 
practice.   
b)  The rationale for a theoretical framework grounded in    
  philosophy 
Conceptualizing the notion of experiencing through a philosophical lens may permit a 
more in-depth and nuanced interpretation of learning in clinical environs.  This 
includes an exploration of the multiple realities embedded in encounters of practice, 
relations of the self and of practice, construction of values that mediate and shape 
what is understood, and an appreciation of the knowledge created through intra-
actions (Barad, 2007) between the knower and known.  This may allow for 
experiences of surgical training to be problematised and explored through an 
approach that is more ‘open’ and not subject to fixed criteria (Schaviro, 2012; 
Atkinson, 2016).   
Such a project has the potential to consider dimensions of practice that are not self-
evident and may otherwise remain invisible or even be perceived as ‘harmful’ by the 
dominant biomedical discourses in Medicine.  An example of the latter is the 
perception of emotion in practice as detrimental to objective thinking and decisive 
action (McNaughton, 2013; Orri et al, 2013, 2015; Pinto et al, 2013).  
The objective of a pedagogy of the surgical event 
A pedagogy of the surgical event acknowledges the importance of transcendent 
frameworks of established knowledge but focuses on how an actual learning 
encounter comes to matter for a trainee.  An examination and analysis of the surgical 
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event requires an approach that is sufficiently nuanced to accommodate and account 
for the human lives in which unpredictable clinical encounters occur.  With this in 
mind, I developed a method based on particular philosophical theories exploring 
society and the nature of reality and experience.   
How I plan to use theory 
Bordage (2009: 313) describes conceptual frameworks as, ‘ways of thinking about a 
problem or a study, or ways of representing how complex things work the way they 
do.’  He bemoans the absence of explicit statements on the conceptual framework 
used by experimental studies in medical education (see also Cook et al, 2007).  
Conceptual frameworks are like lighthouses and lenses . . . Whereas the 
lighthouse illuminates certain parts of the ocean at any given time, other parts 
are left in the dark.  Each framework highlights or emphasises different aspects 
of a problem or research question . . . Any one conceptual framework presents 
only a partial view of reality.  By contrast, conceptual frameworks are also like 
magnifying glasses; each individual framework magnifies certain elements of 
the problem’.  (Bordage, 2009: 313) 
The concepts and ideas described and discussed below are used in this study, to 
guide and inform the analysis of education policy documentation, consultant and 
trainee interview transcripts, as well as ethnographic field data.   
4.4  Contents Of The Chapter 
This chapter is divided into two parts.  In the first part, the onto-ethical dimensions 
embedded in experiencing surgical events of practice are illuminated and magnified 
using key concepts from: 
• Alain Badiou: ‘truth’ and ‘event’ 
• Alfred North Whitehead: ‘experience’ and ‘affect’ 
• Gilles Deleuze: ‘immanence and transcendence’, ‘actual-virtual’ and ‘ethics’ 
• Gilbert Simondon: ‘individuation’ and ‘metastability’ 
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• Brian Massumi: ‘intensities’ and ‘thinking-feeling’    
I describe, analyse and apply these concepts, with reference to the opening narrative 
of the organ procurement and the above excerpt from Radha’s interview.  
In the second part, the ways in which educational policy documentation captures and 
constructs professional surgical identity and conduct is examined through a 
conceptual lens that draws on the philosophies of Pierre Bourdieu, Michel Foucault 
and Judith Butler.     
4.5  ‘Rupture’: Alain Badiou’s Theory Of Truth And Event 
A truth is solely constituted by rupturing with the order which supports it, never 
as an effect of that order. I have named this type of rupture which opens up 
truths ‘the event’ (2005a: 12). 
For Alain Badiou an ‘event’ is an eruption in a situation of something that could not be 
predicted to happen in that situation (2005a).  An example of an event in my 
experience as a trainee surgeon, is the intensities surrounding the lived reality of the 
organ procurement, which I described in the introductory chapter.  How the encounter 
unravelled for me, could not have been adequately anticipated, despite the 
preparation I had put in and the prior information I had access to.  An event is 
characterised by its ability to rupture ‘that which is known’: established frameworks of 
knowledge and practice.   
a)  The notion of ‘event’ 
I had mentally rehearsed the surgical steps of the procedure and assumed I knew 
exactly what the clinical situation would yield.  However, the culmination and 
intensities of the unfolding phases of the procedure, constituted a disturbance.  This is 
the event that could not have been predicted by official manuals of surgery and which 
created a ‘rupture’ for me, with the assimilated knowledge and practice.  The colours 
and odours of the operating theatre, the contrasting sounds of the theatre team’s 
impatience with the soft wails of the deceased donor’s family, the perception of a still 
 97 
warm corpse, all combined, almost concatenated, to pierce my prior understanding of 
what I was tasked with.  It was a lesson beyond the established curriculum.   
An actual encounter or ‘event’ of practice, reconfigured my understanding of a surgical 
procedure.  Prior to the ‘event’, this encounter had been assimilated through pre-
defined and established categories of surgical knowledge and practice.   
b)  The notion of ‘truth’ 
Persevering with the consequences of the event, and committing to what follows from 
the event, is described by Badiou as a ‘truth’ process: ‘it is what exceeds, in a given 
situation, the knowledge that accounts for the situation’, (Leclercle, 1999: 8).  It is 
important to distinguish ‘truth’ from ‘knowledge’.  Truth arises beyond what is known 
or taught.  Truth is not an absolute, it is what is triggered following an event, and 
therefore, punctures established knowledge on the matter.  As I discuss in chapter 1, 
the consequences of that initial organ procurement experience are ongoing for me, 
and my opportunity to learn and further my understanding and knowledge from this 
and other events is dependent on ‘staying true’ to consequences of such moments of 
disturbance.  
Persevering with the consequences of the event was a deeply uncomfortable 
experience.  However, it caused me to re-examine how I dealt with emotions in 
practice that had the potential to overwhelm me.  It led to my devising coping 
mechanisms that would allow some preparation for potentially difficult clinical 
interactions both intra-operatively and in non-operative environments.  This was my 
truth process, which followed the encounter of the organ procurement.  
c)  Applications of Badiou’s theory 
To be faithful to an event is to move within the situation that this event has 
supplemented, by thinking... the situation ‘according to’ the event.  And this, of 
course—since the event was excluded by all the regular laws of the situation – 
compels the subject to invent a new way of being and acting in the situation. 
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(Badiou, 2001: 42). 
At this point we can further explicate this standpoint by exploring Badiou’s idea of 
excess (Badiou, 2005b), which is implied by the notion of an event.  An event is 
always in excess of the existing state, of knowledge, of practice.  This refers to the 
notion that a subject is conceived beyond any particular situation, as it submits to the 
consequences of a truth procedure and thereby passes beyond the limitations of what 
is already known.   
From a pedagogical viewpoint, this refers to the relation between being and 
becoming.  Through a learning encounter a student enters a new and previously 
unknown learning space, with the potential to become, and thus realise the potential 
which has yet to be actualised.  But, it is the truths that proceed an event, that is to 
say, the consequences of ‘sticking with it’, that reconfigure the relationship between a 
subject and the world.   
d)  ‘Real learning’ 
Atkinson (2011), further develops this Badiouian idea of experience, in what he terms 
real learning: ‘this project is articulated around the notion of becoming, where real 
learning is conceived as self-encounter, an event that projects a learner into a new or 
modified ontological state’ (p. 30).  He suggests that, an event involves an encounter 
which disrupts our current ontological state and modes of representation, our ways of 
knowing, thinking and acting.  Through the event, a ‘new subject’ emerges, a new 
ontological and epistemological state is precipitated which present new possibilities of 
being.   
Atkinson comments that for Badiou: ‘the idea of truth is related to the idea of being 
truthful to something, and this truth process denotes a process of subjectivization 
which in other terms can be viewed as a ‘commitment to’’, (Atkinson, 2011: 30).  
Therefore, in any situation, the existing knowledge can neither account for nor 
produce a truth, truth is a disruption of and a furthering of this knowledge.   
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A truth is, first of all, something new, what transmits, what repeats, we shall 
call knowledge.  Distinguishing truth from knowledge is essential” (Badiou, 
2005a:  45). 
Badiou suggests that, it is in these moments of ontological and epistemological 
struggle, that we emerge as subjects who acquire newly formed subjectifications.  We 
pass beyond our routine existences, and act and think in a way that extends what we 
know and who we become.  Atkinson (2011), applies Badiou’s concept to create what 
he terms real learning: ‘what learning can be beyond the parameters of reproduction, 
packaged knowledge, traditional skills and the pragmatic and predictable application 
of knowledge,’ (p. 5-6).   
e)  Being and event 
There is a strange temporality to Badiou’s event as regards the ontology of a subject.  
It is as though, in the event, there is no ontology.  Perhaps this is signified by the title 
of Badiou’s book, Being and Event (2005), where there is an implied separation 
between being and event.  Being suggests a mode of existence prior to an event, a 
state, governed for example, by knowledge frameworks, established practices and 
values.  An event however, disrupts such modes and projects being into new modes 
of becoming, reconfiguring its relationship with local worlds.  A subject becomes a 
subject by submitting to a truth procedure and therefore opening up possibilities for 
new ontological states, some of which may not be predicted or recognised by the 
existing educational or training framework.   
f)  Surgical trainee versus Surgeon-in-training 
If we view a subject as a fixed entity, this would tend to assume that there are 
established epistemologies and ontologies that define or predicate a subject.  This 
restricts other possibilities of what they can become or of what it means to be a 
learner or a teacher.  This is a key point, which again highlights the difference 
between what I propose to call, a surgical trainee versus, a surgeon-in-training.  The 
terminology alludes to different pedagogical approaches: one concerned with the 
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induction of established bodies of knowledge and another with experiences and 
encounters of a surgeon-in-training, through which learning occurs and produces 
knowledge.  This is also known as ‘practical wisdom’ or what the Greeks termed 
phronesis.   
g)  Application of Badiou’s theories to surgical practice  
It is not uncommon for patients to be taken to surgery only for the original operative 
plan to be diverted or subverted.  This may be due to several reasons, including an 
anatomical anomaly, a complication during surgery, or medical information about the 
patient, which for various reasons were not known or available prior to surgery.   
I contend, that every day, surgeons (and other doctors) are confronted by encounters 
that are consistent with Badiou’s ‘event’.  These events can often be categorised as 
‘complications’ of surgery or, a consequence of inadequate preparation or, a lack of 
resources.  However, I believe that they constitute the actualisation of uncertainty in 
practice.  That is, they occur because it is impossible to fully prepare for 
contingencies.  
Persevering with implications or outcomes of the event of surgery is consistent with 
Badiou’s notions of truth.  Radha describes needing to stop when she had exhausted 
every intervention she knew of.  Her knowledge in this area may have been 
constructed from textbooks, research literature, surgical conferences as well as her 
prior intra-operative experiences and the information she had gathered from her 
colleagues’ surgical experiences.  However, in moments such as these, the specific 
patient situation demands an approach that marries her existing knowledge with ‘facts’ 
that she comes to know as a consequence of the ‘rupture’.  In other words, committing 
to the truth process in this event of surgery, may extend the knowledge that she is 
already in possession of.  An example is how she commits to closely observing and 
monitoring the patient through medical parameters.  From this surveillance of the 
patient she may glean vital information that triggers thoughts or actions about what 
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else she is able to do   
4.6   Alain Badiou’s Ethics Of Practice 
Badiou asserts that, events do not always lead to truth procedures.  He identifies five 
subjective spaces; the shock of the new, a faithful space in which the truth and its 
consequences are persevered with, a reactive space in which the event is denied or 
glossed over, an obscure space in which the event is morphed onto the past so that 
what happens is always read in terms of the sense of past events.  Finally, a space of 
resurrection, in which a previous truth is reworked in a new context.   
a)  The shock of the new and persevering 
At the organ procurement, the rupture I experience and the ‘new’ understanding that 
emerges, can be categorised by Badiou’s first two subjective spaces.  Initially, I am 
overwhelmed by the subjective space of ‘shock’ and this later contributes (days, 
weeks and years after) to a consideration of how training could be organised.  By 
‘persevering with the truth and its consequences’, I commit to the truth of event for 
me.  This involves contemplating what needs to be done to reconfigure training, along 
a paradigm that incorporates the unexpected and unforeseen aspects of clinical 
practice.   
b)  A reactive space, an obscure space and resurrection 
The ‘reactive’ one-way conversation between Vinny and myself after the organ 
procurement may indicate his ‘denial’ of the event.  He does not acknowledge my 
speechlessness or paralysis.  Instead, he alludes to it as a function of my lack of 
procedural exposure.  He may have believed that being shocked by certain surgical 
practices, was a natural and possibly fundamental part of learning to become a 
surgeon.  He may have rationalized it, as inculcating in trainees, a ‘hardiness’ and 
necessary resilience.  Through this approach, he ‘resurrects’ what actually occurred at 
the surgical encounter, to be ‘reworked in a new context’.  The ‘new context’ he 
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establishes is the importance of repetitive practice to foster fluent technique and 
competent skill.  In other words, if he noticed the impact it had on me, he appears to 
have denied its meaning, by focusing upon skill and technique. 
c)  ‘An ethics of singular truths’ 
The five subjective spaces outlined above represent an ethics of becoming.  For 
Badiou, ethics is not about compliance with an existing moral code.  He views ethics 
as unique to a particular situation and is therefore singular: ‘I maintain that there can 
be no ethics in general, but only an ethic of singular truths, and thus an ethic relative 
to a particular situation.’ (2001: vi).  Badiou emphasises, that ethical decisions have to 
be made relative to the unique circumstances one finds oneself in.  Put simply, ethics 
is transformed from the position of what one should do or ought to do, to what one can 
do, what it is possible to do in a unique and particular situation.  Such a concept of 
ethics has implications for the relationship between ethics and knowing.   
d)  Applying Badiou’s ethics to clinical practice  
In a complex situation, when a trainee is unsure how to proceed, a form of ‘knowing’ 
can arise, which assists one’s passage through the encounter.  Ethics in this 
approach, is inseparable from knowing, that is specific to individual situations and not 
necessarily generalisable: an ethics of immanence.  In contrast, where ethics is 
related to established knowledge, the situation a trainee may find themselves in, must 
be made to fit into the framework of formal knowledge.  Otherwise, it may be viewed 
as completely mysterious or irrelevant.   
For a surgeon-in-training, the ethical code may be strongly influenced by the reality of 
actual situations.  By contrast, surgical trainees are expected to conduct themselves 
along established moral codes and expressed bodies of knowledge.  The internal 
dialogue of a surgeon-in-training involves negotiating a tension between the 
expectations of the established training programme and the realities of clinical 
practice as experienced acutely by the individual trainee.  How a surgeon emerges 
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from the internal dialogue and the subjective space(s) that is consequently occupied 
has implications for the ethics of practice.   
The relation of event and truth, must involve an engaged subject.  This is someone 
who believes in, and is therefore, able to perceive the event and its subsequent truth 
in their local situation.  This leads to a reconfiguration of this space (Atkinson, 2011). 
‘Thus the event-truth relation is immanent to the functioning space of an engaged 
subject’, (Atkinson, 2011: 25).  It would therefore follow that in denying the event and 
not demonstrating fidelity to the truth procedure one is unable to access the new 
worlds and reconfiguration of this space.   
To return to the example of Vinny, my mentor at the organ procurement, I have 
wondered in the past as to whether he had experienced a similar disruption at some 
point in his training career.  I have queried whether he had chosen to not show fidelity 
to the truth procedure that could follow.  In this way, surgeons may often refuse to be 
faithful to clinical events, because following through can be emotionally 
uncomfortable.  The event can also be viewed, as a microscopy of their personal 
failings, rather than the production of new learning and knowledge that has the 
potential to enhance practice.  In such cases, where events do not happen for these 
individuals, the encounter may be experienced as an anomaly or variable. 
e)  Implications for pedagogies in surgical education  
The challenge for the surgical trainer when responding to the ‘evental’ experiences of 
a surgeon in training is to work with the ‘thisness’ of the situation for the surgeon in 
training.  That is, to develop a pedagogy that is grounded in the haecceties of 
practice, which allow a learner to persevere with the consequences of the event in a 
given moment.  Such a pedagogical strategy can assist a learner to make sense of 
the acuteness of surgical experience.   
The teacher is challenged by the task of recognising an event, as perceived by the 
learner, and then to know how to support and facilitate the student’s truth procedure.  
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The thisness of a clinical learning environment, poses numerous challenges to both 
learner and teacher.  At the organ procurement, I was confronted by the haecceity of 
the event which revealed the reality of what I was about to do.  This comprised 
operating on a dead person, a reality that had not dawned on me till I found myself 
entangled in the actual event of an organ procurement.  I was stunned by the thisness 
and the developing intensities of the clinical scenario, which manifested as an inability 
to carry out the surgery.   
In everyday pedagogical scenarios in an operating theatre, how does a surgeon 
educator negotiate the thisness of an episode of catastrophic bleeding which may 
constitute an event for some surgeons-in-training?  There is the immediate clinical 
emergency that must be dealt with absolutely, yet at the same time, one should not 
lose sight of how this event will unfurl unknown trajectories for the learner.  The event 
may disrupt the ontological state of the learner in ways that are not explicated by 
established clinical knowledge or the teacher’s experience of an exemplar scenario.  
4.7  Theories of Experiencing 
a)  Haecceity 
Radha in her narrative describes how she coped, thought and functioned within a 
given moment of clinical practice.  My purpose in this research is to explore the 
‘thisness’ of experiences of practice, the here-and-now or to use Greek terminology, 
the ‘haecceity’ of practice.  It is in this acuity of experiencing, the immediateness of an 
event, that one may begin to be affected by an encounter.   
You will yield nothing to haecceities unless you realize that that is what you 
are, and nothing else (. . .) You are longitude and latitude, a set of speeds and 
slownesses between unformed particles, a set of non-subjectified affects. (. . .)  
It is the entire assemblage in its individuated aggregate that is a haecceity; it 
is this assemblage that is defined by a longitude and a latitude, by speeds and 
affects, independently of forms and subjects, which belong to another plane. It 
is the wolf, itself, and the horse, and the child, that cease to be subjects to 
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become events. (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 289). 
Deleuze and Guattari are pointing here to the difference between lived experience, 
the speeds and affects of experience, in contrast to how experience is fixed or tied 
down in language. Language is situated in a static discourse.  Deleuze and Guattari 
state that words, such as ’child’ or ‘wolf’ create specific and defined entities.  That is, 
they are fixed (‘subjects’) or intractable in terms of their character and what the entity 
can be or become.  This facilitates our ability to grasp the entity and visualise it.   
However, Deleuze and Guattari argue that the universe is in perpetual motion, 
dynamic and in flux.  Language or any other discourse which interprets the world 
through static terms is problematic because it fails to acknowledge and capture the 
dynamism of all entities.  Their notion of haecceity overcomes this difficulty by 
acknowledging that everything is in flux and composed of ‘speeds’ and ‘affects’.  They 
advocate an approach that incorporates ‘longitudes’ and ‘latitudes’ so that entities can 
be spoken of in terms of becoming and as events.        
I investigate how trainees and surgeons emerge from clinical practice, how they are 
constituted in the ‘thisness’ or haecceities of practice.  This has implications for the 
relations that form within an encounter and extend beyond that specific event of 
practice, transforming and reconfiguring the subjectivities of the professionals. 
b)  ‘Affect’  
My son, Mahen, was born eighteen months ago and his arrival in this world taught me 
to see things in a manner that I had not done since my days as a small child, most 
likely.  Most parents will experience, as I did, how those first days at home with a 
newborn are fascinating.  I watched him squirm, cry, or wrinkle his tiny face in 
displeasure, see the curl of his lip hint at a smile when fat and contented upon being 
fed.  He was awash with physical expressions of how he felt at any moment in time.  
By studying his display of affect, I learnt about my child, I developed an acute 
sensitivity to his demeanour and how he would communicate his needs even before 
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they were conscious thoughts. 
There are many definitions of affect formulated by affect theorists and neuroscientists.  
I have adopted the view held by Whitehead, Deleuze, Massumi and others that the 
initial impact of an encounter is affective, prior to cognitive processes becoming 
involved.  This means that actions and behaviours are held to be informed by affective 
dispositions that are independent of consciousness or rational thought.  
c)  ‘Affective thinking’ versus cognitive thinking 
The pedagogical implications of the affective realm are a complex and understudied 
area of clinical surgical practice.  I have hypothesised that how something matters to a 
trainee/surgeon (the immanence of learning) within a learning encounter, is intimately 
connected to the affective forces evoked in that same clinical experience.  As an 
example, the ways in which I experience the organ procurement (encounter), hearing 
the soft wails of the donor family, agitating in my sterile gown, confronted by the sight 
of a still warm corpse, cultivate how I begin to feel, think and act in the moment.   
At a later time, the affective relations that formed and developed in the encounter 
transformed my understanding of the surgery and my future practice as a transplant 
surgeon.  This is not to minimise or diminish the fundamental role of established 
surgical knowledge and practical skills which are critical to the development of skilled 
and proficient surgeons.  What I want to emphasise, is alternatives that complement 
the dominant model of clinical experiencing.   
The established biomedical model, asserts that thought is grounded in reasoning and 
confined to rationality, cognitive processes.  I want to recognize the importance of this 
approach to practice but, also advocate a view that advances the importance of affect 
in the practice of surgical work.  Put another way, I am proposing a notion of affective 
thinking in encounters of clinical practice.   
I join those philosophers (Whitehead, Deleuze, Simondon, Massumi) who argue that, 
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reasoning and rationality are over relied on and overvalued, to account for, how all 
judgements are formed and all understandings of practice are reached.  Nowadays, 
there are considerable pressures on the profession to expand and develop concepts 
of patient care and what it should mean and how it can be achieved.  I suggest that to 
think creatively and effectively about surgical care in the modern climate requires 
traversing the confines of established bodies of knowledge and assimilated codes of 
practice.  This may allow the surgical profession to extend and reconfigure what it 
means to offer ‘surgical care’ to those who need it.  One way of achieving this goal, 
may be to embrace the concept of affective experiencing, and consider how it may 
enhance and expand what is already known. 
Below I explore the works of philosophers who attempt to theorise on how affect is 
relevant to how we think and act.  
d)  The wider use of affect  
There has been a move towards affect and emotion in social sciences, in media, film 
and gender studies, in cognitive psychology and neurology, in ethnography as well as 
in philosophy.  In these disciplines, it is presented almost as an antidote to the 
privileging of language and representation (Hall, 1997; Clough and Halley, 2007; 
Gregg and Seigworth, 2010; Angerer et al, 2014).  Affect has come to adopt many 
different meanings and connotations and is used differently in areas such as 
neurobiology compared with philosophy.     
An example is how Tompkins and Ekman (Ekman, 2007) have conceptualised 
affective processes as independent of intention and meaning, while Freud considered 
emotions (he used affect and emotion interchangeably) as embodied, intentional 
states governed by beliefs, cognition, desires.  Affect can refer to the ‘senses’ and that 
which moves us whether this occurs in everyday routine events or in extraordinary 
circumstances.  Kathleen Stewart, an American anthropologist and leading affect 
theorist describes affect as: 
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The varied, surging capacities to affect and to be affected that give everyday 
life the quality of a continual motion of relations, scenes, contingencies, and 
emergences.  They’re things that happen.  They happen in impulses, 
sensations, expectations, daydreams, encounters, and habits of relating, in 
strategies and their failures, in forms of persuasion, contagion, and 
compulsion, in modes of attention, attachment, and agency, and in public and 
social worlds of all kinds that catch people up in something that feels like 
something.  (2007: 1-2) 
Cultural geographer, John Wylie states: 
An affect is an intensity, a field perhaps of awe, irritation or serenity, which 
exceeds, enters into and ranges over the sensations and emotions of a 
subject who feels (. . .)  Affect thus denotes the shifting mood, tenor, colour or 
intensity of places and situations.  (2005: 236) 
For Deleuze and Guattari, affect goes beyond being affected by something:  
Affects are no longer feelings or affections; they go beyond the strength of 
those who undergo them.  Sensations, percepts and affects are beings whose 
validity lies in themselves and exceeds any lived.  They could be said to exist 
in the absence of man because man as he is caught in stone, on the canvas, 
or by words, is himself a compound of percepts and affects.  The work of art is 
a being of sensation and nothing else: it exists in itself.  (1994: 164) 
Deleuze and Guattari assert that whilst affect can invoke new meaning to things, it 
can also be independent of the very thing that attributed meaning to it in the first 
place.  This means that as the affects form and develop, they also become 
independent of the encounter which initially brought them into existence.    
An example of this from Radha’s narrative is her state of affections in the encounter 
with the female patient.  She is aware in the days and months that follow, that the 
affects precipitated by the specific conditions of the encounter are still present, even 
though the encounter itself has passed.  The affective states occupy a contradictory 
position, existing both as remnants of the encounter and at the same time exerting an 
independence from the original precipitating event.  But, what is the significance of 
these persisting affective components?  The affective intensities and resonances 
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condition beliefs, thoughts and behaviours, influencing the ways in which practice is 
conceived and carried out.   
Massumi (2002, 2015) and others (Berelson and Murphie, 2010) have warned that, 
ignoring the effect of affective intensities is dangerous, because it conceals the harm 
that manipulation of affective lives can do.  Massumi gives the example of ‘9/11’: the 
collapse of the twin towers in New York, following systematic terrorist attacks.  He 
describes and asserts how the endless playing of repetitive images of the disaster, 
created an ‘affective cut’ in political discourse, laying the groundwork for a foreign 
policy of pre-emptive attack.   
Eric Shrouse (2005) states that: 
The importance of affect rests upon the fact that in many cases the message 
consciously received may be of less import to the receiver of that message 
than his or her non-conscious affective resonances with the source of the 
message. (no pg numbers) 
He adds that the power of many forms of media lie, “not so much in their ideological 
effects, but in their ability to create affective resonances independent of content or 
meaning.”  A comprehensive understanding of the power of affect can also create the 
potential for ethical creativity and transformation, or equally ethical manipulation and 
coercion.   
Massumi states that affect can be studied by examining the traces it leaves in 
narratives and meanings.  It is actual because it occurs as an intrinsic process of 
alteration.  It is virtual because it is independent of the things or forces that trigger it.  
Affect functions to bring about form to things.  
4.8  Alfred North Whitehead’s Theory Of Experience 
An act of feeling is an encounter—a contingent event, an opening to the 
outside—rather than an intrinsic, predetermined relationship. . .  It isn’t 
anything that is already.  (Shaviro, 2012: 62). 
 110 
The theories of subjectivity described later in this chapter according to the writings of 
Bourdieu, Foucault and Butler, hinge on how a subject is constituted as an effect of 
language.  At the core of Whitehead’s philosophy is the assertion that, ‘apart from the 
experiences of subjects there is nothing, nothing, nothing, bare nothingness”, 
(Whitehead, 1929: 167).  For Whitehead, experience is all that there is.  A subject, 
comes into being in and through experience, this is how they emerge into the world.  
The subject is supplemental to the experience, ‘for Kant, the world emerges from the 
subject; for the philosophy of organism_, the subject emerges from the world—a 
superject rather than a subject’ (ibid, 88, my emphasis).  The subject is not devalued, 
rather reconfigured in terms of how it relates to the environment it finds itself in.   
Thus, Whitehead denies the ontological privileging of the human subject.  An example 
is how Radha, as the event unfolds, becomes a surgeon, through the relations she 
forms in the work place and her actions in the operating theatre.  This is not to deny 
her professional qualifications or training, but it is to emphasise how her subjectivity 
emerges through the encounter.  For Whitehead, it is through experiencing in the 
world that things come to matter.  Through experiencing, a subject acquires a 
meaning and therefore emerges as a being in the universe.   
Whitehead proposes an affect based account of experience: ‘the basis of experience 
is emotional’ (1933: 176).  Every experience of perception is imbued with an ‘affective 
tone’, (ibid, 176).  A subject first perceives through a bodily response, this is below a 
threshold of conscious thought: the response is not influenced or organised by 
cognition or reason.  Therefore, ‘feeling’ is a basic condition of experience.   
a)  ‘Prehension’ 
He positions aesthetic inquiry at the heart of Philosophy as opposed to a reliance on 
epistemology or ontology: questions about how we feel or what we feel.  ‘Aesthetics is 
the mark of what Whitehead calls our concern for the world, and for entities in the 
world’ (Shaviro, 2012: 47).  The way in which a subject accounts for something else; 
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how one encounters something that makes a difference for them.  This difference, 
which might arise for example in terms of language, smell or touch is referred to by 
Whitehead as prehension (1929: 33).  Prehension relates to how a subject encounters 
an event or object or in broader terms, how something takes account of something.  
This might be, for example, how an entity or an event affects us through language, 
smell, touch and how this experience matters to the subject and in what forms or 
states it matters.   
In the case of Radha, how she prehends the patient in the clinic room, connected to 
monitors and various intravenous therapies, the swollen state of her face and skin, 
can all be viewed as experiences of prehension.  Once in the operating theatre, 
Radha prehends the open abdomen through, the traumatised and injured tissues and 
viscera, the smells and sights of the surgery and the behaviour of her colleagues in 
the room.  These elements of the encounter, create the thisness of the experience, 
which is how she grasps the situation in ways that come to matter to her.   
Every prehension comprises three elements; the subject which is encountering an 
entity (‘doing’ the prehending), the datum which is prehended in that encounter, and 
the ‘subjective form’, which refers to how the subject prehends the datum (ibid, 23).  It 
is the concept of a ‘subjective form’ which underlies Whitehead’s theory of experience.  
I discussed earlier the process of affectation (using the example of a Radha) whereby, 
a subject can affect something and in turn be affected by it.  The subjective form is 
‘the immediate novelty; it is how that subject is feeling that objective datum’ (ibid, 
232).  The ‘novelty’ arises from the fact that a perception, at any given moment in 
time, can neither be reproduced (re-lived or re-created), nor can one subject replicate 
the way in which another subject prehends something.  Shaviro summarises 
Whitehead’s approach to being in contrast to Heidegger’s: 
If Being is a substantive for the classical metaphysicians and a verb for 
Heidegger, then for Whitehead it is adverbial.  “How an actual entity becomes 
constitutes what that actual entity is. . . Its ‘being’ is constituted by its 
‘becoming’”.  (Shaviro, 2012: 56) 
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Subjects can also be inanimate; a scalpel, the operating table, the scrub cap or mask 
worn by theatre personnel, the asleep patient, as well as the surgeon herself.  ‘The 
whole universe . . . consists of elements disclosed in the experiences of subjects’, 
(ibid., 166).  The scalpel in the hand of the surgeon, ‘perceives’ the firm pressure 
applied by the index finger of the surgeon, preparing to incise the skin.  This way the 
scalpel is affected by the surgeon through the power of the force exerted upon it, and 
this being affected is ‘its experience’ of the world of the operating theatre at this 
moment in time.      
b)  Thinking as feeling 
For Whitehead, thinking within experience, is in the first instance sensing or feeling 
something.  Crucially this notion of the ‘sentiendum’, occurs before the sensation is 
organised or given meaning through cognitive or rational thought.  This theory 
contravenes the earlier writings of Kant.  Most subjective experience (even for human 
beings) is described by Whitehead as non-conscious, ‘implicit, below consciousness, 
in our physical feelings’ (ibid., 229).   
Shaviro (2012) uses the term ‘sentience’ to describe Whitehead’s concept of feelings: 
‘because it does not presuppose that mental processes and experiences are rational, 
nor even that they are necessarily conscious’ (ibid., 9).  Whitehead asserts that 
experience is defined purely by the physical reaction to an event.  An example from 
the organ procurement is my speechlessness and inaction.  I cannot accurately 
rationalise or reason, with complete confidence, why I behaved this way.   
What I do know, is that the reaction was both immediate and automatic, and in that 
moment, not motivated by conscious thought.  I have reflected on this event countless 
times.  It is possible to derive an explanation of my actions (my first organ 
procurement, I was shocked and inexperienced), as is the goal of reflective practice in 
medical training.  This activity requires the search for reason and purpose in all 
interactions.  But, such an approach is premised on the notion that we are primarily 
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rational and thoughtful beings.   
Whitehead however, disabuses the notion of thought as akin to cognition.  Instead he 
(and others) propose that thought can arise experientially or from sentience or 
cognition: thought can be ‘simple physical feelings’ (Whitehead 1929: 236).  I explore 
the non-cognitive version of thought later in the chapter through the notion ‘thinking-
feeling’ (Massumi, 2002).     
c)  The conditions of experience: ‘constantly perishing’ 
Whitehead proposes that through the act of experiencing, a subject while being 
constituted is also constantly perishing.  By this statement, he intends to emphasise 
how in any moment of time, no event can be re-lived or re-created, because the 
subject cannot outlive the feelings it experiences at any given moment: 
In any case, the subject constitutes itself in and through its experience; and 
thereupon it perishes, entering into the “objective immortality” of being a 
“datum” for other experiences of other subjects.  (Shaviro, 2012: xii) 
Whitehead derives his theory from Kant’s original conception of experience as, 
“constructive functioning” (Whitehead 1929: 156).  By this notion, Kant rejects the idea 
that we know something independent to our experience of it.  For Kant and 
Whitehead, we (as individuals) come to know something by being constructively 
involved in whatever it is we are observing or experiencing; this interaction is a 
dynamic process.  ‘In this way, our subjective experience of the world is itself the 
reflexive process through which the world, including ourselves, gets constituted’, 
(Shaviro, 2012: 48).   
However, from this point onwards, Whitehead criticises Kant’s approach to subjective 
experience, as overly concerned with cognition.  Kant believes, that we rationalise and 
organise the chaos of experience according to categories of thought;  
The understanding, with its categories forcefully imposes a conceptual order 
upon an otherwise disconnected and featureless flux of individualised 
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impressions.  In resolving the matter in this way, Kant relies exclusively upon 
“the higher of the human modes of functioning,” and ignores the more 
“primitive types of experience. (Whitehead 1929: 113) 
Whitehead’s principle critique of Kant and philosophy in general, is an over reliance 
on cognition to explain the nature and basis of experience.  For Kant, experience itself 
cannot be used to create categories of understanding, though, he concedes that 
cognition begins with experience (Kant, 1996: 43). 
4.9  Brian Massumi’s Theory Of Affect 
Brian Massumi in an interview states that: 
[..] a power to affect and be affected governs a transition, where a body 
passes from one state of capacitation to a diminished or augmented state of 
capacitation.  This comes with the corollary that the transition is felt.  A 
distinction is asserted between two levels, one of which is feeling and the 
other capacitation or activation.  But the distinction comes in the form of a 
connection.  This separation-connection between feeling and activation 
situates the account between what we would normally think of as the self on 
the one hand and the body on the other, in the unrolling of an event that’s a 
becoming of the two together.  (McKim, 2008: 1-2) 
Massumi describes affect as an event, or a ‘dimension of every event’ (ibid., 1).  He 
writes about affect from a Spinozan perspective.  The body has a capacity to affect 
and to be affected.  In making this ‘transition’ from one state (to affect) to another 
(being affected), the body responds by changing what it can now do: there is a 
change in its capacity (‘diminished’ or ‘augmented’).   
a)  Capacitation 
Spinoza theorises that every transition is accompanied by a feeling of the change in 
capacity.  Capacitation is used by Massumi to describe what we are now able to do 
following the affectation, a form of enabling that marks the individual.  To illustrate 
these concepts, I return to Radha’s narrative.  She is affected by the female patient, 
as she comes to see her in the intensive care unit, and hears about the traumatic 
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events that she has suffered.  Her mode of being is affected and through her position 
as the duty surgeon, she is in some ways obligated to the woman (patient) and the 
event.   
Thus, the encounter that affects Radha, is in turn being affected by her obligatory 
position (as a surgeon).  The difficulties arise, when the ‘inescapable’ existence of the 
woman (a human being in front of Radha) becomes reduced, unavoidably, to the 
medicalisation of the patient.  In other words, the woman is totalized by her identity as 
a patient, for the surgical team around her.  The emerging relations between surgeon 
and patient mix, mingle and become productive in ways that reconfigure the mode of 
being of the patient to a reductive set of medical parameters.   
The medicalisation of the human being that occurs, is often very difficult to avoid.  For 
example, the relationalities that arise between Radha and the body of the patient, how 
Radha relates to the patient as a woman, the relations she forms with the surgical 
‘paraphernalia’ around her such as equipment, instruments, her relations to the 
theatre staff, may reinforce this conception of the patient.  
Another example is the organ procurement.  I am relationally activated (McKim, 2008: 
5), by how I affect the encounter and how I am affected by the encounter (through my 
obligatory position as a surgeon and a peer of the deceased), triggering a profound 
understanding that transforms how I view my personal practice.  I am enabled to see 
the donor as a live female with a life story (that I compose in my mind) as opposed to 
the deceased cadaver before me.   
My understanding of the work of a transplant surgeon is reconfigured to reflect the 
reality of operating on a dead person.  I am apprised of how this is a unique surgical 
procedure—the operation confers no benefit to the deceased individual herself.  This 
is the transition I undergo and the augmented state of capacitation that I subsequently 
assume.  However, the initial impact of the encounter was ‘without cognitive thought’, 
it was affective in its effect, my response was a ‘thinking-feeling’ (Massumi, 2008: 1).   
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b)  ‘The affective hit’ 
Massumi specifies that there are three corollaries to the transition to an augmented or 
diminished state (McKim, 2008).  First, that the transition is felt, or that it is sensed by 
the individual.  What is felt is the quality of the experience.  Second, the feeling 
encountered in the experience leaves a memory or trace of its passage.  It creates the 
past of the body.  Finally, they exist in relation to each other.  Massumi asserts that 
affect is similar to a ‘microshock’ (ibid., 4), an interruption to the way that life was 
proceeding.   
Sometimes this cut, ‘can pass unnoticed, striking imperceptibly, with only its effects 
entering conscious awareness as they unroll’ (ibid., 4).  This means that whilst an 
affect may not be detected, the effects that flow from it may be what is noticeable or 
picked up.  Deleuze and Guattari (1994) described this characteristic of affect as a 
‘microperception’.  This is the idea that something can be felt without conscious 
awareness.  It is a continuous process, whereby, events interrupt the flow of life and 
cause us to stop, re-position ourselves again in relation to the interruption (or as 
Massumi puts it, ‘to re-jig around the interruption.’) and brace ourselves for what is to 
come.  Massumi calls this ‘in-braces’, in the sense that it returns to its potential for 
more of life to come, and that potential is immanent to its own arising’, (ibid., 4).  This 
is in some way similar to Eric Shrouse’s (2005) thoughts: 
The transmission of affect is about the way that bodies affect one another. 
When your body infolds a context and another body (real or virtual) is 
expressing intensity in that context, one intensity is infolded into another. By 
resonating with the intensity of the contexts it infolds, the body attempts to 
ensure that it is prepared to respond appropriately to a given circumstance. 
Given the ubiquity of affect, it is important to take note that the power of many 
forms of media lies not so much in their ideological effects, but in their ability 
to create affective resonances independent of content or meaning. 
An inbrace is an ‘infolding’ of a context.  An example of inbracing is how I am startled 
and motionless, at the sight of the face of the deceased donor.  This response was 
what happened first, prior to any conscious thought or cognitive activity.  This 
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inbracing of the context of the organ procurement is immediate.  In the next few 
moments, I started to ‘think through’ what had caused this reaction.  Massumi 
concludes that this is when: 
(. . .) You own the feeling as your own, and recognise it as a content of your 
life, an episode in your personal history.  But in the instance of the affective 
hit, there is no content yet.  All there is, is the affective quality, coinciding with 
the feeling of the interruption, with the kind of felt transition I talked about 
before.  That affective quality is all there is to the world in that instant.  It takes 
over life, fills the world, for an immeasurable instant of shock.  Microperception 
is this purely affective rebeginning of the world (. . . )  A body is a complex of 
inbracings playing out complexly and in serial fashion.  The tendencies and 
capacities activated do not necessarily bear fruit.  Some will be summoned to 
the verge of unfolding, only to be left behind, unactualized.  But even these 
will have left their trace (. . .)  The concept of affect is tied to the idea of 
modulation occurring at a constitutive level where many somethings are doing, 
most of them unfelt.  Or again, felt only in effect.  No less real for passing 
unfelt.  (Mckim, 2008: 5) 
In the immediacy or acuity of an encounter, all there is, is ‘the affective hit’, a 
collection of affects that mediate our response to an event.  Massumi is emphasising 
that in any event there are the potentials for ‘things’ to happen (the Deleuzian ‘virtual’), 
which may or may not be felt, but nevertheless are suspended within the event.   
d)  ‘Negative prehensions’ 
Whitehead (1929) calls these potentials, that are not actualised, ‘negative 
prehensions’.  This is something that is ‘not felt’ but can still influence the experience 
of the impact.   
There were other members of the scrub team who were affected differently by this 
event.  Massumi explains that what happens in an event is distributed across all those 
bodies: ‘each body will carry a different set of tendencies and capacities, there is no 
guarantee that they will act in union even if they are cued in concert’, (ibid., 6).  For 
instance, my response to the sight of the deceased’s face was different to Vinny, who 
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proceeded with the surgery (perhaps because he had experienced this sight before 
and therefore it did not constitute an event for him).  Massumi draws on Daniel Stern’s 
(1985) description of ‘affective attunement’, to introduce his concept of differential 
attunement, which resonates with notions of ‘negative prehensions’.  Before looking 
specifically at Massumi’s writings on the matter, I shall briefly introduce Daniel Stern’s 
concepts to provide a background for the former’s writings. 
e)  ‘Affective attunement’ and ‘vitality affects’ 
Stern researched (1985; 1987) aspects of the mother-infant relationship.  His notion of 
affective attunement describes how a mother matches some aspect of emotion 
observable in her infant child in specific ‘external ways’.  But, Stern emphasizes that 
what is reflected by the mother is the infant’s inner state of emotion not the infant’s 
physical response.  Stern explains that the way the mother captures the internal state 
of the child is through an external behaviour that incorporates vitality affects.   
Vitality affects are a form of implicit relational knowing, ever present in the background 
of all behaviours: ‘they are experienced as dynamic shifts or patterned changes within 
ourselves’, (Stern, 1985: 57).  Stern is describing qualities of feeling that infer the 
internal state.  Examples include subtle changes in body posture, or an alternation in 
the vocal tone, which may communicate an internal state of tension.  These qualities 
cannot be easily captured by the ‘static’ vocabulary used to describe categories of 
emotion such as ‘sadness’ or ‘joy’.  However, these expressions or vitality affects are 
the subjects of affective attunement.   
In summary, affective attunement can reinforce and affirm an unconscious inner state, 
which may reflect a true sense of self at a given moment. 
f)  ‘Differential attunement’ 
To return to the organ procurement narrative, although the entire team inhabited the 
same affective environment (an empty operating theatre, waiting for a donor to 
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expire), the affects of the situation were felt differently, and responded to in different 
ways by the members of the team.   
Why might this be?  As discussed earlier in the section on Badiou, the organ 
procurement constituted an ‘event’ for me, a rupture with what I had come to know 
and assimilate about this particular procedural experience.   However, for the other 
members of the team, it did not appear to constitute an ‘event’ for them.  It is possible 
that my response to the surgery may have affected other members of the team, such 
as Vinny.  But, the way in which the team conducted themselves during and after the 
organ procurement suggested that it was not an event for them.  However, I would still 
assert that the affects of the situation precipitated by this clinical encounter would 
have been felt differently by all of us.    
I suggest therefore, that Massumi’s notion of differential attunement, offers a way of 
exploring the differences.  He describes differential attunement as: 
A collective in-bracing in the immediacy of an affective event, but differently in 
each case. “Attunement” refers to the direct capture of attention and energies 
by the event. “Differential” refers to the fact that we each are taken into the 
event from a different angle, and move out of it following our own singular 
trajectories, riding the waves in our own inimitable way.  
It’s the idea of an event snapping us to attention together, and correlating our 
diversity to the affective charge that brings and that energizes the whole 
situation. And it’s the idea that this happens at a level where direct bodily 
reactions and our ability to think are so directly bound up with each other that 
they can’t be separated out yet from each other, or from the energizing of the 
event.  (Manning et al, 2011, my emphasis) 
He summarises his view as: ‘we’re all in on the event together, but we’re in it together 
differently,’ (ibid.)  Massumi uses the term ‘event’ here to describe a single encounter 
that is experienced differently by different people.   
I shall unpack Massumi’s above statement, with reference to the organ procurement 
surgery.  In the acuteness of an event there is a form of collective in-bracing.  In this 
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case, as the team listens to sounds of movement and breathing from outside the 
operating theatre door, and then observes the deceased donor being quickly brought 
into the operating room, the organ procurement team ‘readies’ itself to spring into 
operative action.   
This notion of ‘readying’ represents an attunement of the group’s collective focus and 
energies, which are immersed in the imminence-immanence of the event (Manning et 
al, 2011).   Massumi uses the ‘imminence-immanence’ dyad to describe how our 
physical bodies are ‘resonating chambers’ for the impending perturbations in the 
environments we live in.  I find this particularly relevant for the discipline of clinical 
medicine which is characterized by unpredictability and the ever-present potential for 
trauma, catastrophe and adversity.  I would assert that healthcare workers are 
immersed in a form of immi(a)nence, which sees them continually braced for events.   
However, how these inbracings are then experienced and the responses they create 
vary from individual to individual.  Massumi cites this outcome as in part due to the 
different set of tendencies, prior experiences, habits and beliefs we ‘bring with us’ to 
the encounter.   In short, how we collectively inbrace the affects may be attuned, but 
our responses to the affective experiencing is different.    
g)  Pedagogical implications of affective/differential attunement 
The question then arises as to how it may be possible to capture the intensity of the 
in-bracing, so that there can be more solidarity and affective coordination between the 
group?  What I am querying, is how it is possible in clinical learning environments, to 
affectively attune with the learner, or draw alongside the trainee.  Such an affective 
correlation between trainee and trainer may have a few important implications for 
learning.  First, from a trainer’s perspective it may provide an improved ability to 
recognise and understand what the learner is experiencing.  The latter may not be 
reflected in the established teaching practices.  Second, the affective attunement may 
enhance pedagogic strategies aimed at supporting learners engaged in contingent 
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and complex practice.  Third, it may also facilitate a learner’s exploration of the event 
to identify new ways of thinking and acting that may emerge from the experience of 
clinical practice.     
h)  Affects are autonomous 
Massumi explores the above question by proceeding to investigate what can 
modulate the thoughts and actions that emerge from affective states.  In his book 
Ontopower (2015), he explores the post 9/11 discourses in the media and politics.  He 
concludes from his analysis that Politics, is distinguished by how it acts to capture and 
manipulate affective states.  He theorizes that in the days and months after the attack, 
the Bush administration forged enduring and powerful links with the affective states 
that erupted, leading to a political rhetoric around notions of security.   
Massumi gives the example of how repeated images of the towers being attacked and 
subsequently collapsing were played relentlessly on news and other media for days 
and months after the event.  People were seen to be watching these images upright 
and agape.  There was no tolerance for a discussion around what factors may have 
been implicated in the possible motivations underlying that attack.  Instead, the 
affective states were cultivated around discussions of horror and shock.    
It could be argued that the images are powerful because of the emotions they stir.  
However, Massumi asserts that emotions would not be stirred if the images did not 
first have the capacity to trigger affective states:  
Affect is autonomous to the degree to which it escapes confinement in the 
particular body whose vitality, or potential for interaction, it is.  Formed, 
qualified, situated perceptions and cognitions fulfilling functions of actual 
connections or blockage are the capture and closure of affect.  Emotion is the 
most intense (most contracted) expression of that capture—and of the fact 
that something has always and again escaped.  (Massumi, 2002: 35) 
Similar to the approach taken by Deleuze and Guattari (1994), Massumi also 
considers affect to be a quality that is dependent on an event for its coming into 
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existence but at the same time, it becomes independent of that very event.  This 
means that it has the potential to be organized and given meaning, through various 
states of emotion that can capture it at a given moment and claim it as their own.   
Querying how certain forms of thought and behaviour arise from a given affect may be 
important in two ways.  First, in identifying what conditions are conducive to 
generating forms of learning that reflect what matters to the learner.  Second, creating 
‘lessons’ that are enduring.   
h)  Intensity 
Massumi in “The Autonomy of Affect”, an essay from the book entitled Parables of the 
Virtual (2002) describes intensity as an arousal produced by the central nervous 
system, evoking an uncontrolled reaction: ‘intensity is embodied in purely autonomic 
reactions most directly manifested in the skin—at the surface of the body, at its 
interface with things’, (2008: 25).  Massumi defines intensity as an immediate 
response, which may not be visible, but occurs all the same.  He ascribes it as, ‘pre-
personal’ which means that it arises before thought and has no association to our 
autobiography or previous experiences.  
Massumi describes intensity as ‘a non-conscious, never-to-be-conscious autonomic 
remainder’, which relates to language through, ‘interference, amplification or 
dampening’, (Massumi, 2002: 24-25).  Affect is an experience of intensity that is prior 
to or outside of consciousness and not subject to will.  It comprises moments of 
unformed and unstructured potential.  According to Massumi, affect allows us to ‘feel’ 
feelings: it determines the intensity of a feeling.  For a baby, subject to thousands of 
stimuli every day, for which she has no previous experience to help make meaning of 
it, nor the language to organise the sensations, the body responds by infolding the 
sensations and acknowledging them as intensities.  “In the infant, it is pure 
expression; in the adult it is pure potential (a measure of the body's readiness to act in 
a given circumstance) (Shrouse, 2005).” 
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i)  ‘Thinking-feeling’ 
Massumi illustrates this concept by using a three-dimensional object, a cube.  When 
presented with an object, what we see is the surface that faces us.  However, we also 
see the sides and the back of the object without walking around the object to see 
these qualities.  Massumi calls this a perceiving of the ‘object’s voluminousness’ 
(2008: 4).  When we see an object’s shape we are not seeing around to the other 
side, but instead, we ‘imagine’ these other sides due to previous experience with such 
objects.  We are seeing, in the form of the object, the potential our body holds to walk 
around, take another look, extend a hand and touch.   
Thus, seeing an object involves a whole set of active, embodied, potentials that 
constitute such experiences.  By ‘potential’ Massumi is referring to the way in which 
our bodies can relate to objects on different levels.  We see objects directly as they 
appear before us.  But, we also imagine the form, invisible to us from the perspective 
we view of objects, according to previous experiences.   
An example of this is when Radha iterates, “how could anyone understand what she 
(the patient) has gone through?”  This is a reference to what Radha can conceive in 
her ‘mind’s eye’ as the traumatic experience of the patient.  In front of Radha is the 
damaged and worn out body of the patient.  But, Radha can still imagine and tries to 
visualise what the patient would have been through when the surgical operation 
deteriorated into dangerous complications.  Radha’s perception of the patient’s 
journey, which is invisible and yet suggested by her current physical state, allows her 
to relate to the patient in ways that can potentially exceed the doctor-patient relation.  
This may have implications for how the demand of the patient institutes itself in the 
medical situation.  How does Radha recognise this demand?  How does the surgeon 
become 'response-able'? 
Massumi (2008) argues that we never register only what is actually present before us 
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qualities are ‘seen’, we abstractly see potential, we perceive a ‘life dynamic’ or 
‘virtually live relation’ (ibid., 6).  Massumi therefore concludes that what we see are not 
‘objects’ but, ‘events’.   
An object conceptualised in this manner, is dynamic, or full of all sorts of virtual 
movement.  He calls this state of capacitation, being ‘relationally activated’.  To 
answer the above questions, Radha is ‘relationally activated’ as a consequence of the 
states of affectation triggered by the encounter, she is poised for what may come: ‘we 
don’t just look, we sense ourselves alive’, (ibid., 5).  It is this immediate perception of 
an encounter, which is felt, that Massumi refers to as ‘thinking-feeling’ (ibid., 6). 
4.10  Gilles Deleuze’s theory of immanence 
Through the above story of Radha’s on-call encounter and my narrative of the organ 
procurement surgery, aspects of practice are problematised in terms of the immanent 
nature of relations.  That is, the subjects of both narratives emerge through local flows 
of experiencing, in which the intensities that form and develop facilitate how the 
individual makes sense of the clinical encounter and comes to think and act 
(Massumi, 2002; Atkinson, 2016,).   
I have drawn from Deleuze and Guattari’s writings in What is Philosophy? (1994), to 
explore notions of transcendence and immanence.  Deleuze argued that much of 
philosophy was committed to transcendence, by which he means a concern with what 
informs the way we perceive the world.  This lies outside of actual experience and is a 
constant (Colebrook, 2015: 71).  Transcendence thus means, that experience is 
considered or judged from established concepts, categories or criteria.   
In contrast, Deleuze advocated a philosophy of immanence that locates itself within 
experience.  This would emphasise a knowing of how we experience rather than 
submitting experience to external established categories that constitute experience.   
In surgical training, transcendent frameworks of practice refer to the established 
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curriculum (the Intercollegiate Surgical Curriculum), the assimilated training practices 
and the approved forms of assessment.  These forms of knowledge and skills are 
essential to orienting learners in a subject, so that they are taught the necessary skills 
and theory to perform complicated tasks.  Crucially transcendent frameworks in 
Medicine ensure a standard of practice, which has important implications for the 
safety of patients.   
The key point regarding a philosophy of immanence is that it attempts to capture 
particular ways of knowing, as they emerge in practice, rather than exclusively 
predicating practice upon established criteria or frameworks of knowledge.  
Immanence places emphasis upon an openness to processes of becoming, their 
intensities, affects, ways of knowing and seeing in their specific milieus of practice. 
a)  ‘Actual-Virtual’  
Thus, at every moment, my experience […] is objectively problematic, which 
means that it has the structure of a problem, constituted by virtual elements 
and divergent series, and the exact trajectory that “I” will follow is not 
predictable in advance.  In a moment from now I will have actualised certain of 
those virtualities; I will have, say spoken or gestured in a certain manner.  In 
doing so I will not have “realized a possibility” (in which the real resembles an 
already-conceptualised possibility) but will have “actualized a virtuality” - that 
is, I will have produced something new, a difference. (Smith, 2012: 253) 
Daniel Smith (2012) explains Deleuze’s actual-virtual dyad as a consideration that 
every moment is ‘objectively problematic’.  An example of this is the series of ‘events’ 
that are implicated in how Radha’s practice is actualised.  I use the Deleuzian notion 
of ‘events’ in this instance.  Whereas, earlier in the organ procurement narrative, I 
referred to Badiou’s concept of event to describe a moment of rupture in a situation 
from which a subject emerges: a subjectivation according to the truth of an event.   
An event as defined by Gilles Deleuze is something that dissolves the subject.  It 
undoes the subject and its parameters as a consequence of the ‘new’ precipitated by 
the event.  In Radha’s case, when she walked into the hospital to deal with the 
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emergency surgery, she could not have fully known with certainty what would unfurl: 
she would be chastised by the medical director, disappoint her daughter by not going 
to the school assembly and be ‘stumped’ in the operation by an inability to identify a 
cause for the patient’s surgical problem.  These events, have the potential to control 
how Radha’s practice is actualised.  This is seen in how she feels guilt about her 
daughter or irritation created by the medical director’s scolding.  These affective-
emotive states could constitute a distraction or impediment to Radha fully engaging 
with the serious task ahead of her.   
Radha shows good insight into how these aspects could detract from her very 
important goal to provide surgical care for the patient.  She is aware of the impact of 
these ‘emotional moments’, as she calls it, without being fully cognisant of how exactly 
they may impact her thoughts and actions.   
The actualisation of the virtual for Radha comes in two phases.  First, in the moment 
when she stops operating, realising that she has exhausted all the possible options 
she knows of and has been taught.  Second, in the days after the surgery when she 
occupies a ‘watchful waiting’, carefully monitoring the patient to see how the woman 
progresses.  ‘Does the patient deteriorate? does she improve?’   
Deleuze (and Smith, 2012) distinguish the virtual from the ‘possible’, because in the 
former new knowledge is created.  To apply this to Radha, her thoughts and actions 
contribute to producing an understanding or appreciation of the event which had not 
pre-existed her experience with the encounter.  Radha told me that she had been 
taught and had also heard stories about the ‘importance of stopping’ in surgery when 
all interventions had failed.  However, she had not truly understood that concept until 
she found herself in that particular situation: ‘virtual difference has the power to 
become in unforeseen ways, always more than this actual world and not limited by its 
already present flow’, (Colebrook, 2008: 96).   
In this situation, the virtual is partly derived from the relations that Radha forms with 
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what she has been taught and heard in the past, and how she then decides to act in 
the present.  Atkinson (2016: 7) describes these forms of knowing as a ‘necessary 
transcendence’.  It is implicated in how the content of her surgical training in 
emergency situations comes to matter to her in this particular event of practice: 
Here the actualisation of learning takes the form, or the morphology of a 
necessary transcendence, a transcendence emerging not from external 
epistemological frameworks but from the intrinsic relations of how something 
matters for a learner in a particular learning encounter.  (ibid., 7, original 
emphasis). 
b)  ‘Necessary transcendence’ 
Surgical training has played a critical role in equipping Radha with the necessary skills 
of judgement and technical proficiency to bring order to the chaotic nature of 
emergency practice.  However, what Radha has demonstrated in her thoughts and 
actions is the necessity for a particular pedagogic strategy that creates connections 
between transcendent knowledge and the immanence of real events of practice.  
Assimilated practices that overwhelm or totalise a surgeon’s actions through a specific 
understanding of emergency surgery, risk ignoring the ‘local curations’ (Atkinson, 
2012) of learning that occur in unanticipated events.  What is demanded in such 
situations are pedagogic schemes that work alongside a learner’s attempts to resolve 
or answer a particular problem.   
4.11  Gilbert Simondon’s Theory Of ‘Technical Mentality’  
Gilbert Simondon (1924-1989) was a French philosopher from St. Etienne who wrote 
extensively on information, communication and technology.  His work has only 
recently been translated into English text, reaching a far wider audience.  Deleuze 
drew on Simondon’s writings when developing his own theories.   
I have drawn upon Simondon’s writing on ‘technical mentality’, to explore how a 
surgeon emerges from the technical and practical complexities of clinical practice.  I 
have done this by applying his analysis on the development of technological systems 
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to the formation of training systems in clinical medicine.  Simondon himself drew 
comparisons between the emergence of technological systems and the creation of 
systems of reasoning and logic (‘cognitive schema’) in society (Massumi, 2006: 43-
45).   
In the following account, I look at four key principles of his theories; hylomorphism, 
individuation, metastability and affect.  I conclude with a brief explanation of what a 
Simondonian ethics would involve and how the notion of a ‘technician’ may be 
applicable to surgeons in training. 
a)  The challenge of imposing cultural values on new technologies 
Heidegger, viewed technological development as a distortion of the ways of ordering 
the world as well as our cognitive perception of reality (Heidegger, 1977).   He 
asserted that technology was alienating man’s sense of authentic being.  Simondon 
however, considered this perceived crisis a consequence of society’s efforts to 
impose existing cultural values to technological systems (Coombes, 2012; 
Sauvagnargues, 2012; Mills, 2016; Bardin, 2015).  But, he concluded that this 
application of a system of fixed cultural values onto novel technologies was 
problematical.   
Below, I present three reasons consistent with Simondon’s concerns, elucidating why 
he felt this approach was difficult.   I have used the example of in vitro fertilisation 
(IVF), as a modern technology to illustrate Simondon’s ideas.   
First, the application of an existing system of cultural values onto a novel technical 
object, is based on a hylomorphic principle: form is imposed on matter (see below for 
further explication).  An example is the application of society’s moral beliefs onto new 
innovations in fertility and conception.  The introduction of in IVF in the 1970s, to 
enable infertile couples to conceive, was considered highly controversial at the time.  
This was predominantly because it challenged the religious, cultural and moral beliefs 
of that era, which had remained static and constant.   One such belief was the view 
 129 
that IVF techniques contravened the sanctity of life—only God could create and 
destroy. 
Second, application of a hylomorphic framework can obscure the individuation of 
potentialities that are inherent in the system itself.  These potentialities contribute to 
the intrinsic form of the technical object.  In the case of IVF, rigid application of cultural 
values to fertility procedures might conceal the other ways in which the technique can 
be expanded.  For instance, IVF technology has enabled screening of inherited 
genetic disorders such as cystic fibrosis and Huntingdon’s disease.  This has led to 
couples affected with the defective gene, an opportunity to conceive a child who will 
not suffer from the disease.  Thus, the development of IVF technologies represents an 
actualisation of the potentialities that were inherent in the original procedure.       
Third, the inherent form of the object, (which Simondon refers to as its ‘technicity’), is 
constituted by modes of being or functioning (‘technical and physical protocols’) that 
are already in existence.  As such, these modes of functioning will always resist 
having fixed values imposed upon them.  This is primarily because, the inherent 
modes of being are creative of their own norms and values (Mills, 2016: 44).  As such, 
these individuating norms exhibit metastability and are therefore transformative in and 
of themselves.   
IVF technology is constituted by technical protocols (‘modes of functioning’), sets of 
procedural steps (‘the inherent form’).  These protocols, in and of themselves will 
create and develop the technology in terms of: what is possible, how this is achieved 
and the scope for further extension of the technique into fields that are yet to be 
conceived of.  These inherent ‘capacities’ of the technique, will individuate in different 
ways to create norms in practice, which may resist external attempts to frame the 
practice with an ‘outside’ system of values.  Crucially, the inherent norms and values 
of the technology can transform the existing societal and cultural values.  Therefore, a 
recurring causality can be seen between how we think about technology and the ways 
in which technology alters the way we think.        
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b)  Form is immanent to matter 
Hylomorphism is the central doctrine of Aristotle’s philosophy of nature: being is 
composed through an encounter between matter and the transformative actions of 
form.  However, Simondon rejects the form-matter separation.  Instead, he proposes 
that processes of individuation are immanent.  That is, form and matter are 
indissoluble.   
He exemplifies his ideas using the example of a brick.  In Aristotelian terms, the clay 
represents ‘matter’ whilst the three dimensional ‘parallelepiped’ brick, is the form 
imposed on the clay.  But, Simondon identifies how this paradigmatic schema fails to 
recognise the processes or mediatory steps that lie between how clay (‘matter’) is 
individuated into a brick (‘form’).   
The technical operation of the capture of form can thus be used as a paradigm 
provided that one asks this operation to indicate the true relations which it 
institutes. However, these relations are not established between the raw 
material and the pure form, but between the prepared matter and materialised 
forms: the operation of the capture of form does not suppose only raw material 
and form, but also energy; the materialised form is a form that can act as a 
limit, as a topological border of a system. The prepared matter is that which 
can transport the potential energy which charges it in the technical 
manipulation.  (Adkins, 2007, my emphasis) 
Simondon draws our attention to what is implicated in the capture of form.  This 
includes the extraction of clay from marshy soil (raw material), dried, ground, kneaded 
(Chabot, 2003; p. 76).  It also involves processes of energy expenditure, which 
transform the clay into a brick; the technical manipulation of clay through the wood 
species of the brick mould, the skill of the workman, the temperature of the brick oven.  
These processes demonstrate the inherent form of clay, prior to the substance being 
manipulated and moulded into a brick.   
Clinical relevance 
What Simondon emphasises is the notion, that form is immanent to matter.  This is 
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similar to the theories of Deleuze (1994) as well as Piaget (1978).  In Radha’s 
narrative, as the interaction between herself and the patient unfolds and evolves, 
there is already a form inherent to the encounter.  The encounter begins to take 
‘shape’.  The potentialities that emerge and develop, reflect the ‘taking form’ activity 
that is intrinsic to the encounter.   
However, a hylomorphic framework is consistent with a ‘form receiving passivity’, 
(Massumi, 2006: 43) which signifies an external application of structure.  An example 
is the didactic instruction on doctor-patient communication provided by Good Medical 
Practice (2013).  This document details how Radha should interact and speak with the 
patient, through predefined notions of honesty, transparency and ethics.  While it is 
advisable in complex situations to provide detailed guidance for a doctor to follow, this 
approach risks being ineffective if applied blindly to all situations.  This is because it 
neglects to recognise how Radha has already encountered the situation, and how this 
prehension has informed the ways in which she decides to conduct herself in relation 
to the patient as well as to herself as a surgeon and fellow human being.   
Simondon refers to Whitehead’s notion of prehension as the taking-effect of an 
‘operational solidarity’ (ibid., 41).  This is the way in which Radha encounters the 
disparate elements of the encounter (her guilt about her daughter, her duty to the 
patient, the expectations that the hospital have of her as a surgeon) and the relations 
that form and develop with and between these components of matter.  This creates a 
‘new plane of operational solidarity’ (ibid.), a new order of the relations of matter in the 
encounter start to emerge.  This is the mode of existence that Radha assumes.     
c)  Individuation 
Simondon proposed an ontogenetic account of individuation where the emphasis is 
placed on the processes of becoming, rather than on the state of being (the formed 
individual).  Individuation describes how something emerges and becomes 
constituted.  These theories echo the work of Deleuze, (who acknowledges the 
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influence of Simondon’s thoughts) (Deleuze, 1994; Deleuze and Guattari, 1977, 1994) 
and Alfred North Whitehead (1929) (Shaviro, 2012).  
Simondon describes knowledge (epistemology) as grounded in a theory of 
individuation.  This has implications for my hypothesis that the way a surgeon comes 
to know something (knowledge) is immanent to his experience of a clinical encounter.  
The focus is not on what is known, but rather on the processes that constitute how 
knowledge is formed and developed: the individuation of knowledge.   
Therefore, individuation emphasises the conditions that determine what knowledge 
can be (Mills, 2016: 95).  As such it draws attention to the relations, operations and 
interdependencies involved in the processes of becoming (Coombes, 2012; Bardin, 
2015; Mills, 2016).  Simondon’s project of ‘allagmatics’ (1989) is a reference to how 
the different modes of individuation relate to each other:   
Individuated being is not substance but rather the putting into question of 
being, being through a problematic, divided, reunited, carried in this 
problematic, which sets itself up through it and causes it to become.  
Becoming is not the becoming of individuated being but the becoming of the 
individuation of being (Scott, 2014: 6). 
The individual (‘individuated being’) is not the objective nor the purpose of 
individuation.  Instead, ‘a living being exists as only always a becoming between 
individuations, not as a becoming after individuation’ (Scott, 2014: 33).  Individuated 
being is only ever partially complete, in a constant state of (re)forming between 
different modes of individuation.   
Therefore, it is not possible to start with a fully constituted individual and ‘work back’ to 
the ‘pre individual’, a state of potential.  To do so would be to deny the principle of 
individuation and instead, subscribe to the practice of hylomorphism (Shaviro, 2012: 
53) (Simondon, 2005a: 45-60).   An example is how Radha ‘exists between 
individuations’.  In the encounter with the female patient, Radha describes her 
thoughts, emotions and actions as a mother, an employee of the NHS hospital, as a 
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colleague, as an oncall surgeon, as a woman and as a fellow human being.  These 
are all the different modes of individuation that form and develop in the encounter and 
which reflect the various relations that she establishes in that same encounter.  
Appreciating the processes of individuation in any given moment, draws attention to 
the variable factors that influence our thoughts and actions in an encounter of 
practice.   
d)  Metastability 
Metastability is the condition that makes individuation possible.  Simondon borrows 
the term from thermodynamics.  It infers a state that is in-between stability and 
instability, and charged with potential energy for becoming.   
Simondon uses the paradigm of crystallisation to help illustrate his ideas (Chabot, 
2003: 79-84; Mills, 2015: 37-39).  The crystal emerges from two realities, the already 
structured crystal and the amorphous crystalline solution or ‘milieu’.  The milieu is 
Simondon’s description of the broader environment in which individuation occurs.  The 
crystalline milieu is rich in potential energies or virtualities.  These potentialities exist 
within a given milieu but have yet to emerge and take form.  
A speck of dust disrupting the crystalline solution will transform the metastable nature 
of the milieu.  Through transductive processes the potential energies/virtualities are 
restructured along a particular path, resulting in the emergence of a crystal.  
Transduction underlines how individuation comes about.  Simondon states that:  
[…] an operation—physical, biological, mental, social—by which an activity 
propagates step-by-step within a given domain, and founds this propagation 
on a structuration of the domain that is realised from place to place. (Mills, 
2015: 38). 
Importantly, what is individuated is not just the crystal (‘the individual’) but the crystal 
in relation to its milieu; an individual in relation to their milieu or ‘pool of becoming’.   
A complete crystal can continue to expand if placed in another solution.  We can draw 
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parallels for surgeons in training.  Each trainee has the capacity to continually 
individuate and therefore she can have no fixed identity.  Importantly, the potential to 
individuate resides in both the trainee (pre-individual) as well as the relations the 
trainee forms within the encounter (milieu).  For example, Radha herself individuates 
through the clinical encounter with the female patient, and her milieu, (which 
comprises the environment she works in and the relations she forms within it), also 
individuates as the event unfolds.   
The individual, then, is always in relation to its milieu, which co-individuates 
along with it.  As such the individual can never be considered as complete but 
always partial and in the process of individuation, the milieu always acting as 
a mediation between individual and world.  (Mills, 2015: 40). 
The milieu represents the dynamic process of ‘becoming’.  As a metastable structure,  
it is constituted by a complex of virtualities that await structuration.  These virtualities 
can never be completely exhausted (‘used up’) nor can they be entirely dissipated: 
Radha’s capacities in this situation are limitless.    
This notion resonates with earlier concepts of immanence in clinical encounters 
(Deleuze, Massumi).  An individual is never completely in a state of being or one of 
becoming.  Instead, a singularity, which refers to something(s) in a clinical encounter 
that disrupts our way of being (for Radha, it was not being able to find the bleeding 
point in the operation) acts to structure/individuate the potentials within a metastable 
system.  Through this process the encounter attains significance to the individual.  
The learning encounter starts to matter.    
What Simondon’s theories illuminate is the nature of the struggle that confronts 
surgeons in routine practice.  This is the tension between the desires and values 
imposed upon the profession by the regulatory system (which in turn is set by society, 
policy etc.), and the individual capacities that form and develop, consequent to the 
potentialities that arise from actual encounters of practice.  However, what is often 
neglected by regulatory schemes is a recognition of the recurring causality between 
how surgeons view systems of regulation and how systems of regulation can alter the 
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way surgeons think and act.  
e)  Affect 
Simondon (1989) describes affect as an example of a transductive process of 
individuation, which in simplistic terms, can mediate form (‘taking form activity’):   
The affections are an orientation of a portion of the living being in relation to 
itself; they realise a polarisation of a determined moment of life in relation to 
other moments; they coincide to being with itself across time, but not with the 
totality of itself and its states; an affective state is that which possesses a unity 
of integration to life, it is a temporal unity which is part of a whole, according to 
what one might call a gradient of becoming.  (Mills, 2016: 74). 
In the above statement, Simondon defines affect as the manner in which an organism 
(individual) orients itself when confronted by a disparity or tension.  The way in which 
the individual orients itself, refers to how the individual relates to itself as well as the 
environment it finds itself in.  To explain these nuances, I return to the organ 
procurement surgery narrative.  My affective state manifests through my internal and 
physical response to being confronted by the ‘sights and sounds of a newly dead 
corpse’ (which constitutes the ‘disparity’), as well as how I relate to my colleagues, the 
donor patient, the operating theatre.  This resonates with Spinoza’s initial statement 
on affectation being a process of ‘affecting’ and in turn ‘being affected’ by something.   
For Simondon, the problematic of affect is the requirement to act or ‘orient’ oneself in 
ways that provide a resolution to the disparity.  An example of this is how Radha 
admits to ‘talking through’ her feelings of guilt as a way of alleviating the emotional 
burden she feels, which may otherwise detract from her focusing on the important 
operative task.  This is her approach to resolving the tensions she feels within herself 
and how she prepares or orients herself to meet the demands of the emergency 
surgery.    
f)  A clinical application of individuation and affect 
Individuation emerges like the act of solving a problem, or - what amounts to 
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the same thing - like the actualisation of a potential and the establishing of 
communication between disparates.  The act of individuation consists . . . in 
integrating the elements of the disparateness into a state of coupling which 
ensures its internal resonance.  The individual thus finds itself attached to a 
pre-individual half which is not the impersonal within it so much as the 
reservoir of its singularities.  In all these respects, we believe that individuation 
is essentially intensive, and that the pre-individual field is a virtual-ideal field, 
made up of differential relations . . . Individuation is the act by which intensity 
determines differential relations to become actualised, along the lines of 
differentiation and within the qualities and extensities it creates.  (Deleuze, 
1994: 246) 
To explore these particular notions, individuation as an act of ‘problem solving’ and 
affect as a resolution of disparity, I apply the concepts to a clinical example of routine 
practice.  I have finished a morning outpatient clinic, and as I leave to go onto my next 
clinical engagement the receptionist tells me that an elderly patient, Mrs. Grey, who is 
late for her clinic appointment has finally arrived, brought in by routine ambulance 
(she is frail and uses hospital transport, which got delayed due to traffic).  In this 
situation, ‘I’ (Simondon’s ‘organism’) am confronted by the encounter of a late yet 
elderly patient (the singularity that triggers the affective process of transduction).  My 
responses (individuation of a metastable state of potentials) are initially mediated by 
affectations that signify how I think, feel and eventually act in this situation.   
Here are a sample of the factors implicated in the individuation of affective relations in 
this particular situation: I am torn and irritated because clinic has overrun, I’m late for 
an important radiology meeting, I have not eaten or drunk anything in hours and was 
expecting to grab a sandwich now, I have no clinic room to see the patient as the 
rooms are being refreshed for the afternoon clinics, the consultation won’t be quick 
because the elderly patient is physically immobile, partially sighted and deaf.   
The process of individuation in this example, is similar to Deleuzian concepts of the 
actual-virtual.  Simondon, similarly to Deleuze, does not propose a universal 
framework that can be applied to the behaviour of pre-individual being.  How a 
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metastable system operates in any encounter cannot be predicted, because it is 
dependent on ‘singularities’, each event can trigger a system of potentials in pre-
individual being that will actualise in ways that cannot be known in advance.  
g)  Ethics 
While Simondon never described a clear ethics, his theories of normative transduction 
and development suggest an ethics of practice that emphasises the act.   
Ethics is transformed once the perspective for choosing “right” or “wrong” 
actions is made on the basis of an appeal to becoming and the presumption 
that all being is only ever incomplete and indeterminate (to whatever degree).  
In doing so, we replace the Kantian presumption on which moral choices are 
made: the total and complete individual being, with its corollary, conscious and 
coherent subjectivity.  What this means is that the normative is only an effect 
of affective practice and, therefore, expressive of the particular problem of 
incompatibility - of existence and necessity, between the individual and the 
world and between other individuals - that elicits the decision to act, to be, or 
not to be.  An ontogenetic ethics is one that raises the question of how an 
individual lives its problematic being.  (Scott, 2012: 182, my emphasis)  
As is true for Deleuze, a Simondonian ethics goes beyond judgements of right or 
wrong.  Simondon describes ethics as an affective response to the disparity that 
confronts an individual, and which proceeds to create the norms.  In other words, the 
problems encountered at a given time determine whether we choose to resolve the 
tensions that confront us or not.  This is the nature of an ethics of individuation.   
As such, a Simondonian ethics, which is founded on notions of ontogenesis (how 
something becomes) are concerned with how an individual chooses to think or act 
when confronted by particular challenges to its way of life.  This approach is very 
close to an ethics of immanence which is grounded in the actions that emerge from 
the here and now of practice.                        
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h)  The technician 
Simondon states that: 
Man understands machines; he has a function to play between the machines, 
so that there can be a genuine technical ensemble.  It is man who discovers 
meanings (les significations): meaning is the sense that an event takes in 
relation to forms that already exist; meaning is what makes an event have 
information value.  (Mills, 2016: 135) 
To be trained as a surgeon, is to be inducted into a specific code of behaviour and 
norms.  However, to emerge as a professional who is ‘response—able’ to variations in 
clinical situations, which may not be completely covered in the official texts, requires 
an ability to exceed the established code of conduct.  This relates to Simondon’s 
notion of the technician as ‘a man who discovers meanings’.  A technician has the 
capacity to link what is known about a practice with an ability to advance this 
knowledge when confronted by ‘singularities’.  This is what distinguishes a technician 
from a worker.   
In training, through our personal experiences of practice as well as what we learn and 
hear about surgery, a surgeon begins to build systems of potentials.  These systems 
represent ways of thinking, acting and being that are novel and may not have been 
considered yet by the individual.  Over time these systems of potential become 
structured.  However, the structures themselves represent potentialities for further 
development in response to singularities that arise from the environment.   
An example is how a kidney transplant operation, may still have the potential to 
surprise a transplant surgeon who has over 30-years of experience, performing this 
procedure.  In that time, she may have undertaken hundreds of kidney operations 
which provided different sets of potentialities.  These potentialities have been 
organised over the years into methods of procedural knowledge that may now 
become standard practice for the surgeon.  However, a singularity, in the form of an 
outcome or component of a kidney operation has the power to trigger new 
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potentialities to arise from the existing systems.   
For surgeons to become true technicians (in the Simondonian sense) rather than 
labourers within a health service, individuals must cultivate an ability to interpret the 
established knowledges and practices in ways that can be enhanced when faced with 
the actuality of real events of practice.  
4.12  Conclusion 
In this first part of the theoretical chapter, I have proposed that a pedagogy of the 
surgical event is a necessity, if the aim is to understand and prioritise in the learning 
agenda how something matters for a trainee.   
This approach requires a softening of the transcendent frameworks that presently 
govern teaching practices.  It also raises issues of ethics within a pedagogic scenario.  
The way in which a teacher understands something may be punctured by the trainee’s 
response.  An example of this is taken from the organ procurement surgery narrative 
when Vinny, the mentor surgeon, notices the trainee’s response.  It appears he had 
neither anticipated nor previously experienced such a reaction from a trainee.  This 
learning encounter could have afforded him an opportunity to rethink how he prepared 
and taught trainees at an organ procurement surgery.  In this context, an ethics of 
surgical pedagogy is concerned with conduct that is relative to a particular learning 
encounter, how it matters to the trainee and how the trainer engages with the trainee.   
I have presented theories from a select group of philosophers to describe how I intend 
to explore actual encounters of clinical experience, to illuminate the pedagogical 
opportunities embedded within.  I end with a quote from Judith Butler (2005), taken 
from her book Giving an Account of Oneself.  It seems to sum up the ethical position 
of a pedagogy of encounter: 
Perhaps most importantly, we must recognize that ethics requires us to risk 
ourselves precisely at moments of unknowingness, when what forms us 
diverges from what lies before us, when our willingness to become undone in 
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relation to others constitutes our chance of becoming human. To become 
undone by another is a primary necessity, an anguish to be sure, but also a 
chance – to be addressed, claimed, bound to what is not me, but also to be 
moved, to be prompted to act, to address myself elsewhere, and so to vacate 
the self-sufficient “I” as a kind of possession. If we speak and try to give an 
account from this place, we will not be irresponsible, or, if we are, we will 
surely be forgiven.  (ibid., 136). 
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A Theoretical Framework:  Part Two 
               
4.13  Methodological Approach To Policy Analysis 
How surgeons are constructed through policy documents and how this in turn impacts 
on the direction in which surgical education is developed and expanded is the focus of 
the first data analysis chapter.  I have used specific sociological theories to unpack 
the content and meaning of the documents.  This is a novel approach to policy 
analysis in postgraduate surgical education research.   
Previously, the content and impact of policy texts has been understood through an 
evidence-based research paradigm; the effectiveness of a curriculum (policy) and 
whether it is ‘fit for purpose’ is assessed through measurements of performance such 
as examinations, procedural competencies, colleague feedback, patient satisfaction 
surveys (GMC, 2013, 2014, 2016).    
My research is concerned with exploring the ontological aspects of a surgeon’s 
journey through training, and as such I query how a trainee emerges through surgical 
practice rather than what abilities or skills (elements of transcendent knowledge) they 
acquire at each stage of training (what they can do).   
To explore the ontological and ethical dimensions of training I begin by asking 
questions about how policy texts position trainees, educators and patients within 
Medicine and Healthcare.  This investigation of text is complemented by; (i) interviews 
with individuals involved in educational policy making and delivery and (ii) 
ethnographic research utilising examples of actual surgical events from my training 
journal.   
The use of a range of data allows interpretation of each source: each source is both 
singularly and collectively interpreted (Gerard and Farrell, 2013).  These interrelated 
source materials generate multiple research entry points with which to analyse and 
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interpret the subjects and outcomes (actual and proposed) of policy grounded in a 
socio-historic context.  As Gerth and Mills (1958) state, ‘social scientific theory is what 
allow us to connect to “the fate of our times”: it situates our understanding of specific, 
local issues within a broader social and historical context’ (Brosnan, 2013: 6).   
This approach provides a sociological lens for an interpretation of the documents in 
which teaching and learning and their socio-historical context are conceived.   The 
way in which material is presented, evaluated, judged and understood is largely 
shaped by the society of which we are all a part:   
[..] medical education research and policies that are divorced from social 
science theory are at risk of overlooking the origins of the problems they are 
meant to address.  (Brosnan, 2013: 6). 
In studying these documents, I treat them as ‘discursive practices’, that is to say 
practices that construct those entities about which they speak, as opposed to 
revealing essential truths. To facilitate this approach, I have drawn on Foucault’s 
theories of discourse and power-knowledge, Butler’s concept of subjectivities and 
performativity theory and Bourdieuian field analysis. 
4.14  Michel Foucault: The Power Of Discourse 
Discourses are. . .about what can be said, and thought, but also about who 
can speak, when, where and with what authority. Discourses embody 
meaning and social relationships, they constitute both subjectivity and power 
relations. . .Thus discourses construct certain possibilities for thought.  (Ball 
1990, p.17). 
Foucault (1972) theorises that individuals come into being through discourses; a 
structure of language and practice around certain social concepts and ideologies.   
Foucault’s theory of discourse explores the structures and rules that underpin how a 
discourse is constituted; that is the conditions of possibility of what can be said or 
thought or imagined of something in a particular epoch.  In being concerned with ‘what 
can be said’ and ‘who can speak’ discourse, in this Foucauldian sense, is therefore 
indissoluble from power. It is not concerned with revealing the truth of idea or thoughts 
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of a text, as for example in more traditional hermeneutics.  
Ball (2015) argues that much of policy analysis has failed because it focuses on ‘text 
work [rather] than discourse work; that is, a lot more focus on what is written and said, 
rather than how those statements are formed and made possible’ (p. 311).  Therefore, 
applying a Foucauldian analysis of policy text is to investigate the discourses 
embedded in the document to identify the ‘practices that systematically form the 
objects of which they speak’, and the embedded power relations (Foucault, 1972: 49). 
For example, in the context of education, surgery is framed in the following ways;  
• ‘Surgical training is patient safety for the next 30 years_’. 
• Structured surgical training prepares surgeons for independent practice 
within individual specialties. 
• ‘Grit is a fundamental requirement to complete [surgical] training.’ 
The above examples of discourse demonstrate how surgeons and trainees are 
constructed within specific discursive and practice parameters that define ability and 
performance.   
In the first example, the morphing of surgical work with patient safety is a specific  
construction of Surgery.  On the one hand, the link between surgery and safety may 
seem obvious and natural.  But, I suggest that the statement functions to construct a 
particular link, that was previously not emphasized in the same way.  Patient safety is 
the core principal around which all clinical practices and training must orient.  This has 
occurred due to a series of reviews of hospital practice, which have demonstrated 
poor standards in care and unacceptable working practices (GMC, 2013, 2015, 2016; 
Health Education England, 2016).   
In the second example, a link is being established between consultant practice, the 
end goal of training, and the need for organised programmes of education, to achieve 
this objective.  It implies that experience or learning that does not occur within this 
recognised framework of teaching, may not make a valuable or useful contribution to 
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developing professional practice.   
In the final example, the identity of a surgeon is connected to specific values, in this 
case ‘grit’.  The emphasis of this particular quality over others, suggests that surgical 
training is being conceived around the possession of certain inherent or acquired 
characteristics.  Thus, the lack thereof is being associated with an inability to complete 
training.  
Deconstructing these statements allows one to disclose the conditions that regulate 
how a trainee becomes visible through a particular context.  Butler (2005) describes 
how discourses construct a ‘regime of truth’ that ‘offers the terms that make self-
recognition possible’ (p. 22).  Discourse creates the conditions and frameworks that 
enable one to think about how ‘good’ we are or how ‘effective’ we are in what we do.  
a)  Power-Knowledge and Subjectivity 
Foucault emphasised the institutional and political production of knowledge.  Though 
he did not write specifically about medical education, his writings on hospitals indicate 
that he would have viewed medical (surgical) training as continuous with the practice 
of clinical medicine (Foucault 1975).  It is possible to apply his theories to the way in 
which medical (surgical) education has been conceived and developed.   
First, he considers that power operates upon bodies (individuals) through the 
application of knowledge to those bodies.  In essence, this describes his observation 
that, knowledge which is desired or expected within certain practices is imbued with 
power.  For example, the ‘official’ knowledges of Surgery as authorised by the Royal 
Colleges of England (RCS) is contained in the ISC (intercollegiate surgical 
curriculum).  Trainees are ‘legitimised’ by the College when they demonstrate 
proficiency with the ISC as recognised through passing College exams; trainees 
become ‘visible’ as potential surgeons.   
Through this discourse of knowledge, the trainee acquires a specific pedagogic 
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identity: the trainee is constructed as a future surgical being through their relationship 
with the official and accepted bodies of knowledge.  These relations of power activate 
the individual as a subject of certain cultural practices; in this example, it is through 
curricular assessment.  This discourse of knowledge values certain aspects of the 
trainee’s practice over others; the assessment of a trainee’s knowledge refers to 
fluency of their theoretical knowledge, it does not critique the ability of the trainee nor 
their innate skill.   
This means that a trainee is recognised within boundaries that are determined by the 
official framework of surgery; this is the discourse of knowledge that constructs, 
regulates and confirms the surgical student as a specific pedagogic subject.  It 
appears that discourse here operates on a couple of levels.  In the first instance, a 
body of surgical knowledge through which the trainee surgeon becomes initiated.  
Second, the initial formation of this knowledge through which bodies, their anatomies, 
physiologies, pathologies etc. are conceived create a specific medical discourse in 
which surgeons participate. 
However, for Foucault the subject is not a passive victim of power; power is not 
exerted on us by an external force or system. Power insinuates and permeates all 
aspects of an individual’s existence; their relationships, expectations, self-judgments 
and aspirations.  We constitute ourselves as subjects by participating in mechanisms 
of power.  
Butler expands the conditions under which subjection occurs; mastery and submission 
(see below).  Usher and Edwards (1994) point to the concealed and intrinsic aspects 
of power-knowledge discourses: 
Power-knowledge formations operate through the practices which inscribe the 
person as a particular subject prior to entering an educational institution and 
those practices they are engaged in once within it; in becoming a ‘subject’ we 
learn to be a ‘subject’ of a particular sort. It is our assumptions about the 
nature of the ‘subject’ which then inform our practices as teachers and 
learners, yet the effect of power which gives rise to the particular positioning of 
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subjects is effectively veiled.  (p. 96.) 
In applying this understanding of power-knowledge to the surgical education 
example above, one can see that the knowledge-assessment discourse constructs 
specific subject identities.  Walkerdine (1990) describes how identity is formed 
through this discursive power: 
Modern apparatuses of social regulation, along with other social and cultural 
practices, produce knowledges which claim to ‘identify’ individuals. These 
knowledges create the possibility of multiple practices, multiple positions. To 
be a ‘clever child’ or a ‘good mother’ for example, makes sense only in terms 
given by pedagogic, welfare, medical, legal and other discourses and 
practices.  These observe, sanction and correct how we act; they attempt to 
define who and what we are (p. 199, my emphasis). 
Stuart Hall (1996) concludes: 
Precisely because identities are structured within, not outside, discourse, we 
need to understand them as produced within specific historical and 
institutional sites within specific discursive formations and practices, by 
specific enunciative strategies.  (p. 4) 
At different times in the history of surgery, surgical operations and care have been 
conceived through various terms which were consistent with the dominant existing 
bodies of knowledge.  In chapter 2, I describe how between the 1980s and the 
beginning of the 21st century the model of healthcare transitioned from a paternalistic 
doctor-patient relation to one where the both subjects now work ‘equally’ and 
cooperatively in a therapeutic relationship.   Thus, the identities of both doctor and 
patient have evolved through discourses that have altered the balance of power in the 
relationship.   
b)  Normalisation  
How is this pedagogic identity facilitated?  This is partly through normalisation which 
functions by classifying certain behaviours, practices, skills and theoretical knowledge 
as ‘normal’.  The schema of normalisation refers to criteria that specifically structure 
knowledge and practice along trajectories that are then viewed as normal.   
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An example is how the ST3 trainees in orthopaedic surgery (exposed to three years of 
orthopaedic training) must at this specific stage in their training demonstrate fluent 
knowledge of the lower limb anatomy.  Any deviation from this norm (standard) of ST3 
training is viewed as either inadequate or insufficient knowledge.  Application of this 
official knowledge (knowledge-assessment discourse) functions to normalise bodies 
(trainees) so that they are classified according to schemes of normalisation (standards 
of knowledge).  
The ISC curriculum is organised according to such normalising criteria and the system 
of assessment functions to establish whether these norms are met by each trainee 
(see chapter 5 for detailed analysis of normalising criteria).  Establishing expectations 
and guidelines for theoretical knowledge and practical skills is helpful in orienting a 
trainee’s learning and providing guidance.   
My concern lies with the conceptual framework established by normalising discourses.  
Behaviours, knowledge, skill and attitudes that are unrecognised by the ‘official’ 
normalising schema are not valued or visible within this framework.  Whilst, norms are 
important for stability in functioning (societies could not exist without norms) the 
difficulty lies in what they might obscure.  This may include ways of learning that are 
useful and effective but lie outside of the norm.   
4.15  Judith Butler: Subjection & Performativity Theory 
If Foucault’s earlier work examines how we become subjects over time, particularly 
within institutional contexts, then Butler expands this to explore how subjection_ works 
on and in the psychic life of a subject.  To answer this, she concerns herself with the 
conditions that underlie how subjects come into being.    
At the heart of her theoretical framework is the concept of performativity: a theory of 
subjectivity which proposes that identity is constituted through action, discourses or 
the words we speak and behave.  An example is how working in surgical 
departments, operating on patients, participating in discussions around surgical care, 
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trainees through these practices, become surgeons in training.  Their identity as 
surgical trainees, does not pre-exist these activities, it emerges through performing 
them.   
Butler proposes that in assuming this identity, subjection is accomplished through 
mastery as well as submission which though paradoxically placed, occur 
simultaneously, at the same moment in time:  
The more a practice is mastered, the more fully subjection is achieved. 
Submission and mastery take place simultaneously, and it is this paradoxical 
simultaneity that constitutes the ambivalence of subjection. Where one might 
expect submission to consist in a yielding to an externally imposed dominant 
order, and to be marked by a loss of control and mastery, it is paradoxically 
marked by mastery itself... the lived simultaneity of submission as mastery, 
and mastery as submission, is the condition of possibility for the subject itself.  
(Butler, 1995: 45–46)  
A surgeon’s approach to medical revalidation _exemplifies how the subject (surgeon) 
must demonstrate mastery in the different areas of practice as outlined by Good 
Medical Practice (2013), while becoming subjected to the requirements of these 
practices at the same time. Good Medical Practice functions as a governing 
mechanism in this interpretation, where it constructs the ‘double’ subject; at one and 
the same time, a surgeon must be master of certain practices and submit to those 
same practices (Honan, 2002: 1).    
Power is external to the subject but also implicated in the formation of the subject: ‘the 
subject might resist and agonise over those very powers that dominate and subject it, 
and at the same time, it also depends on them for its existence’ (Davies, 2006: 426).  
Butler, extends these ideas by suggesting that power is the locus of both constraint 
and alteration: to change the norms (rules) that constitute (constrains) a subject, one 
must inhabit these norms first: 
We are used to thinking of power as what presses on the subject from outside, 
as what subordinates, sets underneath, and relegates to a lower order.  This 
is surely a fair description of part of what power does.  But if, following 
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Foucault, we understand power as forming the subject as well, as providing 
the very condition of its existence and the trajectory of desire, then power is 
not simply what we oppose but also, in a strong sense, what we depend on for 
our existence and what we harbour and preserve in the beings that we are.  
(1997: 1-2).   
Butler calls this performative resignification.  Her theory of agency is located in the 
concept of performative resignification.  Once a subject has complied with the norms, 
is it possible to then escape them (norms) by mobilising the rules differently?  Butler, 
rejects the traditional separation between the doer and the act.  She views the 
performance as primary in which the actor and act are fused, (Butler, 1990: x).   
In Gender Trouble (1990), Butler uses Nietzsche to explain her thought: ‘there is no 
‘being’ behind doing, effecting, becoming; “the doer” is merely a fiction added to the 
deed—the deed is everything’ (p. 45).  Instead, she theorises that the actions of a 
subject are determined by their desire for recognition and the conferral of existence.  
In other words, we conform to particular ways of acting in order to receive recognition.  
But, such normalizing processes do not prevent other ways of acting emerging at 
times.   
Though it is difficult to overcome the power of the norm particularly in contexts of 
training.  However, by interrogating the norms that inform action, we may be able to 
pass beyond them to conceive action in other more expansive terms.  This is what 
Butler alludes to in her term performative resignification.  However, such 
resignification does not emerge ‘out of the blue’ but from events of practice that in 
some way force us to question normative procedures.  
An example of performative resignification is taken from the organ procurement 
narrative.  At the organ procurement surgery, I had expected to perform a ‘standard’ 
operation, similar to what I had read about and discussed with senior colleagues.  
Getting scrubbed (hand washing, wearing sterile gowns), preparing the surgical field, 
scalpel in hand, my expectation was that I would operate as I had done countless 
times before.  The operating room, surgical attire, theatre staff and equipment were 
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the same (constant) and typical of a surgical operating list, as was my proposed 
technique of cutting and dissection associated with the act of performing surgery.  All 
these elements were consistent with the performative norms of surgery that I had 
become accustomed to and been schooled in.  However, confronted by the reality of 
the surgery, these normative processes failed to capture my experience.   
Any attempts made by a trainee to question the protocols employed in the organ 
procurement surgery, or to advocate an alternative conceptualisation of training, 
would constitute resignification of the norm.  However, in training situations, due to the 
power differential, it is very difficult to enact performative resignification.   
Crucially, such instabilities create avenues for thinking ‘otherwise’: they create the 
conditions by which norms can be changed to potentially include new ways of thinking 
and doing.  Normalizing processes not only inform and regulate action and thinking 
but also our very desire to act and to think in specific ways.  This may be true of how 
surgical trainers are ‘condemned’ to teach in ways that have already been prescribed 
and recommended by the authorised bodies of surgical teaching.   
Only by going on strike against such norms, only by unlearning the rules and 
losing our ‘expertise’, do we have a chance of exposing the field of norms and 
their coercive effects.  This might as well lead to a form of desubjugation as 
yet unimagined. But any such ‘unlearning’ would have to make room for an 
alternative agency, a creative deployment of power, and so a way of entering 
the matrix of rules that allows for an exposure of their porousness and 
malleability, their incompleteness, and their transformability. There are, after 
all, other things to do with rules than simply conforming to them. They can be 
displayed. They can be recrafted. Conformity itself may permit for a hyperbolic 
instantiation of the norm that exposes its fantastic character. In this sense, 
then, a certain errancy within expertise, a certain poeisis that shows what else 
a set of rules might yield offer us options that exceed the binary framework of 
coercion, on the one side, and escape, on the other.  (Butler, 2006: 5)   
With regard to conversations, Butler argues that there are two dimensions to speech; 
what is being said with what is being communicated and what is shown/signalled 
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through what is being said.  Saying as communicating, with saying as displaying.  
When words are being uttered in these ‘saids’, they represent in that relationship how 
one subject presents themselves to another.   
In this way, the act of speech also constitutes how one appears to another, “language 
has to be understood in these instances as ways of taking on a social shape or form 
subject to an aural and visual interpretation”, (Butler, 2006: 529).  This may apply to 
training situations and to the conversations that occur between surgeons and their 
trainees.   
4.16  Pierre Bourdieu’s Theory Of Social And Cultural Reproduction 
Bourdieu proposes a theory of social and cultural reproduction to understand how 
agents (individuals and institutions) generate regulated practices.  He proposes that in 
illuminating the structure of the principles that govern these practices, one uncovers 
the regulated character of social life itself, particularly the social life of institutions.  His 
theories relating to social reproduction provide a way of revealing the regulated nature 
of social structures.  In particular, how power operates to create situations in which 
some sections of society become more privileged than others, for example in 
education.  This is made evident in the book Reproduction (1990), which he co-wrote 
with Jean-Claude Passeron.  The authors demonstrate how students who have 
access to cultural capital tend to succeed in later life in contrast to students from lower 
economic bases who do not get access to such capital.  Policy viewed from a 
Bourdieuian lens is more than text.  Its effect is to produce a specific structuring of 
social spaces (Ball, 1997; Levinson, Sutton and Winstead, 2009; Sutton and 
Levinson, 2001). 
a)  Habitus 
Bourdieu developed his theories through a series of concepts including habitus, field 
and capital, when he analysed the class system in education.  Habitus derived from 
the Greek, ‘hexis’ meaning habit or disposition, refers to a condition or state of the 
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body: 
Constructing the notion of habits as a system of acquired dispositions 
functioning on the practical level as categories of perception and assessment 
or as classificatory principles as well as being the organising principles of 
action.  (Bourdieu, 1990: 12-13). 
Social practices, such as ways of being and interpreting, are internalised in the 
individual from childhood as a set of durable embodied dispositions or habits (ways of 
acting, seeing and making sense of the world), which in turn generate certain 
practices of an appropriate kind.  These dispositions reflect central structural elements 
of the social and cultural group that the individual has been exposed to over a long 
period of time, for example surgeons in a department of neurosurgery will expect their 
trainees to provide a continuous stream of care whatever the demands of the oncall 
rota - this may mean that trainee A is scheduled to work night shifts for the week (8pm 
to 8am daily), but her supervising consultant may still expect her to attend his clinics 
and operating lists in daylight hours (rather than retiring home to rest after what can 
often be a strenuous 12 hour night shift before waking to return for the next night 
shift).    
A neurosurgical consultant may regard this as a recognised and accepted sign of a 
trainee’s commitment to the discipline.  This may then be ‘rewarded’ with learning 
opportunities, where a consultant will take a trainee through a procedure or teach 
them a specific operative technique.  These are the ‘kinship rules’ for neurosurgeons 
and those training in the specialty.  This reinforces the trainee’s engagement with the 
established system of teaching in neurosurgery; leading her to behave in ways that 
reproduce those structural elements.   
Therefore, trainees who progress in this department will do so because they have 
internalised the ‘rules of the game’ and adopted practices that ensure reproduction of 
the system.  Thus, habitus is an embodied objectification of structure: generating 
practice in accordance with the structural principles of the relevant social world.  It 
forms the basis of anticipating practice.   
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Swartz (1997: 6) notes that Bourdieu’s work is concerned with ‘the question of how 
stratified social systems of hierarchy and domination persist and reproduce 
intergenerationally without powerful resistance and without the conscious recognition 
of their members’. 
b)  Field 
Bourdieu views society as composed of many spheres of activity or fields (economy, 
education, politics), politics is the dominant one.  Each field in turn comprises 
individuals and institutions engaged in a hierarchy of power relations, competing with 
one another for valuable resources which he terms capital.  Capital is a form of 
wealth, a valuable resource which each individual has the capacity to invest in 
different fields.   
The aim of investing capital is to either obtain power directly or indirectly through the 
acquisition of some other form of capital.  There are four forms of capital; economic 
(money, wealth), cultural (educational qualifications recognised as valid), symbolic 
(social honour and prestige), social.  A field is therefore a competitive space 
characterised by inequities in access to capital in that competition.  The opportunities 
available to an individual in each field are determined by how well they are endowed 
with capital.  The endowment determines how individuals can invest various valuable 
resources (capital) to secure certain advantages.  A simple example of cultural capital 
in education and training, is the acquisition of examination qualifications or degrees 
which then allow entry into university and professional work beyond.  
If one applies this theory in broad strokes to medical education, the multiple 
institutions that form healthcare (hospitals, clinics, outpatient centres, medical 
schools) represent the social field that encultures doctors.  The practices of care 
developed through national and local policy generate ways of behaving and thinking 
about patient care (embodied by trainees), which in turn impacts on the way policy is 
understood and deployed at the local level (the hospital or clinic).   
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This process of socialisation produces ways of thinking and practices which in turn 
reflect the aforementioned structural elements.  An example of this would be the local 
hospital policies for prevention of hospital acquired infections (HAI).  A rigorous hand 
washing regime has been implemented through hospitals in the UK by widespread 
advertisements and instituting ‘infection’ nurse consultants to lead the way by 
demonstrating correct hand washing technique and ensuring hand sterilisation 
procedures within wards.   
This concern with HAI has been extended in ways that have been both contentious 
and intrusive.  An example is how male doctors are discouraged from wearing ties.  
The rationale presented is that whilst bending over patients, the loose end of the tie 
may become infected with micro-organisms from one patient and be transferred to 
another patient, thus creating a route for cross contamination and possible infection.  
Similarly, medical staff are prevented from wearing wrist watches, rings in some 
hospitals and told to roll up their shirt or blouse sleeves in accordance with the “bare 
below the elbows” policy.   
There is no data whatsoever to justify these practices or demonstrate that the wearing 
of clothing or other items below the elbow is associated with carrying infection 
between patients (Dancer, 2013; Pemberton, 2014).  However, it is now 
commonplace policy, so that newly arrived medical students to hospital chant this 
dictat like a mantra.  They wear neither white coats, ties or long sleeved shirts 
because they have been told that such attire is consistent with the conduction of 
infection.  This is an example of how the medical body (doctors, nurses) has become 
more and more a site of control. 
The above example of socialisation is referred to by Bourdieu as ‘the collective 
enterprise of inculcation’ (1977: 17).  It is not a passive act.  Individuals are complicit 
and play an active role in bringing about their own socialisation.  An example is how 
nursing staff are empowered to carry out this task of ensuring compliance with anti-
HAI policies and do so with great zeal on the ward.  I have frequently been accosted 
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by nurse managers and scolded for wearing a wrist-watch (I refuse to remove this 
item and often cite the fact that there is no evidence to support this belief).   
Medical students, the next generation of doctors, not only comply willing with these 
ideals, they also do so without question or query.  In one clinic, I encountered five 
male medical students, all of whom were without ties.  I informed them that if they 
chose to wear a tie, no-one could stop them as there was no evidence for this activity 
- they were astounded and disbelieving!  They also told me that the medical school 
staff would be angered if they now chose to wear ties as they had been expressly told 
not to.  This process of enculturation illustrates how willingly we subject to certain 
practices and ensure they are propagated without question. 
4.17  Conclusion 
In the second part to this chapter, I have set out my method of analysis to examine 
clinical discourse, whether it presents in spoken or written forms.  The objective once 
again, is not to identify the veracity of discourse.  But, rather, to explore, as Foucault 
suggests, the conditions that make these statements a reality for the individuals or 
organisations concerned.  In the following chapter, I apply the theory discussed in part 
two of this chapter, to critically analyse a selection of documents that collectively 
represent the established clinical guidelines and ethical codes of practice.        
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Chapter 5 
Standards of ‘Good’ Clinical Practice: An Analysis And  
Comparison Of Professional Texts And Guidance With  
Ethnographic Accounts Of Surgical Encounters 
            
5.1  The Art Of Care 
“Oh hello, this is Arundi one of the transplant doctors, I just wanted to see if Dr. Chou 
was available to discuss how Mr. Pitt’s procedure is progressing?”  I settle into my 
chair, knowing that it could be as long as ten minutes before someone picks up the 
phone and comes back to me with an answer.   However, my effort at getting comfy 
has been premature; within seconds I hear the receiver click (what a pleasant 
surprise!), “Mr. Pitt is . . .”, the words are drowned out by an approaching trolley being 
wheeled into the ward.  I peer into the trolley.  The occupier is Mr. Pitt (who should still 
be in the procedure room!).  I return to my phone-call and say wearily, “Mr. Pitt didn't 
have the procedure did he?  I mean. . . I know Dr. Chou is one of the best, but even 
he couldn’t have got a stent in that quickly.”  The voice on the other end is Dr. Chou.  
“Hi Arundi, your gentleman refused to have the procedure, not much I can do I’m 
afraid.  Come back to me when he agrees.”    
Dr. Chou is probably my favourite radiologist.  A calm demeanour and friendly manner 
belie an impressive skill set.  He is notoriously polite to patients and colleagues alike.  
Therefore, I am puzzled as to why my patient is back on the ward, sans procedure.   
Mr. Pitt is now happily ensconced in his bed, patient bay 4.  He catches my eye as I 
approach his bed.  “Hello love, I did as you said but when I got there that fella was 
terrifying!  So they sent me back up.”  “But Mr. Pitt they told me that you refused to 
have the procedure.  Why did you do that?  We talked about it last night and I 
explained to you that the tube connecting your kidney to your bladder has got a 
narrowing in it which means the urine made by your kidney can’t reach your bladder.  
Do you remember the picture I drew?  Where I showed you how your kidney is 
starting to resemble a balloon because of all that urine backed up and trapped in the 
kidney, blowing it up?  That’s why you haven’t been able to pee, because there’s a 
blockage in that tube.  Dr. Chou was going to relieve that block by placing a stent in 
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the tube so that the urine could flow into your bladder again.  It means you’ll able to 
pee again.”   
Mr. Pitt turns to the side table and opens the drawer pulling out a sheet of paper with 
my drawing from the previous night.  “I know what you said love, but that chappy (Dr. 
Chou) told me I had to sign a consent form so he could do the procedure and then he 
told me that there was a chance the stent could make a hole in my kidney. . . 50% or 
something . . . then I’d lose my kidney. . . I can’t go back on dialysis again. . . I just 
can't . . .”  He looks at me, utterly devastated and terrified.   I walk to his bedside and 
sit with him.  “It’s ok”, I say soothingly but he has seen my disappointment and 
exasperation, I cannot hide it this morning.  He clenches my palm between his bony 
fingers.  This day has left him bewildered, tired and now he feels guilty.   
“The chances of something like that happening. . . I think Dr. Chou would have called 
it a rupture or perforation, well it’s rare. . .he possibly quoted a percentage at you, and 
I know that I wasn’t there, but I can assure you that it wouldn’t have been as high as 
50%”, I continue.  “We wouldn’t recommend the procedure unless the risk was so 
small (I pinch my finger and thumb together in a physical demonstration of 
‘smallness’) that it was acceptable for you to go through with it . . . you see at this 
moment the risk of the procedure going wrong is tiny, in fact it’s much, much smaller 
than the risk of your kidney being damaged by the blockage.”  “But he didn’t say that”, 
he says, dejected.  “He said I’d sure as lose it (the kidney)!” 
5.2  Introduction 
Every day, doctors engage with the public in many different clinical environs and 
scenarios with the aim of ensuring that an individual receive the necessary ‘care’.  In 
the context of this thesis, I use the term ‘care’ as opposed to treatment, because an 
encounter between patient and doctor in a clinical setting, is not limited to the 
provision of a remedy or cure, nor is its focus problem solving.  Care denotes 
something beyond the problem-solution paradigm: at its heart is the relationship 
created by the physician responding to the concerns of a patient regarding their 
mental or physical health.  The nature of this ‘responding’ and its significance for 
surgical education are expanded on in Chapters 4 and 6.   
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There is a wealth of literature and research on care and caring.  Care has been 
studied from a variety of perspectives; theoretically (Leninger, 1988; Swanson, 1991; 
Watson, 1985), philosophically (Gaut, 1983; Mayeroff, 1990; Ray, 1997) and ethically 
(Cooper, 1991; Parker, 1990).  It has been explored as a phenomenon in clinical 
practice through ethnographic works such as Forgive and Remember (Bosk, 2003), 
The Boys in White (Becker et al, 1961), as well as through biographical accounts 
(Gawande, 2002; Weston, 2009; Marsh, 2014; Kalanithi, 2016).  I am concerned with 
how surgical care is conceived in policy texts and how it is enacted in training 
practices. Postgraduate medical (surgical) education and training are principally 
concerned with teaching and learning the various elements of general and specialist 
care: ‘Put simply, our doctors are trained for a purpose, to care for patients.’ 
(Greenaway, 2013: 3).   
The objective of this chapter is to explore policy texts pertinent to medical (surgical) 
education to locate key themes that give the reader an impression of how surgical 
education and training are conceived in the United Kingdom.  Put another way, I 
analyse policy documents to identify concepts and themes that shape and direct 
surgical training.  I aim to show that such a construction forms a powerful ideology of 
education and training in which trainee surgeons acquire their medical identities 
(surgeon identities).  The framework for this analysis is based on Foucault’s 
genealogy.  I adopt this methodology to tease out how surgical practice is constructed 
in policy and how the identities of surgeons and patients are subsequently constituted.   
The first part of the chapter explores the different ideologies of Care embedded in 
policy and deployed in actual practice (‘Official’ versus ‘Real’).  I contrast and compare 
narratives illustrating actual events of common surgical practice with the guidance 
provided in key medical texts, Good Medical Practice (2013) and Good Surgical 
Practice (2014b).  The purpose is to explore (through the central concept of Care) the 
difference between how a surgeon appropriates care in actual clinical scenarios 
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(where events cannot be predicted in advance) and how care is conceived 
theoretically in terms of clinical guidelines and established ethical codes.   
I argue, that an inherent and distinguishing feature of Care is uncertainty.  What 
unravels in actual clinical encounters cannot be consistently accounted for by 
transcendent frameworks of practice: approved clinical guidelines and ethical codes of 
conduct (as exemplified in the above narrative involving Mr. Pitt).  There is a need to 
consider carefully the immanent nature of clinical relations and practice in actual 
events of clinical medicine (surgery).  Experience of practice is unique and individual.  
The haecceity of an event, the ‘thisness’ or the concreteness of a clinical encounter 
(singularity of practice) cannot be reproduced nor adequately pre-empted through 
handbooks of practice.   
The second part of this chapter critiques the actions of surgeons engaged in 
unanticipated events of actual clinical practice with reference to how Care is 
conceived in clinical guidelines.  I assert that surgeons confronted by the acuteness of 
clinical practice, must make decisions within contingent clinical situations.  How they 
emerge within this unanticipated event of practice suggests an ethics of immanence in 
terms of the approach and behaviour manifested.  This lies in opposition to an ethics 
of transcendence, where surgeons must adhere at all times to an established code of 
practice.  I argue that there must exist a necessary tension between an immanent 
ethics and a transcendent ethics.  Maintaining this fine balance, between two 
necessary ideologies of clinical ethics is the challenge of a meaningful and effective 
modern day surgical practice.       
5.3  Foucault’s Genealogy 
Michel Foucault introduced a method of historical analysis which he coined with the 
term ‘genealogy’:    
And this is what I would call genealogy, that is, a form of history that can 
account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects 
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and so on, without having to make reference to a subject that is either 
transcendental in relation to the field of events or runs in its empty sameness 
throughout the course of history. 
(Faubion, 2002: 118) 
His approach de-emphasises the traditional view of history as a chronology of events: 
a linear trajectory between the past and present.  Instead, genealogy is a “history of 
the present” (Foucault, 1977: 31).  By looking at the practices, institutions and 
discourses that constitute the object of study, one can pose a question that is situated 
in the present.  For example, the question, “what is surgical education policy?” can be 
answered by exploring how trainees are constituted in policy discourse, what are the 
conditions under which statements about training practices are formed at a given time 
and who’s voice is privileged in the discourses (whose interest does such a 
conception serve) and which voices are silent (see also Chapter 4).   
Foucault (1977) explains his methodology when researching Prisons: ‘the target of 
analysis wasn’t “institutions,” “theories,” or “ideology” but practices—with the aim of 
grasping the conditions that make these acceptable at a given moment: [these types 
of practices] possess their own specific regularities, logic, strategy, self-evidence, and 
“reason”’ (Faubion, 2002: 225, original emphasis).  He continues to say: 
It is a question of analysing a “regime of practices”—practices being 
understood here as places where what is said and what is done, rules 
imposed and reasons given, the planned and the taken-for-granted  meet 
and interconnect.  To analyse “regimes of practices” means to analyse 
programs of conduct that have both prescriptive effects regarding what is to 
be done (effects of “jurisdiction”) and codifying effects regarding what is to be 
known (effects of “veridiction”). (ibid., 225) 
Foucault states that his objective in Discipline and Punish (1977) was not to write a 
history of prisons as an institution, rather to write about the practice of imprisonment 
(Foucault, 2002: 223-239).   
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In a similar way, I approach the subject of surgical education by first posing questions 
about the practice of surgery: what is the purpose of surgeons?  As stated by 
Professor Greenaway, the purpose of doctors is ‘to care for patients’ (see above, p. 
2).  It therefore follows, that the aim of medical training is to teach trainees how to 
provide care for patients.  Similarly, the goals of surgical training must be to educate 
future surgeons in the craft of surgical care6.  Put simply, how to ‘look after’ patients 
who require surgical attention.  Thus, my investigation begins with exploring how Care 
is conceived and deployed in education policy texts: to examine ‘the production, 
regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements’7 about Care. 
To explore the social contexts that underlie how policy text is produced, mediated or 
challenged, I have included analysis of two interviews with individuals involved in 
policy design and curricular development.  To document the ways in which surgeons 
assimilate policy and understand it, I have included excerpts from my training journal 
(textual analysis, ethnographic data and interview data).  I treat these documents as 
‘discursive practices’ (Foucault, Butler et al.).  That is, practices that construct those 
entities about which they speak, as opposed to revealing eternal truths. 
5.4  Ideologies Of Care 
In this section, I describe, examine and contrast Care as encountered in actual events 
of clinical practice versus Care as conceptualised by theoretical policy texts.  Put 
simply, Care as experienced by patients (receivers of care) and doctors (‘givers’ of 
care) in daily practice versus Care as defined by policy text and enacted by policy 
subjects (patients and doctors).  I have chosen to define the former as Real Care (the 
																																																						
6 One of my interview subjects defined surgery as “the art of providing a mechanical solution to an 
organic problem”.  Whilst the technical aspect of practice is what distinguishes a surgeon from other 
physicians, the goals of surgical practice, in my view, are no different to any other area of 
Medicine—care of the ‘whole’ patient whether that requires a specific surgical intervention or not.   
7 Taken from Foucault’s explication of “Truth”: understood as a system of ordered procedures for the 
production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements’ (Faubion, 2002: 132).  
Truth is understood by Foucault as a set of rules which govern what is presented as true and what is 
deemed to be false.   
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‘real’ denotes the reality of undergoing actual care and its experience) and the latter 
as Official Care8 (‘official’ refers to the formal discourses of Care produced by 
stakeholders in medical education policy such as the GMC, the Academic Medical 
Colleges, NHS England, Medical Education England).   
These two conceptions of Care do overlap when there is common ground, for 
example, the overarching goal of care is the welfare of the patient.   However, they 
tend to differ in terms of how the goals of care are achieved.  The latter is the subject 
of the argument below, which contrasts real and official care.   
a)  Real Care 
Section 5.1, is an auto-ethnographic account of a common occurrence of patient care.  
It was in part chosen to demonstrate the typologies of Real Care: the sub-categories 
of care that feature in an everyday experience of clinical care.  These include care as 
experienced by the patient; on the ward, in the diagnostic process, in the radiology 
suite, through encounters with two doctors.  It also comprises the experience of 
providing care on the part of the two doctors and other personnel involved in Mr. Pitt’s 
inpatient stay.  Each type of Real Care is subject to two agendas: the intended 
provision of care (the plan of care devised by the professional team responsible for 
diagnosis and treatment) and the actual experience of care (the patient’s physical, 
emotional and cognitive perceptions of care, as well as the impressions of the 
physicians doing the ‘care-giving’).   
In this specific instance, the intended provision of care was the treatment designed by 
myself and Dr. Chou (insertion of a stent).  However, the actual experience of care by 
the patient undergoing this treatment was fear, bewilderment, guilt and a risk of acting 
foolishly.  Dr. Chou assured me afterwards that he had not quoted a complication risk 
																																																						
8 The use of the descriptors, ‘Real’ and ‘Official’ is terminology I have adapted from Stronach’s 
(2010) analysis of teenage pregnancy in which he labels State (government) discourses on sex 
education as ‘Official Sex’ (p. 46). 
 163 
of 50%, whereas, Mr. Pitt insisted that he had heard exactly that figure when being 
advised of the risk of losing his kidney.  I believe them both.   
It is apparent that the patient wanted desperately to salvage his kidney transplant yet 
was deterred by something.  Was he was suddenly frightened at the dawning 
realisation of the procedure or did the risk appear more exaggerated to him, or did Dr. 
Chou fail to engage with the patient in a manner appropriate to soothe Mr. Pitt’s 
doubts and fears?  It is also possible that factors which neither Dr. Chou nor I had 
anticipated (because we expected a routine event of practice), were responsible for 
Mr. Pitt’s refusal to go through with the procedure.  The experience for myself of 
providing care for Mr. Pitt, was one of disappointment and frustration with both the 
system and my colleague.  Equally, Dr. Chou may also have been dissatisfied and 
worried that a patient who required an urgent procedure failed to receive it.   
As this narrative clearly demonstrates, an occurrence of patient care in clinical 
practice (Real Care) is composed of multiple layers, each concealing hidden 
complexity and nuance, which inevitably contribute to the contingent nature of Care in 
routine medical practice.   
The experiences of Care that occur for patient and doctor in daily practice, cannot be 
fully predicted nor even foreseen.  This is an indisputable fact of clinical medicine.  
Adhering to the various guidance and training manuals on clinical practice may help to 
remove some of the uncertainty and potentially improve a patient’s experience of 
care.  But, it cannot completely control the quality of the experience nor the way it is 
experienced.  I use the term ‘experience’ in this chapter to denote how a person 
encounters something: how they perceive, discern or happen upon an event, person 
or object and what impressions this leaves upon them.  Certainly, the format of a 
procedure (radiological insertion of stent), the theoretical knowledge underlying a 
diagnosis (an obstructed kidney due to a narrowing in the ureter or outflow tube) and 
the remedy for a clinical problem may be common knowledge and form habitual 
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practice.  Nonetheless, how a plan of care is fully experienced and what will unfold in 
the experiencing is always an unknown.   
In conclusion, notions of Real Care are grounded in the contingency of actual 
practice.  This characteristic feature of uncertainty determines how a form of care is in 
fact experienced, as a temporal reality.   
b)  Uncertainty of medical practice  
As I have argued above, the uncertainty of even routine practice, an oxymoron, has 
been well researched and written about extensively (Engerbretsen et al, 2016; 
Guenter et al, 2011; Herman, 1990; Katz, 1984; Lingard et al, 2001; McGee and 
McLaughlin, 1995; Naylor, 1995; Seaburn et al, 2005).  However, the literature 
focuses on uncertainty as it arises through processes of diagnosis, clinical decision 
making and medical judgement: all elements of clinical competence (Latifi et al, 2013; 
Pauley et al, 2011; Jalote-Parmar and Badke-Schaub, 2008; Sutton et al, 2015, Flin et 
al, 2007a).   
Logan and Scott (1996) attribute uncertainty in health care partly to the imprecision 
inherent in decision making.  To illustrate the latter point I use a hypothetical example 
based on Mr. Pitt’s story.  Imagine that I arrive at a diagnosis, based on Mr. Pitt’s 
symptoms, signs and test results.  I then organise an intervention appropriate to this 
diagnosis, only to discover a few days later that the initial diagnosis was incorrect.  
Therefore, the treatment administered was both inappropriate and ineffective.  
Guenter et al (2011) describe how trainees experience, in situations like these, effort 
and anxiety in ‘maintaining a cloak of competence’ (p. 120).  This refers to the 
spectrum of emotions experienced by trainees when their practice is challenged by 
the uncertainty that arises due to limitations in skill or an inability to meet patient 
expectations.  The next chapter (analysis of interviews) explores how instances of 
unpredictability in routine practice unfold to disrupt established ways of thinking and 
behaving to reveal they can profoundly transform surgeons in training: disclose 
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modified ontological states and unfurl new worlds of practice for a trainee.  However, 
in this chapter I develop the notion of contingent routine practice that goes beyond the 
existing body of literature on uncertainty in medical practice.   
c)  Uncertainty versus Error 
I suggest, that the challenge facing surgeons in training and surgical educators, is not 
overly concerned with controlling factors that generate variability in clinical practice.  
The aim of this approach is to reduce or eliminate unpredictable outcomes.  Put 
another way, policy texts that focus on the fluency of a surgeon’s practice, as defined 
by those elements of performance that can be measured directly (observation of 
technical skills, behaviours and attitudes, examination of theoretical knowledge) 
demonstrate a belief, that ensuring proficiency in these aspects of ‘skills’ training is 
the primary solution to eliminating the unpredictability of practice.   
Certainly, developing fluent skill in the component parts of a procedure is critical to 
ensure that patients come to no harm and benefit from successful treatments.  
Measurements of performance assess these component parts, such as; technical 
proficiency, recognition of anatomy, sterile technique and patient communication.   An 
example is the DOPS evaluation (direct observation of procedural skill), which forms a 
core part of trainee assessment in the formative years of training (see Figure 3) 
(examples of assessment tools are critically analysed in chapter 6).   
  
 166 
Figure 3: DOPS (direct observation of procedural skills) evaluation form 
(taken from iscp.ac.uk) 
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However, even a doctor who has performed a thousand such procedures is still 
subject to an unexpected outcome or event (though he may have the experience and 
technical proficiency to deal effectively with an unexpected outcome such as torrential 
bleeding during a procedure).  Therefore, I would argue that no amount of practice, 
repetition or knowledge can obviate the contingency that is inherent to any clinical 
encounter.   
 
What I am attempting is to draw attention to how traditional training viewed from this 
perspective, i.e. the cultivation of procedural skills or behavioural attributes (such as 
reassuring the patient, gaining consent); conceptualises a trainee’s aptitude around 
elements of performance that can be measured or quantified.  As a consequence, 
skills that can be measured directly, and by virtue of this fact become ‘visible’ to the 
world, are prioritised (by the curriculum), recognised (by training practices) and so 
become representative of what it means to be a competent doctor.   
 
This visibility also confers ‘value’ and a quality of valuableness to skills that can be 
demonstrated (see Chapter 6 for further discussion of this theme).  In turn, this 
engenders a belief that orienting training around aspects of measurable and visible 
performance will reduce uncertainty in practice or eliminate the sources of error 
associated with practice.  For example, my inability to participate in the organ 
procurement (because I was speechless and physically paralysed by the reality of the 
event of practice) may be attributed to failed practice owing to a lack of exposure: 
“there’ll be a next time . . .  you just need to do more, that’s all”, (Vinny’s comments).   
This evaluation reveals a widespread belief espoused by surgeons and consolidated 
by educational documents (curriculae, operative manuals): repetitive technical 
practice and recurrent exposure to events, will, in and of themselves, minimise the 
variability of experiences ‘in the field’.  In doing this, a surgeon’s capacity to respond is 
also strengthened.   
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There is no doubt, that repetitive practice and accumulation of experience, are critical 
to developing a surgeon’s ability, confidence and safe practice.  However, the difficulty 
arises when despite the best preparations, a clinical encounter can culminate in 
unanticipated and unpredictable outcomes.  In these instances of contingent practice, 
the uncertainty intrinsic to clinical encounters is perceived as tantamount to an error in 
practice, constituted by a lack of experience or failure in judgement or skill. 
I would add that the single-minded pursuit of eliminating error from practice, obscures 
the objective of medical practice and the purpose of training: providing care for the 
patient and learning how to care for the patient.  In the narrative above, the goal of Mr. 
Pitt’s clinical encounter was not accomplished—he did not receive the necessary 
care.  No stent was placed to relieve the obstruction in his failing kidney transplant.  
The patient was left confused, distressed and guilt-ridden, the doctors were frustrated 
in their attempts to provide urgent care and anxious about the wellbeing of their 
patient.  
d)  A twist in the tale 
In summary, I suggest that, it is at this interface of Care—the unpredictable nature of 
a clinical encounter, that the role of the doctor is constructed for the patient in an 
enduring and forceful manner.  Care deployed by doctors and experienced by patients 
is a complex practice: it is intricate, entangled and inherently human.  In a world that is 
increasingly technologized, in part to detach from the human propensity for error, the 
value and professional longevity of a doctor may lie in how she mediates the 
contingency of clinical practice to give patients reassurance and comfort.  If a doctor is 
successful in this endeavour, then she may paradoxically give patients a sense of 
certainty in their care.  
The current attempt to extinguish uncertainty in our society risks removing 
from the medical profession some important “tools of the trade” and placing 
obstacles in their way.  Too much emphasis in medical training on removing or 
reducing uncertainty will crowd out what little attention is being paid to 
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educating doctors into the maturity and wisdom that they require to be able to 
accompany people in times of need, contain their own and their patients’ 
anxieties and facilitate healing and recovery in an uncertain world. 
(West and West, 2001: 320) 
5.5  Official Care 
The formal discourses on how doctors are trained to provide Care are produced by 
the stakeholders in medical education policy.  These stakeholders include; the GMC, 
the Academic Medical Colleges (for example the Royal College of Physicians, the 
Royal College of Surgeons), NHS England, Medical Education England and the 
Department of Health.  The primary text which provides a framework for how doctors 
should organize and structure their practice as well as guidance on how they should 
conduct themselves as care givers is Good Medical Practice (General Medical 
Council, 1995, 1998, 2001, 2006, 2013), (see Figures 4 and 5), which I abbreviate to 
GMP.   
GMP is written by the General Medical Council (GMC) who are responsible for; 
licensing medical practitioners, setting the duties and responsibilities of a doctor in the 
United Kingdom as well as the standards of training programs, the processes for 
assessment and the professional requirements for maintaining licensure (see Chapter 
2 for a history of the GMC and its duties).  To provide a historical context and rationale 
for the structure and content of GMP (2013), I examined Department of Health policy 
texts published around the same timeline.  My purpose in doing so is to background 
the concepts and frameworks within which doctors, patients and Care are conceived 
in.   
In 2014, the Royal Colleges of Surgeons of England published a related text that 
adapted the principles and guidance set out in GMP for a surgical audience.  Good 
Surgical Practice (Royal College of Surgeons of England (RCS), 2014b), which I 
abbreviate to GSP, was a specific guidance for surgeons engaged in surgical practice.  
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a)  Good Medical Practice (GMP) (2013) 
First published in 1995 by the GMC (See Figure 4), GMP replaced existing guidance 
on unacceptable behaviour in the medical profession, that would lead to a charge of 
professional misconduct at a disciplinary hearing of the GMC9.   
“It was a kind of handbook for ‘doctors in trouble’, you know, you had been 
found negligent or had harmed a patient in some way, and his booklet 
basically told you what you shouldn’t do.  It was pretty obvious stuff, like ‘don’t 
be rude to your patients’.  Things like that. Hardly rocket science!” 
(Stephen, Consultant Surgeon, taken from surgical training journal, 20 January 
2008)  
With the approaching spectre of Appraisal and Revalidation for doctors, the GMC 
overhauled the document in 2005.  The content was reorganised and additional 
material was included with the aim of ensuring: ‘that the standards and principles 
against which doctors will be revalidated are clear, by reorganising the guidance using 
the headings under which doctors are expected to be assessed during revalidation 
and NHS appraisal’ (GMC, 2001: 2).  The new restructured GMP released in 2005 
was now circulated as a handbook for all doctors in practice. 
The 2005/6 review considered the approach to giving guidance: that it should focus on 
good practice rather than list ‘offences’; that it should apply to all doctors on the 
register; that it should establish principles and standards rather than specify particular 
requirements or prohibitions. We do not propose to re-open these issues in this 
review, although we will of course respond positively if the issues are raised by other 
organisations or individuals. (GMC, 2010: 3) 
																																																						
9A detailed discussion on what constitutes professional misconduct is beyond the scope of this 
thesis.  However, the expression ‘serious professional misconduct’ was substituted by the Medical 
Act of 1969 for the term ‘infamous conduct in a professional respect’, used in the Medical Act of 
1858.  It infers an act of omission, negligence or incompetence which falls below the standards set 
by the governing body, the GMC. (Hamer, 2010). 
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Figure 4:  Cover image of Good Medical Practice (1995) 
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Figure 5:  Contents page of Good Medical Practice (2013) 
Areas of practice are presented as ‘domains’ 
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In gathering information on how GMP (2005) should be structured, the GMC 
commissioned Picker Europe to conduct research amongst doctors, patients and the 
public (Picker Europe, 2006)).  Their aim was to look at: ‘what are the key duties of a 
doctor for inclusion in Good Medical Practice; the balance between the roles of 
patients, doctors and other health professionals; the balance between clinical and 
organisational duties; and whether or not it is reasonable to expect doctors to adhere 
to all duties all the time.’ (Picker Europe, 2006) 
GMP was most recently updated and re-released in 2013.  It categorises a doctor’s 
practice into four component areas entitled domains (GMC, 2013).  Figure 5, the 
contents page of GMP, itemises each domain with a list of criteria that a doctor must 
comply with to meet the standards of that specific sub category of practice (See 
Figure 5). The four domains of practice are:  
• Domain 1: knowledge, skills and performance  
• Domain 2: safety and quality  
• Domain 3: communication, partnership and teamwork 
• Domain 4: maintaining trust 
a) How is the concept of Care presented in GMP (1995) in contrast 
to GMP (2013)? 
In this section, I interrogate how the concept of Care is captured in each document 
and whether the notion of Care has transformed over that time.  This has an impact 
on how Care is conceived by the medical profession and practiced. 
Imagery 
The front cover of the 1995 text depicts a Michael Van Musscher portrait, ‘Doctor 
taking a young woman’s pulse’ (See Figure 4).  The pale feminine hand is held 
purposefully by a male doctor.  This image portrays the doctor as self-appointed 
protector, guardian and expert bearer of scientific knowledge, whilst the patient is  
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passive, submissive and the object of the physician’s benevolence and expert 
knowledge.  This alludes to notions of paternalism in the doctor-patient 
relationship.  There is a great body of literature on Paternalism in clinical practice 
(Dworkin, 1972; McKinstry, 1992; O’Neill, 1984; Siegler, 1985,).  However, this is not 
a key area of research for this thesis.  Suffice it to say, that the use of this image in a 
doctor’s guidebook suggests that the accepted ‘face’ of Care in 1995, may have been 
informed by a paternalistic model of Medicine.   
This theme of paternalistic care is continued in the epithet featured beneath the GMC 
logo, ‘Protecting patients guiding doctors’.  It announces the dual roles of the 
organisation as self-appointed ‘protector’ and ‘guide’.  I would suggest that on first 
glance, this first edition of GMP appears to convey a ‘doctor knows best’ approach to 
Care, promoting paternalism.  The image only presents a picture of the doctor’s hand, 
a hand of caring but also possessing the power to heal, the physician himself is 
invisible, so what comes through is the hand of care and power which is unquestioned 
and the submissiveness and trust of the patient. 
However, the covering image on the most recent publication of GMP in 2013 (See 
Figure 6) is in stark contrast to the first edition.  Here, the reader is confronted by the 
sole image (photograph) of a young female. But this time, the woman is the doctor 
rather than the submissive patient, perhaps an acknowledgement of the increasingly 
female population of the medical workforce (reference).  In addition, the female doctor 
is from an ethnic minority background and is photographed smiling broadly, appearing 
engaged and happy at work.   
Presumably the use of a cheery, youthful image presents the ‘face’ of a doctor that 
most patients would like to encounter—approachable, amiable, receptive and 
compassionate.  The epithet beneath the logo now reads, ‘working with doctors 
working for patients’.  This change in the ‘motto’ of the organisation reflects a change 
in philosophy; from paternalism to partnership.  The organisation now promotes a 
more egalitarian approach to the way in which it conceives care-givers (doctors) and  
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Figure 6:  Cover image of Good Medical Practice (2013)  
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recipients of care (patients).  It works alongside doctors in a supportive and advisory 
capacity, guiding their practices of care; whilst engaging with patients through 
advocacy to ensure their needs are voiced and met satisfactorily.  Here the doctor 
does not occupy the omnipotence of the first image and is now subject to the power of 
inspection and audit.  
In the seventeen years between the two documents, the contrasting imagery hints 
particularly at the change in the locus of power within the doctor-patient care 
relationship.  There is a shift from a situation where the doctor controls the processes 
of care-giving because he is perceived to ‘have the patient’s interest at heart’ and 
have sole possession of expert knowledge.  Instead, the giving and receiving of care, 
in the modern age, is framed in terms of a negotiation between the doctor’s expertise 
and the patient’s expressed needs as determined by the GMC.  What may have 
prompted this change is discussed at the end of this section.  
Thus, an important difference between the two images concerns the issue and place 
of power.  In the first image, the invisible doctor occupies an authoritative position with 
the power to heal and care, whilst the patient is submissive to this power.  In the 
second image the patient is now absent, replaced by a smiling (perhaps obedient) 
doctor, subject to the power of the GMC and its edicts on practice and care. 
The ‘good doctor’ 
In the opening pages of GMP (2013: a2) the following statement is made: 
Patients must be able to trust doctors with their lives and health.  To justify 
that trust you must show respect for human life and make sure your practice 
meets the standards expected of you in four domains.  
The first sentence medicalises the life of an individual by placing it in the domain of 
the doctor’s expertise.  In my personal experience when patients consult me within the 
routine of a surgical clinic or emergency setting, it is usually because they are 
experiencing a set of symptoms which is troubling or anxiety provoking. A person may 
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present a health problem that impinges on the quality or longevity of their lives, but, 
the assumption that seeking medical help is tantamount to placing their lives in the 
hands of doctors is aggrandising and dramatic.  Life and health is perceived through a 
lens of disease and treatment, constituting the patient as a medical object.  Following 
this dramatic statement, the document introduces the notion of the ‘good doctor’:  
  Patients need good doctors. Good doctors make the care of their  
 patients their first concern: they are competent, keep their   
 knowledge and skills up to date, establish and maintain good  
 relationships with patients and colleagues, are honest and   
 trustworthy, and act with integrity and within the law.   
 Good doctors work in partnership with patients and respect their  
 rights to privacy and dignity. They treat each patient as an   
 individual. They do their best to make sure all patients receive  
 good care and treatment that will support them to live as well as  
 possible, whatever their illness or disability.  (ibid., 4) 
The notion of a ‘good doctor’ is complex.  There is an expansive body of research 
devoted to what constitutes a ‘good doctor’ and how a ‘good doctor’ is perceived 
(Corrado 2001; Judge & Solomon 1993; Jung et al 1998).  The symbolic evocation of 
the term, ‘good doctor’ is interesting, as the doctor is conceptualised as virtuous, 
demonstrating ‘goodness’.   
In above statements, however, the GMC conceptualise the ‘goodness’ of the doctor 
as a set of practical criteria by which it, the GMC, as professional regulator and 
licensing authority, recognises doctors.  The statement begins by identifying the 
prioritisation of patient care as the outward symbol of a good doctor. It then goes on to 
outline the framework that constitutes how a doctor should ‘make the care of their 
patients their first concern’.  This is through accomplishing proficiency in their work, 
demonstrating their knowledge and skills as current, exhibiting good interpersonal 
skills, honesty and integrity.  All these criteria reference the elements of performance 
that make up the four domains of practice upon which assessments, appraisal and 
revalidation are based on.   
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In summary, I would argue that deconstructing the ‘goodness’ of the ‘good doctor’ into 
these component parts may facilitate assessment of performance and thus serve the 
surveillance and regulatory functions of the GMC, but they do not adequately capture 
the contingency of a doctor’s practice nor the full complexities of good clinical care.  
As such this reductive attempt to define and encapsulate how a doctor cares for her 
patients supports a current criticism of medical practice as a ‘tick box exercise’.  In this 
description, practice is viewed through a series of measurable performances that may 
very easily obscure the more contingent and unforeseen events of doctor-patient 
relations.  
In the narrative of Mr. Pitt, I would contend that both Dr. Chou and I demonstrated 
competence (the correct diagnosis and treatment plan was made), up to date 
knowledge and skill (decision made to insert a stent, and the best radiologist in the 
department was identified for the potentially difficult procedure).  Good relationships 
were maintained between patient and colleague (the two doctors communicated well 
to expedite the procedure, the patient trusted me sufficiently to explain his concerns 
and he found Dr. Chou polite, clear and courteous).   
Did the procedure fail to occur because of a problem in communication skills?  In one 
sense, definitely not.  Dr. Chou and I articulated all the relevant features, consistent 
with GMC defined ‘best practices’.  Information was provided in simple language.  All 
the necessary steps were taken to ensure urgent and appropriate care was given.  
However, no-one could anticipate the eventual ‘failure’ of care that distinguished this 
event of practice.  This may be a consequence of the approach adopted by a 
regulatory perspective.  In this conception, Care is viewed as a complicated 
procedural event: the ‘adding up’ of a series of complicated steps which amount to 
good clinical care.  As opposed to the complexities of actual clinical practice: how the 
reality of Care unfolds in everyday clinical encounters.  This failure may also be due to 
the force of affect, which is ‘unpredictable’.  It exceeds a ‘sense’ of rationality: the 
affect that develops from interpreting the doctor’s words through a growing anxiety, 
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which colours the interpretation.  This illuminates what I perceive to be at the heart of 
the ‘good doctor’; the tension between care as a sequence of complicated steps 
versus care as contingent complex practice.  
Complicated steps versus complex practice 
The content of material between the two editions of GMP, 1995 and 2013 has not 
altered greatly.  This may seem surprising given that GMP (1995) was a guidance for 
failing doctors and as such, the content was originally written to provide clear 
instructions for doctors who were struggling to meet the basic requirements of patient 
care.  For example, an explanation is given as to what constitutes ‘good clinical care’: 
‘adequate assessment of the patient’s conditions, based on the history and clinical 
signs including, where necessary, an appropriate examination […] arranging 
investigations or treatment’ (GMP, 1995: 2).  This explanation is basic and typical of 
how clinical practice would be described to medical students.  However, it was clearly 
felt that for ‘problem doctors’ the return to simple, basic advice was key to help them 
remedy their poor performance.   
The recent publication (GMP, 2013) has kept the original material but altered the 
layout of the content: it is presented as bullet points and a series of paragraphs.   I 
would argue that the way in which the material is arranged is consistent with a 
conception and presentation of Care as a sequence of (complicated) steps that must 
be enacted.  An example is the excerpt below, taken from the domain entitled 
‘Knowledge, Skills & Performance’ (GMP 2013, p. 8).  It itemises the actions that must 
occur, according to the GMC guidelines, in order to provide good clinical care (See 
Figure 7).   
In the above, clinical care is broken down into its component parts or as I have argued 
above, its many steps.  I remember when I first read GMP as a new consultant, being 
struck by how such a presentation of care, as a sequence of steps, created an  
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Figure 7:  Good clinical care (taken from GMP 2013: 4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
impression of clinical practice as a ‘tick box’ exercise: a series of activities to be 
completed.   
There are items under the subheadings of care that comprise attitudes or behaviours 
which a person has to ‘check off’ as they complete the criteria.  The danger with this 
approach is that the focus of the clinical encounter becomes box ticking to meet the 
authorised criteria.  This approach places an emphasis on the process of care rather 
than what actually happens and what is experienced at each stage of care.  The list 
above constitutes care in simple mechanistic terms.  These terms in no way reflect the 
complexities of doctor-patient relations, and all the intensities that affect such relations 
including how a doctor might cope, which is illustrated in Mr. Pitt’s story. 
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If one returns to the narrative of Mr. Pitt, I accomplished all the criteria cited in Figure 
7: I prescribed the correct treatment for Mr. Pitt based on best practice, I checked that 
it was compatible with all his other treatments, I consulted a colleague (Dr. Chou), I 
did what I could to anticipate and alleviate Mr. Pitt’s distress by spending time with 
him, repeating explanations, drawing diagrams etc.  However, whilst the steps in the 
process of care were accomplished, the objective of the care plan was not.  I would 
propose that this may owe a great deal to the fact that care which is contemplated 
principally as an abstract process, neglects to understand the real life processes of 
human interactions and entanglements that constitute the complexity of the practice 
and experience of care. 
I also considered whether there were other factors that had contributed to the decision 
to present care in this style.  I questioned whether developing the notion of care as a 
step wise process was influenced by the assessment criteria that shape a doctor’s 
performance.  Put simply, fragmenting care into technical components that are 
measurable may make the performance of clinical practice more amenable to 
assessment, which is a fundamental tenet of appraisal, revalidation and licensing 
doctors for practice.   
At present, the morbidity and mortality figures of surgeons in disciplines such as 
vascular surgery, breast surgery and orthopaedics are subject to performance 
tables10.  This is taken to provide an indication of the technical expertise and clinical 
experience of a surgeon.  Similarly, there are other assessments that attempt to 
quantify and capture the performance of a surgeon.  In the below example (Figures 8 
and 9), I have compared the instructions in GMP on knowledge, skills and maintaining 
trust with the GMC issued patient feedback questionnaire.  My objective is to explore 
similarities in the content between the two and see if the content of GMP has been 
																																																						
10 http://www.nationalhealthexecutive.com/Health-Care-News/surgeons-performance-data-
published-in-nhs-league-tables- 
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organised in such a way that the questionnaire can be used to check a doctor’s 
compliance with it.   
Figure 8 comprises excerpts from Domain 3 and Domain 4, where instructions on how 
to construct therapeutic relationships with patients are issued.  The requirements 
made of the doctor are specific and detailed.  It demands the doctor show politeness, 
an ability to listen, honesty and integrity, and so forth.  Handbooks providing guidance 
are useful precisely because they act as a point of reference, a source that can be 
delved into at times of uncertainty or when there is a query.  Requiring doctors to be 
polite or honest is obviously an important aspect of the culture of practice and 
therefore its inclusion in the handbook is to be expected.  The challenge however, is 
to provide guidance and advice as opposed to rigidly enforcing a written code of 
conduct.   
As seen in the excerpts taken from GMP (Figure 8) the design of the handbook is as a 
series of instructive paragraphs and points, suggestive of a regulatory code of 
conduct, thereby adopting the style of a legal statute, though it is described as 
‘guidance’.  The ‘legalification’ of non-legal fields is a pervading feature in this and 
Good Surgical Practice (2014b).  Legalification is a term I introduce in this thesis to 
connote non-legal documents being structured by organisations to resemble legal 
statutes and other contractual documents used in legislation and systems of Law.  
Legalification is used as an approach to behaviour and attitudes in all aspects of life.  
Its use in GMP implies a contract for doctors.  A physician must demonstrate 
compliance with all the criteria to be allowed to continue to practice - this is the 
foundation for appraisal and revalidation.   
I believe that the intentions behind GMP (2013) are worthy, notably to remove doubt 
regarding the expectations of minimum standards in practice.  However, the highly 
didactic content and prescriptive format is insufficient to capture the complexity of 
actual events of clinical practice and as such inadequate for the reality of medical 
practice.    
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Figure 8:  Excerpts taken from Domain 3: Communication, partnership and 
teamwork (GMC, 2013; p. 13) and Domain 4:  Maintaining Trust (ibid., p. 21) 
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Figure 9, illustrates Section 4 and 5 of the GMC patient questionnaire (GMC, 2014).  
Section 4 breaks down the care received by the patient into its component parts; the 
personal conduct of the doctor, their clinical skills of diagnosis and treatment and how 
this information was presented, conveyed and organised by the doctor.  Section 5 
also asks the patient to comment on the doctor’s integrity and candour: ‘(is) this doctor 
honest and trustworthy’.  A comparison of parts 4a to 4g in Figure 6 with points 45 to 
49 in Figure 5 show that they are matched and that the questionnaire tests the 
doctor’s familiarity with the ‘rules and regulations’ as opined by the patient.  In 
addition, the questionnaire also assesses care as a procedural phenomenon; it asks 
the patient to comment on the predefined steps of care (listening, being polite, 
providing information etc.). 
Care constituted as a cultural process 
There is a wide body of literature on communication skills and facilitating good patient 
interaction.  Doctors can have excellent communication skills and demonstrate 
optimal body language, which though desirable is not an end in itself.  Possession of 
these skills does not necessarily translate into success when giving care.  I was proud 
of the rapport I had established with Mr. Pitt and the clarity and compassion of my 
communications with him, however it did not ensure a successful outcome.   
I therefore looked to see how the GMC questionnaire (Figure 9) understood the 
important qualities of a doctor providing care.  The ordering of the components of 
section 4 in Figure 6, is interesting because it begins with questions regarding the 
personal conduct of the doctor and ends with how the doctor performed as a whole. 
This document defines conduct through three criteria; are they courteous (‘polite’), 
attentive (‘did they listen’) and comforting (‘make you feel at ease’).  I have worked as 
a surgeon in three other continents; South Asia (Sri Lanka), Western Australia (Perth), 
North America (New York), where the aforementioned ‘niceties’ would not be 
considered important or integral to framing good clinical interaction.   
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Figure. 9: GMC Patient Feedback Questionnaire (GMC, 2014) 
 
These qualities are rooted in a historical tradition of pleasantry unique to the British 
‘way of life’ and as such have cultural significance and value.  As such they provide an 
understanding of how care is socially constructed in British society.   
The authors of the questionnaire may argue that the manifestation of these qualities 
by a physician indicate respect for the patient and pre-empt good communication.  
However, I would assert that their inclusion in the document suggests how the 
regulators and therefore the official body of Medicine structures the visible face of 
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‘Care’: socially constituted by cultural virtues.  These traits may hint at an approach 
that mollycoddles the patient: what my colleagues euphemistically call ‘touchy-feely 
nonsense’.  I know from my own experience of being a patient that polite and attentive 
clinicians can still leave me feeling empty and disconnected from the substance of the 
encounter.  I therefore suggest that, to understand how a patient experiences care 
may require distancing oneself from cultural prerequisites and artificial codes of 
behaviour constructed by regulators, to find out what is important to the individual 
patient.  GMP should function in an advisory capacity as a guidance, not as a dictum 
of care.  
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5.6  Two Stories of Surgical Care 
The Errant Testicle 
We were both scrutinizing the operating field.  In this case, it comprised a 35-year old 
man’s lower abdomen or groin, as commonly termed, and the contents of his 
spermatic cord (a rope like structure that runs in the tissues of the lower abdomen to 
the testicles in the scrotum and carries the vas deferens, a white tube carrying 
sperm).  The scheduled operation was ‘surgical repair of an inguinal or groin hernia’.  
A hernia occurs due to a weakness in the abdominal wall, which allows the contents 
of the abdomen (such as bowel or fat) to push through into the tissues of the groin.  
This a protruding lump, more prominent when standing, straining or coughing.  
However, 15 minutes into the operation, we were both stumped.  We had identified 
the weakness in the wall and were trying to identify what exactly was protruding 
through the abdomen into the groin.  What we found was a rather small, shriveled, 
egg-like structure ensconced in the spermatic cord.   
“That’s a testicle!” we both chimed.  “My goodness, how long has that been there 
for?!”  Answer: since he left the womb.   
During pregnancy, a male foetus’ testicles travel from a site within the abdomen to the 
scrotum.  There is sometimes a delay of this process, so that at birth the testicles 
have not yet descended (travelled to the scrotum).  However, after six months of age, 
if a single or pair of testicles have not yet descended, the standard practice is to 
identify where they are sitting (usually still in the lower abdomen) and suture both into 
their proper place within the scrotum.  Why?  The established research demonstrates 
that after six months of age, undescended testes rarely descend spontaneously into 
the scrotum.  They remain in the abdomen, where they can be a cause for reduced 
fertility and more importantly put the individual at high risk of testicular cancer.  For 
these reasons, male infants with a missing testicle(s) are investigated and if 
necessary a surgery will follow.   
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“I didn’t examine his scrotum, I should have, but it seemed quite full”, MD (consultant) 
admitted, sadly.  Scrotal examination is a part of the examination for a patient with a 
hernia, but it is often missed if there appears to be no need, especially as examination 
of intimate areas can create anxiety and embarrassment for the patient.  At this point, 
I pulled down the drapes and examined his scrotum, there was indeed just one 
unusually large testicle present.  
“Well the scrotum appears deceptively normal because the one testicle he does have 
is so big!”, I conceded.  “It changes nothing however.  We still have to remove this 
testicle, because it’s a risk for cancer and besides its been non-functional for the past 
35 years.  It is unexpected, but we’ve done this young man some good today,” I 
concluded.   
The rest of the operation proceeded uneventfully.  It wasn’t till later, when we were 
both completing the paperwork for the surgery, that I found myself for the second time 
that day, completely astonished.  While filling in the theatre record on the computer, I 
casually asked MB, “so what will you tell him (the patient)?”  He looked up at me while 
composing the operative note on paper, rubbed his eyes and said very matter of 
factly, “oh nothing, it’s not relevant, we did him no harm today. . . in fact we protected 
him by doing this operation. . . he was at risk of a cancer, but not anymore . . .  he 
doesn’t need to know, it will only upset him and make him uncomfortable.  We’ve 
treated his problem.”  With that final word, he returned to his writing.   
I was gobsmacked.  “But, doesn’t he have a right to know?  I’m sure we won’t alarm 
him if we tell him that the lump was caused by a missing testicle. . . in fact he may tell 
us that he always wondered why he had just one ball?!  We can tell him that we did 
some good today.”  Even as I spoke these words, I knew from his body language that 
such a conversation was not to happen.  Ever.  I continued to watch him.  Under 
‘Procedure name’, he wrote slowly and purposefully, ‘Orchiectomy (removal of testis) 
and repair of inguinal hernia’.  He murmured without looking up from his writing, “I 
don’t think that’s necessary”.  That was that.   
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Crème Brûlée 
‘So. . . what d’ya wanna do?  I mean if you wanna talk to him, that’s fine but I’m tellin’ 
ya, he’s not listening and he’s not gonna change his mind.’  She looks at me, 
expectant, twiddling the end of a twist of her hair.  It was her way of throwing down the 
gauntlet, her way of saying the unsaid; ‘if you think you can do better, go right ahead. . 
.  ‘OK, Mary Ellen,’ I say.  I am exhausted after spending the last 13 hours upright in 
what was supposed to have been a ‘routine’ liver transplant.  
I knock gingerly on the door of patient room 10.  There is no answer.  I knock again.  
Maybe he’s asleep or in the bathroom, I reason.  Or maybe he’s sitting in his bed, 
awake and he doesn’t want to hear.   I walk in slowly.  “Mr. Martino, good morning.  I 
just finished a surgery and thought I’d pop in and see how you are.”  Not quite the 
truth, but it will do.  He does not meet my gaze, instead he stares out through the 
window, motionless.  It is then that I notice sitting in the shadows at the back of the 
room, his wife and son.  “Oh I’m sorry, I didn’t realise you had family here”, (I nod my 
head at the family in recognition).  “Well, good.  Perhaps we can all have a chat 
together and see what we can do to get you stronger again.”   I try not to sound too 
chirpy: too much is always a step too far.  The wife and son get up and move their 
chairs closer to Mr. Martino’s bed, so that we are all now facing him.  A jury sitting in 
judgement.  
“I hear you won’t eat anything.  The nurses tell me that you haven’t eaten in two 
days.”  I present the facts.  “In fact, they say that you refuse all food, even the 
delicious food that Mrs. Martino brings in for you”.  I have upped the stakes and briefly 
glance at her, smiling weakly in recognition of her efforts.  Mrs. Martino however, is 
quietly sobbing.  “He says this was a mistake”, Luke, their son, suddenly interjects.  
He sounds worn and exasperated, motioning with his arms.  “He says, that he knows 
this transplant has failed because he feels worse now than he did before the 
operation!  He says he knows he’s dying . . . that no-one can save him.”  The opening 
statements have been made. 
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Mr. Martino remains still, his gaze fixed on the view from the window.  From the corner 
of my eye, I catch sight of the clock.  9.15 a.m.  The next patient for surgery would 
have been escorted to the operating suite by now (Grace Matthews, kidney transplant, 
right side).  She’s probably waiting for me in the anaesthetic room.  In fact, the whole 
theatre team is most likely waiting for me and agitating as it becomes evident that my 
‘no-show’ means the surgery is being delayed.  Yet again.  ‘OK’, I sigh, put my hand in 
my pocket and switch my phone off.  I walk over to the mobile table which is piled high 
with an incredible assortment of food, all cooked lovingly and patiently by Mrs. 
Martino.   
I pick out a small glass dish containing a wonderfully aromatic crème brûlée, the 
vanilla and cinnamon are heavenly.  I think back to three months ago when Julian 
Martino walked onto this same ward; disbelief, trepidation, wonder at the prospect of 
an impending liver transplant.  Since then, one complication after another has 
weakened him and made his ‘new’ liver a hostile implant.  He is presently in a state of 
acute organ rejection.  For the second time in twelve weeks. The effects are florid and 
pernicious.  A strong cocktail of anti-rejection drugs has eaten away at his tissues and 
destroyed his innate defences against disease.  I perch on the edge of his bed, 
teetering on a precipice holding only dessert.   
“I’m not going to lie to you and promise that everything will be better, that what you’re 
going through now is temporary. . .  not, because it isn’t. . .  but because I just don’t 
know.  When I told you that this liver transplant would mean a new life, a new 
beginning for you and your family, I truly believed it.  Yes, I’ve seen things. . . bad 
things that happen when transplants go wrong, but that day when I came to talk to you 
here on the ward, I truly . . . in my heart . . . never thought that those bad things would 
happen to you, because you and the new liver seemed perfect for each other!  It 
seemed like the chances of things not working out were so, so small.”  I continue to 
talk slowly, the fatigue like a sponge in my brain, sucking up thoughts and words.     
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Normally I would have rehearsed this conversation mentally as I walked to his room, 
however, at this moment I am tired, hungry (damn this brûlée!) and irritated at the 
thought of the theatre staff waiting for me downstairs who are most likely cursing as 
they reach my voicemail repeatedly (‘why the hell is her phone switched off?!’).  But 
mostly I am tired.  Tired of the one in a hundred times when things go wrong, tired of 
offering explanations that are always inadequate because the promise of something 
better never quite materialises, tired of the heroic efforts that fall short of finding a 
permanent solution to the destruction, devastation and disappointment of these 
transplant lives.  Tired, tired.   
I twist and turn the spoon in my hand, a blunt scalpel waiting to slice and dice the 
brûlée.  Mr. Martino has not flinched once in the ten minutes I’ve been in the room.  
He continues to stare blankly out of the window, oblivious to my words, indifferent to 
my presence.  He gives me nothing.  I dig into the brûlée and scoop up a sliver of 
creamy flesh.   
“I . . .if you don’t eat, then what you’re telling me, what you’re telling the world is, ‘I 
want to die’. . . because if you don’t eat then that’s what happens . . .you die, whether 
you’ve got a transplant inside you or not.  And that’s just not fair. . . it’s not fair to them 
(I point to his wife and son) because all they want is to take you home, healthy and 
possibly even happy. . . and you know what sir?  It’s not fair to me. . . because that 
means I did a bad thing when I gave you that liver. . .  I did something to harm you. . . 
I hurt you in ways that I could never have imagined. . . and I am so sorry because I 
can’t undo it, I can’t take out that liver, that thing that has poisoned you, because I 
have nothing to replace it with, absolutely nothing.”   
Tears are welling up in my eyes, but I continue to speak slowly and purposefully.  “So 
you can refuse all this glorious food cooked with so much love and hope because 
you’ve clearly given up on hope and you sure as hell have given up on me (my voice 
starts to falter, I am exhausted.  I want to curl up at the foot of his bed and sleep and 
sleep.  And forget).  “And I am so sorry.   You will never know how sorry I am. . . you 
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see I have nothing left to give you right now, not a thing . . .except. . . except this 
bloody amazing creme brûlée that I didn’t even make for you. . . that’s how lost I am 
with you.”  Julian Martino turns his impenetrable gaze to the creme brûlée, never once 
meeting my eyes.  Without a word, he takes the spoon from my fingers and puts it to 
his lips.  He chews slowly on the sweet flesh.  Languid and methodical, he continues 
to scoop out the contents of the dish all the while fixing his gaze out of the window.  
There is no sign of whether he is enjoying it or not.  Infact I don’t believe he eats to 
taste. 
I think he eats not because my words have resonated.   
I think he eats not because hope has miraculously suffused his tissues.   
At this moment in time, I think he eats to lighten my load.    
He eats because he pities me.   
He eats so that I may have hope again.   
Whatever it is, I gobble up every morsel that he offers. 
 
  
 193 
5.7  The Ethics of Surgical Practice 
The above two narratives from my surgical journal, are examples of the different ways  
surgeons can act, when confronted by an unexpected event in a clinical encounter.  
The surgeon is caught unaware by the ‘thisness’ or acuteness of the unanticipated 
event (contingent practice) which had neither been foreseen nor predicted.  In coping 
with an unfamiliar situation, how the surgeon experiences the event and engages with 
the encounter (affective relations) may trigger ways of responding (thinking, acting) 
that she had not conceived prior to the event.  Earlier in the chapter I discussed how 
authorised manuals of practice (Official Care) do not fully capture the complexity of 
actual events of practice (Real Care).  I now investigate how surgeons respond within 
encounters of Real Care (providing care in contingent events) in relation to the 
recommendations of Official Care: what is set out in clinical guidelines and ethical 
codes.  I draw on the theories of affect and ethics from Spinoza, Deleuze and 
Massumi to analyse and interrogate the material.   
What is ethical practice? 
In the first narrative, the unexpected event was the discovery of a testicle in an 
otherwise routine hernia surgery.  MD, the senior surgeon, is an inspiring and 
compelling figure.  No patient leaves his clinic without a diagnosis, or a clear plan to 
establish a diagnosis.  He was careful to elicit important details when a patient 
describes his health problems.  He was compassionate to distressed patients, 
sensitive to the impact of their condition and zealous in the pursuit of treatment and 
cure.   
Therefore, why did he not inform the patient of the discovery, a non-functioning 
testicle in a hernia sac?  Is it because, as he stated, it was ‘not relevant’?  Certainly,  
removing a non-functional testicle which the patient was unaware of and which 
contributed nothing to his health had no adverse outcome on his health.  In fact, by 
removing the testicle, MD had eliminated the risk of it becoming cancerous in the 
future.  Perhaps these issues motivated his belief that the operative finding was 
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‘irrelevant’.  But the crucial question in this and every clinical encounter between 
doctor and patient is whether the surgeon’s course of action was ethically sound.  Did 
MD fulfil his ethical duty to the patient?  And what constitutes the ethical act of the 
surgeon?  
‘You must be honest and trustworthy in all your communication with patients 
and colleagues.’_ 
In chapter 2 I discussed the events leading to the issue of Candour being prioritised in 
healthcare systems (DoH, 2014a; 2014b; RCS, 2014b; 2015).  In late 2014, this 
culminated in new legislation through the introduction of a statutory Duty of Candour 
for all healthcare professionals and organisations involved in patient care (House of 
Commons, 2014: 24):     
(1) [Registered persons] must act in an open and transparent way with 
relevant persons in relation to care and treatment provided to service users in 
carrying on a regulated activity. 
The Duty of Candour (2015) document published by the RCS is primarily concerned 
with honest communications when serious errors or adversity have occurred: ‘a 
notifiable safety incident, i.e. an incident that resulted or has the potential to result in 
moderate harm, severe harm or death’ (ibid., 9, my emphasis).  However, the 
document does state that, ‘after the surgical procedure, the surgeon has a duty 
towards his or her patient to give an account of what happened during the operation’ 
(RCS, 2015: 8).   
MD did meet the patient afterwards while he was recovering from the anaesthetic, and 
gave him a brief and reassuring account of the surgery.  Critically, he did not divulge 
the surprising findings of an errant testicle.  It could be assumed that a description of 
what occurred in a clinical procedure or treatment or the sequence of events that led 
to a particular outcome (good or bad), should be a simple matter of speaking the truth: 
that which happened.  Isn’t this the ethical course of action—a transparent 
conversation with the patient’s best interests at heart?   
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The fact that this did not happen raises the question as to who’s interests are served 
by an omission of the full facts in this case?  To answer this I offer an alternative 
theory, based on the fact that MD appeared to think that full disclosure of the 
procedure would cause the patient unnecessary distress and confusion.   
Difficult conversations 
Perhaps the surgeon, MD, imagined the following conversation: 
Surgeon:  A funny thing. . .  we found a testicle in your hernia. 
Patient:  My testicle?  What do you mean?  You took my testicle out?!! 
Surgeon:  Yes, but also, no.  We found that you had one testicle in your  
   scrotum and the second one was hiding inside your belly. 
Patient:   But I don’t understand, I’ve always had two testicles.  Why did  
    you take the second one out?  Now I’ve only got one testicle.  I  
    thought you were operating on my hernia? 
Surgeon:  No, you’ve only got one testicle.  The second one had not fully  
descended into your scrotum when you were a child.  But don’t 
worry, you’ll be just fine.  You know it’s a good thing we took it out, 
because it could have become a cancer. 
Patient:  Cancer?  You mean I might have cancer?  But I came in   
   today because you told me I had a hernia! 
There are many conversations in routine practice that resemble the above: 
complicated, complex and ripe for miscommunication and misunderstanding.  It is well 
established and extensively covered in the literature (Maguire et al, 1986; Dosanjh et 
al, 2001; Fallowfield and Jenkins, 2004; Barnett et al, 2007; Turini et al, 2008; Herbert 
et al, 2009) that communicating complicated information or bad news is an area of 
difficulty, distress and reluctance for most clinicians.  Physicians are faced with the 
dual challenge of managing the turmoil of a patient’s emotions (shock, anger, grief) as 
well as coping with personal feelings of disappointment, guilt and sadness.   
Rigorous training in communication skills and the development of practical algorithms 
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help prepare physicians as well as simplify and structure potentially difficult 
conversations or clinical events.  However, these measures cannot accurately 
account for the intricacies of human expectation and understanding, nor how an event 
actually transpires.  The nature of complex interactions is that they cannot be reduced 
to discrete categories or their outcome be pre-judged.   
Candour 
It is my opinion that the established guidance is clear as to what the standard of 
practice should be in this situation: MD was expected to communicate the operative 
finding to the patient demonstrating the transparency of his practice.  It could be 
argued that the work on Candour in healthcare is so strongly oriented around adverse 
events that the surgeon believed that this specific event of practice did not qualify for 
such a conversation.  After all it was not a ‘notifiable safety incident’.   
But my argument is separate to these.  I assert that efforts to further explicate or 
elucidate terms such as ‘adversity’, ‘harm’ or even ‘candour’, as is advocated in some 
consultation documents (Williams and Dalton, 2014) will not necessarily create more 
clarity for the physician, nor provide inducements to engage honestly and openly with 
patients.  This is not to discount existing measures to identify and remove those 
attitudes and behaviours that foster and legitimise intolerable standards of care, 
endangering patients.  Instead, I argue that an approach that single-mindedly pursues 
the development and enforcement of more and more clinical guidance and highly 
specified criteria, is indifferent to the reality of medical encounters.  This approach 
neglects to understand how the complexities of actual practice affect the ways in 
which professionals respond and react in difficult and challenging situations of Real 
Care.  To illustrate the latter, I outline some of the factors that may have been 
implicated in how MD acted using Deleuze’s theory of ethics. 
An ethics of immanence 
The above discussion identifies two ideologies of ethical practice.  In the first, ethics is 
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defined as an uncompromising code of conduct that is grounded in Kantian principles 
of morality.  A physician’s actions are assessed according to moral criteria, which 
evaluate and judge the intentions, thoughts and behaviours along categories of ‘right’ 
and ‘wrong’.  Deleuze opines that ethics premised on a foundation of morality reflects 
the transcendent framework of values that are viewed as important by society at that 
moment in time.  This structure of values is expected to direct and influence how 
individuals and organisations think and ‘do’.   
The second ideology of ethics emerges from real events of clinical practice, in which a 
doctor is forced to make decision in the ‘here and now’ (haecceity of practice) of an 
encounter according to the contingencies of the actual doctor-patient relationship.  To 
explore Deleuze’s notion of ethics, I draw on the writings of Daniel Smith, who 
provides excellent insights into some of Deleuze’s denser theory.  
What he calls “ethics”, is on the contrary, a set of “facilitative” [facultative] 
rules that evaluates what we do, say, and think according to the immanent 
mode of existence that it implies.  One says or does this, thinks or feels that: 
what mode of existence does it imply?  “We always have the beliefs, feelings, 
and thoughts we deserve,” writes Deleuze, “given our way of being or our 
style of life.”  (Smith, 2007: 67)     
An “immanent mode of existence” is at the heart of Deleuze’s conception of ethics, but 
what does it mean?  Notions of ethics, for Deleuze, are intimately linked to an 
individual’s capacity to act and the affective relations that enable or diminish the 
power to act.   
To return to the narrative example, to understand the actions of MD is to explore how 
he prehends (Whitehead, 1929) an event.  Prehension is a term introduced by Alfred 
Whitehead, to denote how one entity takes account of another entity.  For example, 
performing operations involves a sequence of prehensive relations involving the 
organic and non-organic components that constitute the act of operating.  Put simply, 
there are intricate networks of relations involving the rotational action of the wrist, the 
scalpel, sutures, blood, tissue, memories of previous procedures, frustrations, 
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surprises etc.  These entities mingle, pull apart and act on each other in complex tiers 
of intra-action (Barad, 2007) which characterise the act and experience of operating.  
It is difficult to know precisely how these relations influence an individual to think or 
act in a specific way.  However, I suggest that these relations are involved in how an 
individual engages with an event because they constitute how something comes to 
matter to her. 
In the narrative of the hernia operation, how does MD prehend the surgical 
encounter?  What affects him in the encounter?  Is he affected by the discovery of the 
testicle?  What affects diminish or augment his capacity to act in this example of 
practice?  These questions emphasise the affective conditions that constitute his 
capacity to act and how he engages with the encounter: ‘we arrive at a real definition 
of a mode of existence only when we define it in terms of its power or capacity to be 
affected […] what is it affected by in the world?  What leaves it unaffected’ (Smith, 
2012: 154).  The power to act in a given moment is not determined by ‘logical 
possibility’ (what we are told, know or conceive to be possible); it is what is actualised 
at every moment (what the person is actually enabled to think, do, react or respond).   
Thus, an ethics of immanence refers to the capacity to be affected in ways that 
encourage an individual to ask in a given moment or situation, ‘what can I do, what 
am I capable of doing?’ (Smith, 2007: 67).  Critics have accused Deleuze and 
Foucault of peddling ‘immorality’ by introducing a philosophy that rejects normative 
criteria to judge thoughts or actions.   
Deleuze provided a very staunch defence of his ideas, which are beyond the 
objectives of this thesis.  However, I want to develop one particular explanation as it 
has significance to the narrative.  A particular mode of existence can be assessed 
along established moral criteria.  The latter signifies a transcendent framework that 
judges intentions and actions as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ depending on how closely they comply 
with an external system of approved values.   
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But an ethics of immanence, is distinguished by the singularity of an event—the 
specific situation in which an individual finds himself in at a given moment: ‘the object 
of philosophy is not to contemplate the eternal, nor to reflect on history, but to 
diagnose our actual becomings’, (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994).  An ethics of 
immanence requires a physician at every moment to ask, ‘what is in my power to do 
such that I reach the limits of my capabilities?’  What I am advocating is an approach 
that promotes physicians to ask, ‘in this event of practice have I pushed myself to do, 
to achieve all that I can?’    
‘Doing the right thing’, is a moral stance premised on known and approved outcomes 
that pre-exist an event.  It is founded on a framework of pre-defined values to 
establish acceptable and safe practices.  However, broad application of a universal 
system of pre-approved, transcendent values can potentially limit the intrinsic and 
actual capacities of an individual, in two ways.  First, a rigid classification of ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ practice may dissuade a physician from being responsive or effectively engaging 
with an encounter.  This is because the physician's 'natural' inclination or response in 
a situation is not recognised or accommodated by the authorised forms of conduct.  
Second, responding in a manner that transcends established protocols is critical if 
new ways of being, thinking and doing are to suffuse medical practice, enhancing 
patient care and professional conduct.  It is this second point that I next develop 
through an analysis of Mr. Martino's story.  
An ethics of practice: how ‘should’ physicians conduct themselves? 
The narrative of Mr. Martino is told from my perspective (the surgeon’s story).  It is the 
story of an unexpected patient response to a complicated liver transplant.  The 
complication itself, organ rejection, though infrequent, is well researched and familiar 
to transplant surgeons and explained to patients (in preparation for transplant surgery) 
as a possible risk.  But, as familiar as I was with the complication, I was unprepared 
for exactly how Mr. Martino would respond.  I was fully cognisant of how the condition 
would manifest physiologically; jaundice, abdominal pain, cachexia, fever, dark urine, 
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loss of appetite.  However, I was unaware of how precisely it would affect Mr. Martino 
and unprepared to deal with his response: a refusal to eat, an avoidance of eye 
contact or engagement with another person.   
Some may assert, that these are the typical features of a depressed transplant 
recipient who is worn out by the daily and ongoing challenge of a complicated liver 
surgery.  But, I would argue that this viewpoint is problematic if it conceptualises the 
encounter through a singular biomedical lens.  If his reactions and responses are 
narrowly emphasised as the psychological features of organ rejection, then this can 
eclipse other factors that emerge from the surgeon-patient relation and that really 
matter to the patient.   
My engagement with the patient, Mr. Martino, may be construed by official codes of 
conduct as overly emotive, inappropriate and unnecessarily entangled.  The language 
I used to communicate my disappointment and despair may be judged as emotional, 
personal and crucially, unprofessional.  I may be accused of lacking the appropriate 
detachment from my patient to ensure that I was objective and dispassionate—key 
qualities historically lauded by conventional medicine as critical to the provision of 
best medical practice11.  Contrasting objectivity in Medicine with the subjectivities of 
practice is beyond the scope of this thesis partly because it is an extensive area of 
study in itself.  
However, I included this narrative not to stimulate judgements or opinions as to 
whether I behaved correctly or appropriately, in what had become an emotionally 
charged situation.  My purpose is to illustrate that there may be no ‘right answer’ as to 
how I should have conducted myself in that situation.  This is because frequently 
difficult patient interactions have no obvious or easy solutions.  Second, an ethics of 
care is imagined as more than a code of behaviour or conduct; it is an ethics relative 
																																																						
11 Best medical practice is a term used in Medicine to describe treatments or ways of working that 
have been proved to demonstrate the best clinical outcomes.   
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to how one responds and emerges in the ‘thisness’ of the clinical encounter and all its 
inherent uncertainty.  Judith Butler (2005) succinctly summarises the issues: 
Perhaps most importantly, we must recognise that ethics requires us to risk 
ourselves at moments of unknowingness, when what forms us diverges from 
what lies before us, when our willingness to become undone in relation to 
others constitutes our chance of becoming human.  To become undone by 
another is a primary necessity, an anguish to be sure, but also a chance - to 
be addressed, claimed, bound to what is not me, but also to be moved, to be 
prompted to act, to address myself elsewhere, and so to vacate the self-
sufficient ‘I’ as a kind of possession.  If we speak and try to give an account 
from this place, we will not be irresponsible, or, if we are, we will surely be 
forgiven.  (p. 136) 
‘Moments of unknowingness’ are the occasions where one struggles to work out how 
to proceed given the absence of appropriate guidance or reference to prior knowledge 
or experience.  It is the task of engaging with the unfamiliar.  Ethical codes are 
necessary in formulating guidelines, but often due to unexpected events of practice, 
they become inadequate.  In these situations, it may be necessary to ‘risk ourselves’, 
that is, to embrace the uncertainty of the encounter with a view to responding in ways 
that exceed what is known.  Such a response I argue is intimately connected to the 
affective conditions of the experience.   
Affective experience: ‘drives’, ‘inclinations’ and ‘microshocks’ 
Affect, as discussed in Chapter 3, has been written about widely by many 
philosophers; Baruch Spinoza, William James, Gottfried Liebniz, Alfred North 
Whitehead, Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, Friedrich Nietzsche, Gilbert Simondon, 
Brian Massumi.  The concept has also been described as, ‘inclinations’ (Liebniz), 
‘drives’ (Nietzsche, 1982), ‘intensities’ and ‘desires’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1977), 
‘thinking feeling’ (Massumi, 2002).  I hypothesise that in moments of unforeseen and 
unpredictable events of clinical practice, as illustrated by the narrative, a surgeon has 
the power to affect the events of the encounter and is in turn affected by it.  This 
creates a state of affectation which is mostly imperceptible (we are not consciously 
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aware of it), however, affect is perceived or ‘felt’ through the effects it exerts.  These 
effects are seen in how an individual is capacitated or how they are activated to think, 
emote, behave: ‘a body passes from one state of capacitation to a diminished or 
augmented state of capacitation’ (Massumi, 2008: 2).   
How we choose to behave in every moment, as discussed earlier, is related to 
Deleuze’s notion of an immanent ethics.  A capacity to transition to an ‘augmented 
state’ refers to what I can do which is at the limit of my abilities in a given moment.  I 
use an example relating to my young child to illustrate this idea.  I hear my baby 
crying because his nappy needs to be changed.  I can put down my cup of tea get up 
and change his soiled nappy (augmented state) or wait for my husband to tend to our 
child (‘diminished’ state).  Therefore, to reiterate, I have the capacity to change the 
baby myself but choose not to do so in the moment that I am confronted by this event.  
It is easy to objectify the two options I choose between (‘changing the nappy’ and ‘not 
changing the nappy’) by making the assumption that I rationalise and make a 
judgement between them.  However, these options are my ‘drives’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1983, adopt Nietzsche’s original term, cited in Daybreak 1881) or what 
Leibniz calls ‘motives’ and ‘inclinations’.  They represent what my tendencies or 
orientations are in this situation.       
If the soul were like an empty page, then truths would be in us in the way that 
the shape of Hercules is in an uncarved piece of marble that is entirely neutral 
as to whether it takes Hercules’ shape or some other.  Contrast that piece of 
marble with one that is veined in a way that marks out the shape of Hercules 
rather than other shapes.  This latter block would be more inclined to take that 
shape than the former would, and Hercules would be in a way innate in it, 
even though it would take a lot of work to expose the veins and to polish them 
into clarity. This is how ideas and truths are innate in us—as inclinations, 
dispositions, tendencies, or natural potentialities, and not as actual thinkings, 
though these potentialities are always accompanied by certain actual 
thinkings, often insensible ones, which correspond to them.  (Leibniz, 2008: 4) 
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Like the veins in the marble, my inclinations are motifs that run through my being and 
which can be modulated.  Minute perceptions are; the comfort of the sofa I sit on, the 
warmth of the tea cup, the temporary moment of time to myself, getting up to change 
would be the distressed crying of the baby, the desire to hold and comfort, the potent 
odour of the nappy, onerous task of cleaning the mess.  How I eventually behave, is a 
result of the tussle that myself is experiencing between the feelings that are agitating it 
and how I choose to resolve those tensions.   
Massumi derives his notion of ‘microshock’ from Deleuze and Guattari’s (1994) 
concept of ‘microperception’.  He states that as individuals we have no fixed identity 
(‘pre-constituted’), instead we are ‘pre-populated’ by feelings, memories, inclinations, 
drives.  We emerge as subjects through the act of experiencing where affect is a 
dimension of this event.   
Affect for me is inseparable from the concept of shock. It doesn’t have to be a 
drama. It’s really more about microshocks, the kind that populate every 
moment of our lives. For example a change in focus, or a rustle at the 
periphery of vision that draws the gaze toward it. In every shift of attention, 
there is an interruption, a momentary cut in the mode of onward deployment of 
life. The cut can pass unnoticed, striking imperceptibly, with only its effects 
entering conscious awareness as they unroll [. . .]  I’d go so far as to say that 
this onset of experience is by nature imperceptible.  (Massumi, 2008:4).   
Massumi argues that at any given moment we are bombarded by an infinite series of 
minor interruptions (‘momentary cut’) that can be perceptible but largely pass 
unnoticed.  Sitting in the room with Mr. Martino, the encounter involves affective 
relations between the visual image of his lean and yellow frame, the light and shade in 
the room, the phone in my pocket, the sound of Mrs. Martino’s sobs, the ticking clock, 
knowing irate staff are waiting in theatre, hunger, the aroma of food, Mr. Martino 
refusing to look at me, fatigue, irritation (and other things that are not perceptible to 
me).  While I register these events, I am not conscious of the intensities they 
precipitate.  However, the affective relations that form and develop in the encounter 
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become visible through the consequent ways in which I think, emote and behave.  
This is how the micro perceptions of affect can manifest.  
After an affective event, the body readjusts around the interruption and infolds the 
context of the experience, preparing for what is to follow: ‘it in-braces, in the sense 
that it returns to its potential for more life to come, and that potential is immanent to its 
own arising’ (ibid., 4).     
[...] in the instant of the affective hit, there is no content yet. All there is is the 
affective quality, coinciding with the feeling of the interruption […] That 
affective quality is all there is to the world in that instant. It takes over life, fills 
the world, for an immeasurable instant of shock. (ibid.) 
For Massumi, the initial engagement in the encounter is purely mediated through the 
affective dimension (‘the affective hit’), the relations of intensity that form and develop 
creating an experience of the encounter.  Although these affective relations emanate 
from my experience of the encounter, they are not personal to me.  However, each 
body is different in terms of their capacity to be affected and their tendencies which 
result in affective states triggering a multitude of ways to think, act and emote.   
Other physicians confronted with the same encounter may have responded differently.  
As suggested earlier, the surgeon may attribute Mr. Martino’s attitude and behaviour 
to depression and proceed to find an appropriate therapy (psychiatric referral, 
prescription of anti-psychotics etc.).  Others may have walked out of the room wishing 
to avoid a difficult conversation or decided to ‘cheer him up’ with humour or promises 
of improved health, or confronted him angrily about his ‘non-compliance’ or gone 
away to read up on new cures for organ rejection and so on.  Most importantly, it 
could be hypothesised that my actions in the encounter were attuned to Mr. Martino’s 
affective state.  While I cannot know what his experience of the medical complication 
is, the events in the encounter affected us in similar ways.  Massumi uses ‘affective 
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attunement’, first described by Daniel Stern (1987)15, to conceptualise how affective 
states can create unison as well as difference in a singular event.  
The immanence of practice: ‘Discognition’ 
I have argued in this chapter for an awareness of how a doctor’s thoughts and actions 
may initially be impacted by the affective nature of an encounter.  Steven Shaviro 
(2015) supports this argument in his writings.  He too argues that as sentient beings, 
our initial experiencing of the world is not necessarily conscious, rational or immersed 
in cognitive thought.  He contends that how we first come to know the world, 
understand and make sense of it is grounded in aspects of sentience.  These include 
sensory awareness or arousal, which inform mental functioning and subjective 
experience.  Sentience therefore is a mode of ‘thinking’ that has yet to be captured by 
cognition or emotion.   
Shaviro introduces the notion of ‘discognition’ as what ‘disrupts cognition, exceeds the 
limits of cognition, but also subtends cognition’ (ibid., 10-11).  He appears to suggest 
that sentient modes of thinking are not only prior to cognition but also have the 
potential to interrupt rational processes thus reconfiguring how we ‘think’ on matters.  
Put another way, a state of discognition is a parallel mode of thinking. Thus far, I have 
described how affect can mediate knowing and understanding.  However, Shaviro 
seems to propose that affect in and of itself is a mode of knowing and being.  I 
suggest that the notion of discognition provides another way of contemplating the 
affective dimension.   
In summary, each clinical encounter is charged with affective relations that can spark 
numerous ways of coping, acting and thinking at every moment.  However, a 
transcendent framework of ethics sets out specific ways of thinking and practicing that 
may appear unconnected to the acuity of real practice.  I am advocating for an ethics 
																																																						
15 Stern suggested that mother and infant share affective states and experiences through affective 
attunement.  This was the observation that mothers undertake a range of actions (e.g. touching, 
smiling, cuddling) that reflect and enhance the presumed affective state of the baby.  The mother’s 
actions create a preverbal understanding of affective states. 
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of immanence which relaxes transcendent frameworks to consider the affective states 
that form and develop in a clinical event.  In events of practice that are unanticipated 
or unexpected, there is a need to consider carefully the immanent nature of clinical 
relations and practice.  The narrative depicts how an unanticipated event of practice 
generated affective states that led to a renegotiation of the doctor-patient relations. 
5.8  Good Surgical Practice (2014) 
In September 2014, several surgical organisations17 collaborated to write and produce 
Good Surgical Practice (2014), which I abbreviate to GSP.  The document sought to 
make the guidance and standards outlined in GMP relevant to surgeon’s engaged in 
surgical practice.  GSP opens with the following statement:  
We share the privilege of working as surgeons, with the responsibilities, joys 
and disappointments that this brings.  As surgeons we understand the 
fulfilment of delivering a successful outcome, and the humility and strength 
required when surgery goes wrong or is unlikely to be a patient’s best option. 
We are all human, we all make mistakes and so we all benefit from guidance. 
We are fortunate; our profession is still respected and held in high esteem. 
Our behaviours and attitudes are observed by those we work  alongside and 
impact directly on the care we deliver to our patients.  The challenge of 
providing compassionate, high quality, safe care is at the top of our 
professional agenda. (ibid., 4) 
																																																						
17 The Association of Surgeons of Great Britain and Ireland 
The British Association of Oral and Maxillofacial Surgeons 
The British Association of Otorhinolaryngologists – Head and Neck Surgeons 
The British Association of Paediatric Surgeons 
The British Association of Plastic, Reconstructive and Aesthetic Surgeons 
The British Association of Urological Surgeons 
The British Orthopaedic Association 
The Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Glasgow 
The Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland 
The Royal College of Surgeons of Edinburgh 
The Society for Cardiothoracic Surgery in Great Britain and Ireland 
The Society of British Neurological Surgeons 
The Vascular Society of Great Britain and Ireland 
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It conveys a romanticised notion of the Surgeon as noble, embattled, good but fallible.  
It clothes the profession in virtuous robes: ‘strength’, ‘humility’, ‘respect’, ‘compassion’.  
The symbolic evocation of the virtuous yet fallible surgeon may appeal to the 
emotional core of the profession’s members.  Through this statement, the RCS 
communicates to all surgeons through a personal voice that acknowledges the 
challenges and complexities of their everyday practice.  It reinforces a sense that 
surgeons are united (constant repetition of ‘we’) by their common affective 
experiences of surgical practice; that is, how the demands and the joys of a career in 
surgery make them feel.   
I use the term ‘feel’ or ‘feelings’ apropos Whitehead in his theory of experience (see 
Chapter 3).  This is the way in which one encounters something (object or event) and 
how it comes to matter to that individual.  For example, the pleasure felt when one 
encounters a beautiful flower.  The ‘pleasure’ is sensed and perceived by the body 
even before one is cognisant of ‘beauty’ as a concept.  Put another way, an individual 
experiences the beauty of the flower before cognitive factors intervene to describe 
and organise that experience.  By creating an affective connection with its readership, 
GSP signals how it can be relevant to surgeons from all disciplines: it claims to 
understand what is at the heart of surgical practice.   
This is an encouraging beginning to the document and suggests it may be a useful 
guide in actual clinical practice.  It goes on to state its objectives: 
Good Surgical Practice aims to be a base line of clear and assessable 
standards for individual surgeons and their practice. It is not a statutory code 
or a regulatory document but rather seeks to exemplify the standards required 
of all doctors by the GMC in the context of surgery.  It represents the 
profession’s core values, the skills and attitudes that underpin surgical 
professionalism to which all surgeons should aspire in order to deliver high 
quality care. (p. 4) 
The authors appear to suggest that, while the document is not a regulatory text, it 
outlines the minimum standard of practice expected of surgeons by the RCS and the 
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GMC.  By claiming to represent the ‘profession’s core values’, the RCS appoints itself 
as the official voice of the profession: an authority on what is deemed by surgeons to 
be important, what skills and attitudes they must demonstrate in practice and what 
ethical principles shape their everyday practice18.  I explore how the notion of an 
ethics of practice had been captured by the RCS, through this written guidance and 
what a surgeon might infer from it.  The below is a critique on how the text interprets 
and conceptualises an ethics of practice and why its approach is problematic.   
a)  The ‘profession’s core values’ 
The launch of this document was accompanied by a three and a half minute 
promotional video19.  A senior medical director at the University Hospital of South 
Manchester makes the following comment;  
“The NHS for a long time has accepted poor values and standards and 
individual surgeons have produced huge amount of variation in practise, a 
variation in standards which has led to a variation in outcomes and the Royal 
College’s Standards (team) have produced a framework of values really.  Its 
values as much as rules I think, which will enable surgeons to practise so 
much more safely in the future.”   
Clare Marx, the president of the RCS is filmed, stating;  
“We can no longer allow people to vacillate about whether this is important or 
not important.  The general view is, a bit like washing your hands, this is 
something you just have to do… it’s not actually just about checking, it’s about 
the whole ethos of the safety culture, it’s about the whole business of team 
working, it’s about the whole open to challenge and it’s about learning from 
other people and making sure that the patient lies at the heart of it and that 
that patient is safe”.   
																																																						
18 As explained in Chapter two, the RCS is the professional body responsible for surgical exams, 
awarding higher surgical qualifications and setting the content of the surgical curriculum.  The 
primary responsibility of the RCS is to patients and the improvement of patient care, for which it was 
given a royal charter.  Its engagement with surgeons is through ways that will ultimately affect the 
care of patients, such as running courses and training to develop and consolidate surgical skills, 
thus improving clinical outcomes and patient experience.   
19 http://www.rcseng.ac.uk/surgeons/surgical-standards/professionalism-surgery/gsp/gsp 
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The above comments portray the surgical environment in a negative light, including 
tolerance of poor practices, acceptance of low expectations and reliance on the 
approaches of individual surgeons (as opposed to a unified professional stance on 
what is acceptable practice and what is not).  As discussed in Chapter 2, the above 
statements reflect the findings of the Mid Staffordshire inquiry (Francis, 2013) and the 
subsequent responses from the college and government.    
This unflattering commentary on the profession is curious.  The romanticised service 
of surgeons iterated in the opening pages is replaced with the more prosaic 
categories of the GMC regulations: ‘standards’, ‘framework of values’, ‘rules’, 
‘business’, ‘team working’, ‘safety’.  The text has created two worlds of surgery.  The 
first, romantic and idealised and the second, flawed and in need of urgent repair.  The 
repair may come in the form of guidance produced in GSP.    
Through an external framework of standards, rules, regulations and a n0n-negotiable 
code of conduct (“we can no longer allow people to vacillate”), the RCS through GSP 
attempts to remedy what is wrong with modern surgical practice: general dithering in 
the face of poor standards and unacceptable practices.  The text presents a code of 
conduct similar to GMP which is exhaustive, listing every detail of the practical 
aspects of a surgeon’s day to day routine.  For example, in Domain 1 (knowledge, 
skills, competence), it instructs surgeons to write clearly and legibly, with the 
appropriate date and patient details: 
1.3  Record your work clearly, accurately and legibly 
Ensure that all medical records are accurate, clear, legible, comprehensive 
and contemporaneous and have the patient’s  identification details on them.  
Ensure that a record is made by a member of the surgical team of important 
events and communications with the patient or supporter (for example, 
prognosis or potential complication). Any change in the treatment plan should 
be recorded.  
(GSP, 2014: 21) 
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A document that professes to extol the principles of practice and the inviolate ethics of 
conduct dilutes its message if it includes operational details of day to day working, and 
present these as core values by which surgeons must work by.  The document 
becomes didactic and dictatorial in providing rigid rules and specifics on how 
surgeons must conduct themselves.   
I believe that the gross error this document makes is in failing to distinguish between 
what is a principle and what is a technique.  Autonomous individuals, like surgeons, 
who deal with complex practice every day and must use independent judgment, 
require overarching principles that can guide, inform and assist their practice.  They 
should be free to use whatever technique that is appropriate given the circumstances 
to achieve those principles.   
For example, in the above, rather than outlining the specific techniques a surgeon 
should use to achieve the goal of clear communication, I would instead identify the 
overarching principle of, ‘ensure communications are clear and understood’.  This 
would be a value whereas the example above is an operational technique.  My 
conclusion is that GSP confuses an ethics of practice with a framework for organising 
the minutiae of practice.    
Summary 
In this chapter, I have attempted to explore through the central concept of care, the 
difference between how to give appropriate care in unanticipated or unpredictable 
clinical situations and how care is treated as a major concept within medical and 
clinical guidelines.  In the former, the surgeon must make decisions in unfamiliar 
situations, trying to find a way forward.  The affects that lead to the thoughts and 
actions of the surgeon relate to an ethics of immanence.  In the latter, a transcendent 
ethics is promoted, an established code according to which surgeons must adhere.  I 
do not argue that a formal code of ethics is unimportant.  Such guidelines are 
important, but in unfamiliar situations they may not help to cope with what happens in 
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relations between surgeon and patient where there is a real need to find an effective 
resolution. 
Attempts in medical practice to establish a clear set of criteria according to which the 
work of practitioners can be evaluated (measurement) is a response to the past 
problems and failures of health care.  Given this background, the drive to assess and 
measure is understandable: strong arguments can be made for it being a desirable 
component of modern healthcare processes.  However, the desire for clarity through 
performative assessments and measurements can obscure the complexities of actual 
clinical practice, as demonstrated in the personal narratives in this chapter.   
A focus on the ‘complicated processes’ of care and the specific issues concerning 
delivery of care, constitute a particular preoccupation with the general business of 
healthcare.  To cultivate professionals who can respond appropriately in a clinical 
encounter with the necessary dynamism, creativity and compassion, surgical 
education and training must embrace a paradigm that goes beyond a narrow 
understanding of competence and skills acquisition.  What is necessary is a relaxation 
and softening of approaches that mandate conduct and behaviour.  
If there is one lesson to be learnt, I suggest it is that people must always come 
before numbers. It is the individual experiences that lie behind statistics and 
benchmarks and action plans that really matter, and that is what must never 
be forgotten when policies are being made and implemented. 
(Robert Francis, 2010: 4) 
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Postscript 
In large capital letters I document in PF’s patient notes, ‘DO NOT MENTION BLOOD.  
THIS IS A TRANSFUSION OF PACKED RED CELLS.’   
I had met PF the previous weekend and admitted her for what essentially was a 
rotting big toe on the right foot.  Her poorly controlled diabetes coupled with an 
accident in which she stepped on some broken glass had resulted in a wound 
infection that had insidiously eaten away at most of the flesh on the back of her toe.  
There was now a great big hole where once there was skin and muscle.  The white of 
the tendon sheaths attached to the base of the big toe were now clearly visible and 
the top edge of the toe looked suspiciously like necrotic (dying) tissue.  The first thing I 
noticed when we met was the disinterest and fatigue in her eyes.  She met my gaze 
but it was a lethargic effort and matched her flat affect.  Though her skin was dark I 
noted a heaviness to her complexion and her habitus was hunched masking an 
emaciated body.  In short, she was obviously neglecting her physical and mental self.  
PF was accompanied by her daughter, AF, a sturdy young woman who was irritated 
but at the same time resigned to the fact that she was spending Saturday night in A&E 
with her mother.  I explained that the toe was infected but there was still a good 
chance she could heal given the right medications and medical support, however, if 
this failed then yes, as she had correctly surmised already, the toe would need to be 
amputated to prevent the infection from spreading.   
The next time we met, a week later, it was clear that regular medical review plus some 
gentle invasive supportive measures (intravenous antibiotics) had not improved her 
toe or overall health.  I sat down with her that morning and explained that due to her 
severe anaemia it was most unlikely that the toe would survive as her basic tissue 
oxygenation was woefully inadequate to foster healing or equip her natural defences 
against infection.  She needed a blood transfusion to increase her red blood cell count 
and thus treat her anaemia.  This was the first crucial step.  Whilst other options were 
available, such as oral pills and supplements that would raise the blood count, these 
would take several weeks to months to produce a noticeable effect.  A blood 
transfusion was the quickest and speediest way of doing this.   
“It’s against my religion.  I’m a Jehovah’s witness.  It’s a sin to accept blood”, she 
whispered, her voice weakened by her overall physical decline.  “Do you want to get 
better?  Do you want me to help you through this?”  I asked her.  “Yes”, she answered 
without hesitation.  “What if I gave you a blood product called packed red cells?  It’s 
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taken from blood, it contains the cells that carry oxygen to your body, but it’s not 
whole blood.  The colour is the same.  It’s what we give people when they need a 
boost to their blood count.  Would you accept it?”  She simply said, “yes”.   
I called AF and explained the situation to her.  I told her that while I was essentially 
giving her mother important constituents of blood, PF seemed to understand this.  But 
I wanted to make sure that the patient was fully aware of what she had agreed to.  
With both mother and daughter there I repeated the treatment plan.  I explained to her 
that her overall lethargy and sense of disinterest was linked to her anaemia and that 
the lack of blood cells meant she was fatigued and felt low.  Behind those tired eyes I 
could see that she was listening intently to my words, she did want to get better but 
was struggling with her faith and what she felt she ought to do.  “You know”, I told her, 
“the treatment you have in this hospital, is confidential.  Whatever happens here is just 
between you and me.  No one from your congregation will ever know unless you 
choose to tell them.  My first priority is to your health and confidentiality.  If you think 
that packed red cells would be acceptable to you and would make you feel better, 
then I can do that right now for you.”  She paused, looked at her daughter and then at 
me and said, “Yes, I don’t want the whole blood, but I’ll take the other option you 
talked about, the packed red cells.”   
Reflection 
I am conscious that this story leaves me open to criticisms from some corners, that as 
a surgeon, ‘I thought I knew what was best for the patient above her religious beliefs’.  
That I manipulated the patient through a form of discourse.  However, I am clear in my 
mind that I did not manipulate or deceive a weakened patient.  I made this decision 
based on a sense of clinical care for the patient, as well as care for her beliefs and 
sensibilities.  I felt she was asking for help to make these treatments more acceptable 
to her.  I am certain that she knew she was accepting blood and was in no doubt 
when the bags were put up and her permission was asked prior to commencing the 
transfusions.  I hope that what I did was help her make a meaningful choice: a choice 
that she felt she could live with.  I hope that I picked up on her actual desires by 
engaging in a way that was respectful to her beliefs yet perceptive and sensitive to the 
internal conflict.  I knew that I could not resolve that conflict for her, but I hope I made 
her feel better about it. 
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Chapter 6 
A Tale of Training: a critical examination of events of clinical practice 
through an analysis of interviews and approved training materials  
            
6.1 The Craft Of Training  
What people would say is that they compare the system now (based on assessments 
and criteria for competencies) and they would say, well at least it’s fair, at least it’s not 
nepotistic like the old system. . . But my feeling is, and as someone who was a junior 
trainee before we had any of these systems of assessment, as a house officer (1st 
year doctor), somebody wrote a little paragraph about me at the end of my job and 
that was that.  As a woman in Medicine, who didn’t go to private school or didn’t know 
anybody in Medicine, I actually had a huge amount of support from all the consultants 
I worked for.  And that wasn’t for any other reason other than they recognised that I 
was hard working, loyal and dedicated as well as being good at the job.  They really 
were vying for me and encouraged me which made a huge difference.  But when 
MMC20 came in that was the real final death knell of that sort thing where your boss 
would phone up their colleague to say, “make sure you shortlist this one because 
she’s good”.   
. . . I had a whole bunch of consultants who were massively supportive and they’d 
phone me and say, “have you been shortlisted?”  And I would burst into tears and say 
no, and they would be absolutely outraged on my behalf, and say “I don’t understand, 
why is the new system not working?!”  But the trouble is. . . [this new system] 
completely removes from the process of picking doctors, the genuine support of other 
doctors.  And I really think that you and I or anybody else whom you would consider a 
good doctor, would be consistently picked out by others as a good doctor.  We all 
know who’s good and who’s not up to par, we all know it!  But there’s no way under 
the current system of just doing that . . . of saying, “I’ll take these eight trainees but not 
those two”. . . It’s the same with nurses isn’t it?. .  . You know which ones are the 
good ones. . . when someone says, “oh so-and-so is the nurse on the ward”, then it’s 
																																																						
20 MMC - Modernising Medical Careers was a controversial postgraduate medical training 
programme introduced in 2005 in the UK.  It replaced the original system of training grades and 
introduced routine assessments of skills and activities.  The independent review of MMC by Prof. 
John Tooke strongly criticised the way in which the programme was instituted highlighting the 
inadequacies and inefficiencies of the system, (See Chapter 2 and Appendix A)  
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understood that, (those tasks) will never get done!  There’s an understanding of 
people.  Human beings understand each other, that some are lazy, others are 
competent.  We understand that about each other, that’s thousands and millennia of 
evolution.  Then we’re coming to a system where we take all that out in order to make 
it fair.  And I understand that it’s a really difficult balance to strike.   
(Lydia, ST7 surgical trainee) 
There is so much focus by the government on outcomes, so we have to show the 
effect.  We know there is a positive impact by using these workshops but you have to 
prove that patients are safer for it, so it’s hard to demonstrate the value of it.  That’s 
the context and the framework that we’re all thinking with now because that’s how 
people are being judged.  We do struggle with this on our courses, we struggle with 
measuring impact.  You’re talking about 2 days out of someone’s annual schedule 
(spent on a course), how do you measure whether this is what’s made the difference 
or not?   
We’re reluctant to just be seen as a course provider, we’d like education to mean 
something a bit broader for people coming to the college.  Not just training.  A bit more 
of everything really. . . all sorts of different types of education . . . more networking 
forums and less formal things, some e-learning that would be free, just a bit more 
investment is needed.  We have a huge number of faculty who teach on our courses 
and to be able to do a bit more with them as a community would be quite good.   
I understand the importance of patient safety.  But, if you're going to value outcomes 
more than people, then you’re stuck aren’t you?  I’m not going to convince anybody by 
saying, “well, you’ll have less trainees who are struggling.”  But, how do I prove that or 
who cares if I prove that?  If we had this (other forms of education) and surgeons 
reflected more then they might feel better coming to work every day, in which case I 
presume it will impact on how patients experience treatment.  But how do you show 
that? 
(Amy, senior educator, Royal College of Surgeons of England (RCS)) 
6.2  Introduction 
Since the 1990s, the medical profession has been under increased scrutiny and 
pressure to reform its practices, foster greater transparency and honesty in doctor-
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patient relations, take decisive and immediate action against physicians who are 
failing in their duty of care (Stacey, 1992; Irvine, 2003, 2006; Bogner, 2004) (see also 
Chapter 2).  It is not surprising therefore, to find that these trends have been reflected 
in the development of medical education and training, bringing about an alignment 
with the wider aims of the medical profession, (DoH, 2002; Carracio et al, 2002; De 
Cossart and Fish, 2005; Brown et al, 2007; Eraut, 2009) (see also Chapter 2).  One 
important example is the incorporation of mechanisms to ensure accountability and 
quality assurance in systems of training (DoH, 2008, 2011; GMC, 2016).  
The aims of medical education and training: priorities and tensions 
As a consequence, there have been strenuous efforts to update and modernise 
training.  In the past decade, no less than eight reviews have been organised into the 
state of postgraduate training and education (Tooke, 2008; DoH, 2008, 2011; Collins, 
2010; GMC, 2010a; Greenaway, 2013).  These studies have tended to focus on the 
structure and delivery of training rather than on how trainees assimilate learning 
content.   
The introduction of formal structured training programmes was to ensure transparency 
and order in postgraduate training with clear measurable outcomes.  The overarching 
aim of postgraduate training is to produce skilled, competent and safe practitioners: 
‘the delivery of high quality education and training is an essential part of delivering 
high quality patient care’, (DoH, 2008: 4).   
Doctors have to care for many more patients with chronic illness and with 
multiple co-morbidities.  This is partly driven by our ageing population, is partly 
driven by the success of earlier intervention . . . partly driven by lifestyle. 
(Greenaway, 2013: 3) 
In the above statement taken from The Shape of Training Review (2013), the current 
and future health needs of the population are identified.  These include: an increasing 
number of people living with more than one chronic condition (asthma, diabetes, high 
blood pressure), and an expanding population of elderly people.  The needs and 
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demands of the ageing population, is particularly cited as an area of healthcare that 
places a specific burden on limited resources.   
The review makes a series of recommendations in response to the changing health 
needs of the population.  One is that physicians be trained with more general skills in 
diagnosis and treatment rather than an overwhelming focus on the acquisition of more 
specialist skills.  The review concludes that cultivating a broad skills base amongst 
trainees would improve the safety and care that patients receive.  The reason is that 
more generic training programmes would train physicians to be better informed and 
skilled at managing a variety of more common medical problems, rather than 
emphasising specialist skills in a few areas.  
These issues give an insight into how the development and design of training 
programmes are subject to other competing considerations.  These include, a 
responsivity to the health demands of the population, a sensitivity to the social and 
political concerns of the time, a recognition of the trainees’ needs as well as physician 
receptivity to the dictates of policy.  These elements can work in harmony but more 
often than not, they exist in tension with each other.  
The objectives of the chapter 
In this chapter, what I attempt to explore, through the central concept of training 
practices, is the difference between how trainer/trainee subjectivities emerge from an 
engagement with the thisness or concrete reality of actual clinical practice, and how 
surgical learning and teaching is treated within official training materials (curriculum 
and assessments).  This is achieved through a critical examination of interviews with 
surgeons and educators alongside an analysis of specific surgical training materials 
(the ISC21, work based assessments (WBAs) and surgical trainer standards).   
																																																						
21 ISC - intercollegiate surgical curriculum.  Briefly defined in Chapter 2 and further explicated later in 
this chapter. 
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The aims of the analysis are four-fold.  First, to investigate the affective nature of 
clinical encounters of practice.  Second, to question how the affective conditions of 
practice are expressed in surgeon attitudes and behaviours.  Third, to inquire how 
training materials pedagogise learners and teachers (through idealised versions of 
clinical practice) and how these documents impact upon the ideas and intensities that 
emerge from the immanence of clinical experience.  Fourth, to examine how the 
formal structurisation of medical practice (how health policy is enacted, how hospital 
departments are organized and deployed, the impact of the ‘outcomes agenda’ on 
patient care and training) controls actualisations of practice.  It is my contention that 
framing the analysis through these questions will lead to a better understanding of 
how surgeons learn and cope within the ontological and ethical complexities 
embedded in actual encounters of clinical practice.   
I have analysed six (out of a total of 9) interviews, 3 of which were conducted with 
trainee surgeons and 3 with consultant surgeons.  I believe that these narrative 
accounts are representative of the widely held experiences of trainees (who undergo 
training) and trainers (who provide the training).  However, my purpose is not to prove 
that the interviews contain routine occurrences, nor is it to confirm the veracity of the 
statements.  Rather, I intend, to understand how the ideas and experiences 
expressed in these (learning) encounters matter to a trainee.  Thus, I ask how the 
examples of clinical practice reported in the interviews, are significant for a learner.   
This is not to diminish the importance or effectiveness of known and established forms 
of surgical teaching and learning.  Instead, I propose an alternate yet complementary 
approach to processes of surgical learning and teaching.  An approach that exceeds 
an application of existing medical pedagogies and established ways of knowing.  I 
suggest that learning can occur as a function of mattering.  That is, how something 
 219 
that attains significance for a learner (and therefore ‘matters’) can create forms of 
knowing, specifically other modes of learning which may yet be unknown.  
To investigate this notion of learning, I locate my enquiry within actual encounters of 
clinical practice as experienced and narrated to me by surgeons.  The accounts of 
clinical experience are problematised using a theoretical framework previously 
outlined in chapter 4, constructed from philosophical theory.  The analytic model 
draws on, Badiou’s notion of truth and event, Whitehead’s writings on experience and 
affect, Deleuze’s concept of the actual-virtual dimension, Simondon’s theories of 
individuation and metastability, and Massumi’s work on affective thinking.  These 
illuminate the intricacies within accounts of experiencing in surgical practice.  I further 
use the philosophical discourses of Foucault and Butler to construct a methodology 
that unpacks the discursive practices of the training materials, as well as the content 
of some of the narrative accounts.   
6.3  Official Training22: Narrative Discourses  
So far, I have introduced the two opening narratives of Lydia and Amy respectively.  I 
treat these as discursive practices.  That is, they are practices that construct the 
entities about which they speak, rather than being an embodiment of ‘truth’ or motive.  
To unpack these statements and tease out the emerging ideas, I draw on the theories 
of discourse of both Foucault (1972) and Butler (2005).  
To describe a formulation qua statement does not consist in analysing the 
relations between the author and what he (sic) says (or wanted to say, or said 
without wanting to); but in determining what position can and must be 
occupied by any individual if he is to be the subject of it.  (Foucault, 1972: 95-
96, original emphasis). 
																																																						
22 This characterization of training is derived from Ian Stronach’s (2010) analysis of teenage 
pregnancy in which he labels State (government) discourses on sex education as ‘Official Sex’ (p. 
46).  In Chapter 5, I similarly used this terminology to describe ‘Official Care’, a form of care 
produced in discourses involving stakeholders in medical education policy.  
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Foucault further states that understanding the subjectivity of an individual requires 
exploring of the conditions of possibility that underpin ‘what can be said’ and ‘who can 
speak it’.  As such, these statements are indissoluble from power.  Butler (2005) 
asserts that discourses operate within ‘regimes of truth’ (p. 22), thereby creating the 
conditions and frameworks for self-recognition, and producing a reality for the 
speaker.  Therefore, I approached the analysis of the narratives with the following 
question: what controls and regulates how a trainee/trainer becomes visible within the 
current system of surgical training?  At this juncture re-reading the opening narratives 
once more will likely facilitate grasping the ensuing analysis.   
a)  Amy’s story 
Amy, an educator at the RCS, is involved in developing new training courses and 
modifying existing programmes.  She vocalises how government strategies to 
prioritise and assure patient safety have challenged the activities of the College.  As 
discussed in chapter 2, investigations such as the Francis inquiry, that highlight the 
appalling standards of care at the Mid Staffordshire NHS Trust, have reconfigured 
healthcare services and training around an agenda of patient safety (Francis, 2013; 
DoH response; GMC 2013; RCS, 2014b).  All organisations and personnel involved in 
medical education and training are required to demonstrate clear outcomes that link a 
particular clinical activity with the prioritisation and promotion of patient safety (GMC, 
2016) (see also chapter 2).   
Amy and the College education staff, believe in the value of providing a broader 
portfolio of surgical education.  This wider pathway would support the growth of the 
surgical professional along additional complementary pathways, such as networking 
events, e-learning or faculty development.   
However, Amy reports that these types of education are considered less important 
than the more established forms of training, such as anatomy courses or suturing 
classes.  These latter courses have demonstrated a clear link with patient safety by 
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being associated with an improvement in a surgeon’s technical proficiency.  By 
contrast, non-traditional educational programmes, which target aspects of practice 
that may potentially make surgeons ‘feel better about coming to work every day’, are 
not recognized or supported in similar ways.  Why might this be?   
The emotional wellbeing of a surgeon is a complex nebulous concept, making it near 
impossible to measure accurately and consistently.  This becomes a challenge within 
the current system of professional regulation which relies on demonstrable outcomes.  
In this case, the College would be required to provide clear evidence of how attention 
to the emotional wellbeing of a surgeon would improve or strengthen the patient 
safety agenda, mandated by national policy.  Identification of concrete, replicable 
outcomes to establish a connection between the affective state of a surgeon and the 
safety of patients is an enormously difficult task given the abstract or obscure nature 
of the relation.       
Learning as a ‘form taking activity’ 
As is shown in Amy’s narrative, meeting the pre-defined and prescriptive outcomes of 
NHS policy, can thwart attempts to widen the concept of surgical education, beyond a 
singular focus on mandatory training.  That is, limiting surgical education to 
compulsory activities considered integral to patient safety, risks narrowing 
professional practice to an isolated acquisition of specific pre-defined skills.  However, 
what I question critically, is not the component skills of established mandatory training, 
nor its promotion over and above other aspects of learning and training.  Instead, I 
want to draw attention to the other forms of learning that are either neglected or ‘lost’ 
when mandatory knowledge and skills are developed in ways that totalize the nature 
and content of training.  This is the dominant theme that emerges from Amy’s analysis 
of the state of surgical training and education.  I have drawn on an application of 
Simondon’s hylomorphism and technical mentality (Simondon, 1964) to illustrate this 
concern.   
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The predefined outcomes mandated by NHS policy, contribute to a form of 
governance according to the creation of a hylomorphic scheme of training.  This is 
unavoidable when organizing a system in which the transmission of fundamental skills 
and knowledge associated with safe and proficient practice must be ensured.  
However, a hylomorphic framework of training risks overlooking other forms of 
learning and their respective forms of governance immanent to an encounter with 
actual clinical practice.  Crucially learning that emerges in these unforeseen and 
unpredictable ways may be associated with how the clinical problem comes to matter 
to the surgeon.  This in turn may be associated with how clinical learning ‘in the field’ 
becomes enduring and transforms existing practice.   
Brian Massumi commenting on Simondon’s theory of form-matter, distinguishes those 
aspects of learning that arise from a direct engagement with actual clinical practice as 
a ‘form taking activity’ (Massumi et al, 2006: 43).  This means that there are forms of 
learning that are inherent to the encounter of practice itself.  This stands in contrast to 
the knowledge that is assimilated from official manuals of training, that reflect learning 
as a ‘form taking passivity’.  I suggest that the learning which emanates from a form-
taking activity can enhance a physician’s practice in two important ways.  First, by 
extending what is already known, in terms of creating new knowledge and skills that 
were previously absent.  Second, the novel ways of thinking and doing that emerge 
from being immersed in actual clinical encounters, can also modify existing 
foundational practices of knowledge and skill so as to ensure that they remain current 
and practically applicable.   
Laparoscopic surgery 
An example of the benefits of learning as a form taking activity, is the development of 
laparoscopic surgery (keyhole surgery).  This minimalist technique, which avoids large 
incisions and gross dissections, was initially used in the field of gynaecology.  
However, surgeons discovered that the technique could be applicable in other 
disciplines of surgery such as colorectal surgery and hepatobiliary surgery.  This 
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represented an extension of the technique by developing novel methods of 
manipulating the procedure.   
But, the exposure to laparoscopic surgery also led to a modification in non-
laparoscopic surgical practice, i.e. the principles of generic surgical practice.  
Laparoscopic incisions are smaller, involve less dissection and are not as invasive as 
standard surgery.  The technique is associated with quicker recovery times and less 
post-operative pain (Veldkamp et al, 2005; NICE, 2006; Papadima et al, 2009; Varela 
et al, 2010).  As a consequence, patients required less analgesia, mobilized quicker 
and are discharged home sooner, frequently with a quicker return to work (Burns et al, 
2010; Varela et al, 2010; Hayden, 2011).  For instance, patients undergoing a 
laparoscopic removal of their gallbladder (one of the most common routine surgeries 
in the UK), are advised nowadays that they can be discharged home the same day of 
the surgery and expect to return to work within two weeks.   
This is a great improvement from the days when a gallbladder was extracted through 
a large incision in the abdomen that necessitated at least four weeks of recovery time, 
and brought considerable postoperative pain.  This experience demonstrated to 
surgeons the benefits of making surgery minimally invasive, leading to a modification 
of generic surgical practice.  It is also an example of the reinforcing causality that 
occurs between how humans think about technology and how technology can in turn 
alter the way society thinks.   
Fostering professional development that is consistent with the principles of 
Good Medical Practice (2013) 
I have suggested above that the current mandated trainings emphasise the 
mechanical aspects of healthcare.  But, if one of the goals of healthcare policy is to 
encourage the development of professionals who are thoughtful, transparent, 
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empathetic and innovative, can mandatory systems alone achieve this?  Not 
according to the following statement: 
The obligations and challenges of candour serve to remind us that for all its 
technological advances, healthcare is a deeply human business.  Systems 
and processes are necessary supports to good, compassionate care, but they 
can never serve as its substitute.  It follows from this that making a reality of 
candour is a matter of hearts and minds more than it is a matter of systems 
and processes, important as they can be.  A compliance-focused approach 
will fail. . . systems and processes can only serve to structure a regulatory 
conversation about compliance. The commitment to candour has to be about 
values and it has to be rooted in genuine engagement of staff, building on 
their own professional duties and their personal commitment to their patients. 
(RCS, 2015: 17, my emphasis) 
The above quotation is taken from a report commissioned by the health secretary 
(Jeremy Hunt), Building a Culture of Candour (RCS, 2015).  The report is a 
culmination of a review into how adverse events should be labelled and reported.  It 
was triggered following the investigation into unacceptable standards of patient care 
at Mid Staffordshire NHS Trust led by Professor Robert Francis (Francis, 2013).   
This document along with many other similar publications in recent years, have 
reiterated a key objective in healthcare: the creation of a professional culture of 
honesty, empathy, compassion and collaboration (Francis, 2013; DoH, 2014a, 2014b; 
RCS, 2015; CQC, 2015).  Cultivation of these values in practice requires physicians to 
engage and be responsive within actual encounters of clinical practice.  In a specific 
event of practice, a surgeon is expected to put into action all the recommended 
attitudes and behaviours.  However, I suggest that expressing these attributes 
appropriately in actual events of clinical practice, is a far more complex activity than is 
reflected by the official documents.  The authors of the candour document do indeed 
identify the complexities of this challenge.  They rightly state that a culture of 
transparency is only possible if there is actual staff engagement, a relation that is 
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critical to making candour an everyday reality of practice, over and above the effects 
of regulatory mechanisms.   
Expanding the ‘capacities’ of a surgeon 
In her interview, Amy talks about professional development beyond mandatory 
training, as a way of enhancing a surgeon’s abilities, which she concludes should in 
turn improve the patient’s experience.  I believe that surgical professionals also need 
a space to contemplate novel ways of expanding their capacities in practice, which is 
unencumbered by the outcomes agenda.  Such an opportunity would I think, permit a 
surgeon to think critically without constraints, about how their practice matters to 
them.   
Critics may argue that this objective is not different from reflective practice, which 
provides an opportunity to ‘look back’ on practice in contemplative ways.  I would 
assert however, that while there may be similarities between reflection and the case I 
advance for a form of learning that arises from the immanence of clinical relations, 
notable differences remain.  First, in reflective practices the tendency is to assume an 
objective stance when reviewing an experience.  Put another way to examine an 
experience from a dispassionate and logical approach.   
Second, the perception and the enactment of reflection are a rational exercise.  That 
is, the thoughts and actions that emerge through experiencing are framed as evidence 
of cognitive processes.  As discussed in earlier chapters, I have hypothesized that the 
initial impact of an encounter is first, affective.  To this end, I have proposed a notion 
of ‘affective thinking’ in clinical practice, a central theme of this thesis.  I expand on 
these initial ideas later in this chapter in the section on Reflective Practice.   
In summary, Amy’s narrative calls for a coherence between how something in practice 
matters to a surgeon and the regulatory demands of healthcare.  A collaborative 
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venture between these avenues, has the potential to generate conditions that create 
enduring values in clinical practice: candour, compassion and competence.  
b)  Technologies of performativity 
Strong parallels can be drawn between the overwhelming nature of performative 
outcomes in medical education and the outcomes agenda in school education.  I 
briefly examine the writings of Stephen Ball, (1997, 2000, 2003, 2013, 2015), who has 
vocally criticised attempts to quantify and measure aspects of performance for both 
learners and teachers.  I use his notion of ‘performativity’ to extend the initial 
arguments I made in the above analysis of Amy’s narrative.  
Performativity is a technology, a culture and a mode of regulation that 
employs judgements, comparisons and displays as means of incentive, 
control, attrition and change — based on rewards and sanctions (both material 
and symbolic).  The performances (of individual subjects or organisations) 
serve as measures of productivity or output, or displays of ‘quality’, or 
‘moments’ of promotion or inspection.  As such they stand for, encapsulate or 
represent the worth, quality of value of an individual or organisation within a 
field of judgment.  The issues of who controls the field of judgments is crucial. 
. . Who is it that determines what is to count as a valuable, effective or 
satisfactory performance and what measures or indicators are considered 
valid? (Ball, 2003: 216). 
‘Performativity’, a term initially introduced by Lyotard (1984) is one of three policy 
technologies (the others being ‘the market’ and ‘managerialism’) in educational 
reform, asserted by Ball.  The performance itself is judged and compared so that it 
comes to represent the ‘worth’ of the individual or organisation.  In other words, the 
performance totalises the contribution by the individual/organisation. 
Ball problematises the way in which categories of judgements are established, by 
asking who determines which criteria are deemed valuable and which are not?  Amy’s 
narrative emphasises this struggle.  What she personally believes to be beneficial and 
valuable to the professional development of surgeons (gathered from her experiences 
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of training surgeons) is obscured by what is formally identified in policy text as worthy 
and effective.  Performativity is construed through what appears to be a rational and 
objective lens—creating fixed outcomes of performance that demonstrate the 
prioritisation of patient safety, an admirable goal.  However, as she opines, it is very 
difficult to reduce the complexity of a surgeon’s affective state to simple categories 
that are amenable to such judgment.   
Through an enforcement of these policy technologies, reform is instituted beyond 
structural organisations, to encompass human subjects--teachers themselves are 
subject to change:  
New roles and subjectivities are produced as teachers are re-worked as 
producers/providers, educational entrepreneurs and managers and are 
subject to regular appraisal and review and performance comparisons.  We 
learn to talk about ourselves and the relationships, purposes and motivations 
in these new ways. (ibid., 218)      
Ball describes how government discourses of performativity subjectivise teachers in 
specific ways.  To be considered a good and effective teacher within these 
discourses, individuals must be able to describe themselves using the associated 
concepts and language, such as ‘producers/providers’, ‘managers’.  This framework of 
values focuses on prescribed identities of performance.  The Standards for Surgical 
Trainers (2014) (see Figure 10, below), produced by the Royal College of Surgeons of 
Edinburgh (RCSE) illustrates these important points well.   
The document was produced as part of a wider initiative to formally recognise surgical 
trainers through a process of training and accreditation.  Today, all surgeons engaged 
as surgical teachers must register their role with the GMC and produce the relevant 
documentation to support their claim. 
I want to draw attention to the introduction in the document of two particular 
categories that are used to distinguish groups of teachers (see Figure 11, below). The 
‘effective trainer’ versus the ‘excellent trainer’.  The document identifies the former as  
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Figure 10: Standards for Surgical Trainers (RCSE, 2014) 
 
 
displaying behaviours that are easily demonstrable (RCSE, 2014: 7) in clinical 
practice.  Whereas the ‘excellent trainer’ is defined as engaging in teaching activities 
that go beyond the clinical workplace.  Examples of these are provided: engaging with 
training activities that improve overall patient safety, developing research projects, 
promoting the widespread use of mandated assessment procedures.   
These examples of ‘excellent’ trainer behaviour reflect the wider agenda of 
professional regulation enforced by the government and GMC.  Namely the principles 
of Good Medical Practice (2013).  Teaching activities have been ‘forced’ into a 
framework that reflects policy objectives.  The difficulty arises when other conceptions 
of surgical teaching, which do not necessarily subscribe to the discourse on 
performativity, emerge from actual learning encounters in clinical practice.  These 
forms of teaching and learning represent adventures of pedagogic work.  That is, they 
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Figure 11:  Excerpt illustrating the core and desirable skills and attributes of an ‘effective 
trainer’ versus an ‘excellent trainer’ (RCSE, 2014: 10) 
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exceed the attempts to predefine the identities and performance of trainees and 
trainers.  Instead, they explore ways of trying to capture and understand what matters 
for learners in their different modes of learning.  In this conception of surgical 
pedagogy, subjectivation relates to how in local practices of learning a learner 
becomes subjectivated to his or her mode of learning and experiencing.  I revisit these 
themes in the analysis of Joseph’s narrative. 
c)  Lydia’s story 
I am well aware that I have never written anything but fictions. I do not mean 
to say, however, that truth is therefore absent. It seems to me that the 
possibility exists for fiction to function in truth.  One ‘fictions’ history on the 
basis of a political reality that makes it true, one ‘fictions’ a politics not yet in 
existence on the basis of a historical truth.  (Foucault, 1980: 193)  
Foucault rejects contemporary notions of ‘truth’ and ‘reality’ as formed by the 
dominant opinions of a given era.  Instead, he focuses on how our stories (‘fictions’) 
create a reality that we live and believe in and thus constitute what we conceive to be 
‘true’.  Thus, Lydia, is an ST7 trainee based in southern England.  Her criticisms of the 
unfairness of the new training system, arise from a personal experience of not being 
selected for further training.  This contrasts with her personal certainty that she is a 
good doctor.  A fact also confirmed by senior colleagues, as she told us.  These 
contrasting experiences have constituted the ‘reality’ of the new training system for 
both Lydia and the community of surgeons she works with.   
Lydia, and others, believe that she is conscientious and diligent, “a good doctor”.  She 
regards these characteristics of a “good doctor” as fundamental to any candidate 
applying for a place on a surgical training scheme.  Therefore, Lydia judges the new 
system of training on how well it identifies and distinguishes ‘good’ trainees.  This 
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notion of ‘goodness’ appears to be what controls and regulates the visibility of a 
trainee, for Lydia.   
The good trainee 
Lydia states that inequities may have existed in the old system (“at least it’s not as 
nepotistic as it used to be”), which the MMC era aspired to eradicate.  However, she 
thinks that it was her hard work and conscientiousness that propelled her, as a trainee 
in the older system.  These attributes were recognised by her supervising consultants 
as evidence that she had the intrinsic qualities necessary to be a ‘good’ doctor.  
Therefore, within this system of training practices, ‘good trainees’ were identified 
through cooperative relations established within work communities.  A community of 
peers and seniors provided unofficial ‘assessments’ on performance at work.  
Trainees who were “not up to par”, would not progress because they would lack the 
recognition and support of senior surgeons. This judgement of trainees was based on 
what Lydia coins “human understanding”.  That is, a senior surgeon’s personal 
experience and knowledge of what a specific trainee was capable of in terms of his or 
her inherent abilities and work ethic.  According to Lydia’s ‘reality’, this is what 
regulated the visibility of trainees in the older system.     
These themes echo the work of Lave and Wenger (1991) who wrote extensively on 
how learning (and advancement of learning) is intimately connected to processes of 
participation in a community of practice.   
But, Lydia is critical of how the complex notion of ‘goodness’ in trainees is captured by 
the current system: 
Let’s say you’ve got five junior doctors they are with our department for four 
months each . . . they are oncall with different people, they are on different 
wards all the time . . .  If at the end of that four-month block, you asked all the 
surgeons to put in order, the best to worst junior doctor.  I suspect that they 
would pick the same order of doctors.  And that’s because you know when 
you work with somebody.  I suppose it’s because you know your expectation 
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of yourself.  It takes a very short time to say, “you know what?  That person is 
extremely dedicated, they know their stuff, they’ve seen their patients, they’re 
aware of everything that’s going on, that’s the junior doctor I would pick for my 
team” . . . The question is how can you get that fact, into some kind of 
numerical scoring system.  And the answer is, that it’s very, very, very difficult 
to do, because once you start trying to put it in parameters, and make it all 
formal . . . you just can’t do it. 
Lydia describes how the attitudes and aptitudes associated with a ‘good trainee’ make 
him or her an appealing and sought after member of the wider team.  Consequently, 
this desirability can also regulate the visibility of a trainee.  Lydia concludes by stating 
that capturing these characteristics which are immanent to daily encounters of 
practice, is near impossible within the current assessment format which relies on a 
numeric system of categories.  I suggest, that one may extend Lydia’s thoughts to 
view the unofficial human evaluations of performance (as opposed to the formal 
numeric assessments) as representative of the ‘intra-actions’ (Barad, 2007) involved 
in practice.  Put simply, ‘human assessments’ can better perceive and accommodate 
the layers of complexity involved in a surgeon’s performance.  
Examples of intra-actions include the complex relations that form between: a trainee’s 
attitude to work and aptitude, the societal expectations of them, the ethos of the 
hospital, the culture of the work place, the facilities and equipment available.  The 
newer system of training may struggle to try to embrace these tiers of complexity 
through application of a limited numerical system (Hodges et al, 1999; Lurie et al, 
2011; Van der Vleuten, 2012; Pangaro and Ten Cate, 2013).          
The context of Lydia’s opinions: recognising competence 
In the pre MMC (Modernising Medical Careers) era, competence was a function of 
how the abilities of a trainee were recognised by those who worked alongside and 
closest to the trainee: their peers and senior colleagues (Sinclair, 1997; Tooke, 2008; 
Watt et al 2008; Carracio et al, 2002; Carracio and Englander, 2013; Sambrook, 
2014).  Whereas, in the post MMC training system with its emphasis on competency 
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based training, the opinions and judgements of surgeons, cannot contribute in the 
previous way.   
The locus of the power relations has shifted.  Systems of learning objectives and 
assessment devised and influenced by various stakeholders (the GMC, department of 
health, the Academic Royal Colleges) replace the ‘human’ evaluations provided by 
senior surgeons working in a community of practice (Norris, 1991; GMC, 2013; 
CanMEDS, 2000; De Cossart and Fish, 2005; ACGME, 2007).  It may appear that 
what is being measured and judged is the actual capacity of an individual (or 
organisation) to perform.  However, in reality, what is actually being evaluated is not 
the inherent ability of an individual.  But, how closely the individual’s performance 
meets the predefined criteria of the performative technology.  In short, it is adherence 
to pre-approved criteria that is being monitored and assessed.   
Lydia’s narrative draws attention to how trainees are identified along prescribed 
categories rather than inherent abilities.  But, what is the trainer’s role in this system of 
competency based assessments?  Certainly, the assessments require observation 
and interpretation by a surgical trainer to ascertain whether the trainee has met the 
criteria being tested.  But, how are trainers empowered by the assessment format to 
generate evaluations of performance?  Is there consistency between what a trainer 
identifies as important in a learning encounter and what is deemed relevant by 
predefined structured assessments?  I attempt to answer these questions in the 
following sections.   
6.4 Official Training: Competences And Reflective Practice 
In chapter 2, I presented a discussion on the origins and development of competency 
based medical education (CBME).  This is the standard model of postgraduate 
training in the UK and overseas.  It comprises a core curriculum with a series of 
competencies identified in areas such as practical skills, behavioural attitudes and 
theoretical knowledge (physiology, pathology etc.) (ISC, 2016; RCPSC, 2015).  
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Trainees are evaluated at each stage of their programme to ascertain whether 
acquisition of the necessary standard competencies (associated with their individual 
level of training) has occurred.  Assessments are conducted in areas that include 
operative ability, clinical judgement and decision making skills.   
The nature of surgical trainer input has changed markedly from the days of the 
apprenticeship system.  Surgical trainees are now required to be taken through 
procedures in a stepwise fashion to demonstrate gradual acquisition of skill (ISC, 
2016) and are therefore not expected to operate alone.  Independent operating occurs 
only once competency is fully demonstrated.  Some of the criticisms levelled against 
CBME include: proposed shorter training times which make achieving competence 
and safety of practice within a limited period more difficult; reductionist approaches to 
practice and assessment; a checklist attitude to complex clinical skills; and a 
perception of competencies as discrete tasks even though actual clinical practice is 
entangled.  Competency based frameworks fail to fully capture all the knowledge, 
skills and abilities needed for safe practice.  Accordingly, the current scheme of 
assessments does not adequately address all the competencies of a practicing 
physician (Grant, 1999; Talbot, 2004; De Cossart and Fish, 2005; Davis et al, 2007; 
Brooks, 2009; Brightwell and Grant, 2013; Touchie and ten Cate, 2016).   
It is not my intention in this thesis to provide a critical analysis of competency based 
medical education.  This task has been well accomplished already, with a wide range 
of studies and opinions reporting from both sides of the debate (Van der Vleuten, 
1996; Simpson et al, 2002; Leung, 2002; Carracio et al, 2002; Carracio and 
Englander, 2013; Lurie et al, 2011; Hodges and Lingard, 2012; Whitehead et al, 
2013).   
However, what interests me, is how the official framework of surgical training is 
actualised by trainees who are engaged in real and acute events of contingent 
medical practice.  Is their actual experience well informed by the pedagogic practices 
promoted by the official training materials such as the surgical curriculum?  What is 
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the nature of the pedagogic relations, involving both the trainee and trainer, that form 
and develop within unanticipated encounters of actual clinical practice?  Does it 
coincide with the ways in which trainees and trainers are pedagogised in training 
materials (curriculum, learning objectives, assessments).  What I problematize here, is 
the nature of training practices, both ‘official’ and ‘real’23, to deepen an understanding 
of the ideologies that constitute how trainees and trainers are engaged in teaching 
and learning activities (surgical pedagogy).    
a)  The Intercollegiate Surgical Curriculum Programme (ISCP) 
The ISCP (see Figure 1) was introduced by the RCS in 2003 as an online resource 
available to surgeons in training with the objective of setting out a defined, written 
syllabus for each of the ten surgical disciplines: Cardiothoracic Surgery; General 
Surgery; Neurosurgery; Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery (OMFS); Otolaryngology 
(ENT); Paediatric Surgery; Plastic Surgery; Trauma and Orthopaedic Surgery (T&O); 
Urology and Vascular Surgery.  As already discussed in Chapter 2, prior to the 
introduction of the ISC, there was inadequate documentation and no consensus on 
what theoretical knowledge and practical skills were required for a surgeon in training.  
‘What you needed to know for the job’, was largely passed on through the practical 
and oral tradition of the apprenticeship training (see Chapter 2).  The ISC was part of 
a seismic change in training culture.  One of the guiding principles of the curriculum 
was to make explicit the required knowledge and skills for surgical trainees. 
Today, the ISC is a definitive, web based pedagogical tool for surgical training.  It 
defines the pathway from Foundation Doctor to Consultant Surgeon in the NHS.  It 
also includes the different assessment strategies.  At each stage of this pathway, the 
curriculum sets out the general and specialty syllabus24: ‘a syllabus that lays down the 
																																																						
23 In Chapter 5 I used the term ‘Real’, to connote actual events or experiences.  In the current 
context here ‘real training’ refers to the actual experiences of training reported by trainees. 
24 Specialty syllabus refers to a specific discipline of surgery, such as Urology or Orthopaedics.  
Each discipline has its own specialty-based knowledge, in addition to the general principles of 
 236 
standards of specialty-based knowledge, clinical judgement, technical and operative 
skills and professional skills and behaviour, which must be acquired at each stage in 
order to progress’ (RCS, 2016: 3).   
What is a competence? 
The curriculum also defines what it expects the trainee to demonstrate at each stage 
of training to confirm that the appropriate learning content has been assimilated and 
digested: these are ‘competences’.  Competences are defined as: 
An observable ability of a health professional, integrating multiple components 
such as knowledge, skills, values, and attitudes. Since competencies are 
observable, they can be measured and assessed to ensure their acquisition.  
(Frank et al, 2010). 
Examples of competences in surgery include: knows the basic concepts of 
haemostasis (arresting bleeding), can diagnose and assess acute abdominal pain, is 
competent to undertake a hernia repair of the groin and manage any complications.  
There are different levels of knowledge and skill within each competence.  The 
objective is therefore to gradually increase one’s competence level.  To use the 
example of haemostasis, a candidate will advance from knowing the basic concepts of 
haemostasis to a fluent application of this knowledge by demonstrating the ability to 
arrest bleeding in an actual clinical event.   
Attainment of a competence affirms that the student has met the necessary standard 
of practice, demonstrated the expected ‘outcome’.  In addition, acquisition of 
																																																						
surgery that all trainees must be taught irrespective of which surgical specialty they finally choose to 
train in. 
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competences at each stage of training determines whether a trainee may progress to 
the next stage of training in that specialty.   
Regulation of progression through training. . . [is] by the achievement of 
outcomes that are specified within the specialty curricula. These outcomes are 
competence-based rather than time-based.” (RCS, 2016: 4).  
 
Progression in training 
The content of the syllabus is organised according to ‘stages’ and ‘standards’ (ibid., 
8).  A stage in the curriculum refers to a specific point in the training pathway of the 
surgeon, for example CT1 or CT2 (core stages of training year 1 or 2 where trainees 
are in the initial stages of their training having graduated from medical school at least 
three to five years earlier).  What trainees are expected to know and do expands in 
terms of depth and complexity as they advance through stages of training.  For 
example, a core trainee (early years of surgery) is expected to know the symptoms 
and management of acute appendicitis.  Whereas senior trainees (ST4 onwards) will 
be expected to build on this initial knowledge by demonstrating an ability to perform 
an appendicectomy (removal of the appendix) and manage any complications of the 
surgery that may arise etc.   
Specialist training25 begins at ST3 and completes at ST8 (see Chapter 2).  The GMC 
sets the level or ‘standard’ it requires all trainees to achieve in their professional 
practice.  The ISC then applies these standards to the content of the syllabus, dividing 
it into three components; theoretical knowledge, clinical and procedural skills and 
																																																						
25 Specialist training refers to entry into a surgical discipline such as Vascular surgery or 
Orthopaedics with the ultimate goal of gaining qualification as a specialist in that area of surgery.  	
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professional skills (ibid., 11-12).  The theoretical knowledge required for a surgical 
topic is categorised using the following numerical scale: 
 1. knows of  
 2. knows basic concepts  
 3. knows generally  
 4. knows specifically and broadly 
A similar numerical scheme is used for assessing the competence level of procedural 
and technical skill: 
 1. has observed  
 2. can do with assistance 
 3. can do whole but may need assistance  
 4. competent to do without assistance, including complications 
A syllabus entitled ‘professional behaviour and leadership skills’ follows on from the 
above to itemise the appropriate behaviours and attitudes expected of trainees. 
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Figure 12: Excerpt taken from ISC (2016: 11-12) demonstrating the competence 
levels in skills and theoretical knowledge  
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b)  How is the trainee pedagogised by the curriculum? 
Power-Knowledge 
How does the novice surgeon become a subject within the training practices 
prescribed by the curriculum?  I explore this question by applying Foucault’s theory of 
power knowledge.  Put simply, I examine how the syllabus identifies, positions and 
regulates the learner.  These positionings of the trainee (as a doctor, a learner, a 
carer and so on) involve relations of power which mould particular kinds of individuals.   
Power is manifested as relationships in a social network . . . Power, through 
knowledge, brings forth active “subjects” who better “understand” their own 
subjectivity yet who in this very process subject themselves to forms of power 
(Usher and Edwards, 1994: 89) 
The above statement refers to how certain forms of knowledge are imbued with 
power, so that they can create specific pedagogic identities.  For illustration, I describe 
how the curricular discourse of operative surgery generates a particular identification 
of the learner surgeon.  I have also drawn on Atkinson’s writings on assessments of 
students’ art practice to develop my analysis of trainee operative practice (2002, 
chapter 5).   
Operative training practices 
Figure 13 is an excerpt from the syllabus (ISC, 2013: 83).  It indicates what levels of 
competence in knowledge, clinical skill (diagnosis, judgement) and technical skill 
(operative technique) are required at each stage of training (ST4, ST6 and ST8) in the 
diagnosis and management of a groin (inguinal)hernia.  I have highlighted in blue the 
areas relevant to my analysis. 
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Figure 13: Sample taken from ISC (2016) regarding knowledge and skills required in 
higher level surgical training on the topic of ‘elective hernia’ (p. 83). 
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‘Knowledge’ is conceived within a biological sciences paradigm: the anatomy of the 
groin area, the pathophysiology of hernia disease, the technical theory underpinning 
the different methods of repairing a hernia.   
In terms of operative technical skill, an ST4 trainee must demonstrate level 3 
proficiency; perform the entire hernia surgery with help from a trainer, in the form of 
verbal advice or assistance.  Figure 13 defines what ‘requiring assistance’ means: a 
fluency with the procedural theory and rationale but still requiring advice or technical 
help from a trainer to complete the operation.   
An ST8 trainee should be able to perform the procedure at a level 4 proficiency; 
perform the procedure without trainer guidance or input (similar to a consultant 
surgeon) and be capable of recognising and managing difficulties encountered during 
the surgery.   
Thus, the terms used to assess the groin hernia operation create a particular 
paradigm of operative training practice.  It anticipates a distinct trainee-skill relation 
based on two prior notions of competence.  First, an assimilation of procedural theory, 
which is demonstrable through a familiarity of the steps of the operation as well as 
knowledge of the potential complications.  Second, the gradual withdrawal of 
assistance or intervention from a trainer.   
This specific representation of operative competence positions the surgical trainee as 
a particular kind of surgeon.  That is, a competent and safe technical surgeon is 
configured along an approved chronology, in which there is a graduated acquisition of 
procedural skill which culminates in complete independence from the trainer.  This 
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recognized training process is the discursive practice within which a trainee’s 
operative practice is made visible to both the trainer and trainee.   
Within this representation of surgical practice, Foucauldian theories of power-
knowledge function so that learners and teachers of surgery are subjectivised as 
pedagogised individuals.  In other words, within the training relationship established 
by this representation of operative surgery, trainers and trainees subject themselves, 
albeit unknowingly, to power relations that appear ‘normal’ or inevitable.  An example 
is the perception of trainees as ‘without skill’ until an engagement with a trainer 
‘cultivates’ actual surgical abilities.   
However, this paradigm of operative practice is problematic.  Particularly, because it 
assesses, positions and regulates a training operation (such as a hernia repair) within 
a specific discursive representation of surgery.  This singular approach, obfuscates 
the potential to view the trainee also through other signifying practices.  An example is 
a trainee’s acquisition of technical proficiency prior to demonstrating a fluent 
understanding of the theory behind the procedure.  Another example is a trainee who 
might conceive a procedure in ways that are not stated or approved by the 
transcendent frameworks of the curriculum.  That is, devising a procedural method 
that is not prescribed by the curriculum, even though it is effective and successful in 
practice.  
Second, the criteria for identifying competent operative practice does not evaluate the 
inherent technical ability in the learner or in the operation itself, though it may appear 
that this is actually what is being assessed according to the curriculum.  The signifier 
of ability, which is assimilation of knowledge and independence from assistance, 
constructs the trainee and trainer as pedagogised subjects.  A learner’s ability to 
operate is not viewed as an intrinsic capacity that can be discovered or developed, 
even though it appears that this is the objective of surgical training.  Instead, a 
trainee’s inherent operative abilities are constituted exclusively in specific training 
practices and their corresponding discourses.  These bring into existence particular 
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regimes of power-knowledge and forms of governance.  It is through these forms of 
power-knowledge and governance that the subjectivities of a surgical trainee and 
trainer, such as trainer assistance and trainee ability are constituted.   
Members of the surgical community, may be disposed to criticise these conclusions.  
Is the ultimate goal of training not the creation of safe and independent operative 
practice?  We all agree that this necessitates a sound knowledge of procedural theory 
coupled with appropriate supervision from a trainer.  Surely, curricular practices must 
reflect this imperative?  There can be no dispute that complicated procedures require 
adequate trainer guidance to ensure the safety of the patient whilst teaching the 
learner appropriate technical methods and so on.   
However, what I advocate is an increased awareness of how curricular strategies can 
mould training practices to reflect exclusively, established components of skill which 
are considered critical to forming competence.  These core skills, specified by the 
curriculum, include evidently incising and closing superficial tissues accurately, tying 
secure surgical knots and safe use of diathermy (electrocautery) (ISC, 2016: 51).  
While proficiency in these techniques is crucial, the difficulty arises when a learner’s 
identity as a competent surgeon is absolutely constituted and confined in terms of 
their ability to develop skills in these core elements.  These ‘core’ criteria establish a 
normalizing discourse that separates, categorises and regulates individual aptitude.  
The unintended result may be that trainees become their abilities and that trainers 
become their surgical practice.    
Not surprisingly, therefore, we find it reasonable and logical to expect the prescribed 
practice—that a trainee emerges through a graded acquisition, with independent skills 
to carry out a hernia operation.  Indeed, the subjectivities of both trainee and trainer 
emerge from submitting (unknowingly) to the forms of power and governance inherent 
in this conception of operative practice and which also appear as obvious and natural 
processes.   
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The difficulty arises when this specific discursive practice identifies surgical skill in 
ways that inhibit or neglect to acknowledge other representations or signifiers of 
technical skill.  These alternative representations may constitute how operative 
practice matters to trainees and therefore, how such forms of mattering may constitute 
personal forms of governance that affect how they learn.  I expand on this topic in the 
below sections.   
6.5  Operative Training: Conceptualising Technical Training 
The point I wish to make is that you can’t learn surgery by yourself.  So, different 
people have different abilities to learn by watching, some people can repeat 
something after watching it once.  I needed to first do things myself and figure it out in 
my head . . . because in my head I’m thinking there are many different ways that this 
could be done. . . So, why would other ways not work and why must I do it this way 
only?  Others don’t think about the alternative ways of doing things.   
Most of our trainers are used to trainees who will carry out things in one approved 
way.  But, it can be a big advantage when doing difficult types of problems, because 
then your mind is attuned to looking at things from different angles and not necessarily 
using the one shot solution. 
(Joseph, Consultant Surgeon, London) 
When I meet for the interview with Joseph, he has been in his first consultant job, for a 
few months.  He works in a London teaching hospital at a tertiary specialist centre.  
“What I am really in this job for is that I really like teaching. . . For me that is the THE 
priority!” Joseph specifically sought opportunities to be involved in the education of 
trainees and other surgeons. 
a) Transcendent frameworks of surgery 
Joseph describes how trainers tend to be confronted by trainees who can only 
operate in a singular way that replicates one particular format.  The apprenticeship 
model of teaching operative skills (as discussed in Chapter 2) was based on the 
premise that a student would learn from an expert surgeon by: watching their 
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operations, being instructed in that surgeon’s particular way of ‘doing surgery’ and 
demonstrating successful attainment of skill by emulating the surgeon’s procedural 
technique and approach to surgical practice.  This model of surgical learning was 
premised on the ‘time spent in training’.   
The move to competency based surgical training, shifted the emphasis away from 
time spent ‘apprenticed’ to a master surgeon towards demonstration of predefined 
competences in a procedure (which need not be time dependent).  But is it the case 
that ‘one master’ has been replaced by another?  In other words, where previously a 
trainee would be expected to operate in the style of one trainer (therefore operating in 
one particular way), now the requirement is to operate in a manner that is consistent 
with a single pre-defined method identified by modern day assessments.   
Operative training relies on a transcendent framework of teaching, whereby trainees 
are introduced, some would say indoctrinated, into an established and historical 
tradition of technical skills.  This involves following an approved format: steps of the 
procedure, shape of the incision, technique to dissect and handle tissues.  The 
operative method is an ancient discipline and some techniques, for example 
trephining (making a hole in the skull, also known as a ‘burr hole’ in surgical parlance) 
have their origins in the neolithic period (Porter, 1997).  Another example is the 
technique of vascular anastomosis (joining two blood vessels together) developed by 
Dr. Alexis Carrel (1873-1944) for which he was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1912.  
It should not surprise therefore, that techniques which are constantly in use, have 
proved to be efficient and effective and thus ‘stood the test of time’, are 
unquestioningly taught and propagated in surgical practice.  When faced with a novice 
surgeon, teaching specific techniques such as knot tying, instrument handling, 
suturing, help the trainee develop a set of actual physical skills that enable the 
practical act of performing surgery.  I clarified with Joseph whether he felt these 
techniques should be passed on.  He vehemently concurred that these techniques 
form the building blocks of a surgical trainees’ operative skill set.  However, teaching 
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traditional techniques should not limit an individual trainee’s process of discovery in 
the operative field.  If didactic pedagogic instruction dominates the teaching of 
operative skills, it can lead to the trainer fetishising the trainee.  This incurs a belief 
that technical skills can only be acquired through unquestioned specific guidance.  
Nowadays, a trainee may rotate through a number of surgical jobs in which different 
expert surgeons are responsible for their operative training.  While the basic principles 
of surgical technique are the same (how to stop bleeding, how to sew vessels) 
individual trainers have their own interpretation of technique and will apply it in their 
own unique way to a procedure.  A personal example is how in a single transplant 
centre, I was taught to perform a vascular anastomosis (joining up of two blood 
vessels) differently by each of the four surgeons in the department.  The basic 
principles of the technique were reiterated by the individual surgeon.  Yet, each had 
their own interpretation of the nuances of the procedure, their own belief systems 
about why they did something in a particular style and their emphasis on chosen 
components of the procedure to corroborate their thinking on the matter.  
The benefit of a multi-surgeon teaching approach, is that a trainee has the opportunity 
to learn different elements or ‘tricks of the trade’ from each trainer.  In turn this will 
permit trainees to develop ‘a toolbox’ of operative techniques, based on what they 
have chosen to retain or discard from their training.  This way, novice surgeons build a 
set of techniques and skills that form the foundation of their own practice.  However, 
while the scope to pick and choose different techniques is a definite advantage for a 
developing trainee, the reality in practice is different.   
Without concrete opportunities to attempt variations of a procedure, which may differ 
from transcendent ways of operating, in a safe and supervised environment that 
ensures patient safety, how do trainees discover what techniques ‘work’ best for 
them?  These opportunities are also associated with initial attempts to develop 
independent beliefs about how an operation should be approached or handled.  I 
suggest that it is through these opportunities to explore, that surgical trainees discover 
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practice.  This process of supervised discovery has significance for cultivating 
thoughtful and creative surgeons who can innovate in unfamiliar situations (not 
prescribed in the official manuals of surgery).  Joseph cites the example of problem 
solving ‘in the field’, when confronted by unfamiliar operative cases which cannot be 
resolved through an application of known or approved methods.  In addition, it could 
be argued that opportunities to discover practice may lead to the development of 
enhanced abilities to manage the complexity and pressures of consultant practice.   
Joseph’s narrative raises three primary pedagogical objectives: first, how can trainees 
be encouraged to expand their understanding of operative practice?  Put another way, 
how can trainees be given some degree of freedom to explore Surgery in terms of 
what can still be created rather than what already exists?  This would lead to a 
contemplation of what Surgery can become, rather than a narrow focus on individual 
operations.  Second, what modes of thinking and being are important in cultivating an 
ability to cope with the immanence of surgical practice?  That is, what attitudes and 
behaviours emerge from the thisness of practice, which are critical to managing the 
uncertainty of practice.  Third, how can imagination and invention be fostered while 
maintaining the demands for patient safety and meeting the criteria for competence?  
I have drawn on Simondon’s writings on transduction, invention and the notion of a 
technician to explore the concepts around transcendent frameworks in training and 
norms in surgical education. 
b) Individuation of norms: expanding what operative training can be 
A broadening of surgical operative training from a sole transcendent governance of 
practice to one that also reflects the immanence of learning encounters, can be 
considered in light of Deleuze’s (1994) actual-virtual dyad.  This approach 
emphasises ‘becoming’ in terms of what can still be created rather than what is 
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already in existence and known.  In section 6.12, I use this theory to unpack narrative 
accounts of actual training practice.  
In operative training I advocate an approach that is open to the modes of thinking and 
doing that emerge from the immanence of surgical practice. In uncertain and 
unanticipated events of surgery, it is necessary to consider carefully the immanent 
nature of clinical relations of practice.  However, this approach must still prioritise the 
safety and welfare of the patient.   
In exploring Joseph’s thoughts and comments, I draw on Simondon’s (2005a) theory 
of individuation.  My objective in doing so, is twofold.  First, to examine how a 
reconfiguration of operative practice along notions of ‘becoming’ may lead to an 
enhanced understanding of what is possible in technical training.  Second, to trigger 
actualisations of virtual potentials that result in ‘invention’, as described by Simondon.  
This notion of invention does not conform to a hylomorphic scheme where an idea 
occurs and results in an effort to construct something in order to replicate this idea.  
Instead, he suggests that invention is, ‘the discovery of a system of compatibility that 
constitutes a higher level on which previously incompatible and disparate elements 
can be integrated’ (Chabot, 2012: 19).   
What Simondon emphasises is a concept of invention that goes beyond the need to 
simply create an alternative solution or a ‘cure’ to the problem.  At the heart of his 
notion of invention, is the act of establishing coherence, (Chabot, 2012: 20).  That is, 
integrating incompatible elements to give rise to ideas or a ‘regime of functioning’ 
(Massumi et al, 2010: 39) that formulates an answer to the initial problem.  
Invention is the actualisation of a potential (Mills, 2016: 134) and is rooted in the 
notion of metastability: a condition charged with potential such that it can ‘produce a 
sudden alteration leading to a new equally metastable structure’ (Mills, 2016: 36). 
The individual, then is always in relation to its milieu, which co-individuates 
along with it.  As such the individual can never be considered as complete but 
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always partial and in the process of individuation, the milieu always acting as 
a mediation between individual and world.  (Mills, 2015: 40). 
The individual, according to Simondon, is conceived of in terms of the relations that 
continually form and develop between what they are at a given moment and what can 
still be actualised in the present.  This state of potentials, a metastable system can be 
disrupted by a singularity, an unanticipated element.   
Joseph in his description of watching an operation as a trainee, discusses how he 
believes that there are numerous ways to proceed in a surgery at a given moment: 
. . . some people can repeat something after watching it once.  I needed to 
first do things myself and figure it out in my head . . . because in my head I’m 
thinking there are many different ways that this could be done. . . So, why 
would other ways not work and why must I do it this way only?   
Although Joseph is aware of the potentialities that emerge from the encounter, by 
simply observing someone else doing the procedure, he personally requires a broader 
application of ‘doing by seeing’.  What he asserts, is the importance of opportunities to 
discover why what he has been shown is the best way forward in a procedure.  I 
suggest that what he is describing, is his personal process of discovery: how a 
particular technique or procedure comes to matter to him.  How a way of operating 
attains significance for him.  It is not simply that he cannot learn from observing or 
being instructed by a more experienced surgeon.  I understand his description and 
thoughts as the necessary tension that must exist on the one hand between 
transcendent forms of learning, and on the other hand, the immanence of learning that 
arises from an application of transcendent practices.   
Another way to examine this concern is to draw on Simondon’s theory of a 
preindividual metastable state, which represents a pool of ‘becoming’.  At any point in 
a procedure there is the potential for the surgery to unfold or ‘become’ in different 
ways (‘the pool of becoming’).  The singularity that triggers an actualization of this 
metastable state (referred to by Simondon as ‘dephasing’) is the trainee being 
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confronted by a technical problem in the procedure.  This may be an episode of 
unanticipated bleeding or an anatomical anomaly.       
In being immersed in the actual operative encounter of the surgery, he has the 
opportunity to actualize the potentials that emerge from the virtual dimension of 
practice.  Through this adventure, he is able to derive meaning from the encounter.  
His practice comes to matter to him through a personal engagement and he learns 
from the event.  It may be that what he learns, is an appreciation of why a procedure 
is conducted in a particular way.  Equally, it is possible that he may discover a new 
way to resolve the technical difficulty, thus actualising a new potentiality.   
What I am advocating through an analysis and application of Simondon’s theory is 
that individuation provides the conditions of possibility for what operative knowledge 
can be, in addition to what already exists.  Indeed, training programmes over many 
years were built on systems of potentials that contributed to the emergence of 
authorised practices and transcendent norms, establishing what is known, how it is 
recognised and when it was approved.  However, these systems of potentials in 
forming authorised norms, structured themselves and these structures in turn also 
represent potentialities for further development in response to singularities that come 
from the environment.   
As such transcendent norms are ‘in essence’ metastable structures, which can be 
disrupted and disturbed by unanticipated or unfamiliar events in the operating theatre, 
to produce potentialities that act to create and expand how we think and practice in 
both surgery and surgical education.  
6.6  Procedure-Based Assessment (PBA) 
PBAs are an example of a workplace-based assessment (WBA), used to evaluate the 
development of operative skill.  The WBAs were designed to investigate the 
knowledge, clinical skills, behaviour and attitudes associated with one specific 
procedure.  WBAs are formative assessments, which are designed to provide 
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feedback on performance, aimed at helping trainees improve their familiarity with the 
procedure, proficiency and technique so that they become expert and safe 
practitioners (Van der Vleuten, 1996; Norcini, 2003, 2007; Norcini et al, 2003, 2007; 
PMETB, 2005; GMC, 2010).   
Figure 14a:  Procedure Based Assessment Form (page 1) (ISC, 2016) 
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Figure 14b:  Procedure Based Assessment form (2) (ISC, 2016) 
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Figure 15:  PBA Trainer Guidance Sheet (ISC, 2016) 
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However, in recent years, WBAs (PBAs) have come to represent ‘examinations’ of 
performance and as such the formative feedback element has been misplaced 
(Norcini, 2007; Phillips and Jones, 2015).  PBAs involve the trainer (assessor) 
conducting an observed assessment of the trainee.  The trainee is assessed carrying 
out a common (‘index’) procedure in that speciality.  For example, a hernia repair by 
an ST4 candidate in general surgery.  Figures. 14a and 14b illustrates the written 
format of the assessment and Fig. 15 is the trainer guidance sheet (ISC, 2016).  
There are two principal components to the assessment.  Each procedure is divided 
into five ‘domains’ (consent, pre-operative planning, exposure and closure) that list 
criteria or ‘competencies’ to be met in order to demonstrate successful completion of 
the stage: achievement of ‘competent practice’.  At the end of the procedure, the 
trainer must give an overall assessment of performance using a global assessment 
that features 8 specific ratings.  The highest rating coincides with consultant level 
practice26.  
The assessment format is didactic (see Figs. 14 and 15) itemising what must be 
observed at each step of the procedure (‘positive behaviours’).  In addition, the trainer 
guidance specifies the parameters in which the ‘positive behaviours’ must be 
observed, such as through speaking or drawing: 
TRAINEE COMPETENCIES    POSITIVE BEHAVIOURS 
Communicates clearly with scrub team  Sets positive tone with 
appropriate greeting 
Demonstrates careful skin preparation   Supervises painting of the 
operative field 
Controls bleeding promptly by an appropriate  Responds calmly by applying 
method of pressure 
Follows an agreed, logical sequence for procedure Justifies actions at any point in 
procedure 
																																																						
26 https://www.iscp.ac.uk/curriculum/surgical/assessment_pba.aspx 
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Achieves an adequate exposure through purposeful Gives a running commentary of  
dissection/identifies all structures correctly  the structures encountered 
Demonstrates knowledge of optimum skin incision Verbally states or marks with a 
pen        anatomical landmarks 
 
The terms that form the assessment of the surgical procedure, assert a particular 
paradigm of operative practice.   In this paradigm, competence is conceived and 
framed through physical expressions of practice that are visual: the ability to 
demonstrate, supervise, vocalise, verbalise, mark out one’s thoughts and actions at 
any given moment.  It is through this discursive practice, which constitutes a ‘physical’ 
representation of operative surgery, that the surgeon becomes visible to both trainer 
and trainee.  The assessment of the procedure is not about inherent ability: it is not an 
assessment of operative ability or clinical judgement in the trainee or in the surgical 
procedure (though it appears this way).  The assessment discourse constructs, 
regulates and confirms a particular kind of surgical trainee within a specific pedagogic 
gaze.   
The danger is that the dominant signifier of ability in the PBA is linguistic skill, this is 
how a trainee demonstrates that the required knowledge and skills have been 
assimilated and understood.  The trainee’s inherent capacity to operate and perform a 
specific procedure is not considered a capacity that can be liberated or discovered.  
Instead, trainee ability is constituted in particular sites of practice.  Critics may argue 
that how else are we to gather information on whether a trainee has the required 
knowledge to perform the procedure if not by asking for an explanation?  I would 
agree that this is a reasonable approach to take and the easiest with which to find out 
if trainees understand their practice.  But, my concern is two-fold: first, that this 
assessment method is the only way advocated for finding out whether a trainee 
understands something (i.e. through a verbal explanation).   
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Second, in reality, surgeons perform surgeries for a variety of reasons: like all human 
beings, they too respond to multiple motivations.  Eleanor comments: 
I’m quite good at saying ‘well, I don’t understand that, what’s your rationale, what’s 
your surgical strategy?’ Because at the beginning you think they just know everything 
and I don’t understand.  But because I’ve done the exam I know that they don’t always 
(have a rational explanation based on theoretical knowledge).  They do things a 
certain way because it’s what they’re familiar with or because he lives at home with 
his mum or some other social thing. . . 
The corresponding discourses constitute and regulate aspects of subjectivity through 
regimes of power-knowledge.  The power implicit in this specific discursive practice in 
surgical training exerts inclusionary and exclusionary forces.  The global rating at the 
end of the assessment, subjects the trainee to the gaze of certain knowledge and 
practice discourses, according to which their practices are measured and categorised.     
In this evaluation, the signifier of ability is ‘guidance’.  Guidance is viewed in a few 
different ways in the assessment, from the giving of advice, to guiding the trainee from 
a position as an assistant to the main surgeon in the procedure and guidance as 
intervention when necessary or not.  The provision and withholding of assistance by 
the senior person reflects the relations of power-knowledge that exist in the trainer-
trainee relationship.  Guidance appears to be required when a trainee is ‘lacking’ in 
knowledge or skill, for example, Level 1a global score is ‘able to assist with guidance’ 
explicated as ‘not familiar with all steps of the procedure’.  Guidance is equated with 
‘help’ or ‘not familiar’.  
Interestingly guidance also appears to be implicated in the following assessment of a 
trainee, labelled as 3b (see Fig 14): ‘procedure performed competently without 
guidance or intervention but lacked confidence’.  It may appear that demonstrating 
competence is automatically equated to being confident in performing the procedure.  
However, the assessment adds a further tier to how competence is now understood.  
It emphasises that demonstrating competence does not mean that the trainee has 
‘confidence’.  By making this link what is the motivation behind the statement?  It’s not 
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clear whether this requires a trainer to make an assumption about the trainee’s state 
of mind or not.  Lydia makes the following comment: 
People say trainees develop at different times.  I think that’s only true partially 
because some people are just cocky and think they can do operations that they’re 
really not fully trained to do.  I remember this guy called Raj Pataki and they said to 
me, “how many hernias could you do?”  And I said, “well, I could do one on my own, 
but I’m training and I therefore want somebody there who’ll be able to tell me what I’m 
doing right and wrong.”  So they said, “ok, well, Raj could do it with you.”  I said, “well 
Raj has done 20 (hernia operations) and I’ve done 50!  Raj is a cocky t*** and I’m a 
conscientious surgeon.  That’s the difference between us.”  So I found it really 
frustrating that they were like, “well, if you’re a bit nervous take Raj with you.”  No!  I’m 
not nervous, what I want is to improve every time I do this operation.  It is a balance 
because at some point you just have to do it. 
Lydia highlights the difficulties that capable yet conscientious trainees may face.  
Their reluctance to be used by the hospital as service providers (in this case she was 
being asked to do an operating list on her own to reduce waiting lists) can be 
perceived as a lack of confidence.  As a senior trainee with sufficient experience, 
surely she should be comfortable and safe to operate independently?  But, in reality, 
Lydia views herself as a trainee who should be guided and supervised.  This is also a 
very desirable trait: a conscientious surgeon who prioritises the patient’s welfare.  The 
confidence of some of her colleagues, as she states so vividly in the above excerpt, is 
not a demonstration of safe or competent practice but a reflection of their attitude and 
state of mind.  This comment emphasises the complexities involved in how ‘skill’ can 
be recognised. 
This example of a WBA demonstrates how notions of ‘competence’ are constructed 
around particular discourses of what is visible and measurable in practice.   
‘Competence’ can be described using Jacques Lacan’s theory as a point de capiton: 
The point de capiton is the point through which the subject is sewn to the 
signifier, and at the same time the point which interpellates individual into 
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subject by addressing it with the call of a master signifier (…) - in a word, it is 
the point of the subjectivation of the signifier’s chain ( Zizek, 1989: 101). 
A point de capiton is an upholstery button which once pinned down on a surface, 
causes folds of material to radiate from its centre.  In the assessment discourses, 
competence forms such a pin, from which conclusions about a trainee radiate like the 
little lines of on cloth, made by the button.  It is the point of convergence that enables 
everything that happens in this discourse to be situated retroactively and 
retrospectively (Lacan, 1993: 268).   
Zizek expands on the idea by discussing through a quilting metaphor, how subjectivity 
and identity are constituted by interpellating (Althusser, 1971)) individuals into 
particular positions through specific discourses.  The meaning conveyed in these 
discourses is structured through a series of points de capitons.  Another example is 
the use of patient safety as a point de caption around which discourses on standards 
in practice, professionalism, regulation of trainees etc. are configured.         
Conclusion to this section 
What is the purpose of instituting these assessments of practice which replace the 
former subjective evaluations of performance made by senior surgeons?  Is it, as 
suggested by Lydia earlier in the chapter, to remove perceived biases and prejudices 
to foster a more equitable system?  Whose interests are served in an ‘a-subjective’ 
conception of assessment?  I have not described the latter system as ‘objective’ 
because my purpose is to emphasise the absence of a surgeon’s voice in this 
structure of assessment.   
These post MMC assessments, although described as ‘objective measures of 
performance’ (ISC, 2016; xx) remain subjective tools, because they are constructed 
by what the official stakeholders in medical education collectively identify and believe 
represent ‘competence’.  The narrative excerpts exemplify the conflicting discourses 
of competence in training.  One that originates from being immersed in a community 
of practice.  The second and contrasting discourse arises from being evaluated by a 
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‘dispassionate’ and impersonal system of assessment.  What distinguishes one 
discourse from the other is primarily the location of power in the assessment 
relationships.  In the next section, I explore how forms of power manifest in training. 
6.7  How Do Surgeons Conceive The Practices Of Training? 
. . .training is very much like apprenticeship isn’t it.  You’re not really trained, you just 
follow people round and you take on as much as you do or don’t.  It’s hard to quantify, 
it’s hard to dispute whether it’s a good way to train.  My absolute favourite example of 
this is when I began Vascular surgery as a registrar (senior trainee) and I worked with 
Mark, who was my SHO (junior trainee).  Mark had been an ST 8 in cardiology (final 
year trainee prior to becoming a consultant) before joining my team.  He got to the 
end of his cardiology training, he’d had kids and he thought, “you know what?  I can’t 
do this (cardiology) for my whole life.”  He retrained as a GP and in his GP training 
rotation he had come to vascular surgery to do a six-months placement.   
His next training job as a GP was to be an SHO (junior trainee) in cardiology, based 
on the same ward that he had worked on as an ST8 in cardiology.  So he phoned up 
the deanery and said, “look guys, I was the ST8 on that ward and I’ve also just 
finished being the consultant for cardiology on that ward, so in terms of training, this 
placement is not going to be of any further benefit to me the six months I’m based 
there.  And they said, “that’s not true, because you’ll learn completely different things 
being a junior on those wards.”  I mean, the mind boggles! And that’s because its 
some administrator who is just ridiculous.  But he (Mark) thought, you know what, just 
sod it!  He was just waiting out his three years training to be a GP and thought, “I’ll do 
it, it’ll be piss easy for six months!”  He had tried to change it to something more 
useful, but they had refused . . .     
(Lydia, ST7 trainee) 
Lydia illustrates her belief and experience of surgical training as a passive process for 
two reasons.  First, training relies on how much a trainee can absorb or learn during 
an attachment.  Second, the trainee himself is a passive subject in the power 
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structures of training, without the authority or ‘voice’ to raise objections or 
suggestions.  
a)  The transcendence of training 
In this example of relations in training, Lydia’s narrative of the trainee’s (Mark) 
thoughts and actions and the training body’s response (the deanery), contributes to 
how she constructs herself (and Mark) as a particular kind of trainee and the deanery 
as a particular authority of training (trainer).  Two questions arise from this story.  
First, Mark is told that there are valuable lessons to acquire as a junior doctor in a 
specialty that he is already an expert in.  What can be ascertained from these 
comments, about the ways in which a trainee is conceptualised by the all powerful 
training body?  Second, in accepting the junior role in Cardiology, what does Mark’s 
actions infer about the nature of pedagogic relations in this encounter?   
Lydia describes the deanery as populated by ‘administrators’.  In other words, non-
medical folk who are unfamiliar and unappreciative of the realities of medical training, 
concerned only with the practicalities of organising a training programme.  I would 
suggest here, that Lydia views the official training body as a ‘transcendent 
organisation’.  In this interpretation of Lydia’s comments, trainees are categorised 
according to approved norms that are predefined.  As such, this framework of training 
may disregard or diminish the value of qualifications or experiences that are not 
recognised by the prior established norms.  Hence, a conception of the trainee as 
‘uneducated’ or ‘unknowing’.   
Perhaps most importantly, we much recognise that ethics requires us to risk 
ourselves precisely at moments of unknowingness, when what forms us 
diverges from what lies before us, when our willingness to become undone in 
relation to others constitutes our chance of becoming human.  To be undone 
by another is a primary necessity, an anguish, to be sure, but also a chance - 
to be addressed, claimed, bound to what is not me, but also to be moved, to 
be prompted to act, to address myself elsewhere, and so to vacate the self-
sufficient “I” as a kind of possession.  If we speak and try to give an account 
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from this place, we will not be irresponsible, or, if we are, we will surely be 
forgiven (Butler, 2005: 136). 
Butler advocates an approach that embraces the ‘willingness to become undone in 
relation to others’.  In pedagogical situations, a trainer may be confronted by events or 
information that do not correspond to the accepted practices and ways of knowing that 
she is familiar with.  But, it is exactly in these instances of ‘unknowing’, that extending 
oneself by thinking beyond the ‘self-sufficient I’ may, in pedagogical terms, lead to a 
deeper and more profound understanding.  The ‘risk’ that Butler urges us to take is 
the encounter with the unknown.  This in turn stimulates a line of questioning, that 
interrogates what constitutes us, how we are constructed as learners or teachers and 
what structures are in place to assure this particular format.   
Such an approach may reconfigure the self-other relation in ways that allow a trainer 
to view the trainee as not deficient or lacking.  In other words, to ‘see’ the trainee as 
knowledgeable in ways that are unappreciated or unacknowledged by the dominant 
mode of training and practice.  Norms in training are necessary to establish stability 
and organised structure so that trainees and trainers alike have a sense of what must 
be taught and how this is best accomplished.  They are also essential for setting a 
good standard of practice which ensures the safety and welfare of patients.  However, 
the difficulty arises in what they might obscure such as ways of learning that may be 
legitimate but lie outside the confines of the norm.    
b)  The power of the norm: performative resignification 
We are used to thinking of power as what presses on the subject from outside, 
as what subordinates, sets underneath, and relegates to a lower order.  This 
is surely a fair description of part of what power does.  But if, following 
Foucault, we understand power as forming the subject as well, as providing 
the very condition of its existence and the trajectory of desire, then power is 
not simply what we oppose but also, in a strong sense, what we depend on for 
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our existence and what we harbour and preserve in the beings that we are 
(Butler, 1997: 1-2) 
Foucault asserts that power in addition to being an external force is also implicated in 
how a subject is formed.  Butler extends his ideas to theorise that in relations of 
power, the ‘doer’ and the ‘act’ are fused as one and the same thing.  In other words, 
we conform to particular ways of acting in order to receive recognition.  However, 
these normalising processes do not prevent other ways of acting emerging at times.  
In this instance, Mark the trainee has been compliant with his training scheme in his 
efforts to become a qualified GP.  However, his next rotation through cardiology 
caused him to question the wisdom of that placement.  This is Butler’s notion of 
performative resignification.  An interrogation of the norms that inform action, may 
allow the limits of the norm to be exceeded.  This would allow action to be conceived 
in other more expansive terms.  However, in the context of training, as is seen in this 
narrative, it can be particularly challenging and difficult to overcome the power of the 
norm.   
In contacting the deanery and interrogating the proposed plan to allocate him to a 
specialty that he was already well versed in, he challenged at least two norms 
established by the training body.  The first norm is that the deanery (and not the 
trainee) is in possession of the necessary expertise and knowledge to identify the best 
education and training plans for doctors in training.   
The second is that, Mark as a trainee, has ‘stepped outside’ the established 
boundaries (norms) that predefine and pre-assess the ways in which a trainee is 
expected to think and act.  In this case, he is expected to go through the pre-arranged 
placements as organised by the deanery.  His actions have challenged the authority 
of the deanery and disrupted the hierarchy of power relations between trainee and 
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training body.  His attempts at resignification did not emerge ‘out of the blue’, but from 
an event of practice that in some way forced him to question the normative structures.  
This is a recurrent and dominant theme in the thesis: how events of practice compel 
surgeons to question or ‘re-think’ the norms that have structured their practice to date.  
These normative frameworks may emerge from the ways in which clinical 
environments are organised and structured.  That is, the mechanisms that constitute 
how a service is delivered, such as restricting waiting times in an outpatient clinic.  
The norms of practice may also arise through attitudes and behaviours that develop 
as the physician attempts to negotiate the different tensions in her routine practice.  
All these competing factors can affect how a surgeon responds to unanticipated 
encounters with patients.  The next section explores these ideas of practice.  
6.8  Eleanor’s Story 
Eleanor is a final year surgical trainee based in London.  She describes her training as 
a ‘disappointing’ experience.  She had competed for a highly desired run-through 
training position (a ratio of 12 candidates per training place).  She had expected that 
the training position, would guarantee her a defined period of formal training with 
skilled mentors.  Instead, Eleanor feels that the surgical training programme has failed 
to ensure that trainees have opportunities to acquire the necessary technical and 
practical skills.  The reasons she cites include; an insufficient volume of operative 
cases and a lack of keen and able surgical trainers who prioritise teaching in the 
operating theatre.  In addition, Eleanor spoke about how the culture of the NHS and 
the pressures on it, diminish the objectives of surgical training: 
The anaesthetists are slow and discouraged and the theatre staff have low 
morale and low motivation and the theatre is hideously inefficient and the 
whole system is against you.  Then there is the pressure of targets to get the 
operation done.  So, if there’s space for you to be taken through an operation, 
it’s just wiped out routinely. . .It’s becoming evident that trainees are doing 
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absolutely nothing, they are just assisting.  Six years of assisting does not 
make you a surgeon 
Regrettably, the above statement exemplifies an opinion voiced by all the 
interviewees for this thesis research, in different ways.  The working culture and 
practices of the NHS, including staff attitudes, make surgical training difficult to initiate 
and sustain.  Eleanor perceives that operative training must incorporate formal 
instruction of a trainee through a surgical procedure (“be taken through an operation”) 
rather than a reliance on assimilation solely through observation or by assisting a 
consultant surgeon.  However, for effective operative training to be facilitated she 
believes there needs to be greater support from the wider surgical team as well as 
hospital systems.   
I asked Eleanor if she could remember a clinical experience that transformed her 
practice by altering her thinking and behaviour.  She produced two stories: 
a)  A case of pain - I 
(I have transformative experiences) all the time Arundi.  That’s the only way that I’ve 
learnt anything.  I was called down to Casualty one night and it was when breech 
times were becoming tight.  It was about 3 o’clock in the morning.  “Can you come 
downstairs and see this nine-year old boy who has pain?”  I was like, “well its 3 
o’clock in the morning why has he turned up now with pain?!”  I asked the nurse to get 
one of their A&E doctors to see him and establish what the problem was.  I got 
another doctor ringing back to say I’d really appreciate your opinion about this child’s 
pain.  There was a change in culture going on where I felt it was very disrespectful of 
my time basically and I had previously worked as a junior in A&E where you tried to 
do the best you could for the patient yourself and when you needed a specialist 
opinion then you called on a specialist.   
Anyway, the long and short of it was that I was in a bad mood.  I had to get up and go 
down there and assess the patient and send them home as quick as possible.  I went 
down there and it was a Bengali family and to make matters worse, the dad started 
trundling on about housing benefit and how they needed to move house because the 
kid couldn’t walk up and down the stairs properly because he was constantly tired.  
This is all leading up to the fact that everything was in place for me to make a mistake 
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based on irritating situational factors.  Thank the lord I didn’t do that!  Had a chat with 
the nine-year old boy who had non-specific abdominal pain.  I took him into a room, 
pulled his clothes up and noticed a slight fullness on the right side of his abdomen.  
He had a Wilm’s tumour (a form of kidney cancer in children).  I spotted that. . . did the 
necessary investigations etc. and he was sent to a specialist centre to have big 
cancer surgery aged nine years.   
That transformed my practice immediately, because I thought when GPs, or A&E 
nurses or doctors ring you up, they may or may not know what they’re doing.  They 
may or may not be polite.  Whatever.  But basically, if they know what they’re doing 
and they’ve asked you to see the patient, you should see the patient.  If they don’t 
know what they’re doing and they ask you to see the patient, then you should still see 
the patient.  It transformed my attitude to that. . . it made me a safer doctor.  I was 
having to do a lot more work, that would previously have been done by other people.  
But, it was a warning to me and thankfully I heeded it.  
b)  A case of pain - II 
When I was working in Hopgood, we had a young woman who had a sarcoma 
(muscle tumour) in her pelvis.  Having had a load of chemo and everything.  She 
came back to the ward and in the morning she was very unwell, dropped her blood 
pressure, very unwell.  I was running around thinking she’s picked up an infection 
after the chemo.  I sorted her out, stabilised her.  It was a bunker job, where we would 
get there at 7 in the morning and leave at 9pm.  We were leaving the building one 
evening.  One of the nurses said to me, this epidural is not working.  I asked her to 
call the pain team.  The next day I came back in the morning and found that the 
patient had a compartment syndrome (a serious muscle condition that can result in 
the loss of a limb) and had lost part of her leg.  The whole thing had been masked by 
an epidural.  That transformed my practice because now if a nurse says anything to 
me on my way out, I say, ‘what do you mean?’  I take more responsibility now.  If a 
nurse comes up to you and says something, then its because they’re worried about 
something.  They’re questioning you because they’re worried.  That was a serious 
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error and I’m not going to say it was all my fault, but I was part of a cascade of 
disastrous events. 
c)  The clinical context of the stories 
Surgical trainees are required to provide on-call cover as part of training requirements 
and service commitments at each hospital.  An oncall surgical trainee provides an 
overnight consultation and treatment service and is supervised in these duties by a 
consultant surgeon.  However, the surgical trainee is the ‘coalface’ of the oncall 
service.  Doctors working in the emergency department (also known as A&E), as in 
Eleanor’s story, may call upon the surgical trainee to review or investigate patients 
whom they conclude have a surgical diagnosis and problem.  The oncall surgeon is 
also responsible for the overnight management of all the ward based surgical patients.   
The purpose of the oncall surgeon is to deal with emergencies such as serious or life-
threatening illness as well as trauma.  An example is, stabilising a patient bleeding 
from a fractured pelvis following a road traffic accident or operating on a person 
admitted with symptoms consistent with appendicitis (inflammation of the appendix).  
Invariably, as is the case in many emergency departments in the UK, the majority of 
patients seen do not require emergency care but investigation of their presenting 
symptoms and reassurance.   
The introduction of limits to the time patients spend waiting to be seen (‘breech times’) 
as well as political initiatives to guarantee patients are seen quickly by specialist 
doctors, has altered the way patients are managed when they initially attend the 
emergency department.  Eleanor expected that she would only be called in the early 
hours of the morning if there was an actual surgical emergency, such as a 
dangerously sick patient who needed immediate operative intervention.  Any other 
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presentation of illness, that was not imminently life threatening should, in her opinion, 
have been investigated and dealt with by the emergency doctors.   
She references her own experience as an emergency doctor to support and validate 
her views and expectations.  Eleanor had expected the emergency team to first 
investigate the nature of the child’s pain and call her once they had made a diagnosis.  
Her task, she believed, was to confirm or refute their diagnosis and subsequently 
make a surgical plan.  Instead, she felt “disrespected” that she was asked to 
investigate a generic complaint of pain where no prior investigation had been initiated 
by the emergency team.  
In the second story, Eleanor works long hours as part of a multidisciplinary team in a 
specialist cancer centre.  This means that there are several medical specialities and 
non-medical personnel (physiotherapists, occupational therapists) involved in the care 
of any one patient on the ward.  It is not uncommon for tensions to arise amongst the 
members of the team, particularly regarding who assumes responsibility for certain 
clinical problems.  Eleanor told me that she is frequently expected to ‘sort things out’ 
even when the clinical problem does not implicate her skill set.  In this example, she 
felt the patient’s pain should first be addressed by the pain team, who are primarily 
anaesthetic doctors, because the symptoms may be due to inadequate pain relief or a 
non-functioning epidural.    
d)  How is Eleanor’s practice actualised? 
Deleuze in Difference and Repetition (1994, chapter five) discusses how individuals 
are not isolated or discrete entities.  Instead, he suggests, individuals are made up of 
an ongoing series of relations that connect the sensations, emotions and thoughts 
with the intensities that trigger them. These intensities or affective relations, have the 
capacity to produce specific outcomes of behaviour or actualisations.  
Thus, at every moment, my experience […] is objectively problematic, which 
means that it has the structure of a problem, constituted by virtual elements 
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and divergent series, and the exact trajectory that “I” will follow is not 
predictable in advance.  In a moment from now I will have actualised certain of 
those virtualities; I will have, say spoken or gestured in a certain manner.  In 
doing so I will not have “realized a possibility” (in which the real resembles an 
already-conceptualised possibility) but will have “actualized a virtuality” - that 
is, I will have produced something new, a difference. (Smith, 2013: 253) 
In the above statement, Smith describes Deleuze’s view that the way in which 
something develops cannot be predicted ahead of time, it is “objectively problematic”.  
It is not known exactly how Eleanor will act from moment to moment during the oncall 
shift.  Deleuze’s ‘virtual’ or ‘potential’ (Whitehead) represents an unknown course of 
action (has not previously been conceived or predicted) but along with the actual, it 
constitutes the real, it is what can happen (how Eleanor chooses to act and react).   
However, the virtual is distinct from the realm of what-is-possible because it brings 
into being something that is novel, that which has not been considered or actualised 
yet.  Deleuze asserts that the ‘possible’, is what is already known, it is a given.  The 
possible is what is preformed and pre-existing, “an already-conceptualised possibility”, 
awaiting realisation.  
For example, Eleanor may have chosen to behave in the following ways: refusing to 
see the patient, reiterating to the emergency team that this patient was their 
responsibility to manage, asking the patient to return during day time hours, reviewing 
the patient but missing the diagnosis because her irritable mood occludes her ability 
to be open to the clinical problem, reviewing the patient but missing the diagnosis 
because she approaches the clinical problem with fixed ideas of what the cause may 
be.  These forms of responding are known and may have been realised in the past.  
They do not contribute towards creating something new or expanding the capacities of 
the individual beyond what is known or expected.   
e)  Virtual multiplicities 
However, Eleanor’s actions that night took on a different course, put simply she did 
not just ‘go through the motions’ of a duty surgeon, she did not act in one of the 
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multitude of ways that is known or expected.  Instead, she made a choice to 
persevere with the clinical event, to be curious and responsive to an evolving surgical 
encounter.  Her conduct actualised a particular virtual multiplicity, referring to the 
infinite number of ways in which she could act in a novel way that was a departure 
from more routine practices of thinking and doing.  Engaging with the surgical 
encounter in the form in which it presented itself to her (a case of apparent non-
emergency pain in a clinical atmosphere that she perceived as hostile to her being) 
developed in surprising and unanticipated ways.   
Eleanor detected a rare tumour and in the complex process implicated in her 
discovery, new modes of thinking and doing emerge from the relations that formed 
and developed between how she views herself, her practice, her colleagues and her 
patients.  In her own words, the experience was a “warning sign”, she feels she was 
complacent in her attitude to clinical practice.  The virtual therefore does not produce 
a new ‘thing’ or ‘phenomenon’, it creates new relationalities.  In the case of Eleanor, 
she develops new relations to her practice which makes her a more careful, thoughtful 
and “safer doctor”.   
The second narrative reveals a very different outcome which in a sense is a reverse of 
the previous narrative but still brings about a learning event for Eleanor.  In this 
learning event Eleanor takes the routine pathway and follows established clinical 
procedure by referring the nurse to the pain team.  After passing on the nurse’s 
request to see the patient because the epidural was not working, Eleanor learns the 
tragic outcome for the patient the next day. The patient was suffering pain due to a 
developing surgical pathology that claimed their leg.  She then realises that she 
should have responded to the nurse’s request because it underlined a serious 
concern that the nurse had but was unable to verbalise adequately, perhaps due to 
the relation of authority.   
Eleanor speaks of how this event changed her, so that now she listens carefully to 
anything a nurse has to say because their questions or requests may imply real 
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clinical concerns.  At the time the nurse requested her assistance, Eleanor acted by 
deferring responsibility, thus signifying a realisation of the ‘possible’--behaviour that is 
known and pre-exists the encounter.  We might say that it was the shock of what 
happened on the following day that ‘opened up’ the virtual for Eleanor in the sense 
that it opened up other ways in which to act. 
f)  Intra-actions 
An important question arises from both encounters concerning the processes of 
actualisation.  Put another way, there are processes of selection that underlie 
Eleanor’s actions.  An example is in the first narrative, why did she perceive the oncall 
encounter as an irritant, how and why did her response to see and treat the child 
become actualised, how did a particular solution emerge from the problem?  The 
questions posed constitute issues of clinical decision making, an area that is well 
written about in medical literature and which I reviewed in chapter 4.   
However, my questions refer to how we are enabled to act in specific ways when 
immersed in the contingent nature of clinical practice, a central motif of this thesis.  It 
is difficult to predict or anticipate how clinical events can materialise at any one 
moment.  As Medicine is a discipline grounded in science, fact and evidence-based 
practice, one may expect clinical decision making to be a transparent process 
dependent on a rational evaluation of indisputable facts.  But, the process of acting on 
factual data cannot be reduced to a linear sequence of discrete steps.   
As seen in earlier narratives such as the story of Mr. Pitt’s stent insertion as well as 
the above clinical accounts, clinical decision making is steeped in the ‘messiness’ of 
human interactions and relations.  In the theoretical chapter, I discussed Barad’s 
notion of intra-actions, the idea that agency arises from the relations that emerge 
between human actants (previous experiences, affects, thoughts, bodies) and non-
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human actants (examination findings, radiological images of a tumour, the oncall 
pager, discourses on patient care, concepts of ethics).   
For this reason, we cannot predict Eleanor’s clinical decision-making process nor 
anticipate the outcome because it is contingent on a series of intra-actions that form 
and develop within the clinical encounter.  How she takes account or prehends 
(Whitehead, 1929: x) the living and inanimate entities, imply how her practice matters 
to her, and cannot be known in advance, adding another layer of complexity to an 
already mysterious process.  The formation of these prehensive relations is distinct 
from concepts of cause and effect or subject-object dichotomies.   
Two further issues arise from how Eleanor actualises her practice.  First, what is the 
role of the structurisation of medical practice in enabling and also controlling the way 
in which Eleanor actualises her practice?  Put another way, how do the structures and 
organisation of clinical medicine condition how Eleanor perceives, thinks and acts in 
an event of practice.  Second, what are the ways in which Eleanor experiences the 
clinical encounter, how is she capacitated to produce particular ways of thinking, 
being and doing? 
g)  The structurisation of medical practice 
In the first narrative, Eleanor is aware of her emotive state (“I was in a bad mood”) 
identifying the ‘triggers’; an unsatisfactory encounter with A&E staff on the phone, 
disappointing workplace etiquette, her sense of being disrespected, her expectations 
of colleagues, the impact of breech times, her irritation at having to review a patient 
whom she felt was a non-emergency, her annoyance at the father’s housing 
comments.  Each trigger factor in this encounter reflects the day to day stressors and 
tensions that a surgeon must negotiate.  In addition, the elements cited, construct or 
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(in)form her practice: the way she experiences clinical events and how she responds 
through thoughts and actions.   
Eleanor herself is only too aware of this fact, stating that “everything was in place for 
me to make a mistake based on irritating situational factors”.  She opines that the 
culmination of the triggers had structured the encounter in such a way that conditions 
were ripe for a potentially serious error of practice and disastrous outcome.  Eleanor 
argued with emergency staff because she viewed the patient referral as inappropriate, 
exemplifying how the actualisation of practice (arguing and refusing to see the patient) 
had been controlled by the structure of the hospital working practices and culture.   
Later, she describes what expectations were created by these structures, “I had to get 
up and go down there and assess the patient and send them home as quick as 
possible.”  She defines a transcendent framework of practice, the well-established 
duties and tasks of an oncall doctor, that control how she organises and enacts 
practice (Foucault refers to these structures that govern attitude and behaviour as 
dispositif).    
The ways in which hospitals organise their staff and working patterns (for example 
through rotas and specified roles) and the uptake of policy initiatives (such as the 
breech times), as well as the concomitant discourses that evolve alongside, contribute 
to an interpellation (within a particular dispositif) of Eleanor as a particular subject in 
an oncall scenario.  She is interpellated as a doctor who when called upon, must 
assess the patient and manage his physical complaint efficiently so he can be rapidly 
discharged home.  The culture of medical practice within the hospital, her previous 
experiences both as an oncall doctor and as a surgeon and her communications with 
other staff constitute part of a particular discourse of clinical medicine implicated in the 
interpellation process.   
Her feelings and perceptions of the injustice of the oncall encounter or asking the 
nurse to contact the pain team as in the second story narrative, may be attributed to 
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her incarnation as a particular interpellated medical subject: tasked to manage 
emergencies or specific pre-identified surgical problems, not field general complaints 
of pain.  I would argue, that processes of interpellation may obscure and occlude a 
surgeon’s capacity to access the virtual dimension of their practice.   
I often ask my experienced trainees to think about how they can ‘shake off’ the 
confines of conventional medicine.  What I mean is to encourage their efforts to 
exceed what they are told, have read and believe to be their clinical duties and limits 
of practice.  To do so is to be wholly capacitated within an encounter in ways that 
allow one to answer the question posed by Spinoza and others, ‘What can I do?’ 
rather than ‘what must I do?’  I expand on these ideas later in the chapter when I 
explore the ethical realm of practice.   
h)  ‘Thinking feeling’: Affect and intensities  
The pedagogical task of surgical educators is to consider how one may attempt to 
capture the internal resonance of this clinical event because this is how one 
understands what matters for a trainee in a clinical learning encounter.  What are the 
ways in which she engages with the clinical encounter?  Deleuze proposes that 
experiencing within an encounter can spark powerful affective forces or a series of 
intensities, that arise from the relationalities (how one relates to something) that 
develop.  Relations not static events between subject-subject or subject-object.  
Rather, affective relations refer to dynamic local intensities that form and develop 
within the flows of experiencing.  Put another way, a series of intensities emerge from 
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the immanence of the clinical encounter, within the thisness of practice, what 
Massumi calls the ‘thinking-feeling’ aspect of experience (2002).   
[…] that shift in polarisation an organism undergoes due to disparities that 
occur within itself over time, due both to its inherent metastability as well as its 
relation to an exterior via sensation.  (Mills, 2015; 74) 
In the above explanation of Simondon’s theory of affect, Mills describes how being is 
composed of layers of relationalities constituted by how the individual orients to itself 
as well as how it relates to the environment it finds itself in, creating ‘polarisations’.  
Polarisations are similar to micro-potentials in that they produce a change in the 
internal resonance, capacitating the individual to think and act in certain ways.  Affect 
is both precognitive and pre-linguistic, it can begin vaguely before being organised by 
emotion into something meaningful.   
For example, Eleanor’s bad mood is an emotive state created by the series of affects 
she experiences within the encounter with emergency staff.  Simondon postulates that 
it is through affect that the subject attains form.  Affect is what allows the individual to 
grasp the immanence of an event in ways that reflect how the encounter matters to 
the individual.   
Eleanor engages with the encounter through intensities that arise within the clinical 
encounter.  These intensives constitute the form of her experience and reflect how the 
encounter matters to her.  By ‘mattering’ I refer to Whitehead’s notion of prehensive 
relations, it is how she takes account of things within the encounter, how she affects 
and is in turn affected in the relations.  For example, affective relations are sparked by 
a series of encounters for Eleanor; the encounter with the child, the encounter with a 
slightly abnormal looking abdomen, the encounter with her own expectations of 
colleagues, the encounter with the radiological images of the child’s abdomen, the 
encounter with her prejudices regarding social housing and welfare and the encounter 
with herself as a practitioner who is safer and more responsible now.  The way in 
which she prehends the encounter, effect certain affective intensities that relationally 
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activate (Massumi, 2012) Eleanor to think and act in particular ways.  In Simondon’s 
words, ‘the individual is not a being but an act’. (Barnaby Norman, 2015: 26)  
6.9  Miranda’s Story 
Miranda is a consultant surgeon and senior lecturer of five years standing.  She works 
in a central London teaching hospital.  She completed most of her surgical training in 
hospitals within London and Essex.  She had a strong interest in clinical research as a 
trainee and undertook a research degree as part of her training.  Her present role is 
supposedly split between NHS clinical work and academic research.  However, she is 
frustrated by the increasing demands of her surgical practice which encroach on 
valuable time she should be spending conducting her research and supervising her 
PhD students.  She is exasperated by the fragmentation of her junior surgical team.  
Well I think the first thing to say is that there is nobody to train!  My clinics. . . I 
don’t have a registrar, be it for training or service and I have set up the clinics 
in a way which means I don’t need them (the trainees) because it’s too 
unreliable to rely on their presence.  Initially, when they were available it was 
not reliable to depend on them because they would be away doing nights or 
whatever, so you can’t run a service this way. . .  Theatre lists. . . you do have 
somebody to train, but usually . . . the person who’s in theatre on Wednesday 
is often off after an oncall night, so I end up texting them to give them a heads 
up, which other (consultants) don’t do, and you can complain about the 
trainees but at the end of the day it’s the system. Emergencies. . . I am 
increasingly called to go and just deal with it.  So, as a trainer, well, there is 
nobody to train!  And also it’s very difficult to train because you don’t know 
what their training needs are and you’re not seeing them on a regular basis. 
Miranda’s anxieties and complaints about ‘the system’ are common threads in all the 
research interviews.  There is an exasperation that the shift system and the 
organisation of the hospital prevent the existence of teams of surgeons who work and 
train together consistently, building a sense of camaraderie, shared responsibility and 
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common goals.  Similar to Eleanor’s story, the hospital structures and working 
patterns control actualisations of practice. 
In the above, Miranda refers to her weekly Wednesday operating list.  She is 
aggravated by the situation, as frequently her trainee is scheduled to on the Tuesday 
night oncall leaving them unable to operate on the Wednesday morning list.  The 
hospital is legally required to ensure that the trainee is sent home to rest straight after 
an oncall and not permitted to engage in clinical work.  However, some trainees, 
mindful that they are missing out on valuable opportunities to operate, practice and 
learn, attend the operating list once discharged from their oncall duties.  Miranda 
looks upon these trainees kindly and will often alert them via text message as to what 
surgical cases are scheduled and who the patients are.   
However, the surgical tradition is such that, in order to attend an operating list and be 
taught, trainees are expected to come into work early on that morning (usually 7 am), 
see all the pre-operative patients, read their notes, be familiar with the medical 
information and prepare patients for surgery.  This is a challenging task if the trainee 
has been oncall the previous night and busy in the morning hours organising an 
appropriate patient handover.   
For Miranda, the structure of the hospital and work schedules control how she 
actualises her medical practice.  An example is how she organises her clinic to 
function without trainee involvement, because she cannot rely on the rota to grant her 
trainees who are unencumbered by other scheduling commitments such as an 
overnight oncall. 
In the below narrative, Miranda describes her early experiences of dealing with 
ruptured aortic aneurysms, encounters that transformed her practice and attitude to 
patient care.  An aneurysm is an abnormal dilatation of the main blood vessel in the 
body (aorta), see appendix Fig. 1.  Consequently, the walls of the blood vessel are 
weakened and at risk of rupture, which can be fatal.  In some situations, it is possible 
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to operate or use radiological guidance to insert a stent and potentially save the 
patient’s life.  However, these are high risk situations and frequently the prognosis is 
poor even if the patient survives the procedure.  If the patient has a pre-existing 
physical condition that is poor, intervening to repair the rupture is not appropriate and 
a decision is made to allow the patient to pass away comfortably.   
a) “When you can’t operate . . .” 
Everybody thinks that a rupture is so exciting and you want to do the surgery.  But 
then there are the cases you can’t operate on because its too late.  What I hadn’t 
realized back then was that sometimes patients with a ruptured aneurysm (who are 
unsuitable for surgery) don’t die that quickly, so you put them in a side-room.  But 
they’re still alive the next day, what do you do then?  You’ve already told the family 
and relatives the night before that the prognosis is very poor.  And now that they are 
relatively stable, well, can they go home?  Can they die at home?  I remember that the 
first time that became difficult for me was somebody who was still stable about twenty-
four hours later, quite comfortable and the family said we would like to take her home, 
so we put her in an ambulance and then she became unstable so she came back to 
us and died in the hospital.  And that was obviously traumatic for everyone. . .  
Nowadays, people expect the full explanation, they normally will understand but then 
it’s when the patient doesn’t die. . .“are you sure?” . . .  Even though we have a CT 
confirmed diagnosis.  We get asked, “will they be aware?  will they slip away?”  
Sometimes they do, sometimes they don’t. . .  
Recently on an oncall I found that I wanted to spend more time with that patient and 
their family than someone we would take to theatre and operate on.  Because I think, 
if you’re explaining an operation to a patient, the family, they understand and they 
have questions, you explain and get on with it.  But in this sort of situation, you can 
imagine it’s very difficult to understand. . .  Very often it’s too tempting for the team to 
say. . .“the patient is still alive, we’ll address all the symptoms, make sure they’re not 
in pain”.  And then it’s very tempting to say, “there are no more decisions to be made 
on the ward round” or “we’ll see this patient last or if at all” or “the Palliative team will 
see them”.  But actually, that’s the family/patient who has the most questions, isn’t it?  
Or another family member will arrive and say, “they’re still with us, but for how long?”  
All those questions I think you cannot give a clear answer to but giving a stab at it is 
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important.  Whereas, there are other life threatening conditions where you know you 
can do an operation and fix it. 
(Miranda, consultant surgeon) 
The mortality associated with emergency aneurysm surgery is very high.  From a 
purely technical stance, the steps of an aneurysm surgery involve making big 
incisions, a considerable dissection of tissue, strong efforts at controlling rapid and 
catastrophic bleeding, all the time aware that the patient may die on the operating 
table itself.  The surgeon needs to be decisive, quick and fluent in their technique.  
The heroic intra-operative efforts can appear exciting for a trainee who is enthused 
and keen to learn surgical method.   
Miranda was initially excited at the prospect of participating in the aneurysm surgery.  
However, she had not expected to be most affected by those patients for whom she 
would never provide an operative solution.  The actualisation of the virtual occurs for 
her the following day when a patient is still alive following a ruptured aneurysm 
despite forewarning patient and family.  She is relationally activated in this moment 
before being able to think through why she feels this way.  Massumi describes this 
process: 
You own the feeling as your own, and recognise it as a content of your life, an 
episode in your personal history.  But in the instance of the affective hit, there 
is no content yet.  All there is is the affective quality, coinciding with the feeling 
of the interruption [. . .]  That affective quality is all there is to the world in that 
instant.  It takes over life, fills the world, for an immeasurable instant of shock.  
Microperception is this purely affective rebeginning of the world. (Massumi, 
2008: 5) 
The ‘affective hit’ in this instance are the intensities sparked by seeing the patient-
alive-and-yet-to-die the next morning.  The expressions of affect may be imperceptible 
or manifest as, stunned silence, standing agape, a quickening of the heartbeat or 
teary eyes.  The intensities have not been explicated or interpreted into rational 
thought or meaningful emotion, “there is no content yet”.  For example, no emotion of 
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sadness or anger has evolved in the moment of the affective hit.  Her feelings 
(Whitehead, 1929) or affective intensities rupture ‘the world’ of surgery and human life 
as she has come to understand it.  The patient-yet-to-die does not fit into the 
transcendent categories that she has read about in textbooks or been advised on by 
her community of mentors and peers.  This patient does not neatly fit into the 
‘survived the rupture’ or ‘died from the rupture’ categories.  The latter and former 
outcomes belong to the realm of the possible, as proposed by Deleuze.  
For Miranda, the affective interruptions of this encounter being precognitive and 
prelinguistic, form Badiou’s ‘event’.  Her pre-existing understanding and knowledge of 
both aneurysm pathology, surgical intervention and the human condition are 
punctured by the reality of a yet-to-die patient: ‘the event [. . .] compels the subject to 
invent a new way of being and acting in the situation’ (Badiou, 2001: 42).  Miranda’s 
‘new way of being and acting’ translate into a desire to spend more time with the 
families of patients’ she is not able to operate on.  She rationalises after the affective 
hit that it makes sense to do so, because these families have the most questions 
owing to the confusing but fatal outcome.  One may suggest that she is relationally 
activated in these attempts.   
Massumi iterates that the ability to affect and in turn be affected causes a transition 
between ‘one state of capacitation to a diminished or augmented state of 
capacitation’, (Massumi, 2008: 2).  Miranda observes that patients close to death may 
not require any active clinical intervention (for example, medication or a blood 
transfusion) and this can lead to doctors removing themselves from any direct 
involvement with the patient or family.  However, her experiences have enabled her or 
relationally activated her to view the situation differently.  Her process of affectation 
has compelled her to make attempts at answering the difficult questions posed by the 
patient/family.   
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6.10  The Pedagogical Implications 
Eleanor and Miranda narrate clinical experiences describing how they reacted and 
coped with the immediacy of unexpected surgical events which questioned their 
perception and understanding of practice.  These vignettes describe disturbances of 
practice in that each surgeon emerges from their experience of the clinical encounter 
forced to think and act in ways that they had not conceived of prior to the event.  The 
interruption to practice shifts the focus from ‘being’ a trainee to ‘becoming’ a surgeon.  
There are two or three pedagogical issues that arise from the narrative analysis which 
I discuss below: 
a)  Surgeon identifications 
The vignettes demonstrate how individual identifications as surgical professionals 
emerge through experiences with contingent clinical practice.  In other words, each 
surgeon identifies specific priorities that are of concern in surgical practice and which 
can be traced back to how the clinical encounter mattered to them.  For example, 
Miranda explains that her technical practice will never become stale for her even 
though she is engaged in repetitive surgeries.  Each operative encounter, she 
believes, affords an opportunity to better the patient experience or improve the team 
dynamic.   
Eleanor describes herself as a “safer doctor”, who assumes “more responsibility” after 
the encounters with patients in pain.  The particular priorities, voiced by the individual 
surgeon, appear to arise as a consequence of how the surgeon engages with or 
prehends the initial clinical event.  I suggest that what is being described is how the 
individual encounters the form of the event, how they grasp the specific clinical event 
so that it becomes a matter of concern.  Whitehead in his theory of experience 
identifies the ‘subjective form’ as the, ‘immediate novelty; it is how that subject is 
feeling that objective datum’ (1929: 232).  By ‘novelty’ he refers to the fact that how a 
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datum is perceived at a given moment cannot be reproduced (re-lived/recreated) or 
replicated.   
I suggest therefore that the individual subjectivities of the two surgeons arise through 
unique processes of mattering (how a datum is perceived/how a subject encounters 
something) in an encounter: ‘in any case, the subject constitutes itself in and through 
its experience; and thereupon it perishes, entering into the “objective immortality” of 
being a “datum” for other experiences of other subjects’ (Schaviro, 2012; p. xii).  For 
Whitehead (and Deleuze), the individual emerges through the relations it forms within 
the process of experiencing something before dissolving in the process of becoming 
so that new relations may emerge.  For example, Eleanor becomes a subject (comes 
into being) through the affective relations that arise as she engages in the encounter: 
how she affects the encounter (feels her time and specialist skills are not respected) 
and is in turn affected by the encounter (being called to see a patient in the early 
hours, the limits on the time a patient is permitted to wait).  The intensities triggered by 
the immanence of the affective relations cause her to emerge relationally activated 
and capacitated to think and act in ways that were not conceived prior to the 
encounter but which reflect how the encounter matters to her.   
The distinction I wish to make here is that official documentation like GMP (2013) and 
GSP (2014) interpellate subjects along prior established and instructive ways of 
thinking and doing.  There is no pre-existing surgeon identity: the surgeon emerges 
through ideological interpellation.  Put simply, the inherent capacities that Miranda and 
Eleanor possess to act and think are not legitimised outside of the documentation.  
The training materials anticipate a particular surgeon identity with specific recognised 
and all surgeons must demonstrate these skills.  
What the official documents do not embrace are the affective experiences that 
surround the singular happenings of putting these skills into practice.  These singular 
happenings are described by both my accounts of practice and my interviewees 
experiences of practice, discussed in this thesis study.  These stories contain 
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descriptions of the local flows of experience that emerge from the immanence of 
practice.  However, the official documentation deals only with listing and describing 
the skills required, in a kind of decontextualised space.  But, as is seen in the 
examples of actual practice, the application of these idealised forms of thought and 
behaviour are difficult.   
Miranda outlines how repetitive practice is dull.  It becomes routine.  Patients who are 
dying tend to receive less attention, because there is no appropriate surgical 
intervention to be offered, besides supportive measures.  Eleanor, for her part, 
highlights the difficulties of seeing all the patients in an oncall.  These various 
challenges to enacting practice are not expressed in ways that reflect the reality of the 
difficulties encountered by surgeons in practice.  Instead, the documents present 
clinical practice in idealized forms: a sanitary environment devoid of the challenges or 
conflicting tensions of the real world.  To encourage the desired clinical behaviours 
and propagate satisfactory patient experiences, there is a requirement for an 
understanding of the implications of the affective dimensions of practice.   
b)  Immanent practice emphasises a process of becoming  
The individuation of Eleanor and Miranda through their accounts of practice illustrate 
processes of self-transformation in their beliefs and practice.  The immanence of each 
learner’s pathway, is a story of their becoming through learning encounters which 
trigger new ways of thinking and being.  
Norms are individuated 
Established criteria of practice interpellate the surgeon as a particular subject of 
ideological practices and surgical training because, their actions can only be 
recognised and legitimised within that specific framework.  However, this is to deny 
the ability of an individual to individuate through processes of immanent reflection, 
reflexive practice and critical thought.  Through such individuation, the generic 
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medical guidance on practice is transformed in ways that are relevant and meaningful 
to trainees, as individuals engaged in real practice. 
c)  Ethics of practice 
If one were to contrast the deployment of care in the official guidance (GMP, 2013; 
GSP, 2014) with the narrative accounts of doctor-patient relations detailing how care 
is performed or thought to be performed by the doctor, two kinds of ethics emerge.  
First, ethics as prescribed in the literature is presented as a moral code, a set of rules 
and criteria by which to judge and evaluate the thoughts, intentions and behaviours of 
a physician.  Deleuze stipulates that an ethical code based on morality is founded on 
a transcendent framework of values, which society or an organisation deem to be 
important in directing and influencing our thoughts and actions at that moment in time.  
Secondly, an ethics of practice emerges from real events of clinical practice, in which 
the doctor must make decisions in the ‘here and now’ according to the contingencies 
of the actual doctor-patient relations.  Deleuze advocates such a conception of ethics: 
a set of facultative rules that ‘evaluate what we do according to the immanent mode of 
existence that it implies’ (Smith, 2012: 176).  This counteracts criticisms that Deleuze 
is promoting an unethical practice or practices that are wrong or inappropriate, 
because there would be no norms by which to judge or assess conduct.   
Deleuze answers this concern by reiterating that an immanent mode of existence 
refers to how far we push the limits of what we can achieve in a situation and what 
separates us from acting in a certain way.  In other words, Deleuze poses the 
question that an ethics of practice must raise, “What can I do, what am I capable of 
doing?” rather than “What must I do?” (which refers to issues of morality).   
This is exemplified in Eleanor’s second narrative.  She is aware of her clinical duty 
and ethical responsibility to the adult female patient.  However, it is late in the 
evening, she is constantly interrupted by nurses making demands of her that she 
views as inappropriate.  In her opinion, there are other members of the team who 
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should first review the patient, because their primary task is to respond to issues of 
organic pain.  She is fatigued and excited to go home ‘early’ for a change.  These 
tensions in practice are implicated in her decision to not see the patient and defer 
responsibility. 
A Deleuzian conception of ethics would pose the following questions to direct 
Eleanor’s conduct in an actual event of practice, “given my power to act, what am I 
capable of achieving in this situation, what are my capacities of doing? How can I 
come into active possession of my power?  How can I go to the limit of what I can 
do?” (derived from Smith, 2012: 176).  In short, Deleuze promotes a view of ethics 
that is a form of responding to the situation that we as individuals find ourselves 
immersed in.  It is characterised by the individual’s attempts to consistently push 
themselves to the limits of what they are capable of ‘doing’ in that encounter. 
Deleuze is critical of those elements that distance the individual from the power to act.  
Transcendent frameworks of ethical behaviour may constitute such a separation from 
our power to act.  Such frameworks prescribe a fixed response to a situation and thus 
prevent the individual from ‘dreaming’ or conceiving other ways to think and act that 
exceed what is known. 
Rather than judging actions and thoughts by appealing to transcendent or 
universal values, one evaluates them by determining the mode of existence 
that serves as their principle.  A pluralist method of explanation by immanent 
modes of existences in this way is made to replace the recourse to 
transcendent values; an immanent ethical difference.  (Smith, 2012: 147). 
Therefore, ethics for Deleuze is not grounded in the notion of the transcendent 
subject, such as the projected figure of the ‘good doctor’ in GMP (2013) who’s actions 
are recognised within a pre-existing framework of ‘moral practice’ that is not subject to 
the realities of clinical medicine (e.g. time constraints).   
Atkinson (2016) describes the unique dual experiences of standing in a waterfall and 
the states of affect that emerge from within compared to the experience of standing 
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outside on the banks of a river and watching the waterfall, observing it.  Caught in the 
strong rushes of water standing within the waterfall, the force of the flows of water can 
trigger powerful affective states: the crashing flows of water may leave you utterly 
terrified or supremely exhilarated.  This lies in stark contrast to the affect precipitated 
by the act of watching the tumbling torrents of water from the river banks.  One may 
still feel a sense of thrill or fear but the local intensity of the experience is different to 
the flows of experience that come about as an observer.  Standing within the waterfall, 
represents the immanent nature of experience, capturing the flows of affect and 
emotion. This can be used as an analogy to how we experience something in the 
moment, to how we experience it later when recalling, recollecting and reflecting on 
something.  The latter is also how teachers would observe or asses a trainee, they 
cannot know how the trainee experiences or feels events of practice.   
How is a mode of existence determined?  The learner or teacher arise out of a 
specific instance of learning or teaching rather than through the assessment criteria of 
a WBA, for example.  The subject as such does not exist prior to the experience.  The 
mode of being is determined either through the power to act in an encounter and the 
relations of affectivity or otherwise through the inability of the subject to act to their 
fullest capacity.  Therefore, Deleuze moves beyond a process of judgement facilitated 
by reference to norms.  Instead, he advocates that individuals should look to see 
whether their actions are in keeping with their full capacity to act in a given situation.  
Through an augmented state of capacitation, the individual brings about a self-
transformation and the potential to create new modes of existence.   
Prioritising a notion of immanence in teaching/learning means to subscribe to an 
ethics of immanence where the pedagogical priority is to try to understand learning 
from the perspective of the learner’s capacities to grow and not to judge such 
capacities from external criteria.  This is not to diminish the need for course material, 
syllabus, assessment etc., all of which help to educate a learner in terms of what they 
need to know and the skills necessary to manage other human lives.  An ethics of 
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immanence is about trying to understand how something matters for a learner in a 
particular encounter.  And a pedagogy of immanent ethics refers to how a teacher 
may draw alongside a learner to better understand the experience of the learner and 
to assist the learner in unpacking the encounter.   
An example, is the encounter between Eleanor and the child.  What caused her to go 
and meet with the child and examine the child as thoroughly as she did given all the 
factors that were dissuading her from that particular actualisation of practice?  How 
did the encounter affect her as it did?  How did the affective relations emerge to make 
this a matter of concern for her?  These affective relations constitute the immanent 
criteria which determine how an individual grasps the encounter, what Atkinson (2016) 
calls a ‘necessary transcendence’.  Transcendence in the way I use the term, 
following Deleuze, implies appraising things in accordance to some law, body of 
knowledge or religion.  Therefore, what is being considered is along established ways 
of seeing, practicing etc.  The notion of immanence relates to that which emerges 
from within practice itself.  However, that which emerges from within practice may for 
the practitioner be equivalent to a ‘necessary transcendence’ that allows grasping the 
meaning of the particular experience of practice.   
Therefore, there is a difference between external transcendence, with established 
rules, criteria, methodologies and necessary transcendence emerging from within 
practice, constituted by ways of coping, understanding, emerging from within the flow 
of practice.  This argues for an approach in learning as well as clinical practice where 
the learner (surgeon) is sensitive to the form in which a patient with a problem 
presents and responds to that problem step by step as the issues arise.  She poses 
questions, rather than working from universal values that totalise the experience.  She 
decides the path ahead.  This is the power of becoming, answering to the event and 
generating the that-which-is-not-yet that exceeds established practices and has the 
potential to create new worlds of practice.  Whitehead in his theory of experience 
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places aesthetics before ontology because, he wants to emphasise that ‘how’ we 
experience is the primary concern, before looking at the process of becoming. 
6.11  Conclusion 
The tale of surgical training that unfolds in these pages, derived from the stories of 
training and an analysis of educational material, precipitates a call for emancipation; a 
deliverance from entrenched bureaucratic systems of continuous surveillance, 
relentless assessment, pernicious regulation and a socio-political mantra of tireless 
reform.  That these elements of the modern day surgical education model were well-
intentioned, conceived and designed to primarily protect and promote the welfare and 
safety of patients, is not contested (DoH, 2000, 2010; NPSA, 2009; Berwick, 2013; 
HEE, 2016).   
However, as the narratives illustrate, the affectations, thoughts and behaviours of the 
surgeon are dynamic, unanticipated and affected by various factors.  These include; 
rotas, schedules, physical fatigue and mood, colleague relationships, policies, 
prejudices, bureaucratic inertia etc., which in turn can neither be accurately predicted 
nor fully accounted for but have to be negotiated or integrated (Simondon) for the 
principles of ‘good practice’ to prevail.  The difficulty arises when the normative criteria 
specified by the current system of assessment and evaluation act to occlude the 
intensities and ideas precipitated through local flows of experience which are crucial 
to learning and making meaning out of practice. 
There is therefore a need to recognise the governance of established and valued 
procedures in medical practice that have been accumulated through time.  But there is 
also a parallel requirement, to acknowledge personal forms of governance-in-practice 
that emerge from a surgeon’s experience. 
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Chapter 7 
Surgeon Education: Entangled Subjectivities, Affective Dispositions 
and the Heterogenous Obligations that Emerge from Events of 
Practice  
               
7.1  Seeing Red 
It is 3.37.  AM.  Operating theatre 14.  Mr. Cunningham, the recipient of the shiny new 
liver transplant, lies on the operating table, his abdomen spliced open.  On the prep 
table behind me sits a blue tub which holds his shiny new liver, bathed in special 
juices, glistening under the theatre lights.  I pack the insides of his belly with pristine, 
crisp white swabs.  Almost as soon as I place them, the white of the swabs instantly 
disappear, drenched in a deep crimson hue.  My hands move quickly and 
methodically across the four corners of the abdomen.  Removing blood soaked 
swabs, squeezing out a shower of sticky, scarlet juice that sloshes around in a bucket 
while the cell saver hoovers up each precious red cell and pumps it back into the 
patient.  Every few seconds I quickly glance up at the rising tide of blood in the upper 
cavity of the abdomen; a concave hollow, occupied up until a few minutes ago, by a 
cirrhotic liver—ugly, rotting, bulbous flesh.  The operating theatre is littered with empty 
bags of various blood products.  All given in what is becoming a futile attempt to stem 
catastrophic bleeding.   
I say nothing, I am speechless.  Speech-less, mute.  My eyes dart quickly round the 
raw tissues of the abdomen, planning where next my hands must go to mop and pack 
the bleeding.  My feet squelch inside my clogs, a mixture of my sweat and fluid 
draining from the sides of the operating table.   I keep going—this is not what I’m here 
to do I think, increasingly getting angry and irritated.  I didn’t come here to watch this 
man exsanguinate to oblivion!  And yet, here I am.   
JE, the consultant surgeon in this surgery is annoyed and exasperated.  ‘We have to 
do better Arundi, really we do.  This is not going to work out for him (the patient). . .  
Can someone get me Eva on the phone?  I want to know why we decided on this man 
for this transplant?!  Has he got family outside?  Who brought him in to hospital?  This 
is really . . .  just not good enough!. . .’   
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I’ve noticed that the conversation at these moments always takes on the same tone, 
the same exasperation, the same questions, the same need to blame someone, 
anyone, when things don’t go according to plan.  When patients don’t return from the 
operating theatre, leave alone make if off the operating table.  Surgeons seem to 
believe that we can somehow pinpoint a patient’s demise to one particular decision.  
One wrong move in what is otherwise presented as a flawless game of chess, careful 
calculation and evaluation gets the patient from waiting list to the operating theatre.  
The worlds of the operating theatre; excitement, good things, heroics and success, 
transforms in minutes or hours to a place of failure, despair and death.  Many worlds 
inhabit one space, yet I struggle to figure out just where I should tread, where I should 
belong.   
I glance up at the clock, 3.53 AM.  Someone is holding a mobile phone to JE’s ear, as 
he mutters and paces.  He walks away from the operating table.  Perhaps he’s calling 
another colleague for help.  Perhaps he’s arguing with night staff working at the 
depleted blood bank, demanding more products to be sent.  Or, perhaps he’s scolding 
the beleaguered Eva.  I don’t know and I don’t care.  I return to Mr. Cunningham’s 
belly which still weeps red.  I continue to ‘pack and squeeze’. 
(Excerpt taken from my surgical journal, 10th August 2011.) 
7.2  Structure Of The Chapter 
In this final chapter, I draw on key aspects of my research to put forward 
recommendations for the development of surgical training and education.  I begin by 
revisiting the initial questions that stimulated the development of this study.  My 
decision to use philosophical theory and discourse to examine aspects of learning and 
practice, is a novel research venture in the field of postgraduate surgical education 
research.  I chose to do so, because it is difficult to reduce the entangled relations that 
form and develop within an encounter of clinical practice into discrete categories, in 
attempts to identify the implications for learning and teaching.  This is not to diminish 
the findings of those research studies that have employed established techniques to 
unpack the content of learning encounters.  Such techniques include quantitative 
methods such as statistical analysis or qualitative approaches such as grounded 
theory to examine interview data.   
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Instead, I asserted that studying complex phenomena, such as learning encounters in 
clinical practice, requires a wider research methodology than is currently available.  I 
proposed that a critical approach to philosophical theory may provide one way of 
achieving this objective.  However, the current education agenda in surgical training 
does not recognise, incorporate or investigate the potential pedagogical value of 
philosophical theory and discourse.   
Therefore, I discuss how the theory driven methodology of this thesis has extended 
and enhanced what is known and understood about experiencing and learning within 
actual encounters of clinical practice.  I review the findings and consider the limitations 
of my research.  I conclude by commenting on the significance of modes of mattering 
in surgical models of teaching and learning.    
7.3  The Purpose Of The Research Study  
In the opening chapter of this thesis, I presented an experience of surgical training, 
taken from my early days as a trainee in transplantation surgery.  The 
autobiographical account, told the story of how I experienced my first organ 
procurement surgery, a retrieval of abdominal organs.  It was this experience of 
learning ‘in the field’, that had a profound affective impact upon me.  It emphasized 
the pedagogic relations that form and develop in the local flows of experiencing 
events of practice.  Organ procurement surgeries are extraordinary procedures in 
themselves, and not typical of the daily routine of surgical practice.  However, as I 
argued in chapter 1, my purpose in using this exceptional event of practice, was not to 
shock or be provocative.  Instead, I chose to include the encounter, because it 
perfectly illustrates the daily complexities implicated in how a learner experiences 
contingent medical practice.  That is, clinical events are uncertain, they cannot be 
accurately predicted, the ways in which a learner experiences and subsequently 
learns within the encounter may not be fully anticipated (by the learner or teacher) and 
risk being nonvisible or intangible.  These elements have implications for the 
development of pedagogic strategies.  They also provide a strong commentary on the 
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present day system of assessment and evaluation in medical training and practice.    
a)  Research aims 
From these observations and thoughts, I developed the following research questions 
to direct the study and structure the findings: 
i) How do surgeons make sense of their day to day experiences, in and of 
practice, as they happen in actual time? 
ii) What are the educational opportunities embedded in the day to day 
phenomenology of practice? 
iii) What are the ways in which a trainee constructs meaning in and of routine 
surgical practice?   
b)  Rationale of the study 
I made the assumption that the way in which a surgeon ‘makes sense’ of events of 
practice was intimately connected to how that learning encounter comes to matter to a 
trainee, how it attains significance for a surgeon.  It is possible that an encounter with 
an event of practice may affect clinicians in the same way.  However, ‘experiencing’, 
as seen in the narrative accounts, tends to be a personal, unpredictable and often 
unique process.  As such, an event of practice has the strong potential to affect 
individuals differently.   
Therefore, I concluded that the multiple realities immanent to an encounter of practice, 
may be more fully accommodated and explained using a critical theoretical approach 
derived from a close examination of philosophical theory.  I devised a theoretical 
framework based on philosophical ideas and concepts to hypothesize an alternative 
theory of experiencing (‘affective thinking’), to inform the mode of inquiry of the study 
and to construct the analytic method of data analysis.   
c)  Summary of research strategy 
I hypothesized that on encountering a clinical event of practice, the initial impact was 
experienced as an ‘affective learning’, prior to the development of cognitive and 
rational processes.  I proposed that the thinking that emerged from clinical encounters 
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could also be affective in nature (Whitehead, 1929; Simondon, 1992, 2005a; 
Massumi, 2008), in addition to the dominant view of thought in the biomedical 
sciences, as primarily a rational process of cognitive reasoning.  I suggested that the 
affective dimension of learning encounters may be non-visible or intangible, 
assertions originally made by Whitehead (1929) and Massumi (2002).  However, I 
hypothesized that, it was critical to examine the insensible nature of these affective 
aspects of experiencing, if learners and teachers of Surgery were to deepen their 
understanding and develop effective pedagogic strategies in clinical events of 
practice.   
Thus, the objective of my research study, was to critically examine the immanent 
nature of events of clinical practice from the perspective of affective forms of 
experiencing.  I gathered data from three sources, which were analysed using a 
philosophy-based theoretical framework.  The results were derived from; an analysis 
of policy and curricular documentation, a critical exploration of interviews conducted 
with surgeons in practice and an examination of auto-ethnographic accounts of 
practice.   
7.4  What Is The Original Contribution Of This Research Study?  How 
Does It Extend What Is Already Known?   
a)  How is postgraduate surgical education presently studied? 
Philosophical theory is a much neglected field in postgraduate medical education.  
However, the application of theoretical concepts as a set of critical tools to examine 
surgical encounters of practice, is a novel direction in which to develop research into 
surgical education.  It is an alternative yet complementary research paradigm.  One 
which may exert a dual effect: enhancing current research strategies whilst also 
creating a conceptual framework that is better suited to examining the multiple 
realities that exist in a learning encounter.  Deleuze says, ‘a theory is exactly like a 
box of tools... It must be useful, it must function,’ (Foucault and Deleuze, 1977: 210). 
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I have approached learning from the question, how are actual encounters of practice 
experienced by a learner?  Why is this important?  It is in how we respond to 
uncertainties in practice, even when we anticipate them (from prior experience or 
through studying established bodies of knowledge), that we demonstrate our 
understanding and ability to negotiate the reality of complex medical practice.  It is in 
these moments that one grapples with the anxiety, discomfort and confusion: feelings 
that emerge from how we experience a particular event of practice.  At these times, 
‘finding our way’ can be challenging, perplexing or even enlightening. 
An application of the principles of evidence-based medicine 
My research journey began with an investigation into how clinical experiences in 
surgical practice were reported, described and analysed in the literature.  It was 
quickly evident that research into surgical experience was strongly influenced by a 
paradigm of evidence-based medicine (EBM).  In this approach, how surgeons 
encounter practice was defined by identifying prior categories of performance which 
could be directly measured and analysed.  Examples include, the acquisition of 
discrete sets of professional and clinical skills (ensuring aseptic technique prior to 
surgery, demonstrating clear communication with team members).   
Thus, actual experiences of clinical practice such as a trainee’s operative encounter 
with a particular surgical procedure or a trainee engaging in a difficult patient 
communication, were fragmented into discrete areas that were pre-defined.  This 
approach converted an encounter of practice into a performance of practice, which 
could then be measured and assessed.  These are necessary measures if training 
programs are to ensure that skilled, proficient and safe practitioners are produced.  
However, these pedagogic strategies become problematical if they totalize a learner’s 
experience of practice.  In doing so, they risk obscuring other non-visible and non-
tangible aspects of learning, which signify how something matters to a learner and 
therefore, how it attains significance for the trainee. 
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Limited application of social theory and philosophical discourse 
Within postgraduate surgical education, the application of social theory was restricted 
to sociological methodologies such as interviews and case studies to accumulate 
data.  There was an absence of philosophical theory and discourse being used to 
formulate research questions, as well as critical inquiries into surgical training and 
education.   
b)  A novel approach to postgraduate surgical education research 
Chapter 1 begins with a narrative account of my first organ procurement experience.  I 
describe my affective response to the reality of the procurement surgery as a 
‘speechlessness of practice’.  This phrase allowed me to emphasize those aspects of 
a learner’s mode of being which interested and intrigued me the most: the non-
cognitive and non-rational forms of ‘thinking’ and ‘doing’ that emerge from the initial 
flows of experiencing in unanticipated encounters of clinical practice.  It is this 
investigative analysis of the affective dimension of practice and learning, that my 
research contributes to the broader field of medical education research. 
Crucially the affective dimension of practice and learning in surgical training has 
hitherto been a neglected area of research.  The ways in which the affective domain 
impacts on how events of practice come to matter to a learner have yet to be explored 
or theorized by postgraduate medical education research.  My research thesis is an 
adventure of surgical pedagogy that is novel and innovative.  It generates new 
insights within surgeon experiencing and learning that extend the existing knowledge 
practices.   
The second contribution that this research thesis makes is in the methodological 
approach to examining learning encounters.  I introduced a philosophy-based 
theoretical framework to inform the investigation into events of surgical practice.  For 
me, this mode of enquiry has opened up aspects of surgical training and surgeon 
practices that may otherwise not be explored.  In particular, it has sparked a line of 
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questioning that interrogates the ideas and intensities of clinical experience that 
emerge from events of practice.  Previously, these affective elements of experiencing 
were either neglected or occluded by the official discourses of care and surgical 
practice  
I hope that the process of reading this research thesis, constitutes an ‘event’ (Badiou, 
1992) for the reader as they contemplate some of the ideas and theories about 
learning and practice, which may rupture existing assumptions and attitudes to 
education in the field of medical practice.  Alternatively, the encounter with this thesis 
may in itself trigger ‘affective forces’ (Massumi, 2008) that precipitate a reconfiguration 
or re-examination of dominant ideologies of pedagogy and practice.  Either way, my 
intention in constructing this research study, was to imagine new and original ways to 
explore how events of practice may be experienced in the moment, and how they 
come to matter to the surgeon through a pedagogy of the surgical event.    
7.5  The Findings Of The Research Study 
The development of a pedagogy of the surgical event (PSE), encapsulated 
philosophical theories of experiencing (Whitehead, 1929), affect (Deleuze, 1994, 
2004; Massumi, 2002; 2008; Simondon, 2005a, 2005b; Mills, 2016), immanence and 
transcendence (Deleuze, 1994, 2004) truth and event (Badiou, 1992), Individuation 
(Simondon, 1992; 2005a) and ethics (Deleuze, 1977, 1994, 2004; Mills, 2016).  The 
research study identified four major themes that emerged from a close examination of 
experiencing within events of clinical practice.  I present the key themes below with a 
discussion of their significance for surgical training.   
This study has identified that in the thisness of clinical practice, how surgeons make 
sense of their daily encounters in and of practice involves forms of affective thinking.  
This was best illustrated in the narrative accounts from Eleanor and Miranda in 
Chapter 6.  Miranda described how caring for ‘yet-to-die’ patients had transformed the 
business of her daily ward round.  She discussed the importance of finding time for 
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these patients and their families because, she concluded that ‘they have the most 
questions’ when confronted by a relative who is still alive despite being given a fatal 
prognosis.   
Eleanor similarly described how an encounter with a child in pain reconfigured her 
attitude regarding how she responded to the demands exerted upon her as an oncall 
doctor.  The analysis of both surgeons’ encounters with the thisness of actual practice 
raises the following question: what modes of thinking and being are important in 
cultivating an ability to cope with the immanence of surgical practice?  This is the 
central question that guided the examination of events of practice.  It is answered in 
the four themes that are discussed below. 
a)  The affective force of events of practice 
The affections are an orientation of a portion of the living being in relation to 
itself; they realise a polarisation of a determined moment of life in relation to 
other moments; they coincide to being with itself across time, but not with the 
totality of itself and its states; an affective state is that which possesses a unity 
of integration to life, it is a temporal unity which is part of a whole, according to 
what one might call a gradient of becoming.  (Simondon, 1989: 119, as quoted 
in Mills, 2016: 74). 
In the above statement, Simondon identifies the problematic of affect as the 
requirement to act or ‘orient’ oneself in ways that provide a resolution to the disparity.  
The disparity arises as a consequence of how the subject experiences the event.  In 
the example of Miranda, her mode of thinking and being, when confronted by 
terminally ill patients and their families, may arise from the affectations precipitated by 
the complex situation.  Namely, by choosing to interact in specific ways with these 
patients, she resolves the tension that exists within herself and the challenging 
situation she finds herself in, allowing her to continue as a doctor and a human being.  
This form of affective response is implicated in the emerging subjectivity of Miranda.   
Thus, the affective force of encounters with unanticipated clinical practice can be 
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experienced in ways that reflect how the individual prehends (Whitehead, 1929) the 
event of practice.  That is, how the surgeon takes account of the event has 
implications for how the encounter with practice comes to matter to her.  This notion of 
mattering resonates with Simondon’s concept of invention.  He asserts that invention 
is more than finding a solution to a problem.  Instead, he emphasizes it as the act of 
establishing coherence (Chabot, 2012: 20), integrating incompatible elements to 
create a ‘regime of functioning’ (Massumi, 2010: 39) that provides an answer to the 
initial question.  In this case, immanent modes of thinking and being in clinical practice 
can be conceived as inventive ways of developing coherence when confronted with 
complex situations and emotions.  These inventive processes are critical to the 
process of mattering and how the subject ‘goes forward’ from the event. 
b)  Form is immanent to clinical encounters of practice 
The training materials and official documents of clinical practice anticipate a particular 
surgeon identity associated with specific skills. This was presented in Chapter 4 
through the comparison of Official Care and Real Care.  In the former, documents 
such as Good Medical Practice (2013) and Good Surgical Practice (2014) prescribe 
certain ways of being and acting that are framed as ‘safe’ and desirable attitudes and 
practices.  These transcendent frameworks of practice are necessary to ensure that 
surgeons are trained with the critical skills that ensure competent and safe practice.   
However, the reality of how a surgeon actually provides appropriate care in 
unexpected situations of clinical practice, does not fit neatly into the prior categories of 
skill and practice.  This is illustrated in the auto-ethnographic accounts of Chapter 5 
describing the discovery of an ‘errant testicle’ in a hernia operation and Mr. Martino’s 
refusal to engage with his medical team.  The surgeons in these separate clinical 
episodes are forced by the form of the encounter to think and act in ways that are not 
necessarily subscribed to by the formal bodies of knowledge and practice. 
The difference between providing official care and real care demonstrates how the 
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immanent nature of clinical relations and practices is not captured by the 
hylomorphism of established modes of being and acting.  The difficulty arises when 
surgeons are confronted by contingent events which have neither been described nor 
discussed by the official manuals of practice.  These documents and ways of acting, 
do not embrace the affective experiences that surround the singular happenings of 
putting approved skills into practice.  This is exemplified by the ‘speechlessness of 
practice’ that characterizes my experience at the organ procurement, an encounter in 
which I am unable to demonstrate the surgical skills that I have come to acquire.  
Such responses and reactions represent the local immanence of clinical events of 
practice.   
How then are clinicians to be guided and supervised through the uncertainty of clinical 
events?  I have argued using the theories of Whitehead, Deleuze and Simondon for a 
recognition of the intrinsic form that is immanent to all events of practice.  That is, as 
an event of practice unfolds, the clinician prehends or takes account of the event by 
grasping the inherent form of the clinical encounter.  The form of the encounter 
emerges through the relations that evolve and develop through processes of intra-
action (Barad, 2007) and interaction, creating complex layers of experiencing within 
the event of practice.   
Therefore, in conceiving effective pedagogic strategies and practices, it is imperative 
to consider how best to support learners as they grapple with prehending the form of 
events of practice.  This struggle to grasp the event in a way that becomes meaningful 
to them either within the encounter or after it, may exceed the resources of knowledge 
and skill that they are already familiar with (because it has been taught previously or 
experienced in the past).  For surgical teachers, this may constitute a contemplation of 
the ways in which a trainer can draw alongside a learner engaged in the thisness of 
practice, to attempt to ‘see’ and understand how the form of the learning encounter 
arises for them.  Atkinson (2008, 2011) describes this principle as a ‘pedagogy 
against the state’: it resists the traditional practices that normalise learning encounters 
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according to established categories of thinking and doing, otherwise regarded as 
transcendent values.  This stance allows the learner and teacher to respond in ways 
that reflect what matters to them in the encounter, and so embrace the differences 
that emerge from specific events of practice.   Put another way, this approach 
supports an engagement with the form that is immanent to an encounter of practice.  
c) Power-Knowledge: official training manuals and practice 
In Chapter 5 and 6 I used Foucault’s theory of power-knowledge (as well as insights 
from Butler and Bourdieu) to examine how training materials and policy 
documentation pedagogised the surgical trainee and trainer.  I concluded, using the 
example of how a trainee’s operative practice was scrutinised, that a learner’s ability 
to operate is not viewed as an intrinsic capacity that can be discovered or developed.  
Even though, this may appear to be the objective of the technical teaching and 
assessment exercise.  Instead, I suggested that the present paradigm of operative 
training constituted a particular discursive practice: it identified surgical skill in ways 
that inhibit or neglect to acknowledge other representations or signifiers of technical 
skill.   
This becomes problematic within an educational and training context, if such a 
discursive practice occludes alternative signifiers of ability, which may constitute how 
operative practice matters to trainees and therefore, how such forms of mattering may 
constitute personal forms of governance that affect how they learn. 
This analytic finding was not asserted to diminish the very important role that 
established foundational practices provide in training surgeons to operate competently 
and safely.  Rather, what I advocate is an increased awareness of how curricular 
strategies can mould training practices to reflect exclusively, established components 
of skill which are considered critical to forming competence.  The subjectivities of both 
trainee and trainer emerge from submitting (unknowingly) to the forms of power and 
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governance inherent in this conception of operative practice and which also appear as 
obvious and natural processes.   
d)  An ethics of immanence 
At the heart of this thesis is the finding of a necessary tension between an ethics of 
actual practice, contrasted with an ethics of transcendence.  The former, I have 
contended emerges from real events of clinical practice.  In these encounters, a 
doctor has to make decisions in the ‘here and now’ according to the contingencies of 
the actual doctor-patient relations: an immanent ethics of clinical practice.  An ethics 
of transcendence, refers to the forms of surgical care, set out in terms of clinical 
guidelines and ethical codes.  Although they provide guidance for a doctor, they are 
not situated in actual events of practice and as such, I have argued, can be ineffective 
when confronted by problems in the ‘here and now’ of practice.  In addition, I have 
shown that even when formal guidance is clear and applicable, surgeons may not 
follow the approved practices due to various ‘barriers’ (personal beliefs, the conflicting 
demands of busy practice) that preclude this.  This was demonstrated in Chapter 5 in 
the tale of the unusual hernia operation and in Chapter 6 in Eleanor’s second account 
of a woman in pain.   
To explore how surgeons actualise practice and to theorise on how the structurisation 
of medical practice can enable and also control actualisations of surgical practice, I 
applied Deleuze’s concepts on the virtual-actual dimension and his notion of ethics.   
Virtual difference has the power to become in unforeseen ways, always more 
than this actual world and not limited by its already present flow (Colebrook, 
2002: 96). 
This concept of learning, is consistent with my assertions about how events of 
practice come to matter to a learner.  Deleuze proposes that real learning (Atkinson, 
2008) is a process in which a subject expands on their capacities through an 
engagement with virtual potentialities, or ways of thinking, being and doing that are 
yet to emerge and become concrete.  This echoes the earlier point I made about 
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surgical pedagogies attempting to include strategies that allow a teacher to ‘draw 
alongside’ a learner.  Such an approach complements the teaching of important 
foundational knowledge and skills as well as enhancing local flows of learning that can 
extend, enable and strengthen a learner in practice.   
Deleuze advocates a conception of ethics as a set of facultative rules that ‘evaluate 
what we do according to the immanent mode of existence that it implies’ (Smith, 2012: 
176).  This theory of ethics exceeds moral concerns and instead precipitates the 
following questions; “what can I do, what am I capable of doing?” rather than “what 
must I do?” (which refers to issues of morality).  Therefore, the mode of being is 
determined through a subject’s power to act in an encounter which is influenced by 
relations of affectivity, or otherwise through the inability of the subject to act to their 
fullest capacity.  A surgical pedagogy grounded in an onto-ethics of immanence, is a 
concept of learning and teaching in clinical environments that is premised on notions 
of becoming (individuation) and difference within local flows of events of practice.  It 
promotes an ethics of practice which encompasses transcendent frameworks of how 
doctors should and shouldn’t behave (as prescribed in guidelines), and then proceeds 
to exceed these confines.  This is not to devalue the assimilated values and practices 
of surgery but to draw attention to how they may be limited in dealing fully with the 
complexities of actual clinical practice.   
An ethics of immanence, recognises the ideas, actions and subjects that emerge from 
the dynamic flows of local experiences of practice.  Put another way, an immanent 
ethics of surgical practice is grounded in the thisness or ‘here and now’ of an 
encounter of clinical practice: it may trigger the following question, ‘what does it mean 
to provide care for this patient?’  Such a response is consistent with the nature of 
entangled practices and subjectivities that constitute the worlds of surgical practice 
and which I have sought to illustrate in the arguments presented in this thesis.  
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7.6  Limitations and future directions of the study 
I have identified four areas in the research strategy which have implications for how 
the findings can be interpreted.  These include; researcher bias, the selection of 
interview participants, the choice of training/policy documentation, the challenges of 
examining experience, trainer experiences, the use of other methodologies to broaden 
the data collection further. 
a)  Researcher bias 
My aim in devising this research investigation was to explore new and alternative 
ways of examining the learning experiences of surgeons engaged in actual events of 
practice.  In particular, I derived my hypothesis from personal struggles with surgical 
training and practice.  I was also highly motivated, when moving institutions from an 
organization of science and technology to a liberal arts school, to use philosophical 
discourse and social theory to construct both the research strategy and method.  It 
could therefore be argued that what I have presented in the preceding pages of this 
thesis constitutes my personal prior beliefs and concerns with surgical training.  Thus, 
this thesis is not an ‘objective’ work of research, but rather an elaboration of my 
personal ideologies of practice.  Even though, I argue in this thesis for a relaxation of 
the established transcendent ideologies of knowledge and skill.  As such what I have 
presented is a particular view of surgical practice rather than committing to the 
‘unknown’ adventure of research.   
I would counteract this criticism by first asserting that it is my personal experiences of 
clinical practice that have helped to draw attention to the ‘reality’ of events of practice, 
which I return to continually in this thesis.  These examples of actual clinical practice, 
are a departure from the sterile environments devoid of entanglements which are 
created by the official manuals and policies of practice.  However, all the interviewees 
provided accounts of actual practice which described similar realities: the entangled 
subjectivities and complexities embedded in real events of practice.  These aspects of 
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practice have been written about extensively in various fictions and non-fictions and 
are not in doubt (Becker, 1976; Bosk, 2003; Weston, 2009; Kalanith, 2015) 
I stated in the methodology chapter that my intention in analysing the interview data 
was not to prove the veracity of the accounts nor identify objective truths about 
training practices.  I was concerned with what aspects of clinical encounters came to 
matter to the individual surgeons in their reflections on practice.   
As such this study is not limited by concerns with the accuracy of the data.  However, 
by applying philosophical concepts to narratives of experiencing what I have 
attempted to identify includes understanding the complexities that constitute 
actualisations of clinical practice by surgeons and what factors are implicated in how a 
surgeon comes to think and act in the thisness of encounters.  My purpose is not to 
mistreat or misunderstand established modes of practice.  Instead, I hope that the 
findings of this study challenge the conservative views of assimilated ideologies and 
practices in surgical education and thinking, with the aim of broadening our concepts 
of how surgeons come to construct meaning in and of clinical practice which is both 
an uncertain and risky venture.   
I would ask that readers of this thesis, be they surgeons or from a non-medical 
background, ask how the themes, issues and outcomes identified in the findings of 
this study, resonate with their own experiences of work.  Be that in clinical 
environments or other professional environs.   
b)  The selection of interview participants 
The greatest challenge I met with in the data collection process, was in ‘securing’ 
participants for the study.  The complicated and busy schedules of NHS surgeons 
made it particularly difficult for candidates to guarantee that they would be available to 
interview at the agreed time and place.  As a consequence, the majority of interviews 
were conducted over skype.  This created a ‘magpie’ like opportunistic approach to 
interviewing—if a surgeon was suddenly free to chat, I encouraged them to call me 
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and I organized my interview schedule to fit around this.  Some of the surgeons who 
made the effort to call me and commit to the interview process may have done so 
because they had a prior interest in education or were keen to ‘rant’ about their 
experiences in surgery.   
For these reasons, the breadth and range of surgeon interviewees was limited to a 
network of London surgeons, except for one surgical trainee based in the South West 
of England.  I suspect that the demands and pressures of training and practicing in 
London may be very different from the experiences of those surgeons working in other 
cities and towns of the United Kingdom.  This difference in experience may contribute 
to alternative ways of thinking and reflecting on practice.  For example, the study 
strategy may have been strengthened, by opportunities to interview surgeons from 
northern towns in England as well as from the devolved countries that constitute the 
United Kingdom, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.   
In particular, the ways in which national health policy impacts clinicians working in 
other parts of the country would have been interesting to examine.  There may be 
variations in how the internal structures of medical practice, such as waiting lists, 
patient volume, hospital funding etc. affect the ways in which surgeon practice is 
actualized and controlled.     
c)  Absence of a longitudinal study 
In the methodology chapter I explained how I came to choose senior trainees and 
junior consultants as my participants.  These recounted experiences of practice are 
static in that they are reflected on by individuals who are engaged in practice at 
definite time points.  That is, a senior trainee reflects on their earlier practice but from 
the perspective of a senior trainee, she is not able to comment on the experience of 
practice as a junior trainee or as a senior consultant.  The passage of time may alter 
the way in which events are reflected on, so that they come to attain differing levels of 
significance or are remembered in other ways.   
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It would have been useful to explore the effect of time on how views of experiencing 
clinical events change.  It is possible that more experienced surgeons may develop 
expanded insights with time, or that junior trainees with much less experience, have a 
more insightful view of practice because clinical medicine is still fresh and new to 
them.  As a consequence, the novice surgeon is more thoughtful or creative in the 
way he thinks about practice.   
Further investigations into experiencing in clinical environments could explore how 
events of practice are viewed at different stages of training by collecting surgeons 
from a variety of training positions.  It may also be useful to consider how to organize 
a study that followed a few surgeons over a period of time, to gauge how their views, 
thoughts and actions in events of practice evolve, change or develop as they 
accumulate more experiences.     
Such a study may identify different factors that enable and control actualisations of 
practice.  It may also find that the impact of affective thinking varies with time.  
Investigating why this may be could have implications for how pedagogic strategies 
are developed, depending on the year of training of the surgeon.   
d)  Training/policy documentation 
When I first investigated the scope of documentation pertinent to surgical training, I 
found that a discourse analysis of training materials alone would constitute a PhD 
project in itself.  For example, there are at least ten assessments of practice used to 
measure and evaluate a trainee’s performance.  Therefore, it was difficult to discretely 
identify a few documents that I could examine closely and thoroughly.  In addition, 
each document itself referred to many other prior documents that had been used to 
construct the text I was interested in.     
The documents I chose to analyse were picked because they were official 
representations of how practice was conceived.  However, I am aware that there are 
numerous other documents that inform how a surgeon develops their practice.  An 
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example includes an SUI form (serious untoward incident) which is used by a clinician 
to document an adverse event of practice that he has been involved in.  Another 
example is the surgical consent form that a patient signs when agreeing to undergo a 
surgical procedure.  These examples of documentation identify, position and regulate 
the subjectivities of both doctor and patient in particular ways.  Therefore, they are 
implicated in how doctors develop their practice and the ideas and experiences of 
clinical encounters that emerge as a consequence.     
e)  Trainer experiences 
This study prioritises the experience of learners in surgery over those of the surgical 
trainer.  The main reason for this is that I had to focus the scope of the research in 
one or two areas which were manageable from a data collection stance and could 
therefore be investigated within the constraints of a single PhD study.  In the opening 
narrative of the organ procurement, I describe my interaction with Vinny, my mentor in 
the surgery.  In an ideal research scenario, I would have gathered an account from 
Vinny about how he reflected on the episode and contrasted this with my trainee 
narrative.  This may provide a dual perspective of the same learning encounter, which 
could have been unpacked to identify how teachers and learners engage and interact 
with the thisness of uncertain practice.   
f)  The use of other methodologies to broaden the data collection  
I used a mixed methodology (interview analysis, document review and 
autoethnography) to improve the integrity and applicability of the results 
(Schifferdecker and Reed, 2009).  Originally, I had planned to organize focus groups 
to pose collective questions to surgeons, to explore how ideas and thoughts may be 
shared as well as to collaborate the findings.  However, the difficulty of scheduling 
agreed upon times for the interviews made this mode of enquiry impossible.   
I suggest that a future extension of this study would be to observe the ideas and 
intensities of experience that emerge from routine shared encounters of practice, such 
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as departmental meetings in hospitals.  An example of this is the Morbidity and 
Mortality meeting that all surgeons attend once a month, to discuss the complications 
and deaths that have occurred in the department over the previous four weeks.  
These are considered important educational meetings where colleagues can learn 
from each others’ experiences and reflections.   
From an educational stand point, I would have liked to include ethnographic data from 
observing a trainer and trainee engage in an assessment of practice such as the 
reflective exercise of a case based discussion.  Another interesting ethnographic 
exercise would have been to observe an ARCP (Annual Record of Competence 
Progression) of a surgical trainee.  In this panel interview, a trainee’s progress is 
reviewed by a panel of surgical educators to make an assessment about the 
candidate’s fitness to proceed with training.   
7.6  Modes Of Mattering And Becoming: The Wider Implications Of 
The Research Findings  
This thesis explores how events of clinical practice come to matter to surgeons.  
Through a process of mattering, events of practice make sense and become 
meaningful for the individual practitioner.  As such, encounters with clinical practice 
can have the effect of producing ontological and epistemological growth.  Modes of 
becoming and modes of being (ethics) emerge from an engagement with clinical 
events of practice.  The question arises therefore, as to how to create surgical 
pedagogies that are sensitive to the different modes of mattering?  How can surgical 
practices inherit the specific modes of mattering of the entities with which they are 
entangled?  
Surgery is distinguished as a craft specialty characterised by ‘doing’ in response to 
what is seen, felt and anticipated.  It is a discipline that relies on visual and tactile 
stimuli to provide information to the surgeon both in operative and non-operative 
(clinics, wards) environments.  The potent odours, the graphic and acute images of 
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flesh and viscera, the differing textures and vivid colours of tissues all combine to elicit 
strong sensations and responses.  These experiences constitute a whole world of 
affects and senses which the trainee can also encounter as a sense of apprehension.  
I assert in this thesis that these entities, the affective responses they spark, and the 
intra actions that form and develop between them, come together in a dynamic mode 
of becoming.  This composes the doctor patient relation in an event of practice.   
The paradoxical challenge to surgical practice is to resist thinking about these entities 
as detached, discrete components of experience but at the same time being careful to 
consider their independent and differential modes of existence. Therefore, clinical 
practices must develop ways of responding to the dynamic problem of different modes 
of mattering that can coexist in a clinical encounter and which compose the becoming 
of an event of practice.  The onto-ethical concern that arises from these processes of 
mattering is how to respond in the thisness of a clinical encounter in ways that attend 
to the heterogenous obligations posed by the many entities (the human and non-
human actants in the situation).  An example is the ‘problematic existence’ of Mr. 
Cunningham, the transplant recipient I describe at the beginning of this chapter, whom 
I operate on.  In the environment of the operating theatre, his ‘stubborn’ existence as 
a human being with past experiences and a life story are reduced (unavoidably) to the 
medical parameters that constitute his being as a patient.   
What I advocate in this thesis, is an approach to clinical practice that is first concerned 
with recognizing and understanding the various modes of mattering that develop and 
form within an event of practice.  Second, a consideration of how the differential 
modes of mattering determine how the demand of the patient’s mode of being 
institutes itself in the clinical situation so that his ‘stubborn existence’ is captured 
beyond the medical parameters of his clinical status.  This has implications for how 
the surgeon becomes ‘response-able’ (Harraway, 2008: 88).  This is the challenge of 
an immanent ethics of clinical practice, to be situated in relation to a complex of 
entities (Whatmore, 1997).   
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7.7  Summary  
In this thesis, I argue for a surgical education that exceeds the traditions of the original 
craft of surgery.  Instead, I advocate for pedagogies of surgical training that are 
liberated from the tyranny of competency based training and meticulous assessments.  
The latter are necessary to develop a system of medical training that is accountable 
and transparent.  Its purpose is to assure the competence and professionalism of 
doctors, thereby ensuring that patients receive the best care and their welfare is 
prioritised.   
However, I propose an educational project that remains sensitive to these existing 
concerns but, reconfigures learning as a responsiveness to the haecceities of 
practice.  In this conception of learning, surgical training is grounded in a metaphysics 
of immanence and becoming.  This would create an alternative yet complementary 
epistemology of clinical practice.  One that is concerned with exploring how to 
cultivate connections between the mode of mattering of an entity and the mode of 
responding of the practice.  In surgical practice, this is best illustrated by the 
affectations triggered within a clinical encounter.  First, how the encounter with 
practice affects a surgeon: in terms of how she is obligated by the human and non-
human actants in the encounter.  Second, how the encounter itself is affected by the 
surgeon’s obligatory positions.   
Engaging an epistemology of practice through an ethics of response-ability is a way of 
being accountable for what emerges from the uncertainty of clinical practice.   
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Modernising Medical Careers (MMC) Inquiry reports 
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Excerpts from Michael Eraut’s (2008) investigation of Intercollegiate 
Surgical Curriculum Project (ISCP) 
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Excerpts from the public inquiry led by Sir Robert Francis (2013) into 
MidStaffordshire NHS foundation trust  
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Appendix B Interview Materials 
 
 
Interview Questions 
 
1. ‘Warm up’ Questions 
• Tell me about your duties in your current role? 
• What do you enjoy about the job?  What do you dislike about your work? 
2. Beliefs and values around being a surgeon and practicing surgery 
• What is a surgeon in your opinion?   
• What is important to you in this job?  
• Do you feel the training of surgeons reflects these important aspects of the 
job, as perceived by you? 
3.  Ontological aspects of training 
(Aim: to gather an insight into whether the training experiences of surgeons are 
aligned with the official curriculum of surgery.) 
• What are your expectations as a trainee?  Are these realistic, in your opinion?   
• What do you think the purpose of surgical education/training should be?  Do 
you feel that in your experience, it achieves these goals? 
4.  Events of clinical practice  
(Aim:  to explore the ways in which trainees develop knowledge through affective 
experiencing of events of clinical practice.) 
• How do you prepare for your day-to-day practice?  What resources did you 
use - books, simulation labs, peer groups, talking things over with colleagues, 
watching senior surgeons, personal experiences of practice? 
• Were there moments/ events in your training that were powerful, because they 
taught you something that you had not prepared for or anticipated? 
• Has this event or any other transformed the way you practice?  Perhaps you 
have changed something about the way you conduct yourself in practice or 
perhaps in the way you engage with others?   
5.  Concluding thoughts 
• Let’s imagine that you have retired from professional practice and spend your 
days sipping cocktails on a luxury island - how would you reflect back on your 
training years?  What lessons would you pass on to future trainees?  
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Surgeon interview letters 
Dear Surgeon 
Re:  Participation in Research Interviews  
Further to my phone call yesterday, I write to thank you for kindly agreeing to 
participate in a research interview as part of my PhD studies.   
I am studying towards a PhD in Education which is being supervised by Professor 
Dennis Atkinson (d.atkinson@gold.ac.uk) at Goldsmith’s College, University of 
London.  The aim of the study is to investigate the training experiences of 
surgeons.  One of the methods employed in this study is the use of semi-
structured interviews to explore how learning happens for a surgeon and how this 
affects their role as trainers and teachers of surgery. The study focuses on the 
experiences and views of junior consultant staff (defined as consultant surgeons 
appointed within the last 5 years) across the surgical specialties (vascular, colo-
rectal, breast, urology, neurosurgery, Orthopaedics).   
The final objective of this study is to use the data gathered from the interviews 
(and other sources - document analysis, ethnographic field work, trainee focus 
group interviews) to inform the shape and design of future surgeon education 
models. 
The interviews will last 45 minutes (max) and will be recorded and subsequently 
transcribed.  Strict confidentiality is guaranteed.  The interviews will be analysed 
by myself and anonymized before being presented in the thesis. Should you wish 
to peruse your transcribed interview, please let me know and I shall forward a 
copy to you.  Please note that I may have to contact you again if, during the 
transcription exercise, I notice things that need further clarification.  I hope this is 
acceptable to you. 
I would be grateful if you would complete the enclosed profile document, prior to 
the interview.   
I know time is precious in our busy work environment but I do hope that the 
experience will be enjoyable, stimulating and useful for both of us.   
Thank you again! 
Yours sincerely,  
 350 
Surgeon profile document 
 
Surname:        First name:    
    
 
Present appointment (date & hospital) : 
 
 
Areas of Specialty (e.g. general, vascular, colorectal, laparoscopy etc.): 
 
Research Interests: 
 
Teaching Qualifications: 
(e.g. Masters, training the trainers, postgraduate certificate etc..) 
 
POSTGRADUATE teaching commitments:       
  
 
POSTGRADUATE teaching hours/wk: 
(please list weekly/monthly activities) 
 
 
Was there a training period which you feel was particularly significant for you?  why? 
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Surgeon Consent Form for Research 
Dear Surgeon 
Further to my phone call yesterday, thank you for kindly agreeing to participate in my 
research which will take place from July 2015 to August 2015. This form details the 
purpose of this study, a description of the involvement required and your rights as a 
participant. 
The title of this study:   
Surgeon Education: An investigation into the ontological and ethical dimensions of 
surgical training and practice 
Introduction & Objectives: 
I (Arundathi Mahendran) am studying towards a PhD in Education which is being 
supervised by Professor Dennis Atkinson (d.atkinson@gold.ac.uk) at Goldsmith’s 
College, University of London.  The aim of the study is to investigate the training 
experiences of surgeons.  One of the methods employed in this study is the use of 
semi-structured interviews to explore how learning happens for a surgeon and how 
this affects their role as trainers and teachers of surgery. This study focuses on the 
experiences and views of junior consultant staff (defined as consultant surgeons 
appointed within the last 5 years) across the surgical specialties (vascular, colo-rectal, 
breast, urology, neurosurgery, Orthopaedics).   
The final objective of this study is to use the data gathered from the interviews (and 
other sources - document analysis, ethnographic field work, trainee focus group 
interviews) to inform the shape and design of future surgeon education models. 
Procedure: 
The interview will involve questions about your experiences as both a trainee and a 
trainer and also investigate your thoughts and opinions on surgical education.  Our 
discussion will be audio recorded to help me accurately capture your insights in your 
own words.  The recordings will only be heard by me for the purpose of this study and 
will subsequently be transcribed and analysed by myself.  If at any point during the 
interview you feel uncomfortable, I can turn off the recorder at your request.  Or if you 
don’t wish to continue, you can stop the interview at any point.   
Should you wish to have access to a transcription of the interview, please let me know 
and I will provide a copy.   
I expect to conduct only one interview; however, follow-ups may be needed for added 
clarification.  If so, I will contact you by mail/phone to request this. 
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Benefits: 
There is no direct benefit to you from taking part in this study. I hope that this research 
will inform the design and structure of surgical training models and thus benefit the 
education and practice of surgeons in the future.   
Confidentiality: 
Your interview is confidential.  Though direct quotes from you may be used in the 
study, your name and other identifying information will be kept anonymous. Should 
results of this study be published or presented, individual names and other personally 
identifiable information will not be used unless you give explicit permission.   
To minimize the risks to confidentiality, all interviewees will be identified by codes and 
there will be no public access to audio recordings of the interviews. 
When the research is completed, I may save the recordings and notes for use in 
future research conducted by myself.  I will retain these records for up to 5 years after 
the study is over.  
Compensation: 
You will not be paid for taking part in this study. 
Rights: 
Participation in research is completely voluntary.  You are free to decline to take part 
in the project.  You can decline to answer any questions and are free to stop taking 
part in the project at any time.  You also have the right to withdraw from the study at 
any time.  Should you wish to withdraw, all information you provide (including audio 
records) will be destroyed and omitted from the study.    
Questions: 
If you have any questions about this research, please feel free to contact me. I can be 
reached at 07568 321 058 or edp03am@gold.ac.uk. 
I know time is precious in our busy work environment but, I do hope that the 
experience will be enjoyable, stimulating and useful for both of us.  Thank you again! 
CONSENT: 
You will be given a copy of this consent form to keep for your own records.   
If you wish to participate in this study, please sign and date below. 
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Appendix C Interview Sample 
 
 
Transcript of an interview with Eleanor (E), a senior orthopaedics trainee 
based in London. 
 
E: I am at the beginning of my final year in Colchester doing hip and knee 
replacements and I take part in the trauma rota.  Trauma with paediatrics is what I 
hope to do as a Consultant at the Royal London hospital.  I came out to Colchester 
because it has a good reputation for operative training which is what I need at this 
moment in time to get my volumes of procedures up and my confidence.  It has been 
a really good experience as I’ve got what I needed out of it.   
AOM: What do you enjoy about being an Orthopaedic surgeon? 
E: I like being able to practically assist people, that’s the main reason why I’m an 
Orthopaedic surgeon.  If I talked about what I am naturally good at or what I tend 
towards in Medicine then I would say it’s probably more general medicine.  I like 
putting patterns together and working out what’s wrong with people.  you know one of 
my colleagues has been diagnosed with subacute bacterial endocarditis and I keep 
waking up at night thinking about it.  I made a diagnosis of open TB in a patient on the 
ward last week.  you know?  So that’s what I’m naturally good at.  But I knew very 
early on that it would be worthwhile to gain some actual skills so that I could transform 
my knowledge into a change in reality for my patients, that’s why I went into 
Orthopaedics and I think it delivers on that.   
AOM: What don’t you like about the job? 
E: The culture sometimes is a bit narrow.  You know, like we’re not interested if 
we can’t cut it.  That sort of thing.  Some of the Orthopods just are not interested if its 
not a straightforward Orthopaedic problem.  That’s because their background or 
approach is different from mine.  I think that sometimes there is an element like they 
are blokes who’ve all got sheds and black and deckers and they like that, screws, 
plates and they’re coming at it from a totally different angle to how I am.  But that’s not 
to say they’re wrong, I think they’re probably naturally a bit more adept at the old 
plates and screws practical element of it, because that’s their angle.  But I think it also 
comes potentially with an anti-intellectual, anti-complexity sometimes. 
AOM: What is life like as a trainee? 
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E: It’s pretty poor I’d say.  I was thinking today that I’ve had no life for ten years.  
Really.  The change that I get for that is not particularly a high flying career. It’s not 
like a . . . I haven’t done a PhD or published something in Nature or published 
anything at all!  Its not this stellar career, its just kind of still standing.  That’s my 
victory you know, that I’m still standing.  
AOM: How have you ‘not had a life’? 
E: Well, that’s unfair really.  Since I qualified what I mean is that I’ve been 
working really hard, 7 to 7 on a normal day, plus oncall, plus doing nights, plus doing 
weekends.  I kind of have had a single holiday most years and that’s how I try to 
remember which year was which.  And that’s when I’ve seen my friends.  Its obviously 
more intense since I’ve had children.  I never see my friends, I never speak to them 
on the phone.  There isn’t really a chance to have a life an intellectual life, a social life, 
its kind of like work, eat, not very often, bathe occasionally.  Its like a standing joke.  
My old flat mate and I used to say that when people are very ill in hospital and 
sometimes the situation is so poor that the ICU registrar may turn them down from 
going into intensive care because they just don’t have the quality of life or an 
expectation of a quality of life if they were to survive.  Anna and I used to say, if they 
knew what our quality of life was like, and you had a car accident they’d be turning 
you down.  It’s just a lack of basic . . I notice it out here because we’re in Essex and 
everyone is relaxed.   
I suppose the pace of life and the cost.  That’s the overwhelming thing, the cost of just 
surviving is really, really high.  I don’t think that is appreciated in anyway by the 
trainers, your superiors, its the sound of no hands clapping all the time.   
I imagine it’s like this in lots of jobs.  But the emotional toll. . . the work that we do 
must have a cost in terms of how draining it is.  
AOM: What made you choose Orthopaedics? 
E: Essentially it was a practical thing.  MTAS came around and you had to apply 
or you were about to become rejected from the profession.  This thing about 
diminishing value of your achievements every six months you stayed in.  So you had 
to apply to something you had a proven commitment to.  I had done a year of 
Orthopaedics and six months of everything else.  So it seemed sensible.  I spoke to 
my boss and he said to me, ‘well what attracts you to general surgery? is it the shit, 
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cancer or the fight against gravity?’  In general surgery there is a lot of end of life 
bowel surgery which is not going to go well and a lot of cancer and death.  Whereas in 
Orthopaedics there is a lot of pain and disability which can be made better.  So I 
suppose it was outcome, the quality that you could add.   
AOM: How do you find the camaraderie? 
E: In the past, it has been good, more recently not so much, partly because I’ve 
been in and out on maternity leave.  So I’m slightly out of the loop.  I find Orthopods a 
good bunch, smart, sharp even though they revel in their stupid reputation.   
AOM: On a day to day basis how does your learning develop?  Are there particular 
sources, books, evidence based medicine, colleagues? 
E: I don’t really know.  I’ve always been a bit mystified by this.  I competed to get 
a number, 12 to 1 ratio, and then I kind of naively expected that I would be trained.  
And that never really happened.  I . . my first few jobs were a mixed bag.  I worked for 
a guy who has been stopped from practicing by the GMC, that was a good learning 
experience but not a good surgical experience.  Then I worked for a bunch of people 
who did complex things which you as a junior can’t do.  Paediatric spinal surgery.  I 
was quite under-practiced as an SHO. I’m quite a diligent doctor so I was not in 
theatre, I was on the ward.  I’d sort of drift along and then go to the teaching.  The 
bosses would basically try to humiliate whoever the trainee was and the tone of it was 
sort of ‘oh my god, I can’t believe you don’t know that!’  I used to think well I’m not 
going to sit here and listen to this for six years.  So I signed up and did my exam in my 
second year for that reason.   
I thought well there’s a few things I can control, I can read the book and pass the 
exam.  But I wasn’t trained, it may not have been helped by three sets of maternity 
leave certainly.  But I’ve always worked full time but I just haven’t found essentially 
that there is much in the way of operative training going on.  The things that I’m good 
at are the things that I’ve been left to figure out myself.  There’s a list of operations 
that I can do well because I was left to do them by myself and I’ve done a lot of them.  
I did two and half years doing hip and knee and only now in the fifth job of that 
sequence have I got the experience that I need.  The anaesthetists are slow and 
discouraged and the theatre staff have low morale and low motivation and the theatre 
is hideously inefficient and the whole system is against you.  Then there is the 
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pressure of targets to get the operation done.  So if there’s space for you to be taken 
through an operation, it’s just wiped out routinely.   
AOM: So what you seem to be saying is the book learning is the exam, which is 
learning that you can do yourself, but the operative training has let you down. 
E: yes, and I think the deanery know that which is why they have introduced this 
ridiculous tick-box method.  I would have the analogy similar to what has happened to 
nursing to this country.  As it has become evident that caring has disappeared, so the 
documentation of care must be in triplicate.  I think that that’s what happened to 
training.  When training was good, nobody was documenting how many times they 
spoke to their boss and now its become evident because people must present their 
logbook at every RITA. Its becoming evident that trainees are doing absolutely 
nothing, they are just assisting.  Six years of assisting does not make you a surgeon.  
It’s obvious.  In Orthopaedics it’s expected that you do two years of post CCT 
fellowship so that’s obviously where you get trained.  But I think that it’s just a bit 
dishonest really to advertise a training number that people then compete for and then.  
What you do learn from the bosses is how to make decisions.  I’m quite good at 
saying ‘well, I don’t understand that, what’s your rationale, what’s your surgical 
strategy?’ Because at the beginning you think they just know everything and I don’t 
understand.  But because I’ve done the exam I know that they don’t know.  They do 
things a certain way because its what they’re familiar with or because he lives at 
home with his mum or some other social thing. . .they’re processing a case and it’s 
interesting to elucidate how people are making those decisions.  I think surgery is all 
decision making.  Some of it is intra-operative decision making but basically people go 
wrong when they don’t know how to make good decisions.  So I think for that reason 
it’s been very good. 
Watching people make decisions has been useful.  Seeing people’s thinking process.  
Some are very clear, others are indecisive.   
For me it’s very important that I make a decision with the patient in a cooperative 
manner. I’ve seen bosses who do that and bosses who don’t.  I just think when you’re 
talking about surgery that is not life-saving, there is no role to say to somebody you 
need this operation.  I say, my opinion is that you would benefit from this operation.  
90% chance.  I think it is a definite shared decision and I do that for all of them.  I also 
want the patient to feel that they are in the journey with me.  When things go wrong, 
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you don’t want it to be, ‘you told me to do this and now it’s gone wrong’.  That’s the 
wrong dynamic to be in.  
AOM: how have you managed with events that have come out of the blue?   
E: I was called to a trauma call and I was a second year registrar.  I opened up a 
chest having never done it before.  You have a much broader life experience of these 
extreme events than other people.  I don’t know whether this blunts you a bit.  It 
makes you a bit hard to ordinary concerns in life.  you can’t get your heart rate up a 
bit.  The spectrum for most people is much narrower and you’ve seen how expansive 
it can be.  It makes you a bit hard.  A bit emotionally blunted.  I don’t know you know.  
I remember being in a brief relationship when I was doing neurosurgery.  And this guy 
worked at Price House Waterhouse . . .he was sweet and lovely.  And he said ‘you 
just don’t care about me’.  I just said, ‘I don’t have any care left.  Of course I don’t care 
about you!  There’s nothing in here.’  I think you are literally drained and if you care 
about what you‘re doing and what you’re doing is so extreme in terms of the demands 
on your brain and your emotional resources.  You become a bit blunted but I also 
think you have not much left.   
It didn’t change my practice.  It gave me a quiet confidence.   
AOM: How did your training help you? 
E: I don’t think I’ve had much training.  The knowledge you have comes from 
medical school and you read up on things.  Your basic knowledge comes from a long 
time ago and the rest of it is experience.  
Training was not what I had expected.  You beat off all these other candidates and 
then someone would say this is how you do a knee replacement.   
AOM: What is the purpose of surgical education and training? 
E: To teach you skills.  You preselect those with the knowledge and decision 
making ability.  Then expose them to clinical practice and teach them practical skills.  
It happens in other disciplines.  The anaesthetists are slow because they’re teaching 
their SHOs to put epidurals or central lines in or whatever.  It’s just that the surgeons 
are not good at prioritising that.   
AOM: What happened to you at your annual performance review? 
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E: I was given an outcome 3, which essentially was because I hadn’t done 
enough.  They have these set numbers of things that you have to have done 
independently 40 hip replacements, 40 knee replacements . . . a big massive list of 
them.  I wasn’t anywhere near on hips or knees so I was given another six months to 
make the numbers.  I made the numbers on hips but not knees.  An outcome 3 means 
inadequate progress by the trainee.  Now there is not an outcome for inadequate 
training which is galling.  Because it’s evident that I didn’t have the opportunity to 
make up those operations.  I detailed the lengths I had gone to, to try to overcome the 
problems, like one of the bosses was away for half the week, half his list that summer, 
so he agreed that I could take on that list and do simple joints with another registrar, 
but then my another trainer forbade that because he was clinical director and it was a 
new unit and he might get scrutinised and whatever . . . No matter what I did I couldn’t 
achieve the numbers I was asked to achieve.  There was no outcome to reflect a 
placement that did not serve the purpose.   
There are other requirements for CCT like publications, audit.  I have been working 
flat out to meet all my CCT requirements.    
I did not contest it with them.  I was very angry because they spent the whole RITA 
talking to me about childcare and I said I am going to Colchester and I had agreed this 
with the boss.  And he had agreed.  In the RITA there were seven men on the panel, 
no women.  I don’t think you should go to Colchester etc… I had a conversation about 
this with a bunch of men and I thought unless you’re volunteering I’m going to 
Colchester.  They mean it well, but they’ve probably got some equality and diversity 
box that needs to be ticked off.  I therefore feel that the whole system is completely 
sexist in totally ridiculous ways.   
